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946db9df52
The mesh proxy-tunnel WS handler was gated on full-admin api_token scope only, so node_proxy JWTs (the credential the Add Remote Node dialog tells operators to generate via Settings -> Nodes -> Generate Token) were silently rejected with HTTP 403. Operators followed the dialog's instructions, enrolled the node cleanly, saw reachableMode='proxy' with no negative badge, opted a stack into mesh, watched the redeploy complete, and only then discovered no bytes flow. node_proxy already authorizes every /api/* surface on the remote (deploy, exec, host console, filesystem), which is a strict superset of what the mesh proxy-tunnel does. Gating mesh more strictly was theatre, not security, and it created a UX trap with no in-product signal pointing at the scope mismatch. Change the upgrade dispatcher to accept any machine-to-machine credential: node_proxy JWT or full-admin api_token. Session cookies and restricted api_token scopes (read-only, deploy-only) remain rejected through the same paths as before. Adds positive/negative coverage in upgrade-order.test.ts for all four credential shapes so the gate stays pinned against future re-tightening. Updates user-facing copy in the mesh docs and Settings -> API Tokens description so the documented path matches the actual code. If we ever introduce a demoted node_proxy variant (audit-only, read-only fleet member), the right move is differentiated node_proxy scope claims inside the tunnel JWT (tracker F-A3), not requiring a separate token type for mesh.