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v0.88.2
454 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 Anso
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612e3391e8 |
docs(onboarding): add environment preflight screenshot to quickstart (#1296)
Show the first-run environment preflight step in the quickstart so the setup walkthrough is fully illustrated between the Cold start card and the dashboard. The screenshot renders the six checks (Docker engine, Compose, compose directory, path mapping, TLS, disk) with their results, the Re-run control, and the Enter Sencho action. |
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Anso
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0cfac89cd0 |
docs: v1 docs refresh (batch 4) (#1238)
* docs: refresh introduction page * docs: refine introduction positioning * docs: refresh quickstart for current console |
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Anso
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2435da232b |
fix(api-tokens): harden rate limiting and surface list-load errors (#1292)
* fix(api-tokens): scope per-token rate limits to live tokens Forged or token-shaped Authorization headers no longer mint their own rate-limit budget. The key generator now grants a per-token budget only to a real, active token and falls back to per-IP keying for anything else, so a single source cannot evade the global limiter by rotating fake tokens. The validated token is memoized on the request, so authentication reuses it without a second database lookup. Token validation (format, checksum, lookup, revocation, expiry) is now a single shared helper used by the HTTP auth middleware, the WebSocket upgrade handler, and the rate-limit key generator, replacing two near-identical inline copies that could drift apart. The last-used timestamp write is throttled so a busy token no longer writes to the database on every request. * fix(api-tokens): surface token list-load failures with a retry A failed load of the API tokens list was swallowed: a server error rendered the empty "no tokens yet" state with no sign that anything went wrong. The list now shows an error card with a Retry action and raises a toast on any non-ok response or network error, matching the create and revoke flows. Adds a troubleshooting entry for the error. * test(api-tokens): seed tokens via the shared test helper The new hardening and WS-scope suites computed sha256 of a raw token directly, which CodeQL flags as js/insufficient-password-hash (a false positive: these are 256-bit CSPRNG opaque tokens, not passwords). Route token creation through the existing apiTokenTestHelper and read the stored token_hash back from the row, so the suites no longer hash anything themselves. Also removes the duplicated createToken helpers. * fix(api-tokens): key the rate limiter by the same credential auth uses The rate-limit key generator checked the session cookie before the Authorization bearer, while authMiddleware authenticates bearer-over-cookie (bearerToken || cookieToken). A request could send a Bearer API token plus a forged cookie and be keyed by the cookie's (forgeable, rotatable) username, sidestepping the per-token / per-IP keying the limiter applies to API tokens: a valid token would lose its own bucket, and a forged token-shaped bearer would no longer collapse to per-IP. Reorder the generator to mirror auth: process the bearer first (validate the API token and key per-token or fall back to per-IP; otherwise decode the JWT by username/sub), and consult the cookie only when there is no bearer. Regression tests cover a valid and a forged sen_sk_ bearer, each sent with a forged cookie. |
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Anso
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5289f01bfd |
feat(onboarding): add first-run environment checker (#1290)
* feat(onboarding): add first-run environment checker Add a preflight that checks whether the host can run Docker deploys before a deploy fails for an avoidable reason. It verifies the Docker engine is reachable and permitted, the Compose plugin is present, the compose directory is writable and mounted at a matching host path, the dashboard is behind TLS, and the compose volume has disk headroom. Each result that needs attention carries a specific fix rather than a generic error, and the checks never block: an operator who knows their setup can continue. The checks run as the final step of first-boot setup and can be re-run any time from the Recovery settings tab. A new admin-only endpoint, GET /api/diagnostics/environment, backs both surfaces. * fix(onboarding): distinguish unverified path mapping and support parent binds Treat a container whose self-inspect fails as an unverified path-mapping warning instead of a false "not containerized" pass, so an unverifiable mapping never reads as healthy. Resolve the compose directory through the longest-prefix bind mount and compare the host path it resolves to, so a parent bind such as -v /opt:/opt correctly covers COMPOSE_DIR=/opt/compose instead of warning that the directory is not bind-mounted. * test(e2e): advance the setup wizard past the environment step in loginAs The first-run setup helper clicked "Initialize console" and immediately waited for the dashboard, but setup now shows an environment-preflight step before landing the console. Click "Enter Sencho" to complete onboarding before asserting the dashboard, so the first test on a fresh instance passes. |
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Anso
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b2cae92a92 |
docs(mesh): note admin-only management, dev-mode diagnostics, and the subnet env var (#1288)
- Note that managing the mesh (the per-node toggle and stack opt-in or opt-out) requires an administrator and that non-admin users see the Routing tab read-only, matching the access model the tab enforces. - Document the [Mesh:diag] developer-mode logs in the Diagnostics section so operators can trace routing decisions and operation timing. - Add SENCHO_MESH_SUBNET to .env.example; it was documented on the feature page but missing from the env template. |
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Anso
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c6d1631afe |
feat(recovery): add safe-mode recovery surface and emergency CLI (#1286)
* feat(recovery): add safe-mode recovery surface and emergency CLI Add a read-only Recovery tab under Settings (admin-only) backed by a new GET /api/diagnostics endpoint reporting app version, database integrity, encryption-key status, Docker reachability, account and SSO counts, and non-secret configuration. The endpoint loads without Docker or live metrics so it stays available when the dashboard does not, requires a genuine admin session, and builds its config block from a non-secret allowlist so no credentials are ever exposed. Expand the emergency command-line toolkit beyond the two-factor reset with seven host-level commands: reset-password, create-emergency-admin, clear-sessions, disable-sso, diagnostics, validate-db, and backup-data. Each prints its result, exits with a meaningful status code, and writes an audit entry where it changes state. Document the toolkit in a new operator guide and link it from the recovery and two-factor pages. * feat(recovery): download the emergency command reference as a text file The recovery commands are needed exactly when the dashboard is unreachable, so reading them only in-app is a chicken-and-egg problem. Add a Download button to the command-line section that saves the full `docker compose exec sencho ...` reference as a text file, letting operators keep it on hand before they need it. Reuses a shared download helper with the existing diagnostics export. * fix(recovery): harden diagnostics, backup, and emergency-admin against edge cases Address findings from an independent review of the recovery toolkit: - DiagnosticsService now degrades instead of throwing when a queried table is missing or corrupt: each read falls back and is folded into database.ok, so a broken database reports "problem detected" rather than failing the whole endpoint or showing a misleading healthy state with zeroed counts. - backup-data refuses a destination that resolves to the live database, which would otherwise report success while producing no separate copy. - create-emergency-admin now applies the same username rule as the user- management route, extracted to a shared helper so both stay in sync. Adds tests for a missing read table, a malformed emergency-admin username, and the backup same-target rejection. |
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Anso
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06b25262cc |
feat(stacks): guided first stack import flow (#1285)
* feat(stacks): add guided first stack import flow Add an Import mode to the Create Stack dialog and a zero-stacks empty state so a new user who already has compose files on disk can land their first stack without reading the docs first. A read-only scan of the compose directory (GET /api/stacks/import/scan) lists the compose files it finds with a dry preview of each file's services, ports, volumes, and env files. Each result is labelled by placement: already a stack, loose at the root of the compose directory, or one folder too deep, with the exact path to move misplaced files to. The scan never writes, moves, or changes any files. Manual stack creation (Empty, From Git, From Docker Run) is unchanged. * fix(stacks): read import-scan candidates via a single file handle Open the compose file once and stat plus read on the same descriptor so the size check and the read observe the same inode, instead of resolving the path twice (stat then readFile), which is a time-of-check/time-of-use race. Mirrors the existing handle-based readers in FileSystemService. * fix(stacks): confine import scan to the compose dir and refine the empty state Harden the read-only import scan: - Resolve symlinks and confirm the real target stays inside the compose directory before reading a candidate, and reject non-regular files, so a symlinked compose file or parent cannot expose a file outside the compose directory through the preview (matches resolveSafeStackPath). - Read at most the stat-reported size (bounded by the 1 MiB cap) from the open handle, so a file that grows after the size check cannot exceed the cap. - Log when the compose directory or a subdirectory cannot be read, so an access failure is not silently reported as "no compose files found". Only show the first-run "No stacks yet" prompt when no filter chip is active, so a filter that matches nothing is not mistaken for an empty fleet. |
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Anso
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02f98ab90a |
docs: add recovery guide and link it from README, quickstart, and troubleshooting (#1283)
Add a consolidated Recovery page that answers "what do I do if Sencho breaks?" in one place. It covers getting back to a working state when Sencho itself fails, a stack deploy fails, an admin is locked out of sign-in, Docker is unavailable, or a remote node is unreachable, and summarizes each path with a link to the authoritative detail page rather than duplicating it. The page opens by stating the core safety fact: Sencho keeps its state in DATA_DIR and COMPOSE_DIR and treats compose files on disk as the source of truth, so recovery is mostly file-level and running containers are unaffected by a Sencho outage. It points to Backup & Restore as the prerequisite. Link the guide from the README documentation section, the quickstart "where to next" cards, and the top of the troubleshooting page. |
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Anso
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65a69d9ecc |
fix(nodes): never send stored node tokens to clients (#1281)
Node read endpoints now return a client-safe projection that omits the stored api_token and exposes a has_token boolean instead, so a node's long-lived proxy credential is never serialized to a browser or API token client. The token stays encrypted at rest and is read server-side only by the components that need it (the remote proxy, the connection test, and the mesh dialer). The edit form opens the API Token field blank, and a blank value keeps the existing credential, so saving an edit without retyping the token no longer clears it; a non-empty value rotates it. The backend enforces the same rule defensively. Node management actions (add, edit, delete, test connection, generate node token) are gated in the UI to match their server-side permission checks, so operators no longer see an action the API would reject. The test-connection route also gains the missing server-side permission and token-scope guards. Also validate the x-node-id header and fall back to the default node for malformed values instead of an obscure 404, and return 400 (not 500) when deleting the default node. |
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Anso
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e60c1c0525 |
feat(fleet-snapshots): add restore-all, per-file download, and scrollable preview (#1276)
Three improvements to the Fleet Snapshots detail view, matching the admin-only access of the existing per-stack restore: - Restore all: a control in the snapshot header restores every captured stack across the fleet in one action, with an optional "redeploy all after restore" checkbox. Each stack is restored independently, so a failure on one (removed node, offline remote, blocked deploy) is reported per stack while the rest still proceed. Backed by POST /api/fleet/snapshots/:id/restore-all. - Per-file download: each compose or .env file in a snapshot can be saved to disk individually from its row. - Scrollable preview: the inline file preview is now a bounded, scrollable panel, so a long compose file can be read in full instead of being clipped. Remote restore and redeploy failures now carry the remote node's status and reason, so a per-stack failure in Restore all is actionable. |
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Anso
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c11a550b6a |
fix(fleet-snapshots): gate reads on admin role and encrypt content at rest (#1273)
* fix(fleet-snapshots): gate reads on admin role and encrypt content at rest Fleet snapshots capture every node's compose.yaml and .env, so the data is as sensitive as the live stacks. This hardens access and reliability across the snapshot pipeline. - Restrict snapshot reads to administrators. GET /api/fleet/snapshots and /:id now require the admin role, matching create, restore, and delete; the Fleet "Snapshots" tab and its panel render only for admins. Previously any authenticated user could enumerate snapshots and read every node's .env. - Encrypt snapshot file contents at rest with the instance key. Restore and cloud-archive paths decrypt on read, so cloud archives stay portable and a database copy no longer exposes stack secrets in plaintext. Rows written before this change still read back as plaintext. - Surface partial captures. A stack whose compose file cannot be read or fetched, or a file over the 1 MB capture cap, is recorded as a warning and shown on the snapshot instead of being silently dropped, so a snapshot is never mistaken for complete. Remote .env read errors are now distinguished from a genuinely absent .env. Adds route-authz, capture-warning, and encryption round-trip tests; updates the Fleet-Wide Backups feature docs. * fix(fleet-snapshots): gate cloud snapshot reads on admin role The cloud snapshot read routes were guarded by provider/license only, not by role, while their write counterparts (upload, delete) already required admin and the Cloud Backup settings surface is admin-only. Because a downloaded archive contains plaintext compose and .env files, a non-admin could list and download cloud snapshots and read every node's secrets, the same exposure the local snapshot reads were just closed against. - Require admin on GET /api/cloud-backup/snapshots, /status/:id, and /object/:keyB64/download, matching the local snapshot reads and the admin-only Cloud Backup settings section. - When capturing a remote node, treat a 200 response carrying X-Env-Exists: false as a stack with no .env (matching the local ENOENT path) instead of storing an empty .env that restore would later write back. Adds non-admin authorization tests for the cloud read routes and a remote absent-.env capture test. |
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Anso
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0953025036 |
fix(fleet): gate node update actions to admins and harden update tracking (#1272)
* fix(fleet): gate node update actions to admins and harden update tracking Node update affordances now render only for admins, matching the admin-only routes behind them. Previously a non-admin could open the Fleet view and see the per-node Update button, Update all, retry, dismiss, and Recheck controls, then get a 403 on click. Those controls are now hidden for non-admins, who still see read-only update status. Both update-status clear routes (per-node and bulk) now require admin, and the bulk recheck throttles its forced "latest published version" lookup so a caller cannot loop it to hammer the upstream registries; the response reports whether the refresh actually ran so the UI can surface a "checked recently" note. Completion detection no longer reports a node as Updated when it merely blips offline and returns on the same version with an unchanged process start time. That case stays in progress and is decided by the existing early-fail and timeout heuristics, so a momentary network glitch is not mistaken for a successful update. Failed and timed-out updates now emit an operator-visible warning, and a periodic safety-net sweep bounds in-flight trackers when no client is polling for status. * fix(fleet): harden update completion and recheck failure handling Refinements from review of the node self-update hardening: - Completion signal 1 now requires a valid version, not merely a different one. A node whose /api/meta momentarily omits or mangles its version (online, same process) reported version=null, which compared unequal to the previous version and falsely marked the update completed. It now stays in progress and is decided by the early-fail/timeout heuristics. - Terminal resolution is atomic: it re-reads the live tracker and transitions only if it is still in flight with the same start time, so two concurrent status polls cannot both warn or clobber each other's transition. - The operator warning for a failed or timed-out update now redacts secret-shaped text (bearer/basic/token/password, credentialed URLs) from the underlying error before logging, in addition to stripping control characters. - The Recheck button now surfaces an error toast when the request throws (network or auth failure), matching the existing non-ok-response path instead of only logging to the console. |
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Anso
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7e0cffa376 |
fix(fleet-actions): stop-by-label works on Community remote nodes (#1270)
* fix(fleet-actions): stop-by-label works on Community remote nodes Fleet-stop's remote leg fanned out to POST /api/labels/:id/action, which is gated to Skipper/Admiral, so on a Community fleet the control node stopped its own stacks but every remote node returned 403. Fleet-stop itself is admin-only and available on every license, so the remote leg contradicted the feature's own gate. Extract the label-match plus bulk-stop logic into a shared runLocalLabelStop helper and add an admin-only, every-license POST /api/fleet-actions/labels/local-stop receiver. The control now fans out to that receiver, so remote stacks stop on every tier. Each node runs under its own per-node bulk lock, so a fleet-stop and a per-label action still serialize cleanly instead of double-stopping containers. Also degrade the control's own leg per-node instead of failing the whole fan-out when its filesystem read throws, and gate fleet-stop and fleet-prune diagnostics behind developer_mode. Tests: local-stop auth, tier, validation, and behavior; a remote-leg routing guard that asserts the fan-out targets local-stop and never the paid route; local-leg graceful degradation; and the three Fleet Action card UIs. * fix(fleet-actions): honor the remote stop receiver's matched flag The control reached the remote leg only because its own mirror had the label, then hardcoded matched:true and trusted results without guarding its shape. A mirror-skewed control (mirror has the label, remote does not) then showed a remote mismatch as "matched, 0 stacks" instead of "no matching label", and a malformed 200 body could flow a non-array into the per-stack renderers. Honor the remote's own matched flag and coerce results to an array when the body is malformed. Add regression tests for the matched:false skew case and the non-array results case. |
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Anso
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085267b466 |
feat(security): make CVE suppressions optionally honored by deploy-block policies (#1269)
* feat(security): make CVE suppressions optionally honored by deploy-block policies
Block-on-deploy policies evaluate the raw scan result, so a CVE an admin
has accepted in CVE Suppressions still blocks the deploy. Add an opt-in,
per-instance toggle ("Honor suppressions in deploy blocks", Settings ->
Security) that, when on, re-derives each image's severity from the
suppression-filtered findings before comparing to the policy threshold. A
deploy that proceeds only because suppressions dropped it below the gate is
recorded in the audit log. Default off, so the strict raw-scan behavior is
unchanged unless an operator enables it.
The setting governs the instance that runs the deploy and is not
fleet-replicated. The gate fails safe: a suppression-read error or an
empty detail set falls back to raw scan severity rather than dropping it.
Also surface a previously swallowed error in the CVE suppressions and
misconfig acknowledgement settings panels so a failed list load shows a
toast instead of an empty list.
* fix(security): gate on raw severity when preflight detail rows are truncated
The suppression-aware deploy gate re-derived image severity from the stored
vulnerability_details rows, assuming any non-empty set was complete. A cached
pre-deploy scan keeps the full aggregate counts but copies only a bounded slice
of detail rows, so recomputing from that slice could drop an unsuppressed
blocking CVE below the threshold and let a deploy through.
Guard the recompute: when the loaded detail rows do not match the scan's total
finding count, gate on the raw scan severity (never drops severity). Suppression
awareness still applies for scans whose details are stored in full, which is the
common case.
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Anso
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d8f73f8203 |
feat(fleet): show stack-label filtering in Fleet View on every tier (#1268)
* feat(fleet): show stack-label filtering in Fleet View on every tier Stack labels and their assignments are a Community feature: the per-node label reads are available to any authenticated user and are already used in the per-node Stacks view. Fleet View, however, only fetched the fleet-wide label palette and per-stack chips when the instance was on a paid tier, so a Community user who had labelled their stacks saw no label dots on node cards and no Tags filter in the Overview toolbar. Drop the paid gate on the fleet label fetch so the palette, the per-stack chips, and the Tags filter render for everyone who has labels. Node-level tag aggregation (used for topology grouping) stays paid and is unchanged. * fix(fleet): surface update-status failures and soften the reconnect timeout Three reliability fixes in the Fleet View update path: - The fleet update-status poll swallowed fetch errors in an empty catch, so a failing poll left a silently stale table with no breadcrumb. It now logs the failure (both thrown errors and non-ok HTTP responses) without toasting on every tick, and keeps the last-known statuses. - The local-update reconnecting overlay declared "Update timed out" after five minutes, which falsely reported failure when a large image pull simply ran longer than the reconnect window. It now shows a non-failure "Taking longer than expected" state with a "Reload to check" action, and the timeout is a named constant that mirrors the backend update timeout. - The fleet overview fan-out already logged a node that failed to report; the update-status and update-all fan-outs now log the rejected node and reason too instead of discarding it. * test(fleet): backfill Fleet View hook, component, and update-tracker coverage Adds unit and component coverage for the previously untested Fleet View surface: all six Overview hooks (overview, update-status, polling cadence, preferences, fleet labels, node labels), the NodeCard, OverviewTab, OverviewToolbar, NodeUpdatesSheet, UpdateStatusBadge, and ReconnectingOverlay components, and the FleetUpdateTrackerService state transitions. * test(fleet): assert update-status poll preserves last-known statuses on failure Adds an explicit case that seeds statuses from a successful poll, then fails the next poll, and verifies the table keeps the seeded statuses (and logs without toasting) rather than relying on the implementation implicitly. |
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Anso
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b61388c675 |
fix(rbac): enforce admin seat cap on promotion and harden last-admin and audit paths (#1266)
Promoting a user to admin now respects the per-tier admin seat limit the same way user creation does, closing a path that let an operator exceed the cap by creating an account and then editing its role to admin. The last-admin guard for demote and delete now runs the admin-count re-check and the write in a single transaction, so two concurrent admin changes can no longer race the admin count to zero and lock everyone out. Admin two-factor resets are now recorded once with their own audit summary instead of being mislabeled as a user creation by the audit middleware. |
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Anso
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bf61ecae3e |
docs(registries): correct multi-node credential model (#1264)
* docs(registries): correct multi-node credential model Private Registries are resolved per instance: ComposeService reads the local instance's own registries at deploy time, and a remote deploy is proxied to the remote Sencho instance, which resolves its own. The control's credentials are never shipped to remote nodes. The page previously described fleet-wide credential injection that does not exist, which would leave an operator unable to explain a private image pull failing with 401 on a remote node. Rewrite the Note, the multi-node section, and the affected troubleshooting entries to describe the real per-instance model: configure registries on each instance that deploys private images, and manage a remote node's registries by signing into that node directly. * docs(registries): tighten wording on credential scope and tier mention Address review feedback on the multi-node section: state that Sencho does not automatically share credentials between instances rather than the absolute "never copied" phrasing, since an admin can still direct a write at a remote node through the distributed-API proxy. Drop the redundant tier and role restatement from "Where to find it"; the requirement is already stated in the page note. |
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Anso
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d4fa4a4965 |
fix(host-console): audit session lifecycle and harden path, resize, and route gating (#1263)
* fix(host-console): audit session lifecycle and harden path, resize, and route gating Record an audit-log entry when a host console session opens and when it closes (capturing user, node, client IP, and timestamp), so interactive host-shell access leaves a durable, accountable trail instead of only an ephemeral log line. Fix a stack-path boundary check that allowed a sibling directory sharing the base path's prefix to pass; directory resolution now uses the canonical within-base check via a small testable helper. Validate terminal resize frames (positive integers within a sane bound) before forwarding them to the PTY, dropping malformed frames instead of passing them through. Mirror the backend admin-only console permission on the frontend route so a non-admin who reaches the view cannot mount a console the server would reject, and log (rather than silently swallow) a working-directory resolution failure. Add unit coverage for the path helper, audit open/close rows, resize validation, and the spawn-error path, plus a WebSocket-upgrade integration test exercising the full gate chain and a live session-open audit row. * fix(host-console): record the node the shell actually runs in When the requested node's directory cannot be resolved, the session falls back to the default node's base directory. Record that fallback node in the session audit row (and log it) so the audit trail names the node the shell actually runs in rather than the originally requested one. Strengthen the upgrade integration test to assert the open row captures the user, node, and client IP. |
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Anso
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d03d97d964 |
fix(nodes): close capability-gating gaps in node compatibility (#1261)
* fix(nodes): close capability-gating gaps in node compatibility Vulnerability scanning is now gated correctly on whether the active node advertises support for it: - A node without the Trivy binary stops advertising the scanning capability. Previously the capability was toggled only on a state change, so a node that booted without Trivy kept advertising scanning it could not perform. - The control node's own capability list now reflects features disabled at runtime, matching what it advertises to peers. - The scan history surface shows a clear "not available on this node" card, with its header actions hidden, instead of attempting a request that fails. A node's version and capability metadata now refreshes immediately after a connection test or a completed update, rather than waiting out the cache. Capability gates fail closed to the unavailable card when a node's metadata request errors, instead of staying open until the next fetch. Adds a test that fails if the frontend and backend capability lists drift, plus coverage for the metadata error path, the runtime-disabled local meta, the scanning capability sync, and the metadata cache invalidation paths. * fix(nodes): refresh node metadata client-side after a connection test A connection test dropped the server-side metadata cache, but the dashboard kept its own cached copy until the client TTL expired, so version and capability gates could stay stale in the browser. The test now forces a client-side metadata refresh for that node, so the version pill and gates reflect the node's current state immediately. Also strips any URL userinfo before logging the metadata fetch target, and makes the scanning-capability detection test deterministically exercise the no-binary disable path rather than depending on whether the runner has Trivy. |
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Anso
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6fc7f200a6 |
fix(scheduled-ops): run stack lifecycle schedules on remote nodes and harden run visibility (#1260)
* fix(scheduled-ops): run stack lifecycle schedules on remote nodes and harden run visibility Stack lifecycle schedules (Restart, Stop, Take Down, Start, Backup Stack Files) now run against whichever node the schedule targets, local or remote. Each remote run proxies to that node's own stack-operation endpoint, so a hub-managed schedule reaches the node that actually holds the stack. Restart with a service subset restarts each selected service and, if one fails, names the services already restarted so run history reflects the stack's partial state. Auto-start on a remote node runs that node's own pre-deploy scan-policy check against the images it holds. Add POST /api/stacks/:name/backup to trigger an on-demand backup of a stack's compose and env files (the same rollback snapshot a deploy takes); it backs the remote backup schedule and is available to operators on its own. A scheduled task that reaches execution on an unpaid licence is now skipped and written to run history as a failed run, so a manual trigger that returned a queued response never silently disappears. Test plan: - Backend unit + integration: scheduler-service (remote proxy per action, per-service fan-out, auto-start policy delegation, remote-failure and no-credentials paths, unpaid-tier skip), stack-backup-route (auth/role/paid/404/400/500), scheduled-tasks-routes. - Frontend component test for the schedules view (list, prefill, node filter, create payload). - tsc and lint clean on both packages. * fix(scheduled-ops): lock the stack-files backup route against concurrent stack ops The stack-files backup writes the same slot the pre-deploy rollback snapshot uses, so running it while a deploy, update, or rollback is in flight on the same stack could overwrite the rollback point. The backup route now takes the per-stack operation lock (as deploy/down/restart do) and returns 409 when the stack is busy, keeping the rollback snapshot intact. Adds the 'backup' action to the stack-op lock type and a busy participle for the 409 message. * fix(scheduled-ops): enforce backup-path containment inline at the filesystem sink The on-demand backup route passes the stack name straight into backupStackFiles, so resolve the backup directory against the backup root and confirm containment with an inline startsWith check before the mkdir/copy/write sinks, matching the barrier restoreStackFiles already uses. The stack name is validated at the route and again by resolveStackDir, so this is defense in depth that also closes a static path-injection finding on the new call path. |
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Anso
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5e66b54153 |
fix(audit-log): neutralize CSV export injection, clamp pagination, bound anomaly history (#1259)
* fix(audit-log): neutralize CSV export injection, clamp pagination, bound anomaly history Harden the Admiral audit log without changing its tier or hub-only gating. - CSV export now defuses formula injection: any field that a spreadsheet would evaluate as a formula (leading = + - @, or a trigger behind leading whitespace, or a leading tab/CR) is prefixed with a single quote before RFC 4180 quoting. Audit summaries embed user-controlled resource names, so this closes a path where a crafted name could execute on export open. - Clamp page and limit to positive bounds on the list endpoint so a negative limit can no longer reach SQLite as "unlimited" and dump the whole table. - Bound the anomaly and stats history reads to a capped slice of recent rows so the analysis paths stay within fixed memory and latency on large histories instead of scanning the full retention window per request. - Surface failed audit list and stats fetches through the standard error toast instead of leaving the view silently stale. - Add a developer-mode-gated diagnostic log to the stats endpoint for parity with the list and export handlers. Covered by new unit and HTTP-integration tests (CSV neutralization through the real export route, pagination clamps, bounded history, stats endpoint, anomaly annotation) and verified end to end in the browser. * fix(audit-log): compute signal-rail stats with exact SQL aggregates Address review feedback on the earlier history-cap change. The cap was correct for the anomaly baseline but made the stats tiles (events, actors, failure rate, hourly series) silently undercount on a hub with more than the cap's worth of rows in the window, since they were derived from the capped row slice. - Add DatabaseService.getAuditStatsInputs: exact counts via SQL COUNT / COUNT(DISTINCT) / GROUP BY hour, and new-ip detection over the small DISTINCT (user, ip) pair sets. No row cap, so the tiles stay exact at any window size while memory stays bounded. - Reduce computeAuditStats to a pure formatter over those aggregates. - Keep the bounded history read only for the list endpoint's anomaly annotation, where a recent-activity baseline is an acceptable heuristic. - Skip the redundant load-failure toast when a fetch fails with a handled 401, so an expired session does not stack toasts on top of logout. Adds exactness tests for the aggregate counts, distinct-actor handling, and new-ip detection, and strengthens the pagination-clamp tests. * fix(audit-log): exclude future-dated rows and make the new-ip sample deterministic Two small parity fixes on the stats aggregates: upper-bound every current window by `now` so a future-dated row (clock skew or a fixture) cannot inflate the live counts, and order the new-ip pair scan so the sample actor shown in the tile detail is stable. Adds a test asserting a future row is excluded. |
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dbb7fe8215 |
feat(auto-heal): restart crashed containers and harden the heal loop (#1258)
* feat(auto-heal): restart crashed containers and harden the heal loop Auto-Heal now restarts containers that crash (non-zero exit) and stay down past the policy threshold, in addition to those that fail their Docker healthcheck. Crash detection reuses the container event classifier so a container that exits cleanly or that an operator stopped is never restarted; only classified crashes set the heal signal. Also hardens the existing loop: - A paid controlling instance refreshes proxied remotes' entitlement on a background interval so a remote node's policies keep evaluating between operator visits instead of lapsing a few minutes after the sheet was last opened. A node that stays unreachable surfaces a warning. - Overlapping policies (all-services plus a service-specific one) restart a given container at most once per evaluation pass, so the hourly cap holds. - A failed restart now counts toward the cooldown and hourly cap, so a broken setup is retried on the cooldown interval rather than every poll. - Diagnostic logging behind developer mode for evaluation, heal decisions, timing, and lease refresh. * docs(auto-heal): document crash healing and refresh troubleshooting Cover the two heal conditions (unhealthy and crashed), note that clean exits and operator stops are never restarted and that crash healing acts on crashes observed while Sencho is running, and update the troubleshooting and tab visibility entries accordingly. * fix(auto-heal): close stale crash-signal race and harden lease refresh A crash signal could outlive the crash it described. The exit classifier is deferred 500ms, so an immediate restart could let it stamp the crash marker after the container was already running, and a later clean or operator-initiated exit did not clear it; the next poll could then restart a container that had exited cleanly. Now a clean or intentional exit always clears the marker, a die that a start has superseded is not stamped, and the die's own time is captured at arrival rather than at the deferred classification so the supersede check is accurate. Also: - Crash state survives the event service's idle-prune window, so crash healing works for any configured threshold rather than only short ones. - An exited or dead container is matched before any health-text parsing, so it can never fall into the healthcheck path. - A remote with no reachable proxy target counts toward the lease-refresh failure warning instead of being silently skipped. |
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69edb0dcbb |
fix(observability): gate global logs to admins, scope to managed containers, harden SSE (#1254)
* fix(observability): gate global logs to admins, scope to managed containers, harden SSE Make the Logs feed an administrator view enforced on both sides (requireAdmin on the /api/logs/global poll and SSE routes; the Logs nav item plus a redirect guard on the frontend), and scope the feed to Sencho-managed containers only via a shared isManagedByComposeDir helper that /stats now reuses. Harden the SSE stream: a stateful frame demuxer that survives chunk boundaries so a Docker frame split across reads is reassembled instead of dropped or garbled; a per-stream error listener so one broken follow stream cannot crash the event loop (it posts a single degraded notice and keeps the others alive); a cap on concurrent follow streams with a truncation notice; a bounded initial tail; and backpressure that pauses the source streams when the client is slow and resumes on drain. Bound the polling snapshot's per-container fan-out with a concurrency limit. Add process-local, in-memory log-stream counters exposed at the admin-only /api/system/log-stream-metrics endpoint (active connections, lines streamed, attach and frame errors). Collapse the view to the local hub and remove the dead remote-node handling. * fix(observability): close remote-proxy bypass of the global-logs admin gate The logs feed's requireAdmin lives in the local route handler, which the remote proxy skips when forwarding a request whose nodeId targets a remote node. A hub user could therefore request /api/logs/global*, /api/logs/global/stream, or /api/system/log-stream-metrics with x-node-id (or ?nodeId= for the SSE transport) pointing at a remote node and have it served as the node-proxy admin on the far side, sidestepping the gate entirely. Add these paths to HUB_ONLY_PREFIXES so hubOnlyGuard rejects a remote nodeId with 403 before the proxy runs, matching the existing protection on audit-log, scheduled-tasks, and notification-routes. Add regression tests covering the collection path, the SSE sub-path (both the x-node-id header and the ?nodeId= query transport), and the stream-metrics endpoint. |
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98049e3b1c |
fix(global-search): surface unreachable nodes and harden the command palette (#1253)
* fix(global-search): surface unreachable nodes and harden the command palette The command palette discarded the cross-node search hook's failedNodes, so a search run while a fleet node was down silently returned partial results with no sign a host was skipped. It now renders an "N nodes unreachable" line and still shows the stacks it could gather. The shared cross-node search hook fetched every node's stack list and statuses on every keystroke. It now fans out once per search session and filters the cached inventory client-side as the query is refined, cutting per-keystroke fleet traffic. A 200 response with an unparseable status body degrades stacks to unknown instead of failing the whole node. The palette now owns result matching (cmdk's built-in fuzzy filter is disabled), so Pages, Nodes, and Stacks match by case-insensitive substring in a deterministic order and the 50-row cap applies to the real match set rather than a re-sorted slice. Adds unit coverage for the hook and palette, plus a Playwright journey spec. * fix(global-search): clear stale cross-node results when the active node changes When excludeNodeId changed mid-search (the sidebar switches it on active-node change), the hook started a fresh fanout but left the previous session's inventory and failedNodes visible until the refetch resolved, so the newly active node could briefly appear under the other-nodes results or a stale unreachable warning could persist. The new session now drops prior results synchronously before refetching. |
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96c5f05cdc |
fix(app-store): harden template deploy, registry fetch, and catalogue refresh (#1250)
* fix(app-store): harden template deploy, registry fetch, and catalogue refresh Serialize generated compose through the YAML emitter so registry-supplied values are escaped correctly instead of interpolated into hand-built lines. Cap the registry response size so an oversized or runaway catalogue cannot exhaust backend memory, and surface the fetch failure to the caller. Reload the catalogue when the active node changes, since the registry is node-scoped. Add developer-mode deploy diagnostics (counts only, no values) and extend the unit tests with YAML round-trip, LinuxServer.io mapping, and size-cap coverage. * fix(app-store): reset node-scoped catalogue state on fetch and bound deploy diagnostics Clear the templates list and Trivy availability at the start of each catalogue load so a failed fetch after a node switch shows the new node's empty state instead of the previous node's catalogue or scan toggle. Bound the developer-mode diagnostic template title/source length, and document that the registry cache serves the last-known-good catalogue on a transient fetch failure (the size cap still protects memory in every case). |
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2844f606cd |
fix(git-sources): harden webhook delivery, transport errors, and clone limits (#1249)
* fix(git-sources): harden webhook delivery, transport errors, and clone limits Map webhook-pull outcomes to real HTTP status codes (200 success, 202 debounced, 404 no source, 422 failure) instead of always returning 200, so a Git provider and any monitoring on it can tell when a delivery actually failed. Close a concurrent webhook fan-out gap: the debounce window is now re-checked inside the per-stack lock, so simultaneous deliveries for one push run a single clone instead of one per request. The whole pull/apply critical section runs under a single lock acquisition. Unwrap fetch transport causes (ENOTFOUND, ECONNREFUSED, ECONNRESET, TLS) so a clone failure surfaces an actionable, host-qualified message instead of a bare "fetch failed". Cap how many bytes a single clone may download to protect the host disk; operators can tune it with GITSOURCE_MAX_CLONE_BYTES (default 100 MB). Log webhook pull failures server-side, since the webhook path is unattended. * test(git-sources): assert surfaced host via toContain to satisfy CodeQL * fix(git-sources): bound per-file read, treat debounced webhooks as non-failure, correct clone-cap docs * docs(git-sources): correct clone-cap comment to describe a download bound, not disk |
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b33a0e8422 |
fix(deploy-enforcement): surface scan-policy blocks on update and sidebar deploys (#1248)
* fix(deploy-enforcement): surface scan-policy blocks on update and sidebar deploys A blocked deploy only opened the policy dialog from the editor deploy button. The update action and the sidebar context-menu deploy/update fell through to a generic error toast, so an admin could not review the violations or bypass the block from those entry points. Route the 409 policy response through a shared handler on all three paths and make the "Deploy anyway" bypass retry the originating action (deploy or update) so an update bypass still re-pulls images. Also: - Correct the "Block on deploy" policy-editor helper text, which described post-deploy alerting rather than the pre-flight rejection it actually performs. - Dispatch the documented scan_finding warning (policy name and the offending images) when a scheduled auto-update or auto-start is blocked, instead of recording an opaque failure. - Add a standard log line when the gate blocks a deploy, plus developer-mode diagnostics for the matched policy and per-image severity decision. - Fix deploy-enforcement docs: complete the enforced entry-point list, correct the policy-precedence wording, and remove inaccurate tier and audit-actor claims. * fix(deploy-enforcement): surface policy block on rollback and name images in remote auto-update alert Addresses two gaps found in independent review: - Rollback is a policy-gated deploy path (it restores the saved files then re-runs the gate before redeploying), but the frontend treated a blocked rollback as a generic error toast. Route the 409 through the same handler as deploy and update so the block dialog opens, and let an admin "Deploy anyway" retry the rollback with the bypass flag (the rollback route already honors it). - The remote auto-update path dispatched its policy-block warning without the offending image refs, unlike the local scheduler. Append the images so the alert matches the documented contract on every node. Also list rollback as an enforced entry point in the docs and clarify that Git Source enforcement covers both the create-time deploy and a manual apply-with-deploy. |
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45844b92ca |
fix(atomic-deploy): harden rollback locking, restore fidelity, and tier gating (#1247)
* fix(atomic-deploy): harden rollback locking, restore fidelity, and tier gating Hardens the Atomic Deployments feature found during a full audit: - Rollback now holds the per-stack lifecycle lock (deploy/update already do), so a rollback can no longer race a concurrent deploy on the same compose files. Adds a 'rollback' lifecycle action and releases the lock in finally. - restoreStackFiles is now a faithful revert: it removes managed compose/.env files added after the backup before copying, so a rollback no longer leaves a hybrid of old and new configuration. Scope is the protected file set only; user data is untouched. Aborts (rather than reporting success) if a stale managed file cannot be removed. - The scheduled image-update path derives the atomic flag from the licence tier instead of hardcoding it on, keeping the paid capability explicit at the call site (the scheduler is already paid-gated; this prevents silent drift). - The backup-metadata read (GET /stacks/:name/backup) now requires a paid licence, matching the rollback flow that is the only caller. - Manual rollback dispatches a success/failure notification, alongside the existing audit-log entry. Adds route integration tests (lock acquisition/release, tier 403, notifications, no-backup 404), filesystem tests for the faithful restore (orphan removal, variant switch, abort path, non-managed files preserved), a community-tier scheduler test, and a developer-mode logging matrix. Documents the restore semantics and reconciles the scheduled-update wording in the feature guide. * fix(atomic-deploy): assert restore target stays within the compose dir before unlink The orphan-removal step in restoreStackFiles joins the stack directory with a managed filename and unlinks it. The stack directory is already validated and contained by resolveStackDir (allowlist stack name + within-base assertion), but the containment guard was not reapplied to the joined target at the delete sink, so static analysis flagged the path as derived from user input. Reassert containment on the final path before unlinking, matching the barrier the other write/read helpers in this service already apply. No behavior change for valid stacks; defense-in-depth at the sink. * fix(atomic-deploy): inline the path-containment barrier at the restore unlink sink The wrapped within-base assertion was not recognized as a sanitizer by the static path-injection analysis, which still traced the stack name to the unlink sink. Replace it with the inline path.resolve + startsWith containment check the other write helpers in this service already use (the recognized barrier), kept in the same scope as the sink. Behavior is unchanged for valid stack names. * fix(atomic-deploy): clear stale managed files from the backup slot before writing The backup directory is reused across runs and was only ever added to, never cleared. A managed file removed from the stack since the last backup (e.g. a deleted .env or a switched compose variant) lingered in the slot, so a later rollback restored a file that did not exist immediately before the failed run, contradicting the faithful-revert guarantee. Clear the protected file set from the slot before copying the current files, with the same inline containment barrier the restore path uses. A clear failure is logged, not fatal, since it only risks a stale future rollback and should not block a valid deploy. |
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5dea040ec8 |
fix(deploy-progress): decouple deploys from the live progress stream (#1246)
* fix(deploy-progress): decouple deploys from the live progress stream The deploy progress modal streamed compose output over a WebSocket, but the deploy itself was coupled to that socket in two ways that could break or silently abort a deploy: - The deploy request was gated on the progress socket connecting, so any upgrade failure (a reverse proxy blocking WebSocket upgrades, or the admin-only stream rejecting a scoped deployer) left the modal stuck on "Connecting..." and the deploy never fired. - The backend terminated the running compose process when that socket closed, so minimizing the modal, navigating away, or a network blip aborted an in-flight deploy. Make the progress socket output-only: the deploy is owned by its request and runs to completion (or the existing command timeout) regardless of the stream. The modal now degrades to a "Live progress unavailable" state and still reports success or failure from the request result. Connect failures, drops, and a connect timeout all release the deploy instead of blocking it. Also route progress output per deploy: the frontend sends a correlation id on both the connectTerminal message and the deploy request header, and the backend keys progress sockets by that id so concurrent deploys from different tabs or users no longer cross-stream each other's output. Cap the in-memory parsed log rows so a very long deploy cannot grow the modal's state unbounded. * fix(deploy-progress): generate the deploy session id with a CSPRNG The per-deploy correlation id keys which WebSocket receives a deploy's live output, so a guessable id lets one authenticated client register a victim's id and read its compose output. It was built from Math.random() plus a timestamp, which is not cryptographically secure. Generate it with crypto.getRandomValues (128 bits, hex). That is the one Crypto member available in insecure contexts, so it still works over LAN HTTP where crypto.randomUUID is unavailable. * fix(deploy-progress): stop headerless ops bleeding into a keyed progress modal Address review findings on the progress-stream routing: - Only an id-less connectTerminal registration may become the id-less fallback socket. Previously every connectTerminal (including keyed deploy modals) set the fallback, so a headerless operation (bulk update, rollback, or a legacy client) resolved via getTerminalWs() into another user's keyed deploy modal. Keyed sockets are now excluded from the fallback, and a socket that adopts a session id is removed from it. - The connect-timeout fallback now also flags the modal as "Live progress unavailable" instead of leaving it on "Connecting..." while the deploy runs. - Log only a short prefix of the deploy session id in developer diagnostics, not the full capability value. |
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b034de58f3 |
fix(auto-heal): gate panel write controls on admin role (#1245)
The Auto-Heal panel rendered its add-policy form, the per-policy enable toggle, and the per-policy delete button without any admin guard, but POST/PATCH/DELETE on /api/auto-heal/policies enforce requireAdmin + requirePaid. Paid non-admin users could see the controls and would hit a 403 on click. Same drift class as the Schedule task gate already moved in the prior sidebar parity pass. Gate the add-new-policy section, the enable toggle, and the delete button on the admin role. Reading existing policies and viewing history stay available to every paid user, matching the backend GET routes which are requirePaid only. Docs updated to call out the admin requirement on Auto-Heal write actions and to add a troubleshooting accordion for non-admin operators who see the panel without the configuration controls. |
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979181875d |
fix(sidebar): require admin role for Schedule task and debounce search input (#1243)
The right-click Schedule task menu item and its keyboard shortcut were gated
only on isPaid, but the backend write routes under /api/scheduled-tasks
enforce requireAdmin + requirePaid on every action. Non-admin Skipper or
Admiral users would see the menu item and hit a 403 on click. The frontend
now mirrors the backend by gating Schedule task on isPaid && isAdmin so the
affordance only renders for users whose action will actually succeed.
Also adds a 120ms keystroke debounce to the sidebar search input. The
useStackListState filter rebuild was previously running on every keystroke
because <Command shouldFilter={false}> disables cmdk's own filter and the
existing 250ms timer only debounces state-invalidate events. Visible input
stays immediate via local state; the debounced emit drives the filter pass.
Adds a regression guard that /api/stacks/statuses is short-circuited by the
remote-node proxy (covers the sidebar status poll path) and updates the
sidebar feature docs to reflect the admin role requirement on Schedule task.
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424c362ef1 |
docs: deep review and rewrite of introduction page (#1234)
* docs: audit and rewrite introduction page * fix(stack-files): avoid false failed download metrics |
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adcd04b01a |
refactor(auto-update): retire per-stack gate, drive auto-update from schedules only (#1233)
* refactor(auto-update): retire per-stack gate, drive auto-update from schedules only
The per-stack Auto-update toggle in the stack sidebar context menu wrote a
gate row to `stack_auto_update_settings`, but actual updates only ran when a
`scheduled_tasks` row with `action='update'` fired. On a fresh install the
toggle was inert: detection ran every 6h, nothing was applied.
The same context menu already exposes `Schedule task`, which opens
ScheduledOperationsView pre-filled for the stack where the user can pick
`Auto-update Stack` and any cron. Keeping the toggle alongside that flow
duplicated the same action and turned the gate table into a parallel store
of "is a covering schedule active" derivable from `scheduled_tasks` itself.
Drop the gate model entirely:
- Backend: remove the `stack_auto_update_settings` table and its four
accessors, the three routes under /api/stacks/*/auto-update, the per-stack
skip in /api/auto-update/execute and SchedulerService.executeUpdate's
fleet branch, and the clearStackAutoUpdateSetting call on stack delete.
Dashboard `autoUpdate` count derives from scheduled_tasks (action='update'
rows pinned to the node, total/enabled split).
- Frontend: drop the Auto-update entry from the sidebar context menu and its
optimistic toggle plumbing. Drop autoUpdateSettings state, the
/stacks/auto-update-settings fetch, and the auto-update-settings-changed
WebSocket branch. Slim useSidebarActivitySummary (just nextRunAt; no
enabled/total counts). AutoUpdateReadinessView's per-card autoUpdateEnabled
now means "a covering enabled action='update' schedule exists" (per-stack
row or fleet row on this node, earliest next_run_at wins, per-stack row
wins on ties), with the gate-fetch removed.
- New: scheduledTasksRouter broadcasts scope: 'scheduled-tasks' on POST,
PUT, PATCH /toggle, and DELETE so useConfigurationStatus and
useNextAutoUpdateRun refetch under the 250ms debounce instead of waiting
for the 60s poll. The broadcast is wrapped so a broken subscriber socket
cannot turn a successful mutation into a 500.
- Docs: rewrite the "Per-stack control" section of auto-update-policies.mdx
to describe the schedule-based model; update the matching troubleshooting
entry. The misleading fleet-update help text in ScheduledOperationsView
is corrected to reflect that every stack on the node is covered.
Tier parity: the surviving auto-update path (Schedule task -> Auto-update
Stack / All Stacks) is gated `requirePaid + requireAdmin` backend and
`isPaid + isAdmin` frontend, matching the gate the deleted routes carried.
The pre-commit grep returns no tier-related diff outside this PR's scope.
No data migration is provided: greenfield rules apply, and the leftover
table on already-shipped instances is harmless because no code reads or
writes it after this PR.
* docs: sweep remaining references to the per-stack auto-update toggle
The previous commit retired the per-stack Auto-update gate in favor of
configuring auto-update purely through scheduled tasks. This commit
removes the now-stale mentions of that toggle across the operator docs:
- docs/features/sidebar.mdx: drop the Auto-update entry from the Inspect
group description, the matching screenshot alt-text, and the Skipper
Note that listed it. Schedule task now carries the cross-link to
Auto-Update Policies.
- docs/features/stack-management.mdx: drop the Auto-update list item;
refresh the Schedule task entry to mention the Auto-update Stack action.
- docs/features/dashboard.mdx: rename the Configuration Status row from
"Auto-update stacks" to "Auto-update schedules" with the new value
shape, and rewrite the troubleshooting accordion to describe the
scheduled-tasks invalidation path.
- docs/features/scheduled-operations.mdx: rewrite the Auto-update All
Stacks row and helper text to reflect that every stack on the node is
covered (no per-stack opt-out from this surface anymore).
- docs/features/multi-node.mdx: rewrite the Updates column definition to
derive the Auto/Off flag from enabled Auto-update Stack / Auto-update
All Stacks schedules instead of the removed per-stack policy.
The auto-update-policies.mdx rewrite in the previous commit already
covered the main reference page. The sidebar-context-menu.png screenshot
will be refreshed on release once the new menu is live in production;
the alt text is updated in this commit so it accurately describes the
shipping state.
No website edits needed: the Auto-Update Policies feature card description
("Schedule automatic image pulls and redeployments per stack on your own
cadence") and the feature matrix labels ("Auto-update stack schedule",
"Auto-update all stacks schedule") remain accurate under the new model.
* fix(stacks): drop orphaned requireAdmin import after auto-update route removal
CI's backend lint step flagged this PR's earlier deletion of the three
/api/stacks/*/auto-update routes: those handlers were the only callers of
`requireAdmin` inside routes/stacks.ts, leaving the named import on line 15
unreferenced. `requirePaid` and `effectiveTier` from the same line are still
in use elsewhere in the file and stay.
tsc --noEmit does not flag unused named imports; ESLint's no-unused-vars
does. Local backend lint reproduces and now reports 0 errors against the
existing 334-warning baseline.
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80499ee18d |
feat(stack-activity): in-process metrics, structured diagnostic logs, docs (#1229)
Phase 3 + Phase 6 of the Stack Activity audit (PR 2 of 2): - StackActivityMetricsService: in-process counters and ring-buffered latency histogram (1000 samples per nodeId/op pair). Mirrors the FileExplorerMetricsService pattern shipped in #1216. No external export. Records (nodeId, op) where op is read or write, with success/error counts and p50/p95 latency on demand. - Admin endpoint GET /api/stack-activity-metrics returns the snapshot. Admin-only via requireAdmin, mounted next to the file-explorer metrics route. An operator debugging "why is the activity tab slow on this node?" can pull per-(nodeId, op) counts and latencies without scrolling logs. - Diagnostic logs: route handler emits a structured [StackActivity:diag] read entry per request (stackName, nodeId, limit, before, beforeId, returned, elapsedMs); dispatchAlert emits a [StackActivity:diag] write entry per persisted notification (category, stackName, nodeId, actor, messageLen). Both gated on developer_mode via isDebugEnabled. Same namespace so a single grep covers reads and writes on the timeline path. Per-request and per-event, never inside a poll loop. - Metric record points: the route's try/finally records a read metric with the outcome of the DB call; dispatchAlert records a write metric on both the success path and (before re-throwing) the failure path, so error rates from the insert path stay visible. - docs/features/stack-activity.mdx: refreshed to reflect PR 1's retention behavior (30 days plus per-(node, stack) 500-row cap, 1000 per-node unattached), composite (timestamp, id) cursor, error-vs- empty UI distinction, and "by username" vs "via Subsystem" actor rendering. Adds Troubleshooting entries for "Activity unavailable" (node disconnect or fetch failure), "expected event missing" (retention windows), and "same restart shows twice" (manual click vs Auto-Heal redeploy are distinct events). No tier, role, or capability gate touched. The admin metrics endpoint inherits the standard requireAdmin gate already used by /api/file- explorer-metrics and /api/stack-metrics. |
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19c28b77b5 |
docs: soften Admiral tier wording from "enterprise-grade" to "fleet-wide governance and operational" (#1226)
"Enterprise-grade" is an absolute readiness claim that overstates the maturity of a pre-1.0 product. The replacement names what the Admiral tier actually covers (the items already listed in the parenthetical: audit log, host console, cross-node Mesh traffic management, federation overrides, fleet-wide policy push) without leaning on marketing language. |
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f32b6372a1 |
docs: pre-1.0 readiness pass for public beta launch (#1225)
Close the trust-blocking items from the pre-v1.0 readiness audit so the repository is ready for the first public posting. No backend or frontend code changes; no tier gates move. README: - Add a single beta-status GitHub [!NOTE] callout below the dashboard image. Beta status also appears in selected install-flow docs (Quickstart, Known Limitations, Security Architecture, Upgrade, Troubleshooting) so install-flow readers are not surprised. - Add a "Before you install" subsection that names the docker.sock privilege model with the Portainer / Dockge / Komodo comparison. - Fix the docker run example: add the missing /opt/docker:/opt/docker mount that COMPOSE_DIR=/opt/docker depends on. - Reword the two "no exposed Docker socket" sentences so the claim is scoped to remote / cross-node exposure. - Reword "transparent HTTPS proxy" to "authenticated HTTP and WebSocket proxy" with a TLS / VPN reminder. - Fix the RBAC bullet: the role set is admin, viewer, deployer, node-admin, auditor. There is no "editor" role. - Add tier markers to the Capabilities list (matrix sentence plus per-bullet (Skipper) / (Admiral) markers), verified against the route guards in backend/src/routes/. - Fix the broken notification-routing link to point at the existing alerts-notifications#notification-routing anchor. - Soften the BSL paraphrase to point at LICENSE plus the license FAQ. - Add a "Telemetry and data handling" section: no telemetry, no analytics, no crash reports; license validation only when a paid key is activated. - Add a "What Sencho is not (yet)" section so the scope boundaries are visible above Capabilities. Templates: - PR template: drop the contradictory CHANGELOG checkbox; release-please owns CHANGELOG. - Bug report template: update the stale 0.2.2 version placeholder to 0.86.6 and add fields for compose snippet, container logs, browser console, and an involved-subsystems checkbox. Docs: - docs/operations/trivy-setup.mdx: replace both sencho/sencho:latest occurrences with the published image saelix/sencho:latest. - docs/reference/settings.mdx: rewrite the API Tokens Note (no tier gate in code; admin role only) and the Stack Labels Note (basic CRUD is free; only bulk actions require Skipper or Admiral). - Add the shared beta-status Note callout to docs/getting-started/ quickstart.mdx, docs/operations/upgrade.mdx, docs/operations/ troubleshooting.mdx, and docs/reference/security.mdx. CONTRIBUTING: - Replace the public link to the in-repo coding-rules file with a pointer to docs.sencho.io for architecture deep-dives. - Fix the sample clone URL case (Sencho.git becomes sencho.git). New files: - SUPPORT.md: where to ask, response-time expectations, in / out of scope. - KNOWN_LIMITATIONS.md: scale, platform, architecture, and feature limits documented for the beta audience; scale numbers marked "not benchmarked yet" pending real benchmarking. |
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96c7104521 |
docs(dashboard): refresh Troubleshooting accordion for new metrics-stale chip and tightened refresh model (#1223)
Three accordion edits keep the user-visible behaviour described on docs/features/dashboard.mdx in step with the audit's surface changes. - "Configuration Status still shows the old value after I changed a setting": replace the broad "most settings dispatch a live invalidation" language with the precise behaviour, which is that only a stack Auto-update toggle triggers an immediate refetch; every other settings edit waits for the 60-second poll. The change avoids promising responsiveness the card cannot deliver and points the operator at the hard-reload escape hatch. - New "The masthead shows a 'metrics stale' chip" entry: describe what the chip means, the threshold (three consecutive metrics-endpoint failures), that polling continues regardless, and that the chip describes data freshness rather than the polling cadence. Points the operator at the Docker daemon and Sencho container logs as first checks. - New "The dashboard feels sluggish on a large deployment" entry: document the Developer mode toggle as the supported diagnostic path for slow-dashboard reports. Lists the [Dashboard:debug] log shape so the operator knows what to look for, and reminds them to disable the toggle afterwards. |
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Anso
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d6afc298da |
docs(stack-files): refresh the file explorer page after the audit batch (#1224)
Brings the customer-facing page in line with what shipped in #1200 through #1220: - Names the stack-read capability without enumerating which roles carry it. Every signed-in role does today, so the wording is forward-compatible with a future role that omits it. - Updates the directory display cap to 1000 and points at the new filter input above the tree (the previous text quoted 500 and a shell-only fallback that no longer matches the UI). - Explains the unsaved-edits confirmation on file switch, the optimistic-concurrency reconcile flow with the file-changed- elsewhere notice, and the atomic write semantics in a single short paragraph. - Updates the upload row to describe drag-and-drop, the Replace confirmation on same-name conflicts, and the brand-coloured drop target hover. - Replaces the four troubleshooting accordion entries the audit asked for in plain product language: stack:read 403, protected delete, file-changed-elsewhere 412, and DISK_FULL on upload. No internal-tooling or fence-spec language. No tier-bypass walkthroughs. No legacy phrasing. |
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Anso
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d8b6f8cf3b |
feat(stack-files): force-text override for misidentified binary files (#1215)
* feat(stack-files): force-text override for misidentified binary files
The binary-detection heuristic (30% non-printable / NUL in the first
8 KB) sometimes flags UTF-8 files that happen to carry an embedded NUL
or a high non-printable ratio, locking the user out of inline editing
with only a Download fallback.
readStackFile now accepts an optional { forceText: true } that bypasses
isBinaryBuffer on the small-file path and returns the bytes as UTF-8
content. The route exposes this as ?force=text on GET /files/content.
The oversized branch deliberately stays untouched: returning a multi-MB
file as JSON-encoded text is wasteful regardless of the heuristic.
SpecialFilePanel grows an optional extraAction slot. The viewer's
binary branch wires Open as text anyway, which refetches with the new
flag, clears isBinary, and routes the content through the existing
Monaco editor path. A failed override surfaces both an inline error
panel and a toast so the user knows why the click did nothing.
Backend tests pin the heuristic-vs-override behaviour pair on a file
with a literal NUL byte. The frontend test asserts that the second
readStackFile call carries forceText: true and that Monaco mounts.
Troubleshooting accordion entry updated to mention the new affordance.
* fix(stack-files): guard the binary-override path against oversized files
The override on the binary panel could open Monaco against an empty
content buffer if the backend's oversized branch ran (files past the
2 MB inline-preview cap intentionally carry no content even when
force=text is set). Saving that empty buffer would wipe the file on
disk.
Two reinforcing changes:
- Initial load now checks result.oversized before result.binary, so a
file that is both oversized and has binary bytes in the 8 KB probe
shows the Download panel rather than the binary panel. The size
signal stays in front of the operator and the override button never
surfaces for a file that cannot be safely opened inline.
- The handleForceText handler now respects result.oversized on the
refetch and transitions to the Download panel instead of clearing
isBinary and copying result.content ?? '' into Monaco.
Same handler also gains a stale-request guard via a selectedPathRef:
a slow override for file A no longer stomps on file B's state if the
user navigated away while the request was in flight.
Two regression tests pin the new behaviour: oversized+binary surfaces
the Download panel on initial load, and an oversized refetch from the
binary panel routes to the Download panel rather than Monaco.
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Anso
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c2357ec534 |
fix(stack-files): symlink-aware delete and chmod (#1214)
deleteStackPath now lstats the leaf and unlinks the link entry itself when it is a symbolic link, so the file the user clicked on in the tree is what gets removed (the linked target stays intact). chmodStackPath rejects with LINK_CHMOD_UNSUPPORTED on a symlink rather than silently mutating the target's permissions; Node's lchmod is macOS-only and following the link is the bug being fixed here. Path-component symlinks are still resolved via the existing resolveSafeStackPath, so a symlinked parent that escapes the stack dir still surfaces SYMLINK_ESCAPE before the leaf is inspected. Service-level tests cover delete on internal-target / external-target / broken / dir-target symlinks, chmod rejection on symlinks (including the broken case), and non-symlink regression checks. Route-level tests pin the 409 LINK_CHMOD_UNSUPPORTED mapping and the link-only-delete behaviour. The describe blocks are platform-gated; Windows symlink creation needs admin/developer-mode and is skipped along with the existing SYMLINK_ESCAPE test. Docs updated to describe both behaviours in plain product terms. |
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Anso
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7c84969b31 |
fix(editor): harden save-deploy, node-switch, delete, and stats reactivity (#1188)
* fix(stacks): validate input, bound YAML parses, and reorder delete steps
Backend hardening covering three editor-served routes:
- `/:stackName/containers` GET adds an explicit `isValidStackName` guard so
bad input is rejected at the call site even if the router-level param
validator changes in future.
- `MAX_COMPOSE_PARSE_BYTES` (1 MiB) bounds the two `YAML.parse` callsites
(`resolveAllEnvFilePaths`, `/services`) so a malformed or oversize compose
cannot exhaust heap during routine env/service lookups.
- `DELETE /:stackName` is reordered to abort before any database cleanup
if `FileSystemService.deleteStack` throws, keeping DB and FS in sync.
Partial-failure responses now describe the resulting state in human
terms instead of returning a generic 500.
Adds debug-mode entry-point traces (`[Stacks:debug] ...`) on save / down /
restart / delete handlers, all sanitised through `sanitizeForLog`. New
vitest covers the containers validator, the YAML size guard, and the
small-compose happy path.
* fix(editor): gate save-and-deploy on save success, abort stale loads
`saveFile` now returns a boolean: true on a successful PUT, false on any
failure. `handleSaveAndDeploy` short-circuits when save fails so a backend
500 on the compose write no longer slips through to a deploy with the
unsaved in-memory content. The diff-preview confirm path in ShellOverlays
applies the same guard.
`loadFile` now drives a per-hook `AbortController`. A stack switch, a
node switch (via `resetEditorState`), or hook unmount aborts the in-flight
GET chain so a late compose / env / containers / backup response from the
previous selection never overwrites freshly-loaded state.
`hasUnsavedChanges` is exported so EditorLayout can check it during the
node-switch lifecycle. New unit tests cover the boolean save contract and
the save-fail-blocks-deploy invariant.
* fix(editor): prompt on node switch when the editor has unsaved changes
Switching the active node previously called `resetEditorState()` without
checking the editor's dirty state, silently dropping in-progress edits.
The post-auth shell now intercepts the node-change effect: if the editor
is dirty, the attempted node is stashed via the existing
`pendingUnsavedNode` field, `pendingUnsavedLoad` is set to a sentinel
that routes `discardAndLoadPending` to `setActiveNode`, and `activeNode`
is reverted to the previous node so the dialog can be resolved without
losing content.
A re-entrant switch (clicking a third node while the dialog is still
open) is now ignored — the second switch reverts silently so the
dialog's anchor stays on the first attempt. When the previous node is no
longer in the registry and cannot be reverted to, the operator gets a
warning toast before the wipe so the loss is at least visible.
* fix(editor): split delete and deploy permission gates in the action bar
The action bar previously wrapped every affordance — including the Delete
menu item — in a single `can('stack:deploy')` check, even though the
backend route requires `stack:delete`. A user with `stack:deploy` only
saw a Delete button that 403'd, and a user with `stack:delete` only saw
no menu at all.
Each affordance now renders against its own permission: deploy / stop /
restart / update on `stack:deploy`, delete on `stack:delete`, rollback on
`canDeploy + isPaid + backupInfo.exists`, scan on `isAdmin +
trivy.available`. The overflow menu appears if any of {rollback, scan,
delete} is granted, so a delete-only operator still has a way to remove
the stack.
Adds a Monaco model dispose on EditorView unmount via the existing
editor ref, and a compact `Stats unavailable` chip in the CONTAINERS
header that lights up when the live-stats WebSocket reports a persistent
failure.
* fix(editor): make container-stats hook reactive to the active node
`useContainerStats` previously read the active node id from
`localStorage` on each WebSocket open, with a deps array of `[containers]`
only. After a node switch the stats stream stayed pointed at the
previous node's `/ws` endpoint until the containers array refreshed.
The hook now accepts `activeNodeId` as a second argument, depends on
`[containers, activeNodeId]`, and drops the localStorage read. The
return shape is `{ stats, error }`: the error field carries a string
when the stream fails, surfaced by EditorView as a small chip in the
CONTAINERS header. A per-WS `warnedOnce` set ensures a flaky daemon
emits at most one console.warn per stream lifetime, never at message
rate. Close codes 1000 / 1001 stay silent (normal teardown, navigation).
The error reset (`setError(null)`) is split into its own effect keyed on
`activeNodeId` so the banner does not flap on every containers-array
refresh tick against a persistently-flaky daemon. Tests cover the new
shape, the node-id reactivity, and the abnormal-close warn behaviour.
* docs(editor): describe new gate split and add troubleshooting entries
Updates the editor cockpit page to reflect that the action bar now
gates each affordance on its own permission (deploy / delete), and that
the bar appears for delete-only users so a stack can still be removed.
Adds three troubleshooting accordions covering the new behaviours: a
failed save that blocks the subsequent deploy, the unsaved-changes
prompt on node switch, and the live-stats chip when the daemon is
unreachable.
Adds an E2E spec verifying that a forced PUT 500 on the compose write
surfaces the failure toast and prevents the deploy POST from firing.
* fix(stacks): use printf-style format for compose-down warn
`console.warn` treats arg-1 as a printf format string when subsequent
args follow. The template literal here interpolated a sanitized but
not %-escaped stackName into arg-1 alongside an error argument, so a
stackName containing a `%s` placeholder could theoretically swallow
the error in the substitution. Switch to the file's established
`'... %s ...', value, err` pattern.
* test(editor): fix save-deploy spec; click both edit buttons, drop Monaco fill
The editor has two edit affordances: a lowercase 'edit' in the Anatomy
panel header that swaps the right column to the editor tabs, and a
capital 'Edit' in the editor toolbar that flips Monaco from read-only
into edit mode. The spec previously matched both with a case-insensitive
regex and only fired one click, so Monaco never entered edit mode.
It also tried to fill .monaco-editor textarea — that element is Monaco's
IME accessibility helper, hard-coded readonly; the real editable surface
is a contenteditable div.
`saveFile()` does not gate on a dirty buffer, so the spec does not need
to modify Monaco at all. Click both edit buttons with case-anchored
regexes and drop the fill step.
* test(editor): disambiguate Save & Deploy locator from sidebar row
The TEST_STACK fixture is named 'e2e-save-deploy-stack'. The sidebar
renders each stack into a div with role=button whose accessible name
includes the stack slug, so the regex /save.*deploy/i matches both the
sidebar row ('e2e-save-deploy-stack') and the editor toolbar's actual
Save & Deploy button — strict-mode bails. Anchor the locator to the
literal button text with exact:true.
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Anso
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8ba88755b1 |
fix(stacks): default Empty template ships ports block commented out (#1189)
The Empty branch of the Create Stack flow wrote a compose.yaml whose first service bound the host's port 8080 by default. On any workstation already running something on 8080 (traefik, caddy, librespeed, another nginx, etc.) the very first deploy failed at the docker compose networking step with "Bind for 0.0.0.0:8080 failed: port is already allocated", which made the day-one experience feel broken right after F-2 (PR #1168) tightened the dialog itself. The boilerplate in FileSystemService.createStack now emits the ports block commented out plus a one-line hint above it. A fresh deploy binds no host port, so the container starts cleanly on any host; the user uncomments the two-line block when they're ready to expose the container. The deterministic shape (no probe-and-write, no random port, no preflight scan) avoids the TOCTOU race that a free-port probe would have left between template creation and the actual compose up. Adds backend/src/__tests__/file-system-service-create-stack.test.ts (8 cases): directory + file creation, structural YAML assertions via yaml.parse to lock in the no-live-ports invariant, raw-text regex to lock in the commented hint, and the already-exists rejection path. FileSystemService.createStack had no coverage before this change. Adds e2e/default-stack-template-no-fixed-port.spec.ts (1 case): drives the dialog through Create, reads the resulting compose via the in-browser apiFetch, and asserts the live + commented invariants end-to-end. docs/features/stack-management.mdx Empty bullet rewritten to describe the minimal skeleton and the commented ports block instead of calling it "blank". Resolves: F-3 in the v1.0 audit tracker. |
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Anso
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aa3d99a594 |
fix(mesh): re-evaluate data plane every 10s and add opt-in auto-recreate (#1184)
* fix(mesh): re-evaluate data plane every 10s and add opt-in auto-recreate MeshService.dataPlaneStatus was written exactly once at boot in setupMeshNetwork() and never re-evaluated. After the operator removed sencho_mesh at runtime (or it was recreated externally, or Sencho was disconnected from it), /api/health and the dashboard banner kept returning the stale boot-time discriminator until the next process restart. Adds a 10s revalidator that inspects the current Docker truth in one network-inspect call and transitions dataPlaneStatus to reflect it. Short-circuits in not_started / not_in_docker / subnet_invalid (states that cannot change within this process) and in concurrent ticks. Transitions are idempotent on stable state, so the timer can tick indefinitely on a healthy mesh without log noise. New 'not_found' reason value for the network-was-removed-at-runtime case. Existing reasons (subnet_mismatch, subnet_overlap, attach_failed) also surface from the revalidator when their underlying conditions arise post-boot. transitionDataPlane keeps message and subnet fields fresh across consecutive observations even when reason is unchanged, so /api/health never reports stale numbers (e.g. two consecutive subnet_mismatch observations against different external subnets). Adds an opt-in mesh_auto_recreate global setting (default off). When on, the revalidator additionally calls attemptInPlaceRecreate() after surfacing not_found. The helper hard-prefers the boot-chosen subnet (this.meshSubnet) and never iterates candidates, because changing the subnet here would invalidate every existing extra_hosts override on disk. A real conflict on the original subnet is reported as subnet_overlap and preserved during the 60s recreate throttle window so the operator-actionable reason is not flapped back to not_found between attempts. Self-attachment is checked via Name match (operator --hostname X matches container Name /X) or full container-ID prefix for hex HOSTNAMEs >= 12 chars (Docker default short ID). Non-hex HOSTNAMEs cannot collide with container IDs at all so a Name miss is conclusive; short hex HOSTNAMEs preserve the prior status as 'unknown' rather than risking a false-positive prefix match. Frontend surfaces: - types/mesh.ts: 'not_found' added to MeshDataPlaneReason. - MeshDataPlaneBanner: 'not_found' headline copy. - Settings > System > Mesh data plane: TogglePill bound to mesh_auto_recreate, default off, helper text explains the tradeoff. Backend coverage in backend/src/__tests__/mesh-data-plane-revalidate.test.ts (25 cases): short-circuits, idempotent stable-state, recovery from subnet_mismatch / subnet_overlap, transition to not_found / subnet_mismatch / attach_failed, transient-Docker anti-flap, re-entrancy guard, name match path, ID-prefix path, short hex hostname ambiguity, non-hex hostname certainty, transition message refresh on observation drift, auto-recreate off (default), auto-recreate success with senchoIp preservation, auto-recreate overlap classification with no subnet drift, throttle window preserves classified reason, throttle release. Lifecycle test covers timer wiring in start()/stop(). Existing mesh-setup-error-classification suite (27 cases) still green. Resolves: F-4 in the v1.0 audit tracker. * fix(mesh): address Codex review of PR #1184 Three findings from the independent review: BLOCKER: attemptInPlaceRecreate() called recordSetupFailure() on create / attach failures, which clears this.senchoIp. The next revalidator tick's attachment check is guarded on senchoIp, so with it null the check is skipped and the snapshot path can silently flip the status back to ok against a network where Sencho is in fact not attached. Also: a later successful recreate would call ensureSelfAttached() with senchoIp null, which short-circuits, so the network gets recreated without binding Sencho. Replaced the recordSetupFailure() calls in attemptInPlaceRecreate with a new recordRecreateFailure() that uses transitionDataPlane and preserves senchoIp. Added two tests: create-fails-then-succeeds (verifies senchoIp survives the failure and the later retry binds Sencho correctly) and create-succeeds-attach-fails-then-next-tick (verifies the snapshot path surfaces attach_failed on the next tick instead of falsely reporting ok). SHOULD-FIX 1: single-key POST /api/settings wrote String(value) without re-validating against the per-key schema, so an allowlisted enum-shaped key like mesh_auto_recreate could persist arbitrary strings ('banana', 'true') that the bulk PATCH would later refuse. Routed the single-key path through SettingsPatchSchema.safeParse so both write paths validate identically. Added regression tests for an invalid mesh_auto_recreate value, a valid mesh_auto_recreate write, and an out-of-range numeric value. SHOULD-FIX 2: the new Mesh data plane subsection lived inside a section the registry exposes to non-admins, who would see the toggle and only learn it was admin-only after the save 403'd. Gated the subsection on `isAdmin` from useAuth so non-admins do not see the control. The other system controls keep their existing visibility pattern (read-only for non-admins). 71/71 backend tests green (revalidate + mesh-setup + settings-routes). 276/276 frontend tests green. tsc clean on backend + frontend. |
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Anso
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f03c9dc7b6 |
fix(webhooks): address Codex review of PR #1177 (#1181)
* fix(webhooks): close HMAC timing oracle on trigger reject paths The trigger handler in PR #1177 returned a uniform 404 for every unauthenticated rejection, but only the wrong-signature path computed an HMAC over the request body. The other reject paths (unknown id, disabled webhook, non-paid tier, missing X-Webhook-Signature header, missing rawBody) short-circuited before any HMAC work. Repeated near-rate-limit probes with a large attacker-controlled body could distinguish a valid-and-enabled paid webhook id from the other reject cases through response latency. WebhookService.validateSignature is now constant-time over every input shape: it always runs crypto.createHmac and crypto.timingSafeEqual against fixed-length 32-byte buffers regardless of whether the signature is missing, has the wrong prefix, is malformed hex, or is the wrong length. The trigger handler calls it unconditionally before any reject branch fires, using a stable per-process decoy secret (WebhookService.getDecoySecret) when the webhook does not exist and an empty buffer when the request has no body. Response timing now depends only on the size of the request body, which the attacker already controls and which reveals nothing webhook-specific. Six new tests pin the behaviour: validateSignature is observed firing on the unknown-id and missing-signature paths through a spy assertion, and four direct-call tests confirm validateSignature returns false without throwing for empty, wrong-prefix, malformed-hex, and wrong-length signatures. * fix(safe-log): redact Basic auth and lowercase Windows drive letters The redactSensitiveText helper now covers two cases the prior chain missed: * Authorization: Basic <base64> previously left the base64 payload intact. The existing key/value regex caught only the literal word Basic before stopping at the space. A new Basic\s+[A-Za-z0-9+/=]+ replacement runs before the key/value regex so the credential is scrubbed first. * Windows homedir paths like c:\Users\<user>\... with a lowercase drive letter previously slipped through because the regex required [A-Z]. Changed to [A-Za-z] so both letter cases are covered. Two new tests pin both fixes. * docs(webhooks): document 429, fix shared schema, comply with D27/D31 * Trigger endpoint declares the 429 response that webhookTriggerLimiter can return (500 requests per minute per source IP); both docs/openapi.yaml and the response table in docs/features/webhooks.mdx carry the new row, and a new troubleshooting accordion explains the shared-NAT scenario. * Shared Webhook schema in docs/openapi.yaml extends the action enum to include git-pull and documents the node_id property. The GET list endpoint returns these fields; the prior schema would have failed validation for any git-pull row. * docs/features/webhooks.mdx:7 rewritten from a customer-side role enumeration ("non-admins on a paid tier can view the list but cannot manage it") to a single requirement statement ("Webhooks require a Skipper or Admiral license. Managing webhooks is admin-only.") per CLAUDE.md D27/D31; the prior phrasing was customer-side fence-spec. * Two em dashes in webhook description strings I had touched in the prior OpenAPI sync commit replaced with semicolons per D18. |
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Anso
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21ec5e7e0a |
fix(webhooks): harden trigger response surface (#1177)
* fix(webhooks): harden trigger response surface
Bundles six audit findings on the incoming-webhooks trigger path. All
changes preserve the documented happy path: a CI caller signing the exact
request body with the webhook secret still receives 202 Accepted.
* Uniform 404 on every unauthenticated rejection (missing webhook,
disabled webhook, non-paid tier, missing signature header, missing
raw body, signature mismatch). The four-way response surface previously
let an unauthenticated probe enumerate webhook ids and fingerprint the
instance's licence tier; callers now see one shape for any failed auth.
* Fail closed when express.json()'s verify callback did not capture the
raw request body. Previously the handler fell back to
JSON.stringify(req.body), which compares the HMAC against a
re-serialised payload that is not byte-equal to what the client signed.
* Pass the already-loaded webhook through to WebhookService.execute()
instead of re-fetching by id. Closes the delete-during-execution race
where an admin deletion between the trigger handler's load and the async
dispatch silently dropped the execution row. The webhook_executions
table has ON DELETE CASCADE, so recordExecution now wraps the insert in
try/catch and logs a warning when the FK constraint trips because the
parent webhook was deleted mid-flight.
* Redact bearer tokens, JWTs, URL credentials, and homedir paths from
error strings before persisting to webhook_executions.error. The
execution history is readable by any paid user via GET /webhooks/:id/
history; redactSensitiveText gains three home-directory patterns
(/home/<user>, /Users/<user>, <drive>:\Users\<user>) and now runs on
every error stored from this path.
* Cap webhook name at 100 characters on both POST and PUT, rejecting
non-string and oversized values with 400 before they reach the DB.
* Validate the body's action override against a typed allowlist
(isWebhookAction type guard) on the trigger endpoint, returning 400
before queueing execution. An unknown override no longer reaches
recordExecution as a stored failure row.
Tests updated to pass db.getWebhook(id)! instead of the raw id to the new
execute() signature. Docs at docs/features/webhooks.mdx updated to reflect
the new uniform 404 response, the new 400-on-invalid-action behaviour, and
a rewritten troubleshooting accordion that walks operators through every
cause of the uniform 404.
* test(webhooks): cover trigger handler auth, race, and redaction paths
Adds 21 vitest cases for the public webhook trigger handler and the
WebhookService.execute / recordExecution pipeline, plus 3 cases for the
new homedir patterns in redactSensitiveText.
webhooks-trigger.test.ts covers, per audit finding:
* M1 + H3 uniform 404: id unknown, webhook disabled, non-paid tier,
missing signature header, missing rawBody, sha1= prefix, malformed
hex signature, sig mismatch. Each asserts identical 404 body so a
future regression that re-introduces 401 / 403 / PAID_REQUIRED breaks
one of the 8 tests.
* Happy path: 202 with configured action, valid action override,
unknown action override returns 400 after auth succeeds (L2),
non-string action override returns 400.
* L1 name cap: POST and PUT both reject names over 100 chars and
non-string names; 100-char boundary still accepted; PUT allows
partial updates that omit name.
* M5 race: deleting the parent webhook before recordExecution runs no
longer crashes the async dispatch; the FK cascade is swallowed with
a console.warn, and a happy-path test pins the recordExecution row.
* M6 redaction: stubs ComposeService.runCommand to throw errors
containing a bearer token and a homedir path, then asserts the
persisted webhook_executions.error has both scrubbed.
safe-log.test.ts gains three unit tests pinning the new homedir
patterns in redactSensitiveText (Linux, macOS, Windows). The existing
credentials test is untouched.
Tests use prototype spies on FileSystemService and ComposeService (both
hand out a fresh instance per nodeId), so per-test mocks do not leak.
beforeEach restores all mocks and reapplies the LicenseService 'paid'
spy. Closes audit finding H2 (zero trigger-path test coverage).
* docs(webhooks): sync openapi spec with new trigger response surface
Brings docs/openapi.yaml in line with the behaviour changes from the
trigger hardening commit. Mintlify auto-generates the per-endpoint
reference pages from this spec, so the spec drift would surface as
wrong response codes in the public API reference.
POST /api/webhooks and PUT /api/webhooks/🆔
* name: maxLength 100 (matches MAX_WEBHOOK_NAME_LENGTH on the route).
* action enum: add git-pull (pre-existing omission; the route has
always accepted it).
* node_id: documented as an integer property (pre-existing omission).
POST /api/webhooks/:id/trigger:
* requestBody required: true (body is now mandatory; the H3
fail-closed branch rejects a missing rawBody).
* action override: enum restricted to the allowlist.
* 401 and 403 responses removed.
* 404 response: description rewritten to reflect uniform-404
behaviour; the body is { error: "Webhook not found or signature
invalid" } for every unauthenticated reject.
* 400 response added for an authenticated request whose action
override is not in the allowlist.
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Anso
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fcff8e9047 |
fix(monitor): collapse repeated host-metric alerts into per-window summary (F-11) (#1175)
* fix(monitor): collapse repeated host-metric alerts into per-window summary (F-11) A host metric over threshold previously dispatched one notification every 5 minutes for the duration of the breach, producing 7+ identical messages in 35 minutes and spamming Discord/Slack routes. Replace the hardcoded 5-minute cooldown for CPU/RAM/disk with a per-metric suppression window (default 60 min, configurable via host_alert_suppression_mins). The first breach fires immediately; subsequent cycles within the window are silently counted; the next dispatch after the window elapses carries a summary suffix listing how many cycles were suppressed and when the breach first crossed threshold. Recovery clears the counter so re-breach fires fresh. The pattern mirrors PolicyEnforcement.notifyTrivyMissingOnce: module-scope Map, in-memory only, in-cycle dedup, with a test-reset helper. The existing system_state row keeps post-restart re-fires bounded. Janitor and per-stack alert rules are unchanged; they already have adequate cadence and per-rule cooldown respectively. * fix(ci): restore backend and frontend checks * fix(e2e): remove create button timing race * fix(e2e): harden create double-click test * fix(monitor): clear persisted F-11 timestamp on recovery + clamp suppression window Independent audit on the previous commit surfaced two issues. 1. clearHostMetricSuppression early-returned on missing in-memory state, leaving a stale system_state.last_host_*_alert_ts row alive after a process restart. Scenario: breach fires + persists timestamp, process restarts, metric recovers before another evaluate cycle re-seeds the in-memory Map, recovery cleanup early-returns. Next re-breach inside the original window hits the restart-survivability branch and is silently suppressed instead of firing fresh. Fix: read persisted state in clearHostMetricSuppression and reset to '0' independently of in-memory presence. The read-before-write also skips redundant writes when the row is already cleared. 2. host_alert_suppression_mins is validated by zod on the bulk PATCH path but the single-key POST /api/settings path accepts allowlisted keys without re-validation. A 999999999-minute value would silence host alerts for centuries. Add MAX_HOST_ALERT_SUPPRESSION_MIN = 1440 mirroring the zod max, and clamp via Math.min in evaluateGlobalSettings. Two new vitest cases (restart-then-recovery-then-rebreach; the 1440 clamp) confirmed failing before the fix, passing after. The existing "metric drop" case updated to use a mock-backed persistence pattern consistent with the new restart-scenario tests. 73/73 monitor-service tests green; full backend suite 2507/2510 (same pre-existing Windows EBUSY flake on filesystem-backup.test.ts as baseline). |
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0947da13ae |
fix(security): collapse repeated trivy-missing pre-deploy notifications (#1166)
Scan policies on a node without Trivy installed previously fired one "Pre-deploy scan skipped" warning per deploy, flooding the notification feed during CI loops. Add a 60-minute per-(node, stack) cooldown so an operator sees one actionable warning, not one per deploy. The boot log line and the one-click managed install in Settings > Security are unchanged; this only reshapes the per-deploy fanout. Also tighten the vulnerability-scanning entry in /docs/features/overview to point first-touch users at the one-click install on first use. |
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64bf6344a3 |
fix(mesh): bias Sencho static IP via IPAM IPRange (F-13) (#1162)
* fix(mesh): reserve Sencho static IP via IPAM auxiliary address (F-13)
Sencho pins itself to <network>+2 on sencho_mesh, but the IPAM block only
declared Subnet, so Docker freely handed that address to any meshed
workload that restarted while Sencho was offline. A real-world hit on
arrapps-prod during a Sencho upgrade had tautulli grab 172.30.0.2, which
blocked the new Sencho container's mesh attach with "Address already in
use" and left compose in a half-state needing manual disconnect/recreate.
The fix reserves <network>+2 via AuxiliaryAddresses on the IPAM Config
when creating sencho_mesh. Aux-listed addresses are removed from the
auto-allocatable pool, so Docker refuses to hand the IP to any container
that does not explicitly request it. Sencho's own attach via
connectContainerToNetwork({ ipv4Address }) is unaffected because
explicit pins still bind aux-reserved addresses. Workload containers
without a pinned IP get .3 and up.
Wire format verified against the Docker Engine REST v1.33 OpenAPI spec:
the JSON key on POST /networks/create (and on the inspect response) is
AuxiliaryAddresses inside each IPAM.Config item, value { sencho: <ip> }.
Adopt-existing path: when Sencho boots against a sencho_mesh that
pre-dates this reservation, the data plane still comes up but a one-time
warn fires (mesh.enable activity at level: 'warn' plus a [Mesh] console
line so docker logs surfaces it). The advisory explains the squat risk
and gives the recreate recipe.
Tests: 5 cases added to mesh-setup-error-classification.test.ts covering
the explicit-env create payload, the candidate-iteration winner payload,
the adopt-legacy warn (env-unset), the adopt-already-reserved silent
path, and the TOCTOU 409 race-winner adopt-legacy warn.
Docs: one sentence added to docs/features/sencho-mesh.mdx under
"Customising the mesh subnet" describing the reservation positively.
No tier/role/capability/flag gates touched (no frontend changes).
* fix(mesh): use IPRange upper-half bias instead of aux-address reservation
The initial F-13 fix used IPAM AuxiliaryAddresses to reserve <network>+2
on sencho_mesh. Empirical probe against Docker 29.4.3 confirmed this
also blocks explicit pins via EndpointConfig.IPAMConfig.IPv4Address:
libnetwork's RequestAddress() rejects a preferred-address request when
the bit is already set by the aux reservation. Result: the freshly-
reserved network refuses Sencho's own ensureSelfAttached, and the data
plane never comes up.
The pivot uses IPRange instead. IPRange constrains Docker's auto-
allocation to the configured CIDR; preferred-address requests via
RequestAddress(prefAddress) skip the IPRange check and only consult
the subnet-wide bitmap. So setting IPRange to the upper half of the
subnet (e.g. 172.30.0.128/25 for 172.30.0.0/24) biases workloads
without an explicit IP to <network>+128 and up, while Sencho's
explicit pin to <network>+2 still succeeds.
Verified on Docker 29.4.3 with the same workstation that produced the
original audit:
- `docker run --rm --network N --ip 10.99.99.2` against a network
with `--aux-address sencho=10.99.99.2` → "Address already in use"
(rejects explicit pin).
- Same `--ip` against a network with `--ip-range 10.99.99.128/25` →
succeeds (10.99.99.2 is outside the range but inside the subnet).
- Auto-allocated workload on the IPRange network lands at .129.
Adopt-existing legacy detection now compares IPRange instead of
AuxiliaryAddresses. inspectExistingMeshSubnet returns { subnet,
ipRange } and the warn fires when ipRange differs from the expected
upper-half CIDR. Same once-per-process semantics as before.
createMeshNetwork now derives the IPRange via a new
getMeshIpRangeFromSubnet helper. The five regression tests assert
IPRange = <network>+128/<prefix+1> in the create payload and the
expected/actual IPRange in the legacy-warn details.
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474290081d |
fix(mesh): log boot state to console so docker logs surfaces mesh status (#1159)
MeshService records its boot summary and setup failures only through logActivity (in-memory ring buffer + WS listeners), which the Routing tab consumes. The docker-logs surface was silent for the mesh subsystem, so operators running Sencho-in-Docker had no boot-time visibility into whether the data plane came up cleanly. Mirror the existing logActivity entries to console without replacing them: - MeshService.start() success summary: console.log / console.warn / console.error gated on the summary level. Format: [Mesh] data plane ok, self attached at <ip>, subnet <X> [Mesh] data plane unavailable (<reason>: <message>) - recordSetupFailure: console.warn for the expected dev-mode not_in_docker case, console.error for real failures. Format: [Mesh] data plane unavailable (<reason>, subnet <X>): <sanitized> The activity entries that already drive the Routing tab banner stay intact; the console lines are purely additive for the docker logs workflow. Two new unit tests assert the failure and not_in_docker console mirrors fire with the [Mesh] prefix. Fixes F-5. |
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e4fe4cfced |
fix(mesh): address Codex audit findings on F-1 PR (#1158)
- docs(sencho-mesh): split subnet_overlap troubleshooting into env-set vs env-unset paths; rewrite the "Customising the mesh subnet" intro to describe the candidate list and the adopt-existing behavior. - backend(MeshService): preserve idempotent 409 handling in the explicit-env path. On createNetwork 409 (TOCTOU race against another process), re-inspect and treat the race-winner as success when its subnet matches the operator's request; subnet_mismatch otherwise. - frontend(MeshDataPlaneBanner): trim the card variant to a true one-line strip (headline only, truncate min-w-0). Full recovery hint stays on the Routing tab variant and in docs. - tests(mesh): add five cases covering the previously untested branches — candidate-loop non-overlap bail, adopt-existing with unparseable subnet, explicit-env generic createNetwork failure, TOCTOU 409 race-winner match, TOCTOU 409 race-winner mismatch. Architecture map (gitignored per Directive 11) updated locally with the new useMeshDataPlane hook node and the mesh.dashboardBanner flow so the local interactive viewer stays accurate. |