Files
sencho/backend/src/__tests__/pilot-agent-mesh-resolve.test.ts
T
Anso 0947a80cda fix(mesh): trust central for cross-node dial auth and regenerate overrides at boot (#1014)
Two bugs in the same Phase D follow-up surface, fixed together because they
both block declaring B-verify complete on the production fleet.

Cross-node mesh dials returned `denied` at the agent. The pilot's
`tcp_open` handler in `agent.ts::resolveMeshTarget` consulted the local
SQLite `mesh_stacks` table, which is no longer written to under the
post-Phase D control plane (state lives only on central). Drop the check.
The pilot tunnel JWT (scope `pilot_tunnel`, signed with central's
`auth_jwt_secret`) authenticates the caller; the same trust model already
applies to filesystem ops, exec, and container control over the same
tunnel.

Threat-model trade-off: a leaked `pilot_tunnel` JWT or compromised
central can now dial any compose-managed service on the pilot. Containers
without `com.docker.compose.project` + `com.docker.compose.service`
labels remain unreachable via this path.

`MeshService.start()` did not regenerate compose override files at boot.
After a Sencho restart with missing overrides on disk, meshed user
containers had no `extra_hosts` / `networks: [sencho_mesh]` injection
until each stack was opted out and back in. Add `regenerateAllOverrides()`
that walks every `mesh_stacks` row and re-pushes via `pushOverrideToNode`.
Best-effort: per-stack failures log to the mesh activity buffer;
`MeshService.start()` is fire-and-forget at startup so a slow remote
node does not delay boot.

Tests:
- `pilot-agent-mesh-resolve.test.ts` (new): mocks dockerode and proves
  `resolveMeshTarget` no longer returns `denied` with an empty
  `mesh_stacks` table.
- `mesh-service.test.ts`: three new cases for `regenerateAllOverrides` -
  fan-out across the fleet, skip when `senchoIp` is null, log per-stack
  warning on push failure without throwing.
2026-05-09 03:27:39 -04:00

113 lines
4.0 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* F7 regression: pilot agent's mesh dial path no longer denies based on the
* pilot's local `mesh_stacks` table. Central is the sole authority for
* mesh opt-in (state lives in central's SQLite); the pilot resolves the
* target container by Compose labels and dials it directly. The tunnel JWT
* authenticates the caller, so per-stack gating on the pilot would only
* deny legitimate central-issued dials whenever Phase D's central-only
* state model is in effect.
*/
import { afterAll, afterEach, beforeAll, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import { setupTestDb, cleanupTestDb } from './helpers/setupTestDb';
const listContainersMock = vi.fn();
vi.mock('dockerode', () => {
function Docker(this: unknown) {
(this as { listContainers: typeof listContainersMock }).listContainers = listContainersMock;
}
return { default: Docker };
});
let tmpDir: string;
let PilotAgent: typeof import('../pilot/agent').PilotAgent;
let DatabaseService: typeof import('../services/DatabaseService').DatabaseService;
interface ResolveResult {
ok: boolean;
host?: string;
port?: number;
err?: string;
}
function makeAgent(): import('../pilot/agent').PilotAgent {
return new PilotAgent({
primaryUrl: 'http://primary.invalid',
loopbackPort: 1,
initialToken: 'irrelevant',
enrolling: false,
});
}
function callResolve(agent: import('../pilot/agent').PilotAgent, stack: string, service: string, port: number): Promise<ResolveResult> {
const fn = (agent as unknown as { resolveMeshTarget: (s: string, sv: string, p: number) => Promise<ResolveResult> }).resolveMeshTarget.bind(agent);
return fn(stack, service, port);
}
beforeAll(async () => {
tmpDir = await setupTestDb();
({ PilotAgent } = await import('../pilot/agent'));
({ DatabaseService } = await import('../services/DatabaseService'));
});
afterAll(() => {
cleanupTestDb(tmpDir);
});
afterEach(() => {
listContainersMock.mockReset();
DatabaseService.getInstance().getDb().prepare('DELETE FROM mesh_stacks').run();
});
describe('PilotAgent.resolveMeshTarget (F7: trust central)', () => {
it('returns the container IP when mesh_stacks is empty (central is the gate)', async () => {
listContainersMock.mockResolvedValue([
{ NetworkSettings: { Networks: { sencho_mesh: { IPAddress: '172.30.0.5' } } } },
]);
const agent = makeAgent();
const result = await callResolve(agent, 'audit-mesh-pilot', 'echo', 9001);
expect(result.err).not.toBe('denied');
expect(result.ok).toBe(true);
expect(result.host).toBe('172.30.0.5');
expect(result.port).toBe(9001);
});
it('queries dockerode with the Compose project + service label filter', async () => {
listContainersMock.mockResolvedValue([
{ NetworkSettings: { Networks: { bridge: { IPAddress: '10.0.0.7' } } } },
]);
const agent = makeAgent();
await callResolve(agent, 'api', 'db', 5432);
expect(listContainersMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
const args = listContainersMock.mock.calls[0][0] as { filters: { label: string[] } };
expect(args.filters.label).toEqual([
'com.docker.compose.project=api',
'com.docker.compose.service=db',
]);
});
it('returns no_target (not denied) when dockerode finds no matching container', async () => {
listContainersMock.mockResolvedValue([]);
const agent = makeAgent();
const result = await callResolve(agent, 'missing', 'svc', 8080);
expect(result.ok).toBe(false);
expect(result.err).toBe('no_target');
});
it('returns agent_error (not denied) when dockerode throws', async () => {
listContainersMock.mockRejectedValue(new Error('docker daemon unreachable'));
const agent = makeAgent();
const result = await callResolve(agent, 'api', 'db', 5432);
expect(result.ok).toBe(false);
expect(result.err).toBe('agent_error');
});
});