Files
sencho/docs/features
Anso 96b3c49359 fix(deploy): verify atomic-deploy backup integrity before restore (#1422)
* fix(deploy): verify atomic-deploy backup integrity before restore

Atomic deploy and the Rollback action restore a stack from a backup of
its compose file and .env. A backup truncated or corrupted at write time
(out of disk, interrupted copy) was copied back silently, overwriting a
working stack with bad content.

The backup now writes a .checksums manifest holding a SHA-256 of each
backed-up file, and a restore re-hashes every file and compares it before
touching the stack. A mismatch aborts the restore with a clear error and
leaves the live files unchanged. Backups without a manifest, and files
with no recorded checksum, are restored unverified so a rollback is never
blocked by missing integrity data.

* fix(deploy): guard backup source reads with an inline path barrier

The integrity change reads each managed file from the stack directory before
hashing it. Static analysis flags those reads because the source path derives
from the user-provided stack name and the containment check lived in a helper
it does not trace. Re-establish containment inline at each read sink, resolving
against the compose base and confirming the path stays within it, mirroring
snapshotStackFiles. Behavior is unchanged for valid stacks; the guard only
rejects a path that escapes the compose directory, which validation already
prevents.

* test(deploy): assert compose stays put when the backup .env is corrupt

Strengthen the .env-corruption test so it also mutates the live compose.yaml
and asserts it is left untouched, proving the integrity abort halts before any
file is copied back rather than relying on the backup happening to match. Also
note on the test hash oracle that it matches production for UTF-8 text fixtures.
2026-06-24 19:46:59 -04:00
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