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https://github.com/Studio-Saelix/sencho.git
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Proxied requests authenticated to a remote node previously ran as admin regardless of the originating user's role, so a non-admin using the UI against a remote node could reach admin-only handlers there. The forwarding primary now asserts the user's role on a trusted header that the remote honors only for node_proxy/pilot_tunnel bearers (the same trust model as the license tier header), and the gateway overwrites the header on every proxied request so a client cannot smuggle it. An absent header keeps admin for direct instance-to-instance and background service calls; an unrecognized role fails closed to read-only.
218 lines
8.2 KiB
TypeScript
218 lines
8.2 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Tests for cross-node RBAC preservation: the forwarding primary asserts the
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* signed-in user's role on PROXY_ROLE_HEADER, and the remote's authMiddleware
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* honors it for node_proxy / pilot_tunnel bearers instead of granting every
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* proxied request blanket admin.
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*
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* The probe route is `GET /api/users` (admin-only, no Docker dependency). A
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* forwarded non-admin role must be denied there; an absent header (a direct
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* instance-to-instance / background service call) must keep admin.
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*/
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import { describe, it, expect, beforeAll, afterAll } from 'vitest';
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import http from 'http';
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import bcrypt from 'bcrypt';
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import request from 'supertest';
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import jwt from 'jsonwebtoken';
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import {
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setupTestDb,
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cleanupTestDb,
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loginAsTestAdmin,
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TEST_JWT_SECRET,
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} from './helpers/setupTestDb';
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import { PROXY_ROLE_HEADER } from '../services/license-headers';
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let tmpDir: string;
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let app: import('express').Express;
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let viewerBearer: string;
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const VIEWER_USER = 'proxy-role-viewer';
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beforeAll(async () => {
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tmpDir = await setupTestDb();
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({ app } = await import('../index'));
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const { DatabaseService } = await import('../services/DatabaseService');
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const db = DatabaseService.getInstance();
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const hash = await bcrypt.hash('password123', 1);
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db.addUser({ username: VIEWER_USER, password_hash: hash, role: 'viewer' });
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const viewer = db.getUserByUsername(VIEWER_USER)!;
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viewerBearer = jwt.sign(
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{ username: VIEWER_USER, role: 'viewer', tv: viewer.token_version },
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TEST_JWT_SECRET,
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{ expiresIn: '1m' },
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);
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});
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afterAll(() => {
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cleanupTestDb(tmpDir);
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});
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const signToken = (payload: Record<string, unknown>, expiresIn: string | number = '1m') =>
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jwt.sign(payload, TEST_JWT_SECRET, { expiresIn: expiresIn as jwt.SignOptions['expiresIn'] });
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const ADMIN_ONLY = '/api/users';
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// Docker-free, gated by requirePermission('stack:read'); every role carries it,
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// so a 200 here proves a forwarded non-admin retained its legitimate access.
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const READ_ONLY = '/api/stacks';
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describe('authMiddleware - forwarded actor role (node_proxy)', () => {
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it('keeps admin when no role header is present (direct service call)', async () => {
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const token = signToken({ scope: 'node_proxy' });
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const res = await request(app).get(ADMIN_ONLY).set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
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expect(res.status).toBe(200);
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});
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it('keeps admin when the forwarded role is admin', async () => {
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const token = signToken({ scope: 'node_proxy' });
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const res = await request(app)
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.get(ADMIN_ONLY)
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.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
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.set(PROXY_ROLE_HEADER, 'admin');
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expect(res.status).toBe(200);
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});
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it('denies an admin-only route when the forwarded role is viewer', async () => {
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const token = signToken({ scope: 'node_proxy' });
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const res = await request(app)
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.get(ADMIN_ONLY)
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.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
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.set(PROXY_ROLE_HEADER, 'viewer');
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expect(res.status).toBe(403);
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});
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it('denies an admin-only route when the forwarded role is deployer', async () => {
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const token = signToken({ scope: 'node_proxy' });
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const res = await request(app)
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.get(ADMIN_ONLY)
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.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
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.set(PROXY_ROLE_HEADER, 'deployer');
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expect(res.status).toBe(403);
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});
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it('fails closed to read-only for an unrecognized forwarded role', async () => {
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const token = signToken({ scope: 'node_proxy' });
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const res = await request(app)
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.get(ADMIN_ONLY)
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.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
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.set(PROXY_ROLE_HEADER, 'superadmin');
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expect(res.status).toBe(403);
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});
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it('applies the same trust to pilot_tunnel bearers', async () => {
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const token = signToken({ scope: 'pilot_tunnel' });
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const res = await request(app)
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.get(ADMIN_ONLY)
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.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
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.set(PROXY_ROLE_HEADER, 'viewer');
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expect(res.status).toBe(403);
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});
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it('still grants a forwarded viewer its legitimate read access', async () => {
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// The fail-closed branch must not over-restrict: a forwarded viewer keeps
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// stack:read, so this is a 200 rather than a blanket denial.
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const token = signToken({ scope: 'node_proxy' });
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const res = await request(app)
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.get(READ_ONLY)
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.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
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.set(PROXY_ROLE_HEADER, 'viewer');
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expect(res.status).toBe(200);
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});
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it('treats an unrecognized forwarded role as read-only, not zero access', async () => {
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// "Fails closed to read-only" means viewer-equivalent: denied on admin
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// routes (asserted above) but still allowed on stack:read reads.
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const token = signToken({ scope: 'node_proxy' });
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const res = await request(app)
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.get(READ_ONLY)
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.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
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.set(PROXY_ROLE_HEADER, 'superadmin');
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expect(res.status).toBe(200);
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});
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});
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describe('Security - actor-role header cannot be smuggled by a user session', () => {
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it('ignores the role header on a cookie session (uses the DB role)', async () => {
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const cookie = await loginAsTestAdmin(app);
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// A browser session that tries to downgrade itself (or, by the same path,
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// elevate) via the header must be unaffected: the header is honored only on
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// node_proxy / pilot_tunnel bearers, and the gateway overwrites it anyway.
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const res = await request(app)
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.get(ADMIN_ONLY)
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.set('Cookie', cookie)
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.set(PROXY_ROLE_HEADER, 'viewer');
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expect(res.status).toBe(200);
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});
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it('rejects an unauthenticated request even with a role header set', async () => {
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const res = await request(app).get(ADMIN_ONLY).set(PROXY_ROLE_HEADER, 'admin');
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expect(res.status).toBe(401);
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});
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it('does not let a non-admin session elevate by setting the role header', async () => {
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// The attack the header could enable: a viewer setting x-sencho-actor-role:
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// admin on their own session. The user-session branch never reads the
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// header (only node_proxy/pilot_tunnel does), so the DB role wins -> 403.
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const res = await request(app)
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.get(ADMIN_ONLY)
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.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${viewerBearer}`)
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.set(PROXY_ROLE_HEADER, 'admin');
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expect(res.status).toBe(403);
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});
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});
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// The gateway half of the fix: the forwarding primary must overwrite the actor
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// role header from the authenticated session before forwarding, so a client
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// cannot smuggle an elevated role through to the remote. Exercised end-to-end
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// by routing a real proxied request to a loopback capture server and asserting
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// the header it received.
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describe('remote proxy gateway - actor role header forwarding', () => {
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let captured: http.IncomingHttpHeaders | null = null;
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let captureServer: http.Server;
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let remoteNodeId: number;
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beforeAll(async () => {
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captureServer = http.createServer((req, res) => {
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captured = req.headers;
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res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
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res.end('[]');
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});
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await new Promise<void>((resolve) => captureServer.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', resolve));
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const port = (captureServer.address() as import('net').AddressInfo).port;
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const { DatabaseService } = await import('../services/DatabaseService');
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remoteNodeId = DatabaseService.getInstance().addNode({
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name: 'capture-remote',
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type: 'remote',
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mode: 'proxy',
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compose_dir: '/tmp',
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is_default: false,
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api_url: `http://127.0.0.1:${port}`,
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api_token: 'capture-node-token',
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});
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});
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afterAll(async () => {
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await new Promise<void>((resolve) => captureServer.close(() => resolve()));
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});
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it('overwrites a smuggled actor-role header with the session role', async () => {
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captured = null;
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const res = await request(app)
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.get(READ_ONLY)
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.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${viewerBearer}`)
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.set('x-node-id', String(remoteNodeId))
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.set(PROXY_ROLE_HEADER, 'admin'); // smuggled
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expect(res.status).toBe(200);
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expect(captured?.[PROXY_ROLE_HEADER]).toBe('viewer');
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});
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it('forwards the session role when no header is supplied', async () => {
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captured = null;
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const res = await request(app)
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.get(READ_ONLY)
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.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${viewerBearer}`)
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.set('x-node-id', String(remoteNodeId));
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expect(res.status).toBe(200);
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expect(captured?.[PROXY_ROLE_HEADER]).toBe('viewer');
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});
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});
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