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Anso
3386c63152
The file-explorer root containment treated the OS temp root as an ordinary host path, so a stack author with stack:edit could declare it (for example /tmp) as a bind source and browse it. Sencho writes short-lived secrets there: ComposeService and TrivyService stage a docker config.json holding resolved registry credentials, uploads spool under it, and compose/git/scan runs create working dirs there. Exposing that directory is a credible path to read admin-configured registry credentials during a pull or deploy. The same gap left env-relocatable tool paths outside containment: a Trivy binary placed at a custom TRIVY_BIN (for example under /opt, which is otherwise allowed) could be overwritten through a bind and then executed by a privileged pre-deploy scan. Treat the OS temp root and the configurable upload spool, Trivy binary, and Trivy cache as Sencho-managed areas, so a bind overlapping any of them (in either direction) is never browsable, writable, or chmodable. The managed Trivy install and cache already sit under the data dir and stay covered. Legitimate external binds outside these areas remain fully editable.