Files
sencho/backend/src/pilot/agent.ts
T
Anso 0947a80cda fix(mesh): trust central for cross-node dial auth and regenerate overrides at boot (#1014)
Two bugs in the same Phase D follow-up surface, fixed together because they
both block declaring B-verify complete on the production fleet.

Cross-node mesh dials returned `denied` at the agent. The pilot's
`tcp_open` handler in `agent.ts::resolveMeshTarget` consulted the local
SQLite `mesh_stacks` table, which is no longer written to under the
post-Phase D control plane (state lives only on central). Drop the check.
The pilot tunnel JWT (scope `pilot_tunnel`, signed with central's
`auth_jwt_secret`) authenticates the caller; the same trust model already
applies to filesystem ops, exec, and container control over the same
tunnel.

Threat-model trade-off: a leaked `pilot_tunnel` JWT or compromised
central can now dial any compose-managed service on the pilot. Containers
without `com.docker.compose.project` + `com.docker.compose.service`
labels remain unreachable via this path.

`MeshService.start()` did not regenerate compose override files at boot.
After a Sencho restart with missing overrides on disk, meshed user
containers had no `extra_hosts` / `networks: [sencho_mesh]` injection
until each stack was opted out and back in. Add `regenerateAllOverrides()`
that walks every `mesh_stacks` row and re-pushes via `pushOverrideToNode`.
Best-effort: per-stack failures log to the mesh activity buffer;
`MeshService.start()` is fire-and-forget at startup so a slow remote
node does not delay boot.

Tests:
- `pilot-agent-mesh-resolve.test.ts` (new): mocks dockerode and proves
  `resolveMeshTarget` no longer returns `denied` with an empty
  `mesh_stacks` table.
- `mesh-service.test.ts`: three new cases for `regenerateAllOverrides` -
  fan-out across the fleet, skip when `senchoIp` is null, log per-stack
  warning on push failure without throwing.
2026-05-09 03:27:39 -04:00

899 lines
37 KiB
TypeScript

import fs from 'fs';
import net from 'net';
import path from 'path';
import http from 'http';
import { EventEmitter } from 'events';
import jwt from 'jsonwebtoken';
import WebSocket from 'ws';
import { getSenchoVersion } from '../services/CapabilityRegistry';
import { DatabaseService } from '../services/DatabaseService';
import { NodeRegistry } from '../services/NodeRegistry';
import {
AGENT_REVERSE_ID_BASE,
BinaryFrameType,
MAX_FRAME_SIZE_BYTES,
MAX_STREAMS_PER_TUNNEL,
MeshErrCode,
PROTOCOL_VERSION,
STREAM_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS,
StreamIdAllocator,
decodeBinaryFrame,
decodeJsonFrame,
encodeBinaryFrame,
encodeJsonFrame,
wsDataToBuffer,
wsDataToString,
} from './protocol';
import { sanitizeForLog } from '../utils/safeLog';
import { isDebugEnabled } from '../utils/debug';
const RECONNECT_MIN_MS = 1_000;
const RECONNECT_MAX_MS = 60_000;
const LOOPBACK_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS = 300;
const LOOPBACK_TOKEN_REFRESH_SECONDS = 240;
const PING_INTERVAL_MS = 30_000;
const TOKEN_PATH = path.join(process.env.DATA_DIR || '/app/data', 'pilot.jwt');
/**
* Pilot agent: dials the primary via outbound WebSocket and tunnels every
* inbound frame to the agent's own loopback HTTP server (the fully-booted
* Sencho app). Because the tunnel is the only ingress, the agent needs no
* open port, no TLS certificate, and no reachable address.
*/
export function startPilotAgent(loopbackPort: number): void {
const primaryUrl = process.env.SENCHO_PRIMARY_URL;
if (!primaryUrl) {
console.error('[Pilot] SENCHO_PRIMARY_URL is required when SENCHO_MODE=pilot');
process.exit(1);
}
const enrollToken = process.env.SENCHO_ENROLL_TOKEN;
const persistedToken = readPersistedToken();
if (!enrollToken && !persistedToken) {
console.error('[Pilot] SENCHO_ENROLL_TOKEN is required on first boot');
process.exit(1);
}
const agent = new PilotAgent({
primaryUrl,
loopbackPort,
initialToken: persistedToken || enrollToken!,
enrolling: !persistedToken,
});
// Register the agent as MeshService's reverse dialer so outbound
// cross-node mesh traffic from this pilot's MeshForwarder routes via
// `tcp_open_reverse` over the existing pilot tunnel instead of trying
// to use the central-only `PilotTunnelManager.getBridge` path. Lazy
// import keeps `MeshService` outside the cold-boot critical path.
void import('../services/MeshService').then(({ MeshService }) => {
MeshService.getInstance().setReverseDialer(agent);
}).catch((err) => {
console.warn('[Pilot] reverse dialer registration failed:', sanitizeForLog((err as Error).message));
});
agent.start();
}
interface AgentOptions {
primaryUrl: string;
loopbackPort: number;
initialToken: string;
enrolling: boolean;
}
export class PilotAgent {
private readonly options: AgentOptions;
private token: string;
private backoff = RECONNECT_MIN_MS;
private ws: WebSocket | null = null;
private pingTimer?: NodeJS.Timeout;
private reconnectTimer?: NodeJS.Timeout;
private readonly httpStreams = new Map<number, { req: http.ClientRequest }>();
private readonly wsStreams = new Map<number, WebSocket>();
private readonly tcpStreams = new Map<number, MeshTcpStream>();
/** Reverse mesh streams the agent itself initiated via `tcp_open_reverse`. Keyed on the agent-allocated id. Disjoint from `tcpStreams` because those are primary-allocated and live in the lower id half. */
private readonly reverseTcpStreams = new Map<number, ReverseTcpStreamHandle>();
/** Allocator is recreated on every disconnect (`cleanupAfterDisconnect`) so a long-lived agent that reconnects many times doesn't drift up the id range. */
private reverseStreamIds = new StreamIdAllocator(AGENT_REVERSE_ID_BASE);
private readonly idleTimers = new Map<number, NodeJS.Timeout>();
private shuttingDown = false;
private readonly agentVersion: string;
/**
* Optional CA bundle read once at agent construction. Cached so that a
* later rotation (file renamed, secret rotated) does not surprise the
* agent with a process exit on the next reconnect; container restart is
* the documented way to pick up a new CA bundle.
*/
private readonly customCa: Buffer | null;
/** Cached pilot_tunnel-scoped token signed by the LOCAL Sencho's `auth_jwt_secret`, used to authenticate forwarded HTTP and WS requests against the local loopback Sencho. */
private loopbackToken: string | null = null;
private loopbackTokenIssuedAt = 0;
constructor(options: AgentOptions) {
this.options = options;
this.token = options.initialToken;
this.agentVersion = getSenchoVersion() || '0.0.0';
this.customCa = readPilotCaBundle();
}
/**
* Mint or reuse a `pilot_tunnel`-scoped JWT signed by the AGENT's local
* `auth_jwt_secret`. The central proxy strips browser cookies before it
* forwards a request through the tunnel; without an inline auth header on
* the loopback request, the agent's local `authMiddleware` would 401 every
* proxied call. The token's claim shape mirrors what the central mints at
* enrollment, so the loopback `authMiddleware` accepts it via the existing
* `pilot_tunnel` branch with no special-case bypass.
*/
private getLoopbackAuthHeader(): string | null {
const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
if (this.loopbackToken && now - this.loopbackTokenIssuedAt < LOOPBACK_TOKEN_REFRESH_SECONDS) {
return `Bearer ${this.loopbackToken}`;
}
try {
const secret = DatabaseService.getInstance().getGlobalSettings().auth_jwt_secret;
if (!secret) return null;
const nodeId = NodeRegistry.getInstance().getDefaultNodeId();
this.loopbackToken = jwt.sign({ scope: 'pilot_tunnel', nodeId }, secret, { expiresIn: LOOPBACK_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS });
this.loopbackTokenIssuedAt = now;
return `Bearer ${this.loopbackToken}`;
} catch (err) {
if (isDebugEnabled()) console.warn('[Pilot:diag] loopback token mint failed:', sanitizeForLog((err as Error).message));
return null;
}
}
private buildLoopbackHeaders(frameHeaders: Record<string, string>): Record<string, string> {
const auth = this.getLoopbackAuthHeader();
const headers: Record<string, string> = {
...frameHeaders,
host: `127.0.0.1:${this.options.loopbackPort}`,
};
if (auth) headers.authorization = auth;
return headers;
}
public start(): void {
this.connect();
process.on('SIGTERM', () => this.shutdown());
process.on('SIGINT', () => this.shutdown());
}
private shutdown(): void {
this.shuttingDown = true;
if (this.pingTimer) clearInterval(this.pingTimer);
if (this.reconnectTimer) { clearTimeout(this.reconnectTimer); this.reconnectTimer = undefined; }
try { this.ws?.close(1000, 'agent shutdown'); } catch { /* ignore */ }
}
private connect(): void {
if (this.shuttingDown) return;
const wsUrl = this.options.primaryUrl.replace(/^http/, 'ws').replace(/\/$/, '') + '/api/pilot/tunnel';
const ws = new WebSocket(wsUrl, {
headers: {
Authorization: `Bearer ${this.token}`,
'x-sencho-agent-version': this.agentVersion,
},
handshakeTimeout: 15_000,
maxPayload: MAX_FRAME_SIZE_BYTES,
// Self-signed deployments can supply an internal CA bundle via
// SENCHO_PILOT_CA_FILE; rejectUnauthorized stays true. There is
// intentionally no env var to disable TLS verification — that
// would defeat the entire trust model of the tunnel credential.
// The bundle is read once at agent construction (this.customCa);
// rotate by restarting the container.
...(this.customCa ? { ca: this.customCa } : {}),
});
this.ws = ws;
ws.on('open', () => {
// Backoff intentionally NOT reset here: a TCP-level connect that
// immediately fails the protocol handshake (incompatible version,
// bad token consumed at upgrade) would otherwise reset the
// backoff and tight-loop reconnects. The reset moves to the
// handleJsonFrame 'hello' case once we have a clean handshake.
console.log('[Pilot] Tunnel connected to', sanitizeForLog(this.options.primaryUrl));
try {
ws.send(encodeJsonFrame({
t: 'hello',
version: PROTOCOL_VERSION,
role: 'agent',
agentVersion: this.agentVersion,
}));
} catch (err) {
console.error('[Pilot] Failed to send hello:', (err as Error).message);
}
this.pingTimer = setInterval(() => {
if (ws.readyState === WebSocket.OPEN) {
try { ws.ping(); } catch { /* surfaced via error */ }
}
}, PING_INTERVAL_MS);
});
ws.on('message', (data, isBinary) => this.handleFrame(data, isBinary));
ws.on('close', (code, reason) => {
console.log('[Pilot] Tunnel closed:', code, reason?.toString?.() ?? '');
this.cleanupAfterDisconnect();
this.scheduleReconnect();
});
ws.on('error', (err) => {
console.warn('[Pilot] Tunnel error:', err.message);
// 'close' will follow; reconnect is scheduled there.
});
}
private cleanupAfterDisconnect(): void {
if (this.pingTimer) { clearInterval(this.pingTimer); this.pingTimer = undefined; }
for (const [, entry] of this.httpStreams) {
try { entry.req.destroy(); } catch { /* ignore */ }
}
this.httpStreams.clear();
for (const [, ws] of this.wsStreams) {
try { ws.close(1006, 'tunnel closed'); } catch { /* ignore */ }
}
this.wsStreams.clear();
for (const [, stream] of this.tcpStreams) {
try { stream.socket.destroy(); } catch { /* ignore */ }
}
this.tcpStreams.clear();
for (const [, handle] of this.reverseTcpStreams) {
try {
handle._dispatchError(new Error('pilot tunnel closed'));
handle._dispatchClose();
} catch { /* ignore */ }
}
this.reverseTcpStreams.clear();
// Reset the reverse allocator so a long-lived agent that
// reconnects many times doesn't drift up the id range and
// approach the wrap point unnecessarily.
this.reverseStreamIds = new StreamIdAllocator(AGENT_REVERSE_ID_BASE);
for (const [, timer] of this.idleTimers) clearTimeout(timer);
this.idleTimers.clear();
}
private streamCount(): number {
return this.httpStreams.size + this.wsStreams.size + this.tcpStreams.size + this.reverseTcpStreams.size;
}
private refreshIdleTimer(streamId: number): void {
const existing = this.idleTimers.get(streamId);
if (existing) clearTimeout(existing);
const timer = setTimeout(() => this.onStreamIdle(streamId), STREAM_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS);
this.idleTimers.set(streamId, timer);
}
private clearIdleTimer(streamId: number): void {
const timer = this.idleTimers.get(streamId);
if (timer) {
clearTimeout(timer);
this.idleTimers.delete(streamId);
}
}
private onStreamIdle(streamId: number): void {
this.idleTimers.delete(streamId);
const ws = this.ws;
const httpEntry = this.httpStreams.get(streamId);
if (httpEntry) {
try { httpEntry.req.destroy(); } catch { /* ignore */ }
this.httpStreams.delete(streamId);
if (ws) {
try { ws.send(encodeJsonFrame({ t: 'http_err', s: streamId, code: 'timeout', message: 'agent idle timeout' })); } catch { /* ignore */ }
}
return;
}
const wsEntry = this.wsStreams.get(streamId);
if (wsEntry) {
try { wsEntry.close(1001, 'idle'); } catch { /* ignore */ }
this.wsStreams.delete(streamId);
if (ws) {
try { ws.send(encodeJsonFrame({ t: 'ws_close', s: streamId, code: 1001, reason: 'idle' })); } catch { /* ignore */ }
}
return;
}
const tcpEntry = this.tcpStreams.get(streamId);
if (tcpEntry) {
try { tcpEntry.socket.destroy(); } catch { /* ignore */ }
this.tcpStreams.delete(streamId);
if (ws) {
try { ws.send(encodeJsonFrame({ t: 'tcp_close', s: streamId })); } catch { /* ignore */ }
}
return;
}
const reverseEntry = this.reverseTcpStreams.get(streamId);
if (reverseEntry) {
this.reverseTcpStreams.delete(streamId);
reverseEntry._dispatchError(new Error('agent idle timeout'));
reverseEntry._dispatchClose();
if (ws) {
try { ws.send(encodeJsonFrame({ t: 'tcp_close', s: streamId })); } catch { /* ignore */ }
}
}
}
private scheduleReconnect(): void {
if (this.shuttingDown) return;
const jitter = Math.floor(Math.random() * 500);
const delay = this.backoff + jitter;
this.reconnectTimer = setTimeout(() => {
this.reconnectTimer = undefined;
this.connect();
}, delay);
this.backoff = Math.min(this.backoff * 2, RECONNECT_MAX_MS);
}
private handleFrame(data: unknown, isBinary: boolean): void {
try {
if (isBinary) {
const buf = wsDataToBuffer(data);
if (!buf) return;
this.handleBinaryFrame(decodeBinaryFrame(buf));
} else {
const text = wsDataToString(data);
if (text == null) return;
const frame = decodeJsonFrame(text);
this.handleJsonFrame(frame);
}
} catch (err) {
// Per-frame; diag-gated to avoid log floods from a misbehaving
// primary or a malformed frame arriving in a tight loop.
if (isDebugEnabled()) console.warn('[Pilot:diag] Malformed frame from primary:', sanitizeForLog((err as Error).message));
}
}
private handleJsonFrame(frame: ReturnType<typeof decodeJsonFrame>): void {
const ws = this.ws;
if (!ws) return;
switch (frame.t) {
case 'hello': {
if (frame.version !== PROTOCOL_VERSION) {
console.error(`[Pilot] Protocol version ${sanitizeForLog(frame.version)} from primary is incompatible with agent (${PROTOCOL_VERSION}); exiting.`);
this.shuttingDown = true;
try { ws.close(1002, 'incompatible version'); } catch { /* ignore */ }
process.exit(1);
}
// Clean handshake: it is now safe to reset the reconnect
// backoff. Doing this earlier (in 'open') would let a peer
// that always rejects the handshake drive us into a tight
// reconnect loop.
this.backoff = RECONNECT_MIN_MS;
break;
}
case 'ctrl': {
if (frame.op === 'enroll_ack' && frame.payload && typeof frame.payload.token === 'string') {
this.token = frame.payload.token;
persistToken(this.token);
console.log('[Pilot] Enrollment complete; long-lived token persisted.');
}
break;
}
case 'http_req': this.onHttpReq(frame); break;
case 'http_req_end': this.onHttpReqEnd(frame.s); break;
case 'ws_open': this.onWsOpen(frame); break;
case 'ws_msg_text': this.onWsMsgText(frame.s, frame.data); break;
case 'ws_close': this.onWsClose(frame.s, frame.code, frame.reason); break;
case 'tcp_open': this.onTcpOpen(frame); break;
case 'tcp_open_ack': this.onTcpOpenAckReverse(frame); break;
case 'tcp_close': this.onTcpClose(frame.s); break;
default:
// Other frame types are primary-bound only; agent ignores.
break;
}
}
private handleBinaryFrame(frame: ReturnType<typeof decodeBinaryFrame>): void {
switch (frame.type) {
case BinaryFrameType.HttpReqBody: {
const entry = this.httpStreams.get(frame.streamId);
if (!entry) return;
try { entry.req.write(frame.payload); } catch { /* ignore */ }
this.refreshIdleTimer(frame.streamId);
break;
}
case BinaryFrameType.WsMessageBinary: {
const ws = this.wsStreams.get(frame.streamId);
if (!ws) return;
try { ws.send(frame.payload, { binary: true }); } catch { /* ignore */ }
this.refreshIdleTimer(frame.streamId);
break;
}
case BinaryFrameType.TcpData: {
if (frame.streamId >= AGENT_REVERSE_ID_BASE) {
const reverse = this.reverseTcpStreams.get(frame.streamId);
if (!reverse) return;
reverse._dispatchData(frame.payload);
this.refreshIdleTimer(frame.streamId);
return;
}
const stream = this.tcpStreams.get(frame.streamId);
if (!stream) return;
try { stream.socket.write(frame.payload); } catch { /* ignore */ }
this.refreshIdleTimer(frame.streamId);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
}
// --- HTTP dispatch (tunnel -> loopback) ---
private onHttpReq(frame: Extract<ReturnType<typeof decodeJsonFrame>, { t: 'http_req' }>): void {
const ws = this.ws;
if (!ws) return;
if (this.streamCount() >= MAX_STREAMS_PER_TUNNEL) {
try {
ws.send(encodeJsonFrame({
t: 'http_err',
s: frame.s,
code: 'agent_error',
message: 'agent stream cap reached',
}));
} catch { /* ignore */ }
return;
}
const req = http.request({
host: '127.0.0.1',
port: this.options.loopbackPort,
method: frame.method,
path: frame.path,
headers: this.buildLoopbackHeaders(frame.headers),
}, (res) => {
const outHeaders: Record<string, string> = {};
for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(res.headers)) {
if (typeof v === 'string') outHeaders[k] = v;
else if (Array.isArray(v)) outHeaders[k] = v.join(', ');
}
try {
ws.send(encodeJsonFrame({
t: 'http_res',
s: frame.s,
status: res.statusCode || 200,
headers: outHeaders,
}));
} catch { /* ignore */ }
this.refreshIdleTimer(frame.s);
res.on('data', (chunk: Buffer) => {
try { ws.send(encodeBinaryFrame(BinaryFrameType.HttpResBody, frame.s, chunk), { binary: true }); } catch { /* ignore */ }
this.refreshIdleTimer(frame.s);
});
res.on('end', () => {
try { ws.send(encodeJsonFrame({ t: 'http_res_end', s: frame.s })); } catch { /* ignore */ }
this.httpStreams.delete(frame.s);
this.clearIdleTimer(frame.s);
});
res.on('error', () => {
try { ws.send(encodeJsonFrame({ t: 'http_err', s: frame.s, code: 'bad_response', message: 'upstream error' })); } catch { /* ignore */ }
this.httpStreams.delete(frame.s);
this.clearIdleTimer(frame.s);
});
});
req.on('error', (err) => {
try {
ws.send(encodeJsonFrame({
t: 'http_err',
s: frame.s,
code: 'agent_error',
message: err.message || 'agent request failed',
}));
} catch { /* ignore */ }
this.httpStreams.delete(frame.s);
this.clearIdleTimer(frame.s);
});
this.httpStreams.set(frame.s, { req });
this.refreshIdleTimer(frame.s);
}
private onHttpReqEnd(streamId: number): void {
const entry = this.httpStreams.get(streamId);
if (!entry) return;
try { entry.req.end(); } catch { /* ignore */ }
this.refreshIdleTimer(streamId);
}
// --- WebSocket dispatch (tunnel -> loopback) ---
private onWsOpen(frame: Extract<ReturnType<typeof decodeJsonFrame>, { t: 'ws_open' }>): void {
const ws = this.ws;
if (!ws) return;
if (this.streamCount() >= MAX_STREAMS_PER_TUNNEL) {
try {
ws.send(encodeJsonFrame({
t: 'ws_reject',
s: frame.s,
status: 503,
message: 'agent stream cap reached',
}));
} catch { /* ignore */ }
return;
}
const target = `ws://127.0.0.1:${this.options.loopbackPort}${frame.path}`;
const client = new WebSocket(target, {
headers: this.buildLoopbackHeaders(frame.headers),
maxPayload: MAX_FRAME_SIZE_BYTES,
});
client.on('open', () => {
try { ws.send(encodeJsonFrame({ t: 'ws_accept', s: frame.s, headers: {} })); } catch { /* ignore */ }
this.wsStreams.set(frame.s, client);
this.refreshIdleTimer(frame.s);
});
client.on('message', (data, isBinary) => {
if (isBinary) {
try { ws.send(encodeBinaryFrame(BinaryFrameType.WsMessageBinary, frame.s, wsDataToBuffer(data) ?? Buffer.alloc(0)), { binary: true }); } catch { /* ignore */ }
} else {
try { ws.send(encodeJsonFrame({ t: 'ws_msg_text', s: frame.s, data: wsDataToString(data) ?? '' })); } catch { /* ignore */ }
}
this.refreshIdleTimer(frame.s);
});
client.on('close', (code, reason) => {
try { ws.send(encodeJsonFrame({ t: 'ws_close', s: frame.s, code, reason: reason?.toString?.() })); } catch { /* ignore */ }
this.wsStreams.delete(frame.s);
this.clearIdleTimer(frame.s);
});
client.on('error', () => {
try { ws.send(encodeJsonFrame({ t: 'ws_reject', s: frame.s, status: 502, message: 'agent websocket failed' })); } catch { /* ignore */ }
this.wsStreams.delete(frame.s);
this.clearIdleTimer(frame.s);
});
}
private onWsMsgText(streamId: number, data: string): void {
const ws = this.wsStreams.get(streamId);
if (!ws) return;
try { ws.send(data); } catch { /* ignore */ }
this.refreshIdleTimer(streamId);
}
private onWsClose(streamId: number, code: number, reason?: string): void {
const ws = this.wsStreams.get(streamId);
if (!ws) return;
try { ws.close(code, reason); } catch { /* ignore */ }
this.wsStreams.delete(streamId);
this.clearIdleTimer(streamId);
}
// --- Sencho Mesh TCP dispatch (tunnel -> Compose service container) ---
//
// Central is the sole authority for mesh opt-in (state lives in central's
// SQLite mesh_stacks table). The pilot resolves a target by Compose
// container labels and dials directly. The tunnel JWT (scope
// 'pilot_tunnel') gates the WS upgrade itself, so any tcp_open frame on
// an open tunnel is trusted to originate from central.
private async onTcpOpen(frame: Extract<ReturnType<typeof decodeJsonFrame>, { t: 'tcp_open' }>): Promise<void> {
const ws = this.ws;
if (!ws) return;
if (this.streamCount() >= MAX_STREAMS_PER_TUNNEL) {
try {
ws.send(encodeJsonFrame({ t: 'tcp_open_ack', s: frame.s, ok: false, err: 'agent_error' }));
} catch { /* ignore */ }
return;
}
const target = await this.resolveMeshTarget(frame.stack, frame.service, frame.port);
if (!target.ok) {
try {
ws.send(encodeJsonFrame({ t: 'tcp_open_ack', s: frame.s, ok: false, err: target.err }));
} catch { /* ignore */ }
return;
}
const socket = net.createConnection({ host: target.host, port: target.port });
socket.setTimeout(MESH_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_MS);
const entry: MeshTcpStream = { socket, accepted: false };
this.tcpStreams.set(frame.s, entry);
this.refreshIdleTimer(frame.s);
const sendAck = (ok: boolean, err?: MeshErrCode) => {
try { ws.send(encodeJsonFrame({ t: 'tcp_open_ack', s: frame.s, ok, err })); } catch { /* ignore */ }
};
socket.once('connect', () => {
entry.accepted = true;
socket.setTimeout(0);
sendAck(true);
this.refreshIdleTimer(frame.s);
});
socket.on('data', (chunk: Buffer) => {
try {
ws.send(encodeBinaryFrame(BinaryFrameType.TcpData, frame.s, chunk), { binary: true });
} catch { /* ignore */ }
this.refreshIdleTimer(frame.s);
});
socket.on('timeout', () => {
if (entry.accepted) return;
entry.accepted = true;
sendAck(false, 'unreachable');
this.tcpStreams.delete(frame.s);
this.clearIdleTimer(frame.s);
try { socket.destroy(); } catch { /* ignore */ }
});
socket.on('error', (err) => {
if (!entry.accepted) {
entry.accepted = true;
sendAck(false, 'unreachable');
this.tcpStreams.delete(frame.s);
this.clearIdleTimer(frame.s);
return;
}
console.warn('[Pilot] tcp stream error:', sanitizeForLog(err.message));
if (this.tcpStreams.delete(frame.s)) {
this.clearIdleTimer(frame.s);
try { ws.send(encodeJsonFrame({ t: 'tcp_close', s: frame.s })); } catch { /* ignore */ }
}
});
socket.on('close', () => {
if (this.tcpStreams.delete(frame.s)) {
this.clearIdleTimer(frame.s);
try { ws.send(encodeJsonFrame({ t: 'tcp_close', s: frame.s })); } catch { /* ignore */ }
}
});
}
private onTcpClose(streamId: number): void {
// Reverse stream (agent-initiated): primary is closing the
// upstream half. Tear down the local socket the agent's
// MeshForwarder handed us via openMeshTcpStream.
if (streamId >= AGENT_REVERSE_ID_BASE) {
const handle = this.reverseTcpStreams.get(streamId);
if (!handle) return;
this.reverseTcpStreams.delete(streamId);
this.clearIdleTimer(streamId);
handle._dispatchClose();
return;
}
const entry = this.tcpStreams.get(streamId);
if (!entry) return;
this.tcpStreams.delete(streamId);
this.clearIdleTimer(streamId);
try { entry.socket.destroy(); } catch { /* ignore */ }
}
/**
* Inbound `tcp_open_ack` for an agent-initiated reverse stream. The
* primary acknowledges (or rejects) the dial; emit 'open' or 'error' on
* the local handle so MeshService's splice setup can either start
* piping bytes or tear down the source socket.
*/
private onTcpOpenAckReverse(frame: Extract<ReturnType<typeof decodeJsonFrame>, { t: 'tcp_open_ack' }>): void {
if (frame.s < AGENT_REVERSE_ID_BASE) return; // forward-direction acks are primary-bound; ignore.
const handle = this.reverseTcpStreams.get(frame.s);
if (!handle) return;
if (frame.ok) {
handle._dispatchOpen();
this.refreshIdleTimer(frame.s);
} else {
this.reverseTcpStreams.delete(frame.s);
this.clearIdleTimer(frame.s);
handle._dispatchError(new Error(frame.err ?? 'tcp_open_reverse rejected'));
handle._dispatchClose();
}
}
/**
* Public entry point for the agent's mesh forwarder. Allocates a
* reverse stream id, sends `tcp_open_reverse`, and returns a handle
* MeshService can splice bytes through. Returns null if the tunnel is
* not currently open or the per-tunnel stream cap is reached.
*/
public openMeshTcpStream(target: { nodeId: number; stack: string; service: string; port: number }): ReverseTcpStreamHandle | null {
const ws = this.ws;
if (!ws || ws.readyState !== WebSocket.OPEN) return null;
if (this.streamCount() >= MAX_STREAMS_PER_TUNNEL) return null;
const streamId = this.reverseStreamIds.allocate();
const handle = new ReverseTcpStreamHandle(
streamId,
(sid, payload) => {
if (this.ws?.readyState !== WebSocket.OPEN) return;
try { this.ws.send(encodeBinaryFrame(BinaryFrameType.TcpData, sid, payload), { binary: true }); } catch { /* ignore */ }
this.refreshIdleTimer(sid);
},
(sid) => {
if (!this.reverseTcpStreams.has(sid)) return;
this.reverseTcpStreams.delete(sid);
this.clearIdleTimer(sid);
if (this.ws?.readyState !== WebSocket.OPEN) return;
try { this.ws.send(encodeJsonFrame({ t: 'tcp_close', s: sid })); } catch { /* ignore */ }
},
);
this.reverseTcpStreams.set(streamId, handle);
this.refreshIdleTimer(streamId);
try {
ws.send(encodeJsonFrame({
t: 'tcp_open_reverse',
s: streamId,
targetNodeId: target.nodeId,
stack: target.stack,
service: target.service,
port: target.port,
}));
} catch (err) {
this.reverseTcpStreams.delete(streamId);
this.clearIdleTimer(streamId);
handle._dispatchError(err as Error);
handle._dispatchClose();
return null;
}
return handle;
}
/**
* Resolves a mesh target by Compose container labels and returns the
* container's first usable IP. Central has already validated that the
* target stack is opted in before issuing the dial; the tunnel JWT
* (scope 'pilot_tunnel') authenticates the caller, so this handler
* does no per-stack gating of its own.
*/
private async resolveMeshTarget(
stack: string,
service: string,
port: number,
): Promise<MeshResolveResult> {
try {
const dockerodeMod = await import('dockerode');
const Docker = (dockerodeMod as { default: new (opts?: unknown) => { listContainers: (opts?: unknown) => Promise<unknown[]> } }).default;
const docker = new Docker();
const containers = (await docker.listContainers({
filters: { label: [`com.docker.compose.project=${stack}`, `com.docker.compose.service=${service}`] },
})) as Array<{ NetworkSettings?: { Networks?: Record<string, { IPAddress?: string }> } }>;
for (const c of containers) {
const networks = c.NetworkSettings?.Networks ?? {};
for (const net of Object.values(networks)) {
if (net.IPAddress) return { ok: true, host: net.IPAddress, port };
}
}
return { ok: false, err: 'no_target' };
} catch (err) {
console.warn('[Pilot] resolveMeshTarget failed:', sanitizeForLog((err as Error).message));
return { ok: false, err: 'agent_error' };
}
}
}
const MESH_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_MS = 10_000;
interface MeshTcpStream {
socket: net.Socket;
accepted: boolean;
}
/**
* Handle returned by `PilotAgent.openMeshTcpStream` to MeshService. Mirrors
* the surface of `PilotTunnelBridge.TcpStream` (write/end/destroy +
* 'open'/'data'/'error'/'close' events) so MeshService.openCrossNode can
* splice bytes against it without caring whether it's running on central
* or on a pilot. The agent owns the per-stream WS plumbing through the
* `sendData` and `sendClose` callbacks; this class is a thin EventEmitter
* facade.
*/
export class ReverseTcpStreamHandle extends EventEmitter {
public readonly streamId: number;
private readonly sendData: (streamId: number, payload: Buffer) => void;
private readonly sendClose: (streamId: number) => void;
private closed = false;
constructor(
streamId: number,
sendData: (streamId: number, payload: Buffer) => void,
sendClose: (streamId: number) => void,
) {
super();
this.streamId = streamId;
this.sendData = sendData;
this.sendClose = sendClose;
}
public write(chunk: Buffer): boolean {
if (this.closed) return false;
this.sendData(this.streamId, chunk);
return true;
}
public end(): void {
if (this.closed) return;
this.closed = true;
this.sendClose(this.streamId);
}
public destroy(): void { this.end(); }
/** @internal Called by PilotAgent on inbound `tcp_open_ack { ok: true }`. */
public _dispatchOpen(): void { this.emit('open'); }
/** @internal Called by PilotAgent on inbound `TcpData` for this stream. */
public _dispatchData(chunk: Buffer): void { this.emit('data', chunk); }
/** @internal Called by PilotAgent on tunnel-side error or rejection. */
public _dispatchError(err: Error): void { this.emit('error', err); }
/** @internal Called by PilotAgent on tunnel-side close. */
public _dispatchClose(): void {
if (this.closed) return;
this.closed = true;
this.emit('close');
}
}
type MeshResolveResult =
| { ok: true; host: string; port: number }
| { ok: false; err: MeshErrCode };
/**
* Read the persisted long-lived tunnel token from disk if present. ENOENT is
* the normal first-boot case and stays silent. Any other error class
* (EACCES, EIO, EISDIR, etc.) almost certainly means the volume is
* misconfigured or corrupt; log at ERROR with the path and the errno so the
* operator has an actionable signal, then return null. Returning null here
* lets the caller fall back to SENCHO_ENROLL_TOKEN if one is set, or exit
* with a clear "no credentials" message if not.
*
* Calls readFileSync directly rather than racing existsSync + readFileSync
* to avoid TOCTOU and to surface the actual errno on real failures.
*
* Exposed for unit tests.
*/
export function readPersistedToken(): string | null {
try {
return fs.readFileSync(TOKEN_PATH, 'utf8').trim() || null;
} catch (err) {
const code = (err as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code;
if (code === 'ENOENT') return null;
console.error(
`[Pilot] Failed to read persisted tunnel token at ${sanitizeForLog(TOKEN_PATH)}: ${sanitizeForLog(code ?? 'unknown')} - ${sanitizeForLog((err as Error).message)}`,
);
return null;
}
}
/**
* Load the optional CA bundle pointed at by SENCHO_PILOT_CA_FILE so a pilot
* agent can verify a self-signed primary cert without disabling TLS
* verification globally. Returns the file contents or null if the var is
* unset; surfaces a clear error and exits if the file cannot be read so the
* operator does not silently fall back to the default trust store.
*/
function readPilotCaBundle(): Buffer | null {
const caFile = process.env.SENCHO_PILOT_CA_FILE;
if (!caFile) return null;
try {
return fs.readFileSync(caFile);
} catch (err) {
console.error('[Pilot] Failed to read SENCHO_PILOT_CA_FILE:', sanitizeForLog((err as Error).message));
process.exit(1);
}
}
/**
* Persist the long-lived tunnel token so the agent can reconnect after a
* container restart without re-enrolling. On failure we log at ERROR (not
* WARN) with an explicit "next agent restart will require re-enrollment"
* message: a silent warning here meant the operator saw the next-boot
* re-enrollment loop with no signal pointing at the disk. The current
* tunnel session continues with the in-memory token regardless.
*
* mkdirSync with recursive:true is idempotent on existing directories, so
* the prior existsSync guard was redundant and added a TOCTOU window.
*
* Exposed for unit tests.
*/
export function persistToken(token: string): void {
try {
fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(TOKEN_PATH), { recursive: true });
fs.writeFileSync(TOKEN_PATH, token, { mode: 0o600 });
} catch (err) {
const code = (err as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code;
console.error(
`[Pilot] Failed to persist tunnel token at ${sanitizeForLog(TOKEN_PATH)} (${sanitizeForLog(code ?? 'unknown')}: ${sanitizeForLog((err as Error).message)}). Continuing with the in-memory token; the next agent restart will require re-enrollment until the volume is writable.`,
);
}
}