Files
sencho/backend/src/__tests__/proxy-role-forwarding.test.ts
T
Anso 78a742fb44 fix: enforce the signed-in user's role on cross-node proxied requests (#1505)
Proxied requests authenticated to a remote node previously ran as admin
regardless of the originating user's role, so a non-admin using the UI
against a remote node could reach admin-only handlers there.

The forwarding primary now asserts the user's role on a trusted header
that the remote honors only for node_proxy/pilot_tunnel bearers (the same
trust model as the license tier header), and the gateway overwrites the
header on every proxied request so a client cannot smuggle it. An absent
header keeps admin for direct instance-to-instance and background service
calls; an unrecognized role fails closed to read-only.
2026-06-28 16:32:50 -04:00

218 lines
8.2 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Tests for cross-node RBAC preservation: the forwarding primary asserts the
* signed-in user's role on PROXY_ROLE_HEADER, and the remote's authMiddleware
* honors it for node_proxy / pilot_tunnel bearers instead of granting every
* proxied request blanket admin.
*
* The probe route is `GET /api/users` (admin-only, no Docker dependency). A
* forwarded non-admin role must be denied there; an absent header (a direct
* instance-to-instance / background service call) must keep admin.
*/
import { describe, it, expect, beforeAll, afterAll } from 'vitest';
import http from 'http';
import bcrypt from 'bcrypt';
import request from 'supertest';
import jwt from 'jsonwebtoken';
import {
setupTestDb,
cleanupTestDb,
loginAsTestAdmin,
TEST_JWT_SECRET,
} from './helpers/setupTestDb';
import { PROXY_ROLE_HEADER } from '../services/license-headers';
let tmpDir: string;
let app: import('express').Express;
let viewerBearer: string;
const VIEWER_USER = 'proxy-role-viewer';
beforeAll(async () => {
tmpDir = await setupTestDb();
({ app } = await import('../index'));
const { DatabaseService } = await import('../services/DatabaseService');
const db = DatabaseService.getInstance();
const hash = await bcrypt.hash('password123', 1);
db.addUser({ username: VIEWER_USER, password_hash: hash, role: 'viewer' });
const viewer = db.getUserByUsername(VIEWER_USER)!;
viewerBearer = jwt.sign(
{ username: VIEWER_USER, role: 'viewer', tv: viewer.token_version },
TEST_JWT_SECRET,
{ expiresIn: '1m' },
);
});
afterAll(() => {
cleanupTestDb(tmpDir);
});
const signToken = (payload: Record<string, unknown>, expiresIn: string | number = '1m') =>
jwt.sign(payload, TEST_JWT_SECRET, { expiresIn: expiresIn as jwt.SignOptions['expiresIn'] });
const ADMIN_ONLY = '/api/users';
// Docker-free, gated by requirePermission('stack:read'); every role carries it,
// so a 200 here proves a forwarded non-admin retained its legitimate access.
const READ_ONLY = '/api/stacks';
describe('authMiddleware - forwarded actor role (node_proxy)', () => {
it('keeps admin when no role header is present (direct service call)', async () => {
const token = signToken({ scope: 'node_proxy' });
const res = await request(app).get(ADMIN_ONLY).set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
});
it('keeps admin when the forwarded role is admin', async () => {
const token = signToken({ scope: 'node_proxy' });
const res = await request(app)
.get(ADMIN_ONLY)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
.set(PROXY_ROLE_HEADER, 'admin');
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
});
it('denies an admin-only route when the forwarded role is viewer', async () => {
const token = signToken({ scope: 'node_proxy' });
const res = await request(app)
.get(ADMIN_ONLY)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
.set(PROXY_ROLE_HEADER, 'viewer');
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
});
it('denies an admin-only route when the forwarded role is deployer', async () => {
const token = signToken({ scope: 'node_proxy' });
const res = await request(app)
.get(ADMIN_ONLY)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
.set(PROXY_ROLE_HEADER, 'deployer');
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
});
it('fails closed to read-only for an unrecognized forwarded role', async () => {
const token = signToken({ scope: 'node_proxy' });
const res = await request(app)
.get(ADMIN_ONLY)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
.set(PROXY_ROLE_HEADER, 'superadmin');
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
});
it('applies the same trust to pilot_tunnel bearers', async () => {
const token = signToken({ scope: 'pilot_tunnel' });
const res = await request(app)
.get(ADMIN_ONLY)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
.set(PROXY_ROLE_HEADER, 'viewer');
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
});
it('still grants a forwarded viewer its legitimate read access', async () => {
// The fail-closed branch must not over-restrict: a forwarded viewer keeps
// stack:read, so this is a 200 rather than a blanket denial.
const token = signToken({ scope: 'node_proxy' });
const res = await request(app)
.get(READ_ONLY)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
.set(PROXY_ROLE_HEADER, 'viewer');
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
});
it('treats an unrecognized forwarded role as read-only, not zero access', async () => {
// "Fails closed to read-only" means viewer-equivalent: denied on admin
// routes (asserted above) but still allowed on stack:read reads.
const token = signToken({ scope: 'node_proxy' });
const res = await request(app)
.get(READ_ONLY)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
.set(PROXY_ROLE_HEADER, 'superadmin');
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
});
});
describe('Security - actor-role header cannot be smuggled by a user session', () => {
it('ignores the role header on a cookie session (uses the DB role)', async () => {
const cookie = await loginAsTestAdmin(app);
// A browser session that tries to downgrade itself (or, by the same path,
// elevate) via the header must be unaffected: the header is honored only on
// node_proxy / pilot_tunnel bearers, and the gateway overwrites it anyway.
const res = await request(app)
.get(ADMIN_ONLY)
.set('Cookie', cookie)
.set(PROXY_ROLE_HEADER, 'viewer');
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
});
it('rejects an unauthenticated request even with a role header set', async () => {
const res = await request(app).get(ADMIN_ONLY).set(PROXY_ROLE_HEADER, 'admin');
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
});
it('does not let a non-admin session elevate by setting the role header', async () => {
// The attack the header could enable: a viewer setting x-sencho-actor-role:
// admin on their own session. The user-session branch never reads the
// header (only node_proxy/pilot_tunnel does), so the DB role wins -> 403.
const res = await request(app)
.get(ADMIN_ONLY)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${viewerBearer}`)
.set(PROXY_ROLE_HEADER, 'admin');
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
});
});
// The gateway half of the fix: the forwarding primary must overwrite the actor
// role header from the authenticated session before forwarding, so a client
// cannot smuggle an elevated role through to the remote. Exercised end-to-end
// by routing a real proxied request to a loopback capture server and asserting
// the header it received.
describe('remote proxy gateway - actor role header forwarding', () => {
let captured: http.IncomingHttpHeaders | null = null;
let captureServer: http.Server;
let remoteNodeId: number;
beforeAll(async () => {
captureServer = http.createServer((req, res) => {
captured = req.headers;
res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
res.end('[]');
});
await new Promise<void>((resolve) => captureServer.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', resolve));
const port = (captureServer.address() as import('net').AddressInfo).port;
const { DatabaseService } = await import('../services/DatabaseService');
remoteNodeId = DatabaseService.getInstance().addNode({
name: 'capture-remote',
type: 'remote',
mode: 'proxy',
compose_dir: '/tmp',
is_default: false,
api_url: `http://127.0.0.1:${port}`,
api_token: 'capture-node-token',
});
});
afterAll(async () => {
await new Promise<void>((resolve) => captureServer.close(() => resolve()));
});
it('overwrites a smuggled actor-role header with the session role', async () => {
captured = null;
const res = await request(app)
.get(READ_ONLY)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${viewerBearer}`)
.set('x-node-id', String(remoteNodeId))
.set(PROXY_ROLE_HEADER, 'admin'); // smuggled
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(captured?.[PROXY_ROLE_HEADER]).toBe('viewer');
});
it('forwards the session role when no header is supplied', async () => {
captured = null;
const res = await request(app)
.get(READ_ONLY)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${viewerBearer}`)
.set('x-node-id', String(remoteNodeId));
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(captured?.[PROXY_ROLE_HEADER]).toBe('viewer');
});
});