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Anso
0947a80cda
Two bugs in the same Phase D follow-up surface, fixed together because they both block declaring B-verify complete on the production fleet. Cross-node mesh dials returned `denied` at the agent. The pilot's `tcp_open` handler in `agent.ts::resolveMeshTarget` consulted the local SQLite `mesh_stacks` table, which is no longer written to under the post-Phase D control plane (state lives only on central). Drop the check. The pilot tunnel JWT (scope `pilot_tunnel`, signed with central's `auth_jwt_secret`) authenticates the caller; the same trust model already applies to filesystem ops, exec, and container control over the same tunnel. Threat-model trade-off: a leaked `pilot_tunnel` JWT or compromised central can now dial any compose-managed service on the pilot. Containers without `com.docker.compose.project` + `com.docker.compose.service` labels remain unreachable via this path. `MeshService.start()` did not regenerate compose override files at boot. After a Sencho restart with missing overrides on disk, meshed user containers had no `extra_hosts` / `networks: [sencho_mesh]` injection until each stack was opted out and back in. Add `regenerateAllOverrides()` that walks every `mesh_stacks` row and re-pushes via `pushOverrideToNode`. Best-effort: per-stack failures log to the mesh activity buffer; `MeshService.start()` is fire-and-forget at startup so a slow remote node does not delay boot. Tests: - `pilot-agent-mesh-resolve.test.ts` (new): mocks dockerode and proves `resolveMeshTarget` no longer returns `denied` with an empty `mesh_stacks` table. - `mesh-service.test.ts`: three new cases for `regenerateAllOverrides` - fan-out across the fleet, skip when `senchoIp` is null, log per-stack warning on push failure without throwing.