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Anso
4e5ba17710
* refactor(backend): sanitize user input before logging to close CRLF injection
Adds a small sanitizeForLog helper that strips CR, LF, tab, and ASCII
control characters (0x00-0x1F, 0x7F) from a value before it is embedded
in a console.log/warn/error/debug call. Wraps every call site where a
user-controlled value (req.params, req.body, req.query, or a value
derived from them) flows into a log message.
Closes the bulk of the open CodeQL alerts in this family:
- 96 js/log-injection
- 28 js/tainted-format-string
The helper is in backend/src/utils/safeLog.ts. Routes still pre-validate
input at the request boundary; this is the second line of defense and
gives static analyzers a sanitizer they can trace through. JSON
responses, Docker filter labels, and other non-log call sites are
intentionally left unwrapped.
* refactor(backend): printf-style format strings for tainted-log call sites
CodeQL's js/tainted-format-string rule flags template literals in the first
arg of console.X when any interpolated value is user-controlled, regardless
of whether each value is sanitized inline. The canonical mitigation is to
use a static format string and pass values as positional args.
Converts the 28 flagged template literals to printf-style ("%s") format
strings, with sanitizeForLog applied to each positional arg. Also fills in
the log-injection wraps on 9 sites where a user-controlled value was
missed in the first sweep (agents, fleet, gitSources, imageUpdates,
GitSourceService).
No behavior change at runtime. Node's util.format substitutes %s tokens
identically to template-literal interpolation.
* fix(backend): wrap nodeId/snapshotId in fleet restore debug log
CodeQL flagged the unwrapped numeric args even though they cannot
contain control chars in practice. Apply the sanitizer for taint-flow
recognition.
61 lines
2.4 KiB
TypeScript
61 lines
2.4 KiB
TypeScript
import type { Request, Response, NextFunction, RequestHandler } from 'express';
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import { isDebugEnabled } from '../utils/debug';
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import { sanitizeForLog } from '../utils/safeLog';
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import type { ApiTokenScope } from '../services/DatabaseService';
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/**
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* 403 the request if it is authenticated via an API token. Many admin and
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* account-scoped endpoints reject API tokens outright; this helper
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* centralises the message and `code: 'SCOPE_DENIED'` envelope. Returns true
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* and writes the response when rejected, false otherwise; callers should
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* early-return on true.
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*/
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export function rejectApiTokenScope(req: Request, res: Response, message: string): boolean {
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if (req.apiTokenScope) {
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res.status(403).json({ error: message, code: 'SCOPE_DENIED' });
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return true;
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}
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return false;
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}
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// Scope enforcement for API tokens: restricts which endpoints a token can reach.
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const DEPLOY_ALLOWED_PATTERNS: RegExp[] = [
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/^\/api\/stacks\/[^/]+\/deploy$/,
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/^\/api\/stacks\/[^/]+\/down$/,
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/^\/api\/stacks\/[^/]+\/restart$/,
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/^\/api\/stacks\/[^/]+\/stop$/,
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/^\/api\/stacks\/[^/]+\/start$/,
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/^\/api\/stacks\/[^/]+\/update$/,
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];
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const deny = (res: Response, req: Request, error: string, scope: ApiTokenScope | 'unknown'): void => {
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if (isDebugEnabled()) console.log('[ApiTokenScope:diag] Denied:', sanitizeForLog(req.method), sanitizeForLog(req.path), 'scope:', scope);
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res.status(403).json({ error, code: 'SCOPE_DENIED' });
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};
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export const enforceApiTokenScope: RequestHandler = (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction): void => {
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const scope = req.apiTokenScope;
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if (!scope) { next(); return; } // Not an API token request
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if (isDebugEnabled()) console.log('[ApiTokenScope:diag]', sanitizeForLog(req.method), sanitizeForLog(req.path), 'scope:', scope);
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if (scope === 'full-admin') { next(); return; }
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if (scope === 'read-only') {
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if (req.method === 'GET') { next(); return; }
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deny(res, req, 'API token scope "read-only" only allows GET requests.', scope);
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return;
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}
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if (scope === 'deploy-only') {
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if (req.method === 'GET') { next(); return; }
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const fullPath = `/api${req.path}`;
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if (req.method === 'POST' && DEPLOY_ALLOWED_PATTERNS.some(p => p.test(fullPath))) {
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next();
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return;
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}
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deny(res, req, 'API token scope "deploy-only" does not allow this action.', scope);
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return;
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}
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deny(res, req, 'Unknown API token scope.', 'unknown');
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};
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