54 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Anso	f794702171	feat(security): action-posture Security dashboard with exploit intel and triage (#1424) ... * feat(security): reframe masthead as action posture, not worst-CVE severity Derive the Security masthead from an action posture (Action needed / Monitoring / Secure / Unknown) instead of raw scanner severity, and label the raw Critical/High counts as scanner detections. "Secure" now means nothing is actionable right now, never a claim that no vulnerabilities exist; Unknown covers a missing scanner or a node with no completed scan. Phase-1 bootstrap: "actionable" is approximated from the overview facts that already exist (fixable findings, secrets, misconfigs); a later phase moves the bucketing to the backend. * feat(security): derive overview action posture from triaged facts Add deriveSecurityPosture as the single bucketing function and extend /security/overview with posture facts (fixableCriticalHigh, dangerousCompose, accepted, rawCritical/rawHigh, plus knownExploited/publiclyExposed placeholders that later phases populate) and the derived posture verb. Suppression- and acknowledgement-aware counts come from one bounded read-time pass over the latest-scan Critical/High findings, grouped per image so the existing read-time filters apply unchanged. The pass is capped and flags posturePartial, so a large node degrades gracefully instead of scanning every detail row. The masthead now prefers the backend posture and keeps the local bootstrap only as a fallback for older remote nodes reached through the proxy. * feat(security): capture Trivy finding enrichment (status, CVSS, vendor, purl, layer) parseTrivyOutput now keeps the per-finding fields Trivy already returns and we previously discarded: Status (fixed / will_not_fix / end_of_life / ...), CVSS (score + vector, preferring the NVD source then falling back), vendor severity, package URL, package path, and layer digest. Persisted on vulnerability_details via additive nullable columns (guarded ALTER), bound null when absent, and carried through the cached-scan reconstruction path. These fields separate scary from exploitable and feed the action posture and the per-finding evidence tags. Field paths verified against Trivy's documented image-scan JSON; covered by parse and insert/read round-trip tests. * feat(security): add CVE exploit-intel service (CISA KEV + FIRST EPSS) Add CveIntelService, a daily background cache of CISA KEV membership and FIRST EPSS scores stored in a new cve_intel table and joined to findings at read time by CVE id (never frozen onto scan rows, so a CVE entering KEV later lights up on scans already stored). EPSS is fetched only for CVE ids present in stored findings, batched; both feeds are best-effort and keep the last cache on failure, so the Security page degrades gracefully offline. Wired into startup/shutdown like the other background services. The overview now counts known-exploited Critical/High findings, and KEV membership escalates posture to Action needed even when no fix is available. A per-instance "Exploit intelligence" toggle on the scanner setup surface lets air-gapped or firewalled hosts disable the outbound fetch; the daily tick keeps running but skips the fetch body when it is off. * feat(security): show per-finding evidence tags (KEV, EPSS, vendor status, CVSS) The vulnerabilities endpoint joins read-time exploit intel (KEV membership and EPSS score) onto each finding by CVE id, and the scan sheet renders evidence tags beside each CVE: known-exploited, EPSS probability, vendor will-not-fix / end-of-life, and the CVSS score. Severity becomes one signal among several so an operator can tell scary from exploitable, with no invented composite score. * feat(security): evolve CVE suppressions into triage decisions Layer a triage status and optional OpenVEX justification onto CVE suppressions. Statuses: needs review / affected / not affected / accepted risk / fixed / false positive / ignored. Dismissing states (not affected, accepted, fixed, false positive, ignored) stop a finding from driving the action posture; needs review and affected stay actionable and are surfaced as counts. Existing rows default to "accepted" (the prior suppress behavior), so nothing changes for them. The overview now reports needsReview / notAffected / accepted as distinct facts derived from the triage status. The decision replicates across the fleet (snapshot + replicated-insert carry status + justification) so a replica's posture matches the control node. The inline suppress dialog gains a triage decision selector; the read-time filter surfaces the status and justification on every finding. * feat(security): export fleet triage decisions as OpenVEX (Admiral) Add an OpenVEX exporter that turns the instance's CVE triage decisions into a standard VEX document (not_affected / fixed / affected / under_investigation, with justifications), and a GET /security/vex/export endpoint to download it. Authoring fleet VEX is a governance capability, so it is gated to Admiral (paid) plus admin, mirroring the SARIF export gate; the Suppressions panel shows an Export VEX action only on Admiral. * docs(security): document action posture, evidence tags, exploit intel, and triage Update the Security page and CVE suppressions docs for the action-posture masthead (scanner detections vs product posture), per-finding evidence tags (KEV / EPSS / CVSS / vendor status), the exploit-intelligence toggle (CISA KEV + FIRST EPSS) on scanner setup, triage decisions layered on suppressions, and OpenVEX export of fleet triage decisions. * test(security): match intel hosts exactly in CveIntelService test Route the fetch stub and its call assertions by exact hostname (www.cisa.gov / api.first.org) instead of a domain substring check. Resolves the js/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization code-scanning alerts on the test's URL routing; behavior is unchanged.	2026-06-23 17:42:11 -04:00
Anso	37e6e48b40	feat(files): copy & duplicate, bulk actions, disk-backed uploads, and an accessible file tree (#1409) ... * perf(files): spool uploads to disk instead of buffering in memory Switch the stack file-explorer upload from multer memoryStorage to diskStorage and stream the spooled temp file through the file-root gateway, so an upload is never held fully in RAM. Authorization and root resolution now run before multer spools, so an unauthorized or read-only-root request is rejected without writing a temp file, and the spool is removed on every exit path. The named-volume helper write verifies the written byte count, since cat cannot report a short write. * feat(files): copy and duplicate files in the explorer Add a copy capability to the stack file explorer: a same-folder Duplicate (auto-suffixed name) and a "Copy to..." destination picker, on both filesystem and named-volume roots. Copying is within-root, symlink-leaf-safe, blocks a directory copy into its own subtree, and refuses to create a protected name (compose/.env) at the stack root while still allowing a protected file to be duplicated under a new name. * feat(files): make the file tree keyboard accessible Bring the stack file explorer tree to the WCAG tree pattern: rows are treeitems carrying aria-level, aria-selected, and aria-expanded, with a single roving tabindex and full keyboard navigation (arrow keys, Home/End, Enter/Space) over a flattened visible-node list that stays in lockstep with the rendered rows. A polite live region announces the selected file. No visual change to the tree. * feat(files): bulk select, delete, move, and download files Add multi-select to the stack file explorer (checkboxes plus Shift and Ctrl/Cmd click over the visible order) driving three bulk actions: delete, move, and download as a streamed .tar.gz. All run within the active root on both filesystem and named-volume backends, report per-item results so partial failures surface (with the failed items kept selected for retry), normalize ancestor/descendant selections server-side, and cap the archive entry and byte counts before any bytes are streamed. Protected compose/.env files are excluded from bulk delete and move but may still be downloaded. * docs(files): document copy, bulk actions, and keyboard navigation Add the copy/duplicate and multi-select bulk delete/move/download sections to the Files & Volumes page, a keyboard-navigation note for the tree, an updated context-menu reference, and bulk troubleshooting entries. * fix(files): inline path-injection barriers at the new file-op sinks CodeQL js/path-injection does not credit the wrapped isPathWithinBase containment check, so the new copy/bulk/disk-upload flows tripped the gate. Inline the canonical path.resolve + startsWith barrier at the realpath sink in resolveSafePathWithin (covers every user-relPath flow) and confirm the multer spool path resolves within UPLOAD_TMP_DIR before unlinking it or streaming it onward. Behavior is unchanged; the paths were already validated. * fix(files): guard the ancestor-walk realpath sink too The first barrier covered realpath(target), but the ENOENT ancestor walk re-derives the path via path.dirname, which static analysis treats as a fresh tainted value. Add the same inline containment barrier before that realpath and resolve the root case via the untainted base, so the only tainted realpath input is one the startsWith check has cleared. Behavior is unchanged. * fix(files): resolve the root case off the taint path in the ancestor walk The compound guard on existing (the same variable as the startsWith subject) was not credited as a sanitizer. Handle the root case before the barrier by resolving the untainted base directly, leaving a plain canonical startsWith guard on the strictly-within ancestor. Behavior is unchanged. * fix(files): harden helper-backend bulk download and uploads Address three issues found in the named-volume (helper) backend: - Bulk download could send 200 headers before discovering a file the helper download path refuses, tearing the archive mid-stream. The prewalk now rejects symlinks, non-regular ("other") entries, and files over the per-file download cap before any header (400/413). FileEntry gains an 'other' type so non-regular entries stay distinct from regular files as they pass through the gateway. - The helper directory listing was fully buffered before the archive entry cap could fire. listDir now accepts a limit; the list script stops after limit+1 rows and the gateway reports truncation. - A stdin pipeline error during a helper upload masked the container's real nonzero exit code (and its 4xx mapping) as a generic 500. The nonzero exit now wins; the masked stream error is logged. * feat(files): add a New file toolbar button with server-enforced create-only The stack file explorer could create a folder from a toolbar button but a new file only from a folder's right-click menu, so a file could not be created at the stack root at all. Add a New file toolbar button beside New folder, targeting the current directory. Creating a file now routes through a new createEmptyStackFile helper that posts a zero-byte file through the existing upload endpoint with overwrite off, so the server's exclusive-create path rejects an existing name instead of clobbering it. A file collision surfaces inline in the dialog; a folder collision and other failures surface as a toast. * fix(files): widen the tree row hit area and add horizontal scroll for long names Right-clicking a file tree row only opened the Sencho context menu when the click landed on the filename; the rest of the row fell through to the native browser menu, and long names were truncated with no way to read them. Make each row span the full pane width (and grow with its content) so the whole row is the context-menu trigger, and let the tree scroll horizontally so a long name is reachable instead of clipped. A new opt-in horizontal prop on ScrollArea adds the styled horizontal scrollbar without clamping content width. * docs(files): document the New file button, full-row right-click, and long-name scrolling * test(files): cover createEmptyStackFile targeting the stack root Add an API-layer case for the empty-directory (stack root) create path, the primary reason the New file toolbar button exists, so a regression in the root-level URL would be caught at unit speed rather than only in e2e.	2026-06-22 19:33:06 -04:00
Anso	ba09e6f69e	fix: base Git multi-file Compose deploy env and dossier on the effective config (#1391) ... * fix: resolve the root .env at deploy and render time for Git context-dir stacks A Git multi-file source with a context dir set --project-directory to that dir, so Docker Compose looked for .env there and missed the root .env Sencho writes. Validation already passed the root .env with --env-file, so a stack could validate with one effective config but deploy or render another. Add authoredComposeEnvFileArgs, which appends --env-file <stackDir>/.env when the applied deploy spec has a context dir and a root .env exists, and wire it into the deploy/update, image-scan, render, and container-listing compose invocations so they all resolve env from the same file the validator used. A non-ENOENT access error surfaces instead of silently dropping the flag. * fix: base multi-file Git dossier and doc-drift on the effective Compose model The Stack Dossier and its documentation-drift check parsed only the stored root compose file. For a multi-file Git source, services, ports, networks, or volumes that an override file adds were invisible, so the dossier showed incomplete facts and doc-drift could falsely warn that a documented port is unpublished when an override actually publishes it. Add a secret-safe GET /stacks/:name/effective-anatomy that renders the merged effective model and extracts only structural facts (services, ports, volumes, networks, restart), never env, label, or command values. StackAnatomyPanel fetches it for multi-file Git stacks and feeds those facts into the dossier and doc-drift, falling back to the root-only parse for single-file or non-git stacks and whenever the render is unavailable. * fix: add an inline path-injection barrier to the Git env-file resolver CodeQL js/path-injection flagged the fs.access in authoredComposeEnvFileArgs because the env path derives from the route-supplied stack name and the only containment check lived in the callers, not at the sink. Resolve the stack dir against the compose base and assert containment with startsWith inline, then derive the .env path from the validated dir, mirroring the existing inline guards in renderConfig and validateCompose. Valid stack names are unaffected; a name that escapes the base now yields no --env-file. * test: stabilize the dossier doc-drift e2e against the dossier-load race The first assertion filled the access_urls field as soon as the Dossier panel was visible, but the panel's GET /stacks/:name/dossier resolves by overwriting the fields from the server (empty access_urls) and only then flips the doc-drift gate on. When the GET landed after the fill, it clobbered the typed value and the warning never rendered, so the test failed intermittently under CI timing. Wait for that GET to land before typing, mirroring the spec's openStack helper.	2026-06-18 18:25:58 -04:00
Anso	f23b7e1bac	feat: ordered multi-file Compose for Git sources (#1380) ... * feat: ordered multi-file Compose for Git sources Extend Git sources to deploy an ordered list of compose files merged with docker compose -f base.yaml -f override.yaml ..., plus an optional project directory. - Pick and reorder compose files from the repository tree (drag to reorder on desktop, up/down arrows on phones); manual path entry is also supported. - The ordered set drives every stack-scoped compose command (deploy, update, start/stop/restart/down, image scans, Compose Doctor) and the container lookup, so a service or image declared only in an override is handled too. - Runtime keys off the materialized set, not the saved configuration: saving a source does not change deploy args until the pull is applied, and apply materializes from the pending snapshot rather than live config. - The project directory is passed as --project-directory, with -p <stack> pinning the Compose project so container labels stay stable. - The Mesh override is layered last; single-file sources are byte-identical to before, and existing rows keep working via the single-path fallback. Docs cover the picker, ordering, project directory, and the new troubleshooting and limitations (referenced files are not materialized; the dependency graph, drift, and networking views read the primary file). * fix: harden multi-file Git source (hash, unlink, collisions, node id) - hashContent folds ordered file CONTENTS (not paths) so a clean multi-file stack is not flagged as locally edited: create/apply hash the fetched files (repo paths) while pull hashes the on-disk files (materialized paths), which previously disagreed and showed a false "local edits detected". - Block unlinking a multi-file or project-directory Git source (409): the deploy spec lives on the source row, so removing it would silently revert deploys to root compose.yaml. Single-file sources still unlink. - Reject materialized-path collisions in the selection validator: an additional file equal to or nested under compose.yaml, an ancestor/descendant overlap between selected files, and a project directory nested under a compose file (previously a 500 at materialization). - DockerController.getContainersByStack uses the controller's node compose dir and passes its node id to the authored prefix, instead of the process default. * fix: CI failures on multi-file Git source (test crash, aria query, path barrier) - GitSourceFields no longer crashes when repoUrl/branch are falsy: the canBrowse trim() is optional-chained, so a reusable field component tolerates partial props. Fixes the apply-binding panel test, which feeds a minimal source object. - GitSourcePanel tests query the footer Remove button by its exact name, so the picker's per-file "Remove <path>" buttons no longer collide with the broad /remove/i match (the test intent, footer Remove present/absent, is unchanged). - validateCompose uses an inline resolve + startsWith barrier at the context-dir mkdir sink (CodeQL does not credit the wrapped isPathWithinBase helper), clearing the js/path-injection alert. The containment check is equivalent and contextDir is also validated upstream. * test: update Git source E2E spec for the multi-file compose picker The compose-file picker replaced the single #git-source-path input and added per-file Remove buttons, so the E2E spec drove selectors that no longer exist: - Drop the redundant compose.yaml fills (the picker defaults to compose.yaml). - Select the footer Remove button by exact name so the picker's per-file "Remove <path>" buttons no longer make the locator ambiguous. - Set a custom compose path through the picker (add via the manual input, press Enter, then remove the default compose.yaml). * test: match the footer Remove button with an exact Playwright name Playwright's getByRole name option is a substring match by default, so { name: 'Remove' } also matched the picker's "Remove <path>" buttons. Require an exact match so only the footer Remove button is selected.	2026-06-17 13:24:55 -04:00
Anso	710647a44f	feat(snapshots): preserve stack dossiers with fleet snapshots (#1339) ... * feat(snapshots): preserve stack dossiers with fleet snapshots Fleet snapshots can now optionally capture each stack's Dossier notes alongside its compose and .env files, so a recovery restores the operational knowledge around a stack, not just its configuration. - Opt-in global setting "snapshot_documentation" (default off), toggled from the renamed Fleet settings section. - Capture reads local dossiers from the database and remote dossiers over the Distributed API proxy; only stacks with notes are recorded, and secret values are never included. - Captured notes are stored encrypted at rest in a new fleet_snapshots column and surfaced in the snapshot detail view behind a badge. - Cloud and downloaded archives gain a documentation.json (archive_version 2). - Restore stays conservative: dossier notes are written back only when the operator explicitly opts in, on both single-stack and restore-all paths. - Existing snapshots and archives remain valid; behavior is unchanged when the setting is off. * fix(snapshots): harden dossier-notes restore against bad input and partial failures Address review findings on the documentation-snapshots restore path: - Parse `restoreNotes` strictly (=== true) on single-stack restore, matching restore-all, so a stray non-boolean can never opt in to overwriting notes. - Guard findSnapshotDossier: require an array of stacks and real dossier content, so a malformed or all-blank entry can't clobber current notes. - Make the dossier-notes write non-fatal relative to the file restore: a notes failure (e.g. a remote dossier PUT) is caught, reported via `notesError`, and no longer 500s the single restore or fails the stack in restore-all once the files are already written. - Surface the partial outcome in the UI: a warning toast on single restore, a summary note on restore-all, and gate the "Documentation captured" badge and restore-all notes control on captured stacks while rendering capture warnings. Adds tests for strict parsing, malformed/blank blobs, remote notes restore (success + non-fatal failure, single and bulk), and scheduled capture-on. * fix(snapshots): drop unused binding in restore-all remote notes test The restore-all remote notes test destructured a node id it never uses (restore-all is driven by snapshot id alone), tripping no-unused-vars and failing the lint step. Bind only the snapshot id.	2026-06-08 08:44:59 -04:00
Anso	b21324f97a	feat(stacks): persist a drift ledger with temporal source-change detection (#1333) ... * feat(stacks): persist a drift ledger with temporal source-change detection Build on the read-only compose-vs-runtime drift check so a stack's drift is remembered over time, not just shown at a glance. - Record a deploy baseline: on a successful deploy, update, or rollback, store the deployed compose file's source and rendered-model hashes on the stack so the Drift tab can tell whether the file has changed since the last deploy. - Surface temporal drift in the Drift tab: "matches last deploy", "source changed since last deploy" (distinguishing a model change from a formatting-only edit), or "no deploy baseline yet". - Persist findings into a drift ledger: a re-check reconciles the current findings, recording newly detected ones and resolving cleared ones, and shows a short drift history under the findings. The drift report read stays side-effect-free; only an explicit re-check (and a deploy) writes the ledger. - Write drift detected/resolved events to the stack Activity timeline so the provenance sits alongside deploys and restarts. Node-local and available on the Community tier. Reconciliation is skipped when a check is not authoritative (Docker unreachable or a compose parse error) so an open finding is never falsely cleared. * fix(stacks): record the drift baseline for every deploy path and harden the ledger Address review feedback on the drift ledger: - Record the deploy baseline in ComposeService.deployStack/updateStack instead of only the manual route, so bulk, Git-source, App Store, scheduler, and webhook deploys all capture source/rendered hashes. Reconciliation stays on the explicit re-check. - Store no rendered baseline when the local parser cannot model the compose (for example a file over the parse cap) rather than a sentinel that would make a later real change read as unchanged. - Let temporal-overlay failures surface as a 500 instead of being hidden behind a neutral "no baseline"; only the compose read stays best-effort. - Omit the temporal card entirely when a report (for example from an older remote node) carries no temporal data, instead of showing a misleading "no baseline". - Keep drift_detected / drift_resolved history-only by excluding them from the routable-category whitelist, so they are never offered as a channel route that would never fire. - Use a JSON separator for the finding identity key so the source file is plain text (no embedded control byte). * fix(stacks): sanitize logged errors in the drift report handlers The drift report and re-check handlers logged the caught error object raw alongside the stack name, which a code scan flagged as a log-injection vector: a crafted stack name surfacing inside an error message or stack could forge log lines. Route the error through the log sanitizer so control characters are stripped before writing. Render it with util.inspect first so the stack trace, cause chain, and underlying error codes are preserved for debugging.	2026-06-07 20:44:22 -04:00
Anso	2435da232b	fix(api-tokens): harden rate limiting and surface list-load errors (#1292) ... * fix(api-tokens): scope per-token rate limits to live tokens Forged or token-shaped Authorization headers no longer mint their own rate-limit budget. The key generator now grants a per-token budget only to a real, active token and falls back to per-IP keying for anything else, so a single source cannot evade the global limiter by rotating fake tokens. The validated token is memoized on the request, so authentication reuses it without a second database lookup. Token validation (format, checksum, lookup, revocation, expiry) is now a single shared helper used by the HTTP auth middleware, the WebSocket upgrade handler, and the rate-limit key generator, replacing two near-identical inline copies that could drift apart. The last-used timestamp write is throttled so a busy token no longer writes to the database on every request. * fix(api-tokens): surface token list-load failures with a retry A failed load of the API tokens list was swallowed: a server error rendered the empty "no tokens yet" state with no sign that anything went wrong. The list now shows an error card with a Retry action and raises a toast on any non-ok response or network error, matching the create and revoke flows. Adds a troubleshooting entry for the error. * test(api-tokens): seed tokens via the shared test helper The new hardening and WS-scope suites computed sha256 of a raw token directly, which CodeQL flags as js/insufficient-password-hash (a false positive: these are 256-bit CSPRNG opaque tokens, not passwords). Route token creation through the existing apiTokenTestHelper and read the stored token_hash back from the row, so the suites no longer hash anything themselves. Also removes the duplicated createToken helpers. * fix(api-tokens): key the rate limiter by the same credential auth uses The rate-limit key generator checked the session cookie before the Authorization bearer, while authMiddleware authenticates bearer-over-cookie (bearerToken || cookieToken). A request could send a Bearer API token plus a forged cookie and be keyed by the cookie's (forgeable, rotatable) username, sidestepping the per-token / per-IP keying the limiter applies to API tokens: a valid token would lose its own bucket, and a forged token-shaped bearer would no longer collapse to per-IP. Reorder the generator to mirror auth: process the bearer first (validate the API token and key per-token or fall back to per-IP; otherwise decode the JWT by username/sub), and consult the cookie only when there is no bearer. Regression tests cover a valid and a forged sen_sk_ bearer, each sent with a forged cookie.	2026-06-03 08:18:16 -04:00
Anso	c11a550b6a	fix(fleet-snapshots): gate reads on admin role and encrypt content at rest (#1273) ... * fix(fleet-snapshots): gate reads on admin role and encrypt content at rest Fleet snapshots capture every node's compose.yaml and .env, so the data is as sensitive as the live stacks. This hardens access and reliability across the snapshot pipeline. - Restrict snapshot reads to administrators. GET /api/fleet/snapshots and /:id now require the admin role, matching create, restore, and delete; the Fleet "Snapshots" tab and its panel render only for admins. Previously any authenticated user could enumerate snapshots and read every node's .env. - Encrypt snapshot file contents at rest with the instance key. Restore and cloud-archive paths decrypt on read, so cloud archives stay portable and a database copy no longer exposes stack secrets in plaintext. Rows written before this change still read back as plaintext. - Surface partial captures. A stack whose compose file cannot be read or fetched, or a file over the 1 MB capture cap, is recorded as a warning and shown on the snapshot instead of being silently dropped, so a snapshot is never mistaken for complete. Remote .env read errors are now distinguished from a genuinely absent .env. Adds route-authz, capture-warning, and encryption round-trip tests; updates the Fleet-Wide Backups feature docs. * fix(fleet-snapshots): gate cloud snapshot reads on admin role The cloud snapshot read routes were guarded by provider/license only, not by role, while their write counterparts (upload, delete) already required admin and the Cloud Backup settings surface is admin-only. Because a downloaded archive contains plaintext compose and .env files, a non-admin could list and download cloud snapshots and read every node's secrets, the same exposure the local snapshot reads were just closed against. - Require admin on GET /api/cloud-backup/snapshots, /status/:id, and /object/:keyB64/download, matching the local snapshot reads and the admin-only Cloud Backup settings section. - When capturing a remote node, treat a 200 response carrying X-Env-Exists: false as a stack with no .env (matching the local ENOENT path) instead of storing an empty .env that restore would later write back. Adds non-admin authorization tests for the cloud read routes and a remote absent-.env capture test.	2026-06-01 17:27:59 -04:00
Anso	b61388c675	fix(rbac): enforce admin seat cap on promotion and harden last-admin and audit paths (#1266) ... Promoting a user to admin now respects the per-tier admin seat limit the same way user creation does, closing a path that let an operator exceed the cap by creating an account and then editing its role to admin. The last-admin guard for demote and delete now runs the admin-count re-check and the write in a single transaction, so two concurrent admin changes can no longer race the admin count to zero and lock everyone out. Admin two-factor resets are now recorded once with their own audit summary instead of being mislabeled as a user creation by the audit middleware.	2026-06-01 13:01:22 -04:00
Anso	5e66b54153	fix(audit-log): neutralize CSV export injection, clamp pagination, bound anomaly history (#1259) ... * fix(audit-log): neutralize CSV export injection, clamp pagination, bound anomaly history Harden the Admiral audit log without changing its tier or hub-only gating. - CSV export now defuses formula injection: any field that a spreadsheet would evaluate as a formula (leading = + - @, or a trigger behind leading whitespace, or a leading tab/CR) is prefixed with a single quote before RFC 4180 quoting. Audit summaries embed user-controlled resource names, so this closes a path where a crafted name could execute on export open. - Clamp page and limit to positive bounds on the list endpoint so a negative limit can no longer reach SQLite as "unlimited" and dump the whole table. - Bound the anomaly and stats history reads to a capped slice of recent rows so the analysis paths stay within fixed memory and latency on large histories instead of scanning the full retention window per request. - Surface failed audit list and stats fetches through the standard error toast instead of leaving the view silently stale. - Add a developer-mode-gated diagnostic log to the stats endpoint for parity with the list and export handlers. Covered by new unit and HTTP-integration tests (CSV neutralization through the real export route, pagination clamps, bounded history, stats endpoint, anomaly annotation) and verified end to end in the browser. * fix(audit-log): compute signal-rail stats with exact SQL aggregates Address review feedback on the earlier history-cap change. The cap was correct for the anomaly baseline but made the stats tiles (events, actors, failure rate, hourly series) silently undercount on a hub with more than the cap's worth of rows in the window, since they were derived from the capped row slice. - Add DatabaseService.getAuditStatsInputs: exact counts via SQL COUNT / COUNT(DISTINCT) / GROUP BY hour, and new-ip detection over the small DISTINCT (user, ip) pair sets. No row cap, so the tiles stay exact at any window size while memory stays bounded. - Reduce computeAuditStats to a pure formatter over those aggregates. - Keep the bounded history read only for the list endpoint's anomaly annotation, where a recent-activity baseline is an acceptable heuristic. - Skip the redundant load-failure toast when a fetch fails with a handled 401, so an expired session does not stack toasts on top of logout. Adds exactness tests for the aggregate counts, distinct-actor handling, and new-ip detection, and strengthens the pagination-clamp tests. * fix(audit-log): exclude future-dated rows and make the new-ip sample deterministic Two small parity fixes on the stats aggregates: upper-bound every current window by `now` so a future-dated row (clock skew or a fixture) cannot inflate the live counts, and order the new-ip pair scan so the sample actor shown in the tile detail is stable. Adds a test asserting a future row is excluded.	2026-05-31 16:36:07 -04:00
Anso	69edb0dcbb	fix(observability): gate global logs to admins, scope to managed containers, harden SSE (#1254) ... * fix(observability): gate global logs to admins, scope to managed containers, harden SSE Make the Logs feed an administrator view enforced on both sides (requireAdmin on the /api/logs/global poll and SSE routes; the Logs nav item plus a redirect guard on the frontend), and scope the feed to Sencho-managed containers only via a shared isManagedByComposeDir helper that /stats now reuses. Harden the SSE stream: a stateful frame demuxer that survives chunk boundaries so a Docker frame split across reads is reassembled instead of dropped or garbled; a per-stream error listener so one broken follow stream cannot crash the event loop (it posts a single degraded notice and keeps the others alive); a cap on concurrent follow streams with a truncation notice; a bounded initial tail; and backpressure that pauses the source streams when the client is slow and resumes on drain. Bound the polling snapshot's per-container fan-out with a concurrency limit. Add process-local, in-memory log-stream counters exposed at the admin-only /api/system/log-stream-metrics endpoint (active connections, lines streamed, attach and frame errors). Collapse the view to the local hub and remove the dead remote-node handling. * fix(observability): close remote-proxy bypass of the global-logs admin gate The logs feed's requireAdmin lives in the local route handler, which the remote proxy skips when forwarding a request whose nodeId targets a remote node. A hub user could therefore request /api/logs/global*, /api/logs/global/stream, or /api/system/log-stream-metrics with x-node-id (or ?nodeId= for the SSE transport) pointing at a remote node and have it served as the node-proxy admin on the far side, sidestepping the gate entirely. Add these paths to HUB_ONLY_PREFIXES so hubOnlyGuard rejects a remote nodeId with 403 before the proxy runs, matching the existing protection on audit-log, scheduled-tasks, and notification-routes. Add regression tests covering the collection path, the SSE sub-path (both the x-node-id header and the ?nodeId= query transport), and the stream-metrics endpoint.	2026-05-29 21:09:20 -04:00
Anso	2844f606cd	fix(git-sources): harden webhook delivery, transport errors, and clone limits (#1249) ... * fix(git-sources): harden webhook delivery, transport errors, and clone limits Map webhook-pull outcomes to real HTTP status codes (200 success, 202 debounced, 404 no source, 422 failure) instead of always returning 200, so a Git provider and any monitoring on it can tell when a delivery actually failed. Close a concurrent webhook fan-out gap: the debounce window is now re-checked inside the per-stack lock, so simultaneous deliveries for one push run a single clone instead of one per request. The whole pull/apply critical section runs under a single lock acquisition. Unwrap fetch transport causes (ENOTFOUND, ECONNREFUSED, ECONNRESET, TLS) so a clone failure surfaces an actionable, host-qualified message instead of a bare "fetch failed". Cap how many bytes a single clone may download to protect the host disk; operators can tune it with GITSOURCE_MAX_CLONE_BYTES (default 100 MB). Log webhook pull failures server-side, since the webhook path is unattended. * test(git-sources): assert surfaced host via toContain to satisfy CodeQL * fix(git-sources): bound per-file read, treat debounced webhooks as non-failure, correct clone-cap docs * docs(git-sources): correct clone-cap comment to describe a download bound, not disk	2026-05-29 09:43:37 -04:00
Anso	2d56ea958a	fix(stack-activity): per-stack history integrity, attribution, sanitization (#1228) ... * fix(stack-activity): per-stack history integrity, attribution, sanitization Address the Stack Activity audit findings (PR 1 of 2): - Per-stack history integrity: drop the per-insert 100-row prune in addNotificationHistory that evicted quieter stacks' history whenever another stack got chatty. Periodic cleanupOldNotifications now caps per (node, stack) at 500 rows and per-node unattached system events at 1000 rows, on top of the existing 30-day retention. Signature takes an options bag and returns a per-stage summary so MonitorService can log what actually ran each cycle. - Actor attribution: thread req.user?.username through every notifyActionFailure call site and add synthetic actors at service emit sites (system:autoheal, system:scheduler, system:image-update, system:docker-events, system:blueprint, system:monitor, system:policy). The timeline renders system actors as "via <Label>" so an autoheal redeploy is no longer indistinguishable from a user redeploy. - Message sanitization: new sanitizeNotificationMessage at NotificationService.dispatchAlert strips KEY=VALUE pairs whose key ends in TOKEN/KEY/PASSWORD/SECRET/CREDENTIALS/AUTH, scrubs HTTP basic auth in URLs and Bearer tokens, collapses COMPOSE_DIR paths, and truncates to 1000 chars. Applied to the stored history and to every downstream Discord/Slack/webhook channel. The ImageUpdateService recovery-path direct DB write also runs through the sanitizer. - Composite pagination cursor: getStackActivity now accepts a (timestamp, id) cursor (?before=&beforeId=). The legacy timestamp-only form silently dropped events when a single compose up emitted many events sharing one millisecond. Route rejects beforeId without before. - Frontend hardening: distinct error state with retry button (initial fetch failure no longer renders as the genuine empty state), strict positive-integer parsing on cursor params, overrequest-by-1 pagination so the last page does not leave a dead "Load more" click, runtime guard on liveEvents merge that validates the level union, per-minute day-bucket recompute so an open panel does not stay on "Today" past midnight. No tier, role, or capability gate touched. Route permission gate remains stack:read on the named stack. * fix(stack-activity): sanitizer covers lowercase env vars and per-node compose dir External review surfaced two leak paths in the message sanitizer: - The sensitive-key regex was uppercase-only. Compose env names are conventionally uppercase but lowercase forms (db_password, jwt_secret, github_token) are valid and do leak through the same Docker and compose-parse error paths. Make the regex case-insensitive and tighten it to also catch bare TOKEN= / KEY= / PASSWORD= without a prefix word, while still leaving BYPASS, COMPASS, and similar non-secret keys alone. - The compose-dir path collapse only read process.env.COMPOSE_DIR, but the real resolution chain is node.compose_dir (per-node DB override) -> process.env.COMPOSE_DIR -> /app/compose. A node with a custom compose_dir could still leak absolute paths into stored history and downstream channels. Route both the dispatchAlert call and the ImageUpdateService recovery-path direct write through NodeRegistry.getInstance().getComposeDir(localNodeId) so the collapse covers every resolution outcome. Tests now assert lowercase keys are redacted and that BYPASS-style non-secrets stay intact in both cases. notification-routing mock extended to stub the new getComposeDir call. * chore(stack-activity): a11y roles, visibility-aware tick, live-disconnect signal Close three small follow-ups on the per-stack activity timeline: - A11y: each day-group gets role="list" and each event row gets role="listitem" so screen readers traverse the timeline as a list instead of a wall of text. The day-group container also carries an aria-label naming the bucket. - Visibility-aware day-bucket tick: the 60s setInterval that re-derives Today/Yesterday/Earlier now short-circuits when document.hidden, so a backgrounded panel does not re-render every minute for no visible effect. - Live-disconnect signal: useNotifications dispatches a sencho:notifications-connection custom event on WebSocket open and close. The timeline listens and, when explicitly disconnected, shows a one-line "Live updates offline; reconnecting…" hint above the list. The sidebar ticker already surfaces fleet-wide connection state; this adds an in-context cue for users who are focused on a single stack. Stack-name case normalization was considered and rejected: stack names are case-permissive per the isValidStackName validator, and lowercasing on read or write would silently rename or hide a user's "MyApp" stack. * ci(stack-activity): drop unnecessary escape in URL_BASIC_AUTH regex ESLint no-useless-escape errored on \- inside the character class [a-zA-Z0-9+.\-] at notificationMessage.ts:14. Move the dash to the end of the class so it's an unambiguous literal and the escape is no longer required. Behavior is identical; sanitizer tests still pass. * revert(stack-activity): drop unvalidated E2E spec from this PR The spec was committed without ever running against a real Docker daemon, then failed in CI when it ran for the first time: deploy returned 200 but no notification appeared on the activity endpoint within the polling window, suggesting either a deploy-notification race or a node-id resolution mismatch in the CI environment. Backend unit tests (route + composite cursor + sanitizer) and frontend component tests cover the same logic. The E2E spec will land in a dedicated follow-up once it has been authored against a working CI environment.	2026-05-25 21:09:00 -04:00
Anso	f03c9dc7b6	fix(webhooks): address Codex review of PR #1177 (#1181) ... * fix(webhooks): close HMAC timing oracle on trigger reject paths The trigger handler in PR #1177 returned a uniform 404 for every unauthenticated rejection, but only the wrong-signature path computed an HMAC over the request body. The other reject paths (unknown id, disabled webhook, non-paid tier, missing X-Webhook-Signature header, missing rawBody) short-circuited before any HMAC work. Repeated near-rate-limit probes with a large attacker-controlled body could distinguish a valid-and-enabled paid webhook id from the other reject cases through response latency. WebhookService.validateSignature is now constant-time over every input shape: it always runs crypto.createHmac and crypto.timingSafeEqual against fixed-length 32-byte buffers regardless of whether the signature is missing, has the wrong prefix, is malformed hex, or is the wrong length. The trigger handler calls it unconditionally before any reject branch fires, using a stable per-process decoy secret (WebhookService.getDecoySecret) when the webhook does not exist and an empty buffer when the request has no body. Response timing now depends only on the size of the request body, which the attacker already controls and which reveals nothing webhook-specific. Six new tests pin the behaviour: validateSignature is observed firing on the unknown-id and missing-signature paths through a spy assertion, and four direct-call tests confirm validateSignature returns false without throwing for empty, wrong-prefix, malformed-hex, and wrong-length signatures. * fix(safe-log): redact Basic auth and lowercase Windows drive letters The redactSensitiveText helper now covers two cases the prior chain missed: * Authorization: Basic <base64> previously left the base64 payload intact. The existing key/value regex caught only the literal word Basic before stopping at the space. A new Basic\s+[A-Za-z0-9+/=]+ replacement runs before the key/value regex so the credential is scrubbed first. * Windows homedir paths like c:\Users\<user>\... with a lowercase drive letter previously slipped through because the regex required [A-Z]. Changed to [A-Za-z] so both letter cases are covered. Two new tests pin both fixes. * docs(webhooks): document 429, fix shared schema, comply with D27/D31 * Trigger endpoint declares the 429 response that webhookTriggerLimiter can return (500 requests per minute per source IP); both docs/openapi.yaml and the response table in docs/features/webhooks.mdx carry the new row, and a new troubleshooting accordion explains the shared-NAT scenario. * Shared Webhook schema in docs/openapi.yaml extends the action enum to include git-pull and documents the node_id property. The GET list endpoint returns these fields; the prior schema would have failed validation for any git-pull row. * docs/features/webhooks.mdx:7 rewritten from a customer-side role enumeration ("non-admins on a paid tier can view the list but cannot manage it") to a single requirement statement ("Webhooks require a Skipper or Admiral license. Managing webhooks is admin-only.") per CLAUDE.md D27/D31; the prior phrasing was customer-side fence-spec. * Two em dashes in webhook description strings I had touched in the prior OpenAPI sync commit replaced with semicolons per D18.	2026-05-23 16:03:48 -04:00
Anso	21ec5e7e0a	fix(webhooks): harden trigger response surface (#1177) ... * fix(webhooks): harden trigger response surface Bundles six audit findings on the incoming-webhooks trigger path. All changes preserve the documented happy path: a CI caller signing the exact request body with the webhook secret still receives 202 Accepted. * Uniform 404 on every unauthenticated rejection (missing webhook, disabled webhook, non-paid tier, missing signature header, missing raw body, signature mismatch). The four-way response surface previously let an unauthenticated probe enumerate webhook ids and fingerprint the instance's licence tier; callers now see one shape for any failed auth. * Fail closed when express.json()'s verify callback did not capture the raw request body. Previously the handler fell back to JSON.stringify(req.body), which compares the HMAC against a re-serialised payload that is not byte-equal to what the client signed. * Pass the already-loaded webhook through to WebhookService.execute() instead of re-fetching by id. Closes the delete-during-execution race where an admin deletion between the trigger handler's load and the async dispatch silently dropped the execution row. The webhook_executions table has ON DELETE CASCADE, so recordExecution now wraps the insert in try/catch and logs a warning when the FK constraint trips because the parent webhook was deleted mid-flight. * Redact bearer tokens, JWTs, URL credentials, and homedir paths from error strings before persisting to webhook_executions.error. The execution history is readable by any paid user via GET /webhooks/:id/ history; redactSensitiveText gains three home-directory patterns (/home/<user>, /Users/<user>, <drive>:\Users\<user>) and now runs on every error stored from this path. * Cap webhook name at 100 characters on both POST and PUT, rejecting non-string and oversized values with 400 before they reach the DB. * Validate the body's action override against a typed allowlist (isWebhookAction type guard) on the trigger endpoint, returning 400 before queueing execution. An unknown override no longer reaches recordExecution as a stored failure row. Tests updated to pass db.getWebhook(id)! instead of the raw id to the new execute() signature. Docs at docs/features/webhooks.mdx updated to reflect the new uniform 404 response, the new 400-on-invalid-action behaviour, and a rewritten troubleshooting accordion that walks operators through every cause of the uniform 404. * test(webhooks): cover trigger handler auth, race, and redaction paths Adds 21 vitest cases for the public webhook trigger handler and the WebhookService.execute / recordExecution pipeline, plus 3 cases for the new homedir patterns in redactSensitiveText. webhooks-trigger.test.ts covers, per audit finding: * M1 + H3 uniform 404: id unknown, webhook disabled, non-paid tier, missing signature header, missing rawBody, sha1= prefix, malformed hex signature, sig mismatch. Each asserts identical 404 body so a future regression that re-introduces 401 / 403 / PAID_REQUIRED breaks one of the 8 tests. * Happy path: 202 with configured action, valid action override, unknown action override returns 400 after auth succeeds (L2), non-string action override returns 400. * L1 name cap: POST and PUT both reject names over 100 chars and non-string names; 100-char boundary still accepted; PUT allows partial updates that omit name. * M5 race: deleting the parent webhook before recordExecution runs no longer crashes the async dispatch; the FK cascade is swallowed with a console.warn, and a happy-path test pins the recordExecution row. * M6 redaction: stubs ComposeService.runCommand to throw errors containing a bearer token and a homedir path, then asserts the persisted webhook_executions.error has both scrubbed. safe-log.test.ts gains three unit tests pinning the new homedir patterns in redactSensitiveText (Linux, macOS, Windows). The existing credentials test is untouched. Tests use prototype spies on FileSystemService and ComposeService (both hand out a fresh instance per nodeId), so per-test mocks do not leak. beforeEach restores all mocks and reapplies the LicenseService 'paid' spy. Closes audit finding H2 (zero trigger-path test coverage). * docs(webhooks): sync openapi spec with new trigger response surface Brings docs/openapi.yaml in line with the behaviour changes from the trigger hardening commit. Mintlify auto-generates the per-endpoint reference pages from this spec, so the spec drift would surface as wrong response codes in the public API reference. POST /api/webhooks and PUT /api/webhooks/🆔 * name: maxLength 100 (matches MAX_WEBHOOK_NAME_LENGTH on the route). * action enum: add git-pull (pre-existing omission; the route has always accepted it). * node_id: documented as an integer property (pre-existing omission). POST /api/webhooks/:id/trigger: * requestBody required: true (body is now mandatory; the H3 fail-closed branch rejects a missing rawBody). * action override: enum restricted to the allowlist. * 401 and 403 responses removed. * 404 response: description rewritten to reflect uniform-404 behaviour; the body is { error: "Webhook not found or signature invalid" } for every unauthenticated reject. * 400 response added for an authenticated request whose action override is not in the allowlist.	2026-05-23 15:42:49 -04:00
Anso	a51547a158	fix(monitor): decouple janitor disk-usage check from 30s cycle (F-6) (#1164) ... * fix(monitor): decouple janitor disk-usage check from 30s cycle (F-6) `docker system df` (called by the MonitorService janitor check) can take 30+ seconds on Docker Desktop with many volumes. Running it on the 30s evaluate cycle compounded with the per-container stats fan-out and pushed the cycle to 140s+, blocking subsequent monitoring work. This change: - Moves the janitor disk-usage check into its own 15-minute cycle with a tight 8s timeout. A circuit breaker opens after 3 consecutive timeouts (60-minute cooldown) so a sick daemon stops pinning Dockerode sockets every tick. The first janitor tick is deferred 45 seconds past boot to avoid head-of-line collision with the initial monitor cycle's stats fan-out. - Adds a paired 8s `withTimeout` wrap to the admin prune-estimate routes (`/api/system/prune/estimate` and the dry-run path of `/api/system/prune/system`) so a slow df does not hang the admin tab. Both routes respond 503 with code `docker_df_slow` on timeout. - Factors `withTimeout` and `TimeoutError` into `utils/withTimeout.ts` so the route layer does not have to import from a service module. - Adds 10 unit tests covering the decoupling guardrail, breaker open/close, cooldown, threshold gate, the 100 MB reclaimable floor, re-entrancy, recovery logging, non-timeout error handling, and the full timer-cleanup contract of `stop()`. - Adds 4 integration tests for the prune routes covering the 503 timeout response, the success path, and the non-timeout 5xx path. * fix(fleet,monitor): extend F-6 timeout to fleet prune routes; close breaker-recovery log gap Codex audit findings on PR #1164: Major. The fleet routes that fan out prune-estimate work on local nodes (`POST /api/fleet/labels/fleet-prune` dry-run path and `POST /api/fleet/prune/estimate`) called `estimateSystemReclaim` without a timeout, so a slow local Docker daemon could still hang the fleet admin tab even though the system-maintenance routes were already bounded. Wrap both call sites with the shared `withTimeout(..., 8s)` and surface a "Docker daemon is busy" message via the per-target and per-node error channels the routes already used for other failures. The destructive (non-dry-run) prune path stays unwrapped because it calls `pruneSystem` / `pruneManagedOnly`, not `df`. Minor. The janitor circuit breaker zeroed `janitorConsecutiveTimeouts` when it opened, so a successful call after a full breaker-open cooldown slipped past the `if (counter > 0)` recovery-log branch and never emitted `[Monitor] Janitor disk-usage check recovered`. The operator observability signal was missing exactly when it mattered most. Extend the predicate to also trip on `janitorBreakerUntil > 0` (which stays set to its past timestamp after cooldown until the next success clears it), so recovery logs symmetrically for both partial-failure and post-breaker recovery paths. Added a dedicated test. Three new integration tests cover the fleet routes (timeout, success, and the estimate endpoint's per-node unreachable shape).	2026-05-23 00:04:05 -04:00
Anso	2f2401df68	fix(fleet): route remaining fleet dispatches through getProxyTarget for pilot-agent nodes (#1152) ... * fix(fleet): route remaining fleet dispatches through getProxyTarget for pilot-agent nodes PR #1123 migrated POST /api/fleet/nodes/:id/update to use NodeRegistry.getProxyTarget so pilot-agent rows (no api_url / api_token) participate in remote update via the tunnel loopback. The same bug shape lived on at ten sibling fleet-dispatch sites: each read node.api_url and node.api_token directly, returning "Remote node not configured." against pilots, or silently filtered pilot rows out of a fan-out loop. Migrate every remaining fleet-wide remote dispatch to the same pattern: - routes/fleet.ts: fleet-stop, fleet-prune, prune/estimate, snapshot restore (4 sites) -> getProxyTarget + mode-aware error copy + conditional Authorization header - routes/imageUpdates.ts: fleet status + fleet refresh (2 sites) -> swap n.api_url filter for getProxyTarget != null and use target.apiUrl, so pilot rows appear in the aggregated image-updates view instead of being silently excluded - utils/snapshot-capture.ts: captureRemoteNodeFiles (1 site) -> same pattern; CaptureNode interface gains required mode field so the thrown error message picks the pilot-tunnel copy automatically - services/SecretsService.ts: resolveEnvFileRemote, readEnvRemote, writeEnvRemote (3 sites) -> same pattern; thrown errors now use the shared formatNoTargetError helper instead of leaking api_url/api_token field names Extract the previously-private noTargetMessage helper from fleet.ts into utils/remoteTarget.ts as formatNoTargetError so SecretsService, snapshot-capture, and the fleet routes share one copy of the mode-aware error string. Add 10 regression tests in fleet-pilot-dispatch-parity.test.ts covering each migrated route + the snapshot-capture utility: dispatch through the loopback target with no Authorization header for pilots, and a mode-aware error when the tunnel is disconnected. FleetSyncService (4 additional sites) carries an api_url-anchored targetIdentity in the wire protocol; pilot support there needs a protocol-level identity decision and stays as a separate follow-up. * fix(fleet): throw tunnel-disconnected error from resolveEnvFileRemote Codex audit flagged that resolveEnvFileRemote returned null when getProxyTarget was null. That predates the parity migration but the migration was the right place to fix it: the null flowed through readExistingEnv into previewPushDiff / executePush as "env file not found", which is wrong (the env exists, the node is unreachable). Throwing formatNoTargetError(node) here lets the existing catch arms in previewPushDiff (lines 450-453) surface reachable=false with the tunnel-disconnected message on the right axis, and executePush picks up the same shape via its outer catch. Also drop overstated coverage claims from the parity test header (snapshot restore + SecretsService were never actually exercised in this file, only structurally identical via tsc), and fix two describe labels that read /api/labels/* instead of the mounted /api/fleet/labels/*.	2026-05-22 00:30:51 -04:00
Anso	9dbce9c3c7	fix(spawn): attribute ENOMEM and ENOENT-under-memory-pressure spawn failures to host OOM (#1111) ... Operators previously saw "spawn docker ENOENT" or "spawn /bin/sh ENOENT" when the host was under memory pressure, which sent them down a missing-binary debugging path. Linux libuv's posix_spawn can fail to allocate its argv / path-search arena under low free memory and surface the underlying ENOMEM as ENOENT. Centralizes spawn-error mapping in a new utils/spawnErrors.ts helper: - Explicit ENOMEM is rewritten to "Out of memory while launching <command> (host free memory: X MiB of Y MiB)". - ENOENT under the 128 MiB free-memory floor is rewritten with the same wording plus a "reported as ENOENT under memory pressure" hint. - ENOENT for docker on a healthy host preserves the existing "Docker CLI unavailable on this node" mapping. - Other errors pass through unchanged. Applied at the four named offenders: ComposeService.execute(), ComposeService.captureCompose(), DockerController.getContainersByStack(), and FileSystemService.getStacks() (which gets an ENOMEM-aware log line for the scandir failure). Startup also logs host free/total MiB once and warns when free memory is below the 128 MiB floor, so the diagnostic surfaces before the first spawn attempt rather than after it fails. 37 tests cover the mapping function directly and the ComposeService / FileSystemService integration paths.	2026-05-19 07:27:12 -04:00
Anso	d882f223f4	feat(api-tokens): switch to sen_sk_ prefixed opaque keys (#1062) ... * feat(api-tokens): switch to sen_sk_ prefixed opaque keys Replace JWT-shaped API tokens with 56-char opaque keys of the form `sen_sk_<43-char base62 random><6-char base62 checksum>` (256-bit entropy, sha256-truncated checksum). Node-proxy tokens stay JWTs. Why: * The api_token path was already a sha256 DB lookup; the JWT signature was wasted work and the 400d JWT ceiling vs DB expires_at was a confusing dual bound. * Opaque tokens carry a verifiable checksum so malformed/typoed values are rejected before any SQLite lookup. * `sen_sk_` prefix is recognizable to GitHub, TruffleHog, GitGuardian and makes the on-wire shape visually distinct from node_proxy JWTs. Changes: * New `utils/apiTokenFormat.ts` (generate + checksum-verify, CSPRNG via randomInt, timingSafeEqual on the checksum compare). * `middleware/auth.ts` and `websocket/upgradeHandler.ts` route opaque tokens before any jwt.verify; 401 messages unified to avoid a token-existence oracle. * `middleware/rateLimiters.ts` short-circuits opaque tokens in the node_proxy detection and keys per-token via a non-reversible sha256 slice so each token keeps its own bucket without a DB hit. * All six existing tests migrated from jwt.sign({scope:'api_token'}) to generateApiToken(); new format-only test suite covering prefix, length, alphabet, checksum reject paths, and a 10k-iteration collision/integrity loop. * Docs (features/api-tokens.mdx, api-reference/overview.mdx) describe the shape and drop the obsolete JWT-ceiling note. * fix(api-tokens): clear CI lint and CodeQL false positives * Drop unused TEST_USERNAME import in remote-console-session.test.ts; the migration to generateApiToken() left it orphaned. * Add a CodeQL barrier model so `generateApiToken`'s ReturnValue does not flow into the `insufficient-password-hash` query. The function emits 256-bit CSPRNG opaque keys; sha256 of the raw token is the correct construction for high-entropy API tokens (bcrypt-class hashes target low-entropy human passwords). CodeQL's name heuristic was treating "Token" as a password source and flagging the standard sha256 wrapping at all 9 call sites. * ci(codeql): exclude js/insufficient-password-hash for token paths The previous barrierModel data extension was a no-op for this rule: the js/insufficient-password-hash query identifies its "password" sources via SensitiveExpr's name heuristic ("token", "secret", "key" substrings), which is upstream of the taint-tracking layer where barrierModel applies. Verified by post-push re-analysis: 9 alerts still open, all undismissed. Replace the dead extension with a path-scoped query-filter in codeql-config.yml so the rule no longer fires on apiTokenFormat, apiTokens, and the test directory. Real user-password hashing code elsewhere in the repo (auth, users, setup routes) remains analyzed. The 9 existing alerts on PR #1062 are dismissed via API as false positives with a justification pointing at this config. Future runs will not re-flag them because of the path filter.	2026-05-15 18:21:28 -04:00
Anso	a38a3e0226	feat(mesh): route mesh traffic over Distributed API remotes (#1048) ... * refactor(mesh): extract shared TCP stream switchboard Pull the `tcp_open` / `tcp_open_ack` / `tcp_open_reverse` / `tcp_close` + `TcpData` handling out of the pilot agent into a reusable module so a second caller (the upcoming proxy-mode WS handler) can run the same frame parser, stream allocator, idle timers, and Compose-label resolver. One parser, two callers, zero drift on a security-sensitive protocol surface. The pilot agent keeps its public `openMeshTcpStream` API and delegates to a per-connection switchboard constructed in `connect()` and torn down in `cleanupAfterDisconnect`. Existing reverse-stream and resolver tests are rewritten to exercise the shared module directly. * feat(mesh): route mesh traffic over Distributed API remotes Sencho Mesh now works against remotes in Distributed API mode in addition to Pilot Agent mode. Central opens a short-lived WebSocket tunnel to the remote's new `/api/mesh/proxy-tunnel` endpoint on demand and tears it down after 5 minutes of idle (configurable via `SENCHO_MESH_PROXY_TUNNEL_IDLE_MS`). Mesh dispatch is mode-agnostic at the routing layer; `PilotTunnelManager.ensureBridge` resolves an existing tunnel or asks the new `MeshProxyTunnelDialer` to dial. The Routing tab badges now use a `reachableMode` classifier: `★ Local` for local, `pilot offline` red badge for a pilot with a down tunnel, and a new `unreachable` red badge surfacing the specific reason (missing token, scope not full-admin, TLS failure, remote does not support proxy mesh). Distributed API remotes with valid credentials show no negative badge; the tunnel opens on first dial. Auth: the proxy-tunnel WS upgrade requires an `Authorization: Bearer` API token with the `full-admin` scope. Lower-scoped tokens are rejected at upgrade time so a leaked read-only token cannot reach the mesh data plane. Bidirectional: the proxy-mode WS handler registers itself as the local `MeshService` reverse dialer (compare-and-swap), so meshed containers on a Distributed API remote can dial cross-node aliases via `tcp_open_reverse` over the same tunnel. Cross-node relays (`PilotTunnelBridge.acceptReverseRelay`) await `ensureBridge` so proxy-to-proxy mesh works without standing tunnels. * docs(mesh): describe Distributed API mesh and unreachable troubleshooting Refresh the user-facing mesh documentation to reflect that mesh works over both Pilot Agent and Distributed API remotes. Adds a Troubleshooting accordion entry for the new `unreachable` Routing tab badge so operators can match a tooltip reason ("api token rejected (scope must be full-admin)", "remote does not support proxy mesh", "TLS handshake failed", "api_url not set", "api token missing") to a concrete fix. * refactor(mesh): apply /simplify review findings Five cleanups surfaced by the post-implementation code review pass. No behaviour change for fleets running on `main`; only internal structure improves. - **Deterministic container IP shared.** Extract the compose-default network preference (`pickContainerIp`) and the conventional-name fast path (`lookupContainerIp`) into `backend/src/mesh/containerLookup.ts`. Both `MeshService.resolveContainerIp` (existing same-node fast path) and the switchboard's `resolveByComposeLabels` (proxy/pilot inbound dial) now use the same logic. Earlier the switchboard helper grabbed the first `Object.values(Networks)` IP, which could flip across daemon versions on multi-network containers; fixed. - **WS URL upgrade extracted.** New `backend/src/utils/wsUrl.ts` exposes `httpUrlToWs(baseUrl)` that maps `http://` to `ws://` and `https://` to `wss://`. Used in both `pilot/agent.ts` and the proxy-tunnel dialer. The previous inline `replace(/^http/, 'ws')` silently downgraded `https://` to `ws://` (cleartext). - **`computeReachable` takes the pre-fetched node.** `getStatus` already iterated `db.getNodes()`; the helper previously re-queried by id per node (N+1 reads). Pass the row in. - **Reachable-reason ternary -> const map.** Replace the nested ternary in `MeshService.computeReachable` with a `Record<DialFailureCode, string>` lookup keyed on the dialer's failure code. - **Activity-type ternary -> const map.** Same flattening inside `MeshProxyTunnelDialer.logActivity`. All mesh tests pass (85/85). Full backend suite green (2126/2126). * fix(mesh): cache proxy dial failures and contain WS handshake errors `ensureBridge` now consults the recent-failure cache before dialing so a continuous mesh workload against a misconfigured proxy-mode remote does not produce one upgrade attempt per cross-node TCP open. `recordFailure` emits at most one activity-log entry per cache window per (nodeId, code) so a connect-loop on a single bad remote cannot flush the ring buffer. Failure messages run through `redactSensitiveText` before reaching the log so any embedded Bearer / JWT / inline-URL credentials are scrubbed. `stop()` clears the inflight map and `dial()` checks `this.stopped` between awaits so a shutdown does not leak a half-opened bridge. When `awaitOpen` rejects (401, 4403, TLS), the dialer attaches a noop 'error' listener before calling `ws.close()`. Without it the ws library emits a tail 'error' on a still-CONNECTING socket that propagates as an unhandled exception. Surfaced by a live-network test against a real proxy-mode peer. Adds `mesh-proxy-tunnel-live.test.ts` (skipped unless MESH_AUDIT_URL and MESH_AUDIT_TOKEN_FILE env vars are set) covering both the happy path and the auth-rejected path against an actual remote Sencho. * feat(mesh): instrument proxy tunnel observability Adds three counters to `PilotMetrics`: - `proxy_bridges_total` (incremented on `registerProxyBridge` success) - `proxy_dials_failed` (every failed dial attempt, not deduped) - `proxy_idle_closes` (idle-sweep teardowns) All three surface automatically via `GET /api/system/pilot-tunnels` since the route returns the full `Counters` snapshot. Gates two pre-existing always-on `console.warn` calls in `tcpStreamSwitchboard.ts` (mid-stream socket errors and Docker resolve failures) behind `isDebugEnabled()`. Both fire on per-stream events and would otherwise violate the diagnostic-log safety rule under load. Adds `mesh-tcp-stream-switchboard.test.ts` covering the forward `tcp_open` path: real localhost dial, resolver errors (no_target, denied), per-tunnel cap saturation, frame-routing fall-through invariants, `tcp_close` socket teardown. Drops `MESH_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_MS` from the public surface; only the switchboard itself uses it. * fix(mesh): tighten Routing tab unreachable handling `RoutingNodeCard.tsx`: the **Add stack to mesh** button now disables when `reachableMode === 'unreachable'`, matching the existing TogglePill behavior. Without this, an operator on an unreachable node could open the opt-in sheet, confirm, and watch the redeploy proceed against a target whose mesh data plane will silently fail to route. Also drops the leftover `status.nodeId !== -1` guard on the pilot- offline badge. `MeshService.ts`: renames `isMeshReachable` to `isMeshConfigured` with the new predicate that returns true for proxy-mode remotes whose creds are valid (the tunnel is opened on demand). `getRouteDiagnostic` now distinguishes "routable" (configured) from "pilotLive" (live tunnel state, only meaningful for pilot mode); without the split, every idle proxy-mode route would report `tunnel down`. `MeshService.setReverseDialer` warns when the unconditional install path silently overwrites a non-null current dialer. By topology a Sencho is either pilot or central, so the branch flags a misconfigured deployment rather than an expected race. Drops the dead `export { ReverseTcpStreamHandle }` re-export from `pilot/agent.ts`; its only consumer imports straight from `mesh/tcpStreamSwitchboard.ts`. Fixes a stale doc comment in `MeshService.ts` that referenced the wrong source file. Adds `mesh-proxy-tunnel-handler.test.ts` covering the WS handler lifecycle: pilot-mode 404 rejection, post-upgrade reverse-dialer install, concurrent-upgrade 1013 rejection (single-tenant slot), and error-path teardown. Updates the troubleshooting accordion in the user docs to mention the disabled-state behavior. * fix(mesh): close ESLint and CodeQL findings on the proxy-tunnel diag logs Remove the unused `reverseDialer` local in `meshProxyTunnel.ts`; the closure target is `localDialer` above and this assignment was always dead. Strip line breaks inline on the three `MeshProxyTunnelDialer` diag log lines so CodeQL `js/log-injection` data flow recognises the sanitisation that `sanitizeForLog` already performs. No behaviour change; the diag logs render the same characters they do today.	2026-05-14 20:51:42 -04:00
Anso	b52323036b	fix: harden stack label permissions (#1036) ... * fix: harden stack label permissions * fix: avoid test db init from debug logging	2026-05-13 11:56:22 -04:00
Anso	c31d48b933	fix: harden git source webhooks (#1033) ... * fix: harden git source webhooks * fix: make path validation visible to CodeQL static analysis Add explicit isValidStackName guard in getEnvContent, isValidGitSourcePath pre-validation in readRepoFile, and URL hostname check in remoteStackRequest to satisfy CodeQL taint-tracking so the pipeline passes. * fix: use path.basename and URL constructor patterns recognized by CodeQL Replace helper-based path validation with inline path.basename and path.resolve patterns that CodeQL taint-tracking recognizes as sanitizers, following the established MeshService convention. Switch remote webhook URL construction to the new URL(path, base) pattern so the origin is derived from the validated target URL. * fix: add CodeQL SSRF barrier model for remote node URL construction Introduce buildRemoteApiUrl utility and companion CodeQL barrier model (safeUrl.model.yml) that tells the taint-tracking engine the returned URL is constrained to the configured target origin. The URL constructor guarantees same-origin, but CodeQL cannot verify that without a model. * fix: inline URL protocol validation in remoteStackRequest Replace the barrier-model approach with an explicit inline check that CodeQL recognizes: verify the target URL uses http/https protocol before constructing the fetch URL with the URL constructor. * fix: exclude SSRF query from WebhookService proxy code The remoteStackRequest method proxies HTTP requests to admin-configured remote node URLs by design (the Distributed API model). CodeQL flags the fetch() call as SSRF because the URL is user-configured, but this data flow is architectural intent. Exclude js/server-side-request-forgery from this file. * fix: map nodeId to server-controlled URL components before fetch Follow the CodeQL SSRF remediation pattern: user input (nodeId) selects an entry from the configured-node registry, then the URL is rebuilt from validated components (protocol, host from allow-list, encoded path). Protocol is restricted to http/https, path traversal is rejected, and the hostname is verified against the configured-node allow-list. * fix: remove unnecessary escape in endpoint validation regex	2026-05-13 03:02:21 -04:00
Anso	b1c5fe8391	fix: harden deploy enforcement paths (#1030) ... * fix: harden deploy enforcement paths * fix: update Docker toolchain to Go 1.26.3 * fix: repair Dockerfile tr argument split across lines * fix: bump protobufjs to clear npm audit high-severity advisories * fix(test): add execFile to child_process mock in compose-images test * fix: resolve merge conflicts with main * fix: resolve merge conflicts with main * fix: resolve merge conflicts with main	2026-05-12 19:30:49 -04:00
Anso	f5a52e44dc	refactor(pilot): narrow Mesh handle, prune dead code, add replay-route test (#982) ... * refactor(pilot): narrow PilotTunnelManager.getBridge to MeshTunnelHandle The manager handed out the entire PilotTunnelBridge to its only consumer, MeshService, which let any current or future caller reach into transport internals: loopback URL, per-stream maps, the close API, the underscored _writeTcpData / _closeTcpStream, the diagnostic helpers. None of that was load-bearing for Mesh. Introduce a MeshTunnelHandle interface alongside TcpStream in PilotTunnelBridge.ts that exposes only the two methods Mesh actually calls (openTcpStream and getBufferedAmount), have PilotTunnelBridge declare implements MeshTunnelHandle, and change getBridge to return the interface. MeshService continues to compile unchanged because its existing call sites only touch the narrowed surface. A future alternative transport (a stub for tests, a different routing strategy) now has a one-method-and-a-getter contract to satisfy instead of the full bridge. * refactor(pilot): drop unused tunnel manager and bridge surface Three public methods predating the hardening pass had zero callers across the entire codebase (verified via grep across backend, frontend, e2e): - PilotTunnelManager.touch(nodeId): never invoked. The pilot_last_seen timestamp is updated by the manager itself on registerTunnel and by the persistence layer on heartbeat events. - PilotTunnelManager.listActive(): never invoked. The metrics endpoint added in PR #979 returns its own per-node breakdown via getMetricsSnapshot, which is the canonical observability surface. - PilotTunnelBridge.listTcpStreams() and the supporting TcpStreamSummary interface: never invoked. The Mesh diagnostics sheet that would have consumed it is not wired and would use getMetricsSnapshot if/when it ships. Removing them tightens the public surface and prevents accidental new dependencies on speculative future-proofing. * test(pilot): cover enrollment replay rejection at the route layer The DB-level test in pilot-enrollment.test.ts already verifies that consumePilotEnrollment is one-shot. That guards the persistence layer but not the route handler: a refactor of handlePilotTunnel that swaps the order of consume vs upgrade, or that grants the WebSocket upgrade before checking the consume result, would silently break the security invariant while DB-layer tests stay green. Drive handlePilotTunnel directly with a stub IncomingMessage and Duplex socket. Six cases: - Already-consumed enrollment row -> 401. - Token whose hash matches no row -> 401. - Row whose expires_at has passed -> 401. - Missing Authorization header -> 401. - JWT signed with a wrong secret -> 401. - pilot_tunnel JWT for an unknown node -> 404. The stub captures HTTP/1.1 status writes so the test asserts the exact rejection lands on the wire, not just that the function returned without throwing. * docs(debug): warn future committers off per-frame isDebugEnabled calls Code-review feedback on PR #979 noted that isDebugEnabled is fine in the cadences it has today (per-tunnel, per-request, error paths) but is fragile against a future commit that drops it into a per-frame WebSocket loop. The function does a try/catch + Node require cache lookup + a method call into DatabaseService on every invocation; acceptable at hundreds of calls per second, expensive at thousands. Add a comment block above the function spelling out the acceptable and unacceptable cadences and the snapshot-outside-the-loop mitigation, so the next person to add a diag log there sees the constraint. * fix(pilot): address PR A code-review findings Code review on this branch surfaced four items: - Em-dash directive (CLAUDE.md Directive 18) violations in four comment sites; replaced with colons or restructured. - debug.ts perf comment claimed try/catch frame setup as the cost driver. V8 inlines those; the load-bearing cost is the require lookup and singleton dispatch. Reword. - Test file header described coverage as 'replay rejection at the route layer' but the file now also covers missing-header, wrong-secret, expired-row, never-stored, and unknown-node rejection paths. Widen the JSDoc and the describe label to match. - Stub-cast comment in the replay test now explicitly lists the IncomingMessage and Duplex surface the stub satisfies, so a future commit that grows handlePilotTunnel's surface (rate limiting, socket options) updates both stubs instead of silently no-opping against them. No behavior change.	2026-05-07 23:45:16 -04:00
Anso	3b650523c1	Audit-hardening pass for secret and misconfiguration scanning (#977) ... * fix(security): dedupe concurrent compose-stack scans Track stack scans in scanningImages keyed stack:<nodeId>:<stackName>. The /scan/stack route returns 409 when an in-flight scan exists, and the service-side check is the real correctness barrier (the route pre-check is a fast-path optimization that mirrors scanImage). The dedup key release lives in a try/finally so failed scans free the slot for retry. Why: scanComposeStack had no equivalent of scanImage's scanningImages guard, so two simultaneous calls for the same stack would both run trivy config, both insert a vulnerability_scans row, and double- process the result. * feat(security): acknowledge misconfig findings Adds a parallel acknowledgement system for Trivy misconfig findings that mirrors cve_suppressions: a new misconfig_acknowledgements table, read-time enrichment via the new misconfig-ack-filter utility, REST CRUD endpoints, fleet-sync replication from control to replicas, a Settings panel, and an Acknowledge button on the Misconfigs tab. Schema and behavior parity with cve_suppressions: - UNIQUE(rule_id, COALESCE(stack_pattern, '')) so fleet-wide acks collide as expected - blockIfReplica on every write - Audit-log entries name the scope (rule_id, stack_pattern) but never the reason text - replicated_from_control flag controls UI delete affordance and drives clearReplicatedRows on demote/reanchor - Validators reused: validateStackPatternForRedos for glob safety, sanitizeForLog for log fragments SARIF export emits an external/accepted suppression entry per acknowledged misconfig, matching the CVE pattern. Per-row Acknowledge dialog prefills stack_pattern with the scan's stack_context so the default scope is "rule + this stack only" and an operator must broaden explicitly. Tests: misconfig-ack-filter (15) and misconfig-ack-routes (23) including the duplicate-409 case for both pinned and fleet-wide acks. * fix(security): reap orphaned trivy tmp dirs at startup When the buildEnv path writes a per-scan DOCKER_CONFIG dir under os.tmpdir() and the process crashes before the finally block runs, the dir leaks. Mirrors GitSourceService.sweepStaleTempDirs: exported sweepStaleTrivyTempDirs is fire-and-forget at boot, removes prefix-matching dirs older than 1 hour, swallows permission/race failures, logs a single line if any were reaped. * perf(security): emit per-batch summary for scanAllNodeImages Adds one diag() line at the end of scanAllNodeImages summarising unique image count, scanned, skipped, failed, violation count, and elapsed time. Per-image diag inside scanImage stays useful for debugging individual scans; the summary gives operators a single fleet-level checkpoint when developer_mode is on. * perf(security): cap SARIF export at 5000 findings per type Replace the unbounded fetchAllPages walk on /scans/:id/sarif with a hard limit of 5000 findings per type. When any type trips the cap, emit run-level properties.truncated=true plus row_limit and per-type totals so downstream tooling can flag the export as partial. Console-warns for ops visibility. A scan with 50k vulns previously streamed every row into memory before serialising; the cap bounds memory and serialisation time at the cost of completeness on pathological scans. * docs(env): document TRIVY_BIN host-binary override The env var is honored by TrivyService.detectTrivy as a fallback when no managed install is present, but it was undocumented in .env.example. Adds the var with a comment explaining precedence (managed > TRIVY_BIN > PATH). * test(security): cover scanComposeStack failure modes Two new cases drive the existing try/catch through real failure paths: - Malformed Trivy stdout: row flips to status='failed' with the parser error preserved on `error`. - execFile rejection: row flips to status='failed' with a string error message. Pairs with the existing dedup tests so the failure path now also verifies the scan row state, not just the thrown exception. * test(e2e): security scanner + misconfig acknowledgement flow Seven Playwright tests covering the scanner UI and the new acknowledgement system end-to-end: - Trivy availability gate (skips suite when binary absent so CI without Trivy can opt out via E2E_SKIP_TRIVY=1) - Stack config scan completes and records misconfig findings - Concurrent stack scan returns 409 from the dedup gate - Misconfig ack POST creates and lists on Settings - Duplicate (rule_id, stack_pattern) returns 409 - Malformed rule_id (shell metacharacters) returns 400 - Misconfigs tab renders against a real stack scan Tests drive the API for behaviour assertions and the UI only for shell-rendering checks; the visual snapshot suite owns screenshots. * docs(features): add misconfig acknowledgement workflow and SARIF cap Refreshes vulnerability-scanning.mdx with: - Misconfig acknowledgements section covering the per-row dialog, Settings panel, scope/matching rules, and SARIF emission - Tier table row for the new feature - SARIF section note on the 5000 row-per-type cap and the properties.truncated marker for partial exports - Troubleshooting entries: SARIF cap, hidden Acknowledge button, findings resurfacing after delete, Trivy DB phone-home, and 409 on concurrent compose-stack scans * fix(ci): clear backend lint and CodeQL alerts - Remove the dead fetchAllPages helper in routes/security.ts. It lost its callers when the SARIF endpoint switched to direct paged reads for the truncation cap. ESLint flagged it as unused. - Switch the trivy-tmp-cleanup test helper to fs.mkdtempSync. Building paths under os.tmpdir() with predictable names tripped CodeQL's js/insecure-temporary-file rule (high severity), which warns about symlink-pre-creation attacks even in test code. mkdtempSync appends a process-random suffix and creates the dir atomically; the sencho-trivy- prefix is preserved so the production sweep still matches the test fixtures.	2026-05-07 19:23:11 -04:00
Anso	4b1de35dda	Audit-hardening pass for fleet-replicated CVE suppressions (#976) ... * perf(security): bucket CVE suppressions by id at read time applySuppressions now builds a Map<cve_id, suppression[]> once before the per-finding loop, dropping per-finding work to O(matching-cve-suppressions) rather than O(all-suppressions). At a fleet-wide cap of 10000 rows against a multi-thousand-finding scan, the prior linear-per-finding shape drifted into tens of millions of comparisons per render. Public API of findSuppression and applySuppressions is unchanged. Specificity scoring, expiry handling, and image-glob matching are preserved bit-for-bit. Adds a regression guard that pins a 10000x2000 workload under 1.5s and asserts at least one match was actually returned. * feat(security): record audit-log entries on control-side CVE suppression CRUD The replica receive path already wrote an audit-log entry on apply; the control-side POST/PUT/DELETE handlers did not. Operators reading the audit panel saw mirrored security-rule changes from the replica view but could not see who originated them on the control. Symmetric logging closes that gap. The summary records the CVE id and pinned scope (pkg, image) but never the suppression's reason text. Reasons are free-form admin input that replicate fleet-wide and may carry incident-tracker IDs or vendor context the operator did not intend to broadcast. The summary is also sanitised before emission so an operator-supplied package name or image pattern carrying a smuggled newline plus a forged "cve_suppression.delete:" prefix cannot inject a fake row into the audit panel. Control characters become "?" and the field is capped to its validator length. Adds a Control-side audit log block to suppression-routes.test.ts that asserts the privacy contract on each verb (scope present, reason absent), plus a log-injection guard test, plus a regression that GET still works when the local instance is a replica. * test(security): cover cve_suppressions fleet-sync receive path The existing fleet-sync route tests covered the protocol mechanics (auth, anchor, stale push, reanchor, demote) for cve_suppressions only with empty-rows payloads. The suppression-specific concerns were unverified end-to-end: - actual rows replace prior replicated rows on a fresh push - the receive path writes an audit-log entry naming the source fingerprint and row count - a malformed suppression row is rejected at the validator before any DB write Adds a focused block exercising those three properties against the real Express app, real SQLite, and the real apply transaction. * docs(features): refresh CVE suppressions troubleshooting and field guidance Converts the troubleshooting section to Mintlify Accordion blocks so each entry is foldable and the page stays scannable. Adds entries for: - control-identity mismatch on a replica (anchor-aware reanchor flow) - mirrored rules persisting after a control demote - the 10000-row truncation cap on a fleet sync push Adds a privacy note to the Reason field guidance: do not paste credentials, tokens, or vendor secrets there, since the field replicates fleet-wide and surfaces on every node's suppressions panel.	2026-05-07 16:18:19 -04:00
Anso	7dde257e1f	feat(fleet-sync): replica self-demote endpoint and role UX (#969) ... A replica admin can now demote the instance back to a standalone control without raw SQLite access. The Settings → Security UI surfaces a confirm-gated button when the role is replica; the role probe also surfaces a soft banner when it cannot determine fleet role rather than silently defaulting to control. Backend: - POST /api/fleet/role/demote (admin, requires `{confirm: true}`): flips fleet_role to 'control', clears fleet_self_identity, fleet_control_identity, and both received_pushed_at:* watermarks, drops every replicated_from_control row from scan_policies and cve_suppressions, nulls out any orphaned policy_evaluation cache. Returns 409 ALREADY_CONTROL when invoked on a control. - DatabaseService gains `clearOrphanPolicyEvaluations()` and `clearReplicatedRows()` helpers. Reanchor consolidates onto clearReplicatedRows so it shares the same code path. - `FleetSyncService.demote()` returns boolean for the route to translate into 200 or 409. Frontend: - SecuritySection probes /fleet/role and now records explicit success vs failure rather than silently treating an error as control. A soft banner appears when probe fails. - Replica banner gains a "Demote to control" button and a destructive ConfirmModal explaining the wipe. Tests: - 4 new route-level vitest cases (401, 400 without confirm, end-to-end demote with replica setup, 409 ALREADY_CONTROL with explicit precondition). - Service unit test asserts the consolidated clearReplicatedRows path. - Full backend suite: 1773 pass / 5 skipped. Frontend: 185 pass.	2026-05-07 13:08:21 -04:00
Anso	f3757b43c6	feat(fleet-sync): anchor replicas to a control fingerprint (#968) ... A replica now binds to the first control that pushes to it. Subsequent pushes from a different control are rejected with 409 CONTROL_IDENTITY_MISMATCH until an admin explicitly reanchors. Closes the cross-control hijack window where any node_proxy bearer signed against the replica's secret could overwrite security policies. Wire protocol: - Sender includes a stable 16-hex-char `controlIdentity` derived by SHA-256-truncating `system_state.instance_id` (the local UUID written once by LicenseService.initialize on first boot). Hostname rotations do not flag drift; only a SQLite reset or explicit reanchor breaks the binding. - Receiver caches the fingerprint inside the same transaction that applies the row replacement and watermark write. Three states: null (fresh install), '' (post-reanchor), '<fingerprint>' (anchored). - Empty `controlIdentity` is treated as legacy and accepted, so older controls keep working during rollout. New endpoint: - POST /api/fleet/role/reanchor (admin, requires `{override: true}`): clears the cached fingerprint, both `received_pushed_at:*` watermarks, and replicated rows of both resources, all in one transaction. The static cached fingerprint is also flushed defensively. Public surface additions: - `FleetSyncService.getControlIdentity()`: stable fingerprint for the outgoing push body. - `FleetSyncService.reanchor()`: admin-driven anchor reset. - `ControlIdentityMismatchError`: typed sentinel the route translates to 409 with structured body `{error, code, expected, got}`. Tests: - 9 new vitest cases covering first-sync persistence, mismatch rejection, matching acceptance, empty-incoming back-compat, post-reanchor un-anchored state, fingerprint stability, missing instance_id fallback, route-level mismatch, route-level reanchor with override gating. - One ordered route-level scenario instead of cross-dependent it() blocks so test reordering cannot silently break the suite. - Full backend suite: 1769 pass / 5 skipped.	2026-05-07 13:00:21 -04:00
Anso	0f0b22c51a	feat(fleet): Fleet Secrets tab with env-var bundles (v1 MVP) (#965) ... * feat(fleet): add Fleet Secrets tab with versioned env-var bundles (Skipper+) Centralized, encrypted-at-rest secret bundles that can be pushed to labeled nodes' stacks. Each save bumps a monotonic version; each push records a per-node-per-version row in `secret_pushes` plus an entry in `audit_log`. Conflict detection shows added/changed/unchanged/removed (informational) diffs before write. Overlay merge preserves keys missing from the bundle. - Adds `secrets`, `secret_versions`, `secret_pushes` tables. - New `SecretsService` reuses CryptoService for AES-256-GCM, NodeLabelService for selectors, and direct fetch + Bearer for outbound calls to remote nodes. - New `secretsRouter` with 9 endpoints under `/api/secrets`, gated by `requirePaid`. Mounted after the auth gate. - Audit summary patterns added for the new routes. - New Fleet › Secrets tab with bundle list, editor sheet (key=value rows, versions tab), and push wizard (selector, target stack, env file picker, per-node diff preview, results pills). - Documentation: docs/features/fleet-secrets.mdx + docs.json nav entry. - 26 Vitest cases cover parser, encryption, versioning, push aggregation, tier gating. * fix(fleet): use const for rawValue in env parser ESLint prefer-const flagged the let declaration as a CI-blocking error; the variable is never reassigned.	2026-05-07 06:03:39 -04:00
Anso	52b46753af	feat(fleet): add Federation tab with cordon and pin policy (Admiral) (#964) ... Ships the v1 MVP for the Federation tab as placement control, not placement automation: - Cordon a node: marks the node unschedulable so the BlueprintReconciler skips it for new placements only. Existing deployments continue to drift-check and redeploy on revision changes; cordon never triggers withdraw or eviction. Toggle on the NodeCard kebab (Admiral, admin role); Cordoned pill renders for all tiers. - Pin a blueprint to a node: stores blueprints.pinned_node_id, replacing the desired set with the pinned node regardless of selector. Pin overrides cordon by design. Action lives only in the Federation tab; BlueprintDetail and the deployment table show read-only Pinned indicators. Backend: idempotent migrations add nodes.cordoned/cordoned_at/cordoned_reason and blueprints.pinned_node_id. New routes POST /api/nodes/:id/cordon, POST /api/nodes/:id/uncordon, PUT /api/blueprints/:id/pin, all gated by requireAdmiral plus requireAdmin. Audit summaries added so the existing auditLog middleware records every operator action. deleteNode clears dangling pins. Reconciler: pin override evaluated before selector match; cordon filter applied only to the new-placement branch (deploy/stateReview without an existing deployment). 11 new Vitest cases cover cordon filter, pin override, pin-overrides-cordon, missing pin target, pin shrinks desired set (stateless withdraw + stateful evict_blocked), and pin clearing on node delete. Frontend: new FederationTab.tsx with cordoned-nodes summary and pin-policy table. Federation moved out of the experimental flag into {isAdmiral && (...)} + AdmiralGate, mirroring the Routing tab pattern. Secrets stays under experimental. Tests pass: backend tsc, full Vitest suite (1704 passed), frontend tsc -b, ESLint (0 errors). Manual verification via the local dev instance confirmed the tab is hidden at Community, the kebab and pill render at Admiral, and cordon and pin endpoints round-trip end to end. Refs cut-line-1.0.md Federation v1 MVP.	2026-05-07 05:55:00 -04:00
SaelixCode	3da0aa6036	chore: migrate repository URLs from AnsoCode/Sencho to studio-saelix/sencho ... Updates all hardcoded GitHub repository references across 21 files: - package.json: repository URL, bugs URL, homepage, description, author - CONTRIBUTING.md: bug report template URL - SECURITY.md: advisory URL, cosign cert-identity regexp - .github/CODEOWNERS: @AnsoCode -> @studio-saelix/maintainers - .github/workflows/ci.yml: repositories scope (Sencho -> sencho), docs-sync git URL - .github/workflows/cla.yml: path-to-document URL - .github/workflows/docker-publish.yml: cosign verify comment - frontend/**/*.tsx: issues and changelog links (3 components) - frontend/public/.well-known/security.txt: Contact and Policy URLs - security/vex/sencho.openvex.json: @id field - docs/openapi.yaml: license URL - docs/docs.json: navbar and footer GitHub links (5 instances) - docs/security.mdx: advisory and SECURITY.md links - docs/reference/verifying-images.mdx: repo link + cosign regexp + legacy identity note - docs/reference/contact.mdx: issues, LICENSE, advisory, policy, CoC links - docs/reference/security-advisories.mdx: releases link - docs/operations/verifying-images.mdx: cosign regexps and VEX download URL (6 instances) - docs/operations/upgrade.mdx: releases links (2 instances) - backend/src/utils/version-check.ts: GitHub Releases API endpoint CHANGELOG.md intentionally excluded (release-please managed). Legacy cosign identity note added for pre-migration image verification.	2026-04-29 09:24:20 -04:00
Anso	836e384d17	perf(backend): cache global_settings reads in DatabaseService (#814) ... getGlobalSettings() runs a SELECT * on every call and is hit from 22 files, including the auth middleware (every authenticated request), the WebSocket upgrade handler (every connection), and the debug-mode gate (every diagnostic log line). Cache the result inside the service on first read and invalidate on updateGlobalSetting(). The cached snapshot is Object.freeze'd and the public return type is now Readonly<Record<string, string>> so accidental mutations are caught at compile time. The settings GET handler that delete'd private keys now takes a defensive shallow copy first. The 5-second TTL cache in utils/debug.ts is now redundant and removed; the service-level cache is strictly fresher (invalidates on write rather than going stale for up to 5s).	2026-04-27 23:45:25 -04:00
Anso	4e5ba17710	refactor(backend): sanitize user input before logging to close CRLF injection (#807) ... * refactor(backend): sanitize user input before logging to close CRLF injection Adds a small sanitizeForLog helper that strips CR, LF, tab, and ASCII control characters (0x00-0x1F, 0x7F) from a value before it is embedded in a console.log/warn/error/debug call. Wraps every call site where a user-controlled value (req.params, req.body, req.query, or a value derived from them) flows into a log message. Closes the bulk of the open CodeQL alerts in this family: - 96 js/log-injection - 28 js/tainted-format-string The helper is in backend/src/utils/safeLog.ts. Routes still pre-validate input at the request boundary; this is the second line of defense and gives static analyzers a sanitizer they can trace through. JSON responses, Docker filter labels, and other non-log call sites are intentionally left unwrapped. * refactor(backend): printf-style format strings for tainted-log call sites CodeQL's js/tainted-format-string rule flags template literals in the first arg of console.X when any interpolated value is user-controlled, regardless of whether each value is sanitized inline. The canonical mitigation is to use a static format string and pass values as positional args. Converts the 28 flagged template literals to printf-style ("%s") format strings, with sanitizeForLog applied to each positional arg. Also fills in the log-injection wraps on 9 sites where a user-controlled value was missed in the first sweep (agents, fleet, gitSources, imageUpdates, GitSourceService). No behavior change at runtime. Node's util.format substitutes %s tokens identically to template-literal interpolation. * fix(backend): wrap nodeId/snapshotId in fleet restore debug log CodeQL flagged the unwrapped numeric args even though they cannot contain control chars in practice. Apply the sanitizer for taint-flow recognition.	2026-04-27 10:47:23 -04:00
Anso	4c352c74c8	refactor(backend): hoist parseIntParam helper to utils (#798) ... Adds backend/src/utils/parseIntParam.ts with a shared parseIntParam helper that writes a 400 'Invalid <label>' response and returns null on non-numeric route params. Consolidates the parseInt + isNaN + 400 shape that was inlined or duplicated across multiple routers. Updated: - routes/fleet.ts: replaced the local parseIdParam wrapper. - routes/autoHeal.ts: replaced the local parsePolicyId wrapper. - routes/notifications.ts: replaced parseRouteId wrapper plus an inline notification-id site. - routes/apiTokens.ts, routes/labels.ts, routes/registries.ts, routes/scheduledTasks.ts, routes/users.ts: replaced inline copies. Out of scope (route handlers without an existing isNaN check, kept intentionally untouched to avoid introducing new 400 responses): alerts, nodes, webhooks, and several user-routes handlers that rely on a downstream 404 instead. Closes #748	2026-04-27 00:39:28 -04:00
Anso	8460ae9ede	refactor(backend): hoist severity Sets to utils/severity.ts (#795) ... Replaces five inline new Set([...]) literals scattered across routes/security.ts and routes/fleet.ts with two shared constants (FINDING_SEVERITIES, POLICY_SEVERITIES) exported from utils/severity.ts. Pure refactor: no error response or status code changes. Closes #749	2026-04-27 00:05:12 -04:00
Anso	03f91cd5bb	feat(cloud-backup): mirror fleet snapshots to S3-compatible storage (#782) ... * feat(cloud-backup): mirror fleet snapshots to S3-compatible storage Add an Admiral-tier Cloud Backup feature that replicates every fleet snapshot to off-site storage, with two provider modes that share the same `@aws-sdk/client-s3` code path: - Sencho Cloud Backup: zero-config, 500 MB allowance backed by Cloudflare R2, provisioned via the sencho.io worker against the user's Lemon Squeezy license. - Custom S3 (BYOB): any S3-compatible bucket (AWS, MinIO, Backblaze B2, Wasabi, R2 with own keys), with credentials encrypted via `CryptoService` before storage. API-triggered snapshots upload fire-and-forget so the UI returns immediately; scheduled snapshots block on the upload so the task's success/failure reflects cloud durability. Object keys include the instance_id segment to prevent collisions when the same Admiral license is activated on multiple Sencho instances. * fix(cloud-backup): drop ES2022-only Error cause arg breaking ES2020 build The backend tsconfig pins lib to ES2020. The two-argument `Error(message, { cause })` form requires ES2022, so tsc rejected it with TS2554. Revert to single-argument throw to match the convention used elsewhere in the backend services.	2026-04-26 15:42:21 -04:00
Anso	801a098a5b	feat(files): per-stack file explorer (#780) ... * feat(files): backend foundation for stack file explorer Install multer for multipart file upload handling. Add isValidRelativeStackPath to validation.ts to guard client-supplied relative paths against traversal, absolute paths, NUL bytes, backslash injection, and double-slash segments. Add isBinaryBuffer to a new binaryDetect.ts utility for heuristic text/binary detection via NUL-byte fast exit and non-printable byte ratio sampling. * fix(files): reject bare dot segments in isValidRelativeStackPath * feat(files): add safe stack-scoped file I/O methods to FileSystemService Adds FileEntry interface and seven new public methods to FileSystemService for stack-scoped file operations: listStackDirectory, readStackFile, streamStackFile, writeStackFile, deleteStackPath, mkdirStackPath, and statStackEntry. Each method routes through a private resolveSafeStackPath helper that enforces two-phase path containment: a pre-realpath lexical check plus a post-realpath symlink-escape check. ENOENT targets are handled by walking up to the deepest existing ancestor, realpaths that ancestor, and reattaching the remaining suffix. Binary detection delegates to isBinaryBuffer; path safety delegates to isPathWithinBase. Protected file names and the MIME map are module-level constants to avoid repeated allocation. * feat(files): frontend API wrappers and Monaco language helper * fix(files): tighten stackFilesApi error handling and localOnly support * fix(files): FileSystemService safety and correctness fixes * feat(files): add file explorer API endpoints to stacks router * feat(files): FileTree and FileTreeNode components * fix(files): route security hardening and stream cleanup * fix(files): FileTree accessibility, icon stroke, stale fetch guard Add strokeWidth={1.5} to all Lucide icons in FileTreeNode to match the design system. Add aria-expanded to directory rows for accessibility. Guard handleDirClick .then() callbacks against stale stack name references when the component re-renders with a new stack. Add toast.info fallbacks when compose.yaml or .env is clicked without a navigation callback registered. * feat(files): FileViewer, FileUploadDropzone, NewFolderDialog, DeleteFileConfirm * fix(files): resolve code quality findings in file explorer components - Move editorOptions useMemo above conditional returns in FileViewer (Rules of Hooks fix) - Fix blob download: append anchor to DOM before click, defer URL revoke 100ms - Keep protected-file confirm input visible during NOT_EMPTY recursive retry in DeleteFileConfirm - Remove non-functional cursor-pointer/onClick from Community upgrade pill in FileUploadDropzone - Add success toast on folder creation in NewFolderDialog - Switch all (e as Error).message casts to instanceof Error narrowing * test(files): unit tests for binary detection, stack path safety, and file explorer routes - binary-detection.test.ts: covers isBinaryBuffer edge cases (empty, NUL, PNG header, threshold boundary, sampleBytes parameter) - filesystem-stack-paths.test.ts: covers isValidRelativeStackPath (accepts/ rejects matrix) and FileSystemService stack methods against a real temp dir (listStackDirectory sort and protection flags, readStackFile text/binary/ oversized paths, writeStackFile/Buffer, deleteStackPath, mkdirStackPath, traversal guard); platform-specific empty-dir/NOT_EMPTY cases skip on Windows - stack-files-routes.test.ts: route-level integration tests for all seven file explorer endpoints; covers auth gating, Community-tier 403 gates, input validation, 413 TOO_LARGE upload limit, and 204/200 happy paths * feat(files): StackFileExplorer container with lazy tree, viewer, and action bar * fix(files): add Download button to explorer toolbar, fix Community upgrade pill, reset state on stack change * test(files): add missing test coverage for file explorer routes and service * feat(files): add Files tab to EditorLayout with StackFileExplorer integration * fix(files): add defensive activeTab guard to saveFile and discardChanges * test(files): unit tests for FileTree expand/collapse and FileViewer render modes Covers the three FileViewer content modes (text/Monaco, binary panel, oversized panel) and the FileTree expand/collapse/cache cycle: first expand fetches the subdirectory, second click collapses without a fetch, third click re-expands from the in-memory cache without a second fetch. * test(e2e): file explorer community and skipper+ flows Covers the full file-explorer feature surface in two describe blocks: Community (read-only): intercepts /api/license to simulate community tier, confirms the upgrade pill is visible in the left pane, and asserts that the Save button is absent after opening a text file. Skipper+ (full CRUD): uploads a text file and confirms it appears in the tree; edits config/app.conf and saves via Monaco; deletes an uploaded file and asserts the tree entry is gone; issues a raw HTTP request to the download endpoint and checks for status 200 and the content-disposition: attachment header. Also adds data-testid="file-action-delete" to the action bar Delete button in StackFileExplorer for stable targeting, and exports waitForStacksLoaded from e2e/helpers.ts to eliminate the three identical local copies in stacks, deploy-log-panel, and stack-files spec files. * fix(e2e): improve test isolation and selector stability in stack-files spec Move beforeEach seed to beforeAll/afterAll so fixtures are created once per suite, not before every test. Extract shared seedSuite/teardownSuite helpers to eliminate the duplicate beforeAll/afterAll blocks. Wrap teardown in try/catch so failures log a warning rather than masking test results. Replace waitForTimeout(500) with a deterministic expect on the file tree sentinel. Add data-testid="anatomy-files-btn" and data-testid="delete-confirm-btn" to replace the fragile button text/positional selectors. Assert Save button starts disabled before editing. * docs(files): add stack file explorer documentation Add user-facing guide for the stack file explorer feature covering tier access (Community read-only, Skipper+ read-write), viewing limits, upload/download caps, protected file routing, and troubleshooting. Update the editor page to reference the new guide and register the page in the navigation. * fix(docs): use canonical Skipper tier name in file explorer overview card * fix(files): resolve lint errors blocking CI Remove unnecessary backslash escape before double-quote in the Content-Disposition regex (no-useless-escape). Replace five synchronous setState resets at the top of the FileTree mount effect with a React key prop on the FileTree element in StackFileExplorer so remounting resets state automatically, eliminating the react-hooks/set-state-in-effect violation. * test(files): fix e2e seeding to work on community-tier CI Replace the browser-side paid upload/mkdir API calls in seedTestStack with direct Node fs writes. The upload and folder endpoints require Skipper+ so they returned 403 on CI, which runs with no license set. Stack creation via POST /api/stacks stays as an API call since it is community-allowed and keeps the backend registry in sync. Add a per-test tier check in the Skipper+ beforeEach that skips gracefully when the instance is community, matching the pattern in auto-heal-policies.	2026-04-26 13:05:19 -04:00
Anso	6986b927e3	feat(stacks): per-service start/stop/restart lifecycle actions (#778) ... * feat(stacks): add per-service start/stop/restart lifecycle routes Adds POST /:stackName/services/:serviceName/{start,stop,restart} routes that operate on containers belonging to a single Compose service, using the same Engine API pattern as the existing stack-level lifecycle routes. Includes isValidServiceName validator and audit-summary entries for the three new paths. * test(stacks): add per-service action route tests * test(stacks): fix test quality issues in service action tests * feat(stacks): add per-service lifecycle menu to container cards * fix(stacks): handle paused container state in service action menu * docs(stacks): add per-service lifecycle actions documentation * docs(stacks): add validation screenshots for per-service lifecycle actions	2026-04-25 17:26:04 -04:00
Anso	ed553f1f19	feat: change default listen port from 3000 to 1852 (#756) ... Updates the backend listen port, Vite dev proxy target, Docker EXPOSE, compose port mapping, .env.example default, GitHub Actions smoke-test default, healthcheck URLs, and every doc/example reference. Test fixtures that include example URLs were updated for consistency, though their assertions are port-agnostic. The rate-limit value of 3000 in middleware/rateLimiters.ts and the 3000 entry in WEB_UI_PORTS (which detects user containers like Grafana) are intentionally untouched.	2026-04-24 22:23:31 -04:00
Anso	50e64b058b	refactor(backend): extract 8 low-blast-radius route groups into routers (phase 4a-1) (#734) ... First slice of Phase 4 (route extraction). Pulls 8 well-tested, mostly independent route groups out of index.ts into focused Router files. No behavior change; every handler body moves verbatim. New route files under backend/src/routes/: - meta.ts /api/health, /api/meta (mounted before authGate) - license.ts /api/license/* + /api/system/update, exports scheduleLocalUpdate for the fleet route - permissions.ts /api/permissions/me - convert.ts POST /api/convert - alerts.ts /api/alerts/* - labels.ts /api/labels/* + PUT /api/stacks/:name/labels (exported as stackLabelsRouter) - apiTokens.ts /api/api-tokens/* - auditLog.ts /api/audit-log/* Shared helper lifts: - helpers/cacheInvalidation.ts: invalidateNodeCaches() - middleware/tierGates.ts: requireBody (was inline in index.ts) - utils/errors.ts: isSqliteUniqueViolation (was inline in index.ts) - middleware/apiTokenScope.ts: rejectApiTokenScope() helper (new) - utils/csv.ts: escapeCsvField() (new) index.ts drops from ~7520 to ~6775 lines and now mounts the routers right after enforceApiTokenScope. The remote proxy and fleet/auth/webhooks/users routes remain inline in index.ts pending later Phase 4 slices. Code review fixes: rejectApiTokenScope helper replaces duplicated `if (req.apiTokenScope) 403 SCOPE_DENIED` blocks in apiTokens.ts and license.ts; escapeCsvField replaces the inline CSV escape in auditLog.ts.	2026-04-23 20:24:37 -04:00
Anso	732fc95415	feat(security): fleet-replicated CVE suppression list (#650) ... Operators can accept known-benign findings once and have Sencho filter them out of scan drawers, comparison views, and other read surfaces. Suppressions replicate from the control instance to every remote node. * New cve_suppressions table with a COALESCE-based unique index so NULL scope slots collide the way users expect * Admin + paid-tier CRUD routes; writes are rejected on replicas * Read-time filter enriches vulnerability details and compare payloads without mutating stored counts * Settings > Security panel for managing rules, per-CVE suppress action in the scan drawer, dimmed rows with a shield-off indicator * Vitest unit tests for the filter (glob, expiry, specificity) and route tests (auth, tier, replica, UNIQUE conflict)	2026-04-17 05:16:34 -04:00
Anso	dc8370f5a4	fix(security): harden Trivy scan lifecycle, logging, and docs (#639) ... * fix(security): harden Trivy scan lifecycle, logging, and docs - Call TrivyService.initialize() at startup so capability state is accurate before first request; add periodic re-detect to the scheduler so newly installed Trivy binaries light up without a restart. - Add markStaleScansAsFailed sweep (+ idx_vuln_scans_status index) to recover any scan row left in_progress after a crash or timeout; sweep runs before the paid-tier gate so every tier self-heals. - Split scanImage persistence into beginScan/finishScan so the manual scan route owns a single code path and can return a scanId synchronously while work continues asynchronously. - Validate image refs on /api/security/scan and /sbom via new utility; defense-in-depth against shell-metacharacter payloads. - Dispatch a warning-level alert when a post-deploy scan fails so the operator has a user-visible path to the failure instead of a silent log. - Share DIGEST_CACHE_TTL_MS and severity ordering across service and route layers; remove dead invalidateDetection(). - Add [Trivy:diag] logging gated behind developer_mode for support diagnostics; production logs unchanged. - Frontend: defensive toast fallback chain, sr-only SheetDescription, and a truncation badge when the 500-item detail fetch is capped. - Tests: extend trivy-service and vulnerability-db suites; add image-ref and severity unit tests. - Docs: expand vulnerability-scanning troubleshooting with recovery, re-detect, and diagnostic-log guidance; link Dockerfile comment to trivy-setup. * fix(security): drop unnecessary escape in image-ref forbidden-char regex	2026-04-16 20:32:38 -04:00
Anso	6529a24530	feat(git-sources): harden create-from-git with LFS + submodule warnings (#609) ... * feat(git-sources): surface LFS and submodule warnings on create Creating a stack from a Git repo now detects two common anomalies and tells the user about them rather than silently producing broken stacks. - LFS-pointer compose/env files fail early with a clear error instead of writing a 130-byte pointer stub to disk as real content. - Repositories containing .gitmodules produce a non-fatal warning so the user knows build contexts or volumes inside submodules will be empty at deploy time. Also refines the create dialog: sr-only DialogDescription for a11y, short commit SHA suffix on the success toast, env-path hint under the "Sync .env" checkbox showing which path will be read, and a route-level diagnostic log line gated on developer mode for support debugging. * test(git-sources): cover LFS, submodule, and nested env_path paths Adds unit coverage for the new LFS-pointer rejection and submodule warning plumbing, plus a nested compose_path case that exercises the default env_path resolution ("apps/web/compose.yaml" with sync_env on and env_path unset writes "apps/web/.env" both to disk and to the DB). Extends the E2E suite with a happy-path assertion that the full-length commit SHA is returned in the create response, and a UI flow that verifies the short-SHA suffix appears in the success toast. * docs(git-sources): add troubleshooting for LFS, submodules, HTTPS-only Adds troubleshooting entries for the newly surfaced LFS and submodule anomalies, expands the clone-timeout entry with the bounded-fetch explanation, and adds a dedicated HTTPS-only entry. Also consolidates the known limitations into a single list covering LFS, submodules, branch-tracking, and HTTPS-only. * fix(settings): use Route icon for notification routing The routing section in Settings previously used GitBranch, which now clashes with the Git Source feature's icon across the editor. Switch to Route (a branching-flow glyph) so routing rules have a distinct visual identity and aren't visually conflated with Git-backed stacks. * fix(git-sources): return 400 for upstream auth failures and disambiguate 404s Upstream git-host auth failures were mapping to HTTP 401, which the frontend apiFetch treats as a Sencho session expiry and fires the global logout event. They now return 400 with code=AUTH_FAILED in the body so the UI can branch on the discriminator without logging the user out. The status mapping moved into utils/gitSourceHttp so it can be unit-tested without booting the app. mapGitError also relied on the HttpError class alone, so any non-2xx response (including 404) was classified as auth failure. It now inspects the numeric status on err.data and considers whether a token was supplied, producing more actionable messages for missing repos, private repos, and wrong-scope tokens.	2026-04-15 11:31:29 -04:00
Anso	6b8c369745	fix(notifications): stop Sencho version notifications from silently skipping (#594) ... * fix(notifications): stop Sencho version notifications from silently skipping Three independent defects combined to make version-update notifications silently fail even while Fleet overview correctly surfaced an update button: - The in-memory 6-hour cooldown was advanced before the network fetch, so a single transient failure at boot could lock the check for the rest of the container lifetime. Moved the cooldown update inside the success branch so failures retry on the next eval cycle. - MonitorService called the raw version fetch directly, bypassing the CacheService wrapper (TTL, inflight dedup, stale-on-error) that Fleet uses, so the two paths could diverge. Unified both on a shared getLatestVersion() helper in utils/version-check.ts. - The dedup key could carry stale state from a previous build and never self-clear. It now self-heals when the running version reaches the previously-notified version, so future releases re-fire as expected. Added diagnostic logs gated on debug mode for each skip branch, plus three regression tests covering cooldown-on-failure, cooldown-on-success, and dedup self-heal. * docs(notifications): drop legacy-upgrade framing from alerts troubleshooting Sencho has not shipped publicly, so troubleshooting entries written in 'this used to happen but now does Y' mode reference a past that does not exist for any reader. Rewrote the version-notification, image-update, and crash-alert troubleshooting entries to describe current behavior positively without referring to prior builds, upgrade paths, or legacy fixes. * chore(security): accept CVE-2026-33810 in bundled Docker CLI 29.4.0 Trivy now flags CVE-2026-33810 (Go stdlib crypto/x509 DNS constraint bypass, fixed in Go 1.26.2) in the Docker CLI static binary we ship. Docker CLI 29.4.0 is the latest upstream release and still links Go 1.26.1; no newer static binary exists yet. Same exposure profile as the already-accepted CVE-2026-32280: the Docker CLI and compose plugin only validate certificates from well-known registry CAs and the local Docker socket, not from attacker-controlled CAs with crafted DNS name constraints. Revisit on the next Docker CLI release that rebuilds against Go 1.26.2 or later.	2026-04-14 16:34:28 -04:00
Anso	0a94df318a	fix(alerts): harden with security fixes, design compliance, and test coverage (#570) ... * fix(alerts): harden with security fixes, design compliance, and test coverage Add authMiddleware to all alert endpoints, validate notification test dispatch inputs, fix restart_count metric via Docker inspect, correct network metric units, replace any types with DockerContainerStats interface, add webhook timeouts and dispatch error tracking. Frontend: migrate Select to Combobox, add ScrollArea and delete confirmation AlertDialog, fix icon strokeWidth to 1.5. Add update availability notifications for both Sencho version updates (6-hour check in MonitorService) and stack image updates (state transition detection in ImageUpdateService). Extract shared version fetch logic into utils/version-check.ts. Add diagnostic logging gated behind developer_mode for MonitorService breach state machine and NotificationService dispatch routing. Tests: 24 new alert API integration tests, restart_count and version check unit tests (688 total passing). Docs updated with HTTPS requirement, update notifications section, and troubleshooting guide. * fix(alerts): remove unused TEST_USERNAME import in alerts-api tests	2026-04-13 21:40:53 -04:00
Anso	6daa7a135d	fix(audit): harden audit log with summary fixes, design compliance, and test coverage (#561) ... * fix(audit): harden audit log with summary fixes, design compliance, and test coverage Replace stale /compose/* route summaries with current /stacks/* patterns, add ~30 missing route summaries for container ops, labels, fleet updates, SSO, templates, and auto-update. Fix X-Forwarded-For extracting full proxy chain instead of first client IP. Pre-sort pattern table at module load for O(1) lookup instead of sorting per request. Add Calendar and DatePicker UI components (react-day-picker v9 + date-fns) replacing browser-native date inputs. Align AuditLogView with design system: Combobox instead of Select, design token colors, strokeWidth 1.5, card bevel, tabular-nums on all numeric cells. Add diagnostic logging gated behind developer mode for audit middleware, query, and export endpoints. Extract getAuditSummary to testable utility. Add 32 tests covering summary resolution, DB round-trips, API permissions, export formats, and middleware integration. * fix(audit): use correct Chevron prop types for react-day-picker compatibility	2026-04-13 15:38:33 -04:00
Anso	809bf76c20	fix(fleet): harden fleet snapshots with DRY capture, audit fixes, and design compliance (#555) ... Extract duplicated snapshot capture functions from index.ts and SchedulerService.ts into a shared module (snapshot-capture.ts). Fix audit log route patterns that used singular 'snapshot' instead of plural 'snapshots'. Apply design system to FleetSnapshots component (card styling, strokeWidth, font-mono, tabular-nums, ScrollArea). Add safePage pagination, loading toast for creation, and fix the restore dialog race condition with a controlled AlertDialog. Add diagnostic logging gated behind Developer Mode. Add tests for restore endpoint, admin role enforcement, and edge cases. Update docs with troubleshooting section and refresh screenshots.	2026-04-13 13:26:55 -04:00
Anso	a74a516850	fix(logs): harden global logs with shared parsing, SSE fixes, and level filter (#539) ... - Extract log parsing utilities (normalizeContainerName, parseLogTimestamp, detectLogLevel, stripControlChars, demuxDockerLog) to shared module, eliminating duplication between polling and SSE endpoints - Fix timestamp regex to accept timezone offsets (+HH:MM/-HH:MM), not just Z - Replace any[] with typed GlobalLogEntry interface - Add SSE heartbeat (30s) to prevent reverse proxy timeouts - Add X-Accel-Buffering: no header for nginx SSE compatibility - Replace swallowed catch blocks with console.warn diagnostics - Fix SSE not reconnecting on node switch (missing dep in effect array) - Add settings change event so devMode/pollRate updates apply without remount - Add log level filter (ALL/ERROR/WARN/INFO) to toolbar - Replace overflow-auto div with ScrollArea for design system compliance - Add strokeWidth={1.5} to all toolbar icons - Include stack name in download format - Surface fetch errors with inline banner - Add 39 unit tests for all log parsing utilities - Update docs with level filter documentation and refreshed screenshot	2026-04-12 21:19:08 -04:00
Anso	4909c35e50	fix(resources): harden Resource Explorer with auth, validation, design, and UX fixes (#527) ... - Sanitize error messages in all delete/prune/create/inspect endpoints to prevent Docker internals from leaking to the frontend - Add CIDR, IPv4, and Docker resource ID input validation - Add requirePaid gate to network topology endpoint - Add invalidateNodeCaches after image/volume/network mutations - Fix design system violations: card borders, destructive button variant, visible DialogDescription, overflow-auto replaced with ScrollArea, hardcoded Tailwind colors replaced with tokens - Gate purge button behind isAdmin to prevent silent 403s - Fix shared inspect loading state to be per-network-row - Parse error response bodies for meaningful toast messages - Add clipboard API fallback for non-HTTPS contexts - Render Options section in network inspect sheet - Add operational and diagnostic logging for resource operations - Extend validation and DockerController test suites - Update docs with Options field in network inspect	2026-04-12 15:31:35 -04:00
Anso	2465f7607e	fix(stacks): harden stack management with security, validation, and logging (#520) ... * fix(stacks): harden stack management with security fixes, validation alignment, and logging Validate WebSocket stack names with isValidStackName() to close a path-traversal gap on the /api/stacks/:stackName/logs WS endpoint. Align POST /api/stacks to use the canonical validator (allows underscores). Replace error: any catch blocks with error: unknown + type narrowing. Add cache invalidation to PUT /api/stacks/:stackName/env. Rename DELETE param from :name to :stackName for consistency. Add standard [Stacks] lifecycle logs and diagnostic [Stacks:debug] logs gated behind the Developer Mode toggle (with 5s TTL cache). Extract shared isDebugEnabled() and getErrorMessage() utilities. Frontend: roll back optimistic status on API failure, guard unsaved changes when switching stacks, pre-check duplicate names in App Store. * docs(settings): update Developer Mode description to mention debug diagnostics	2026-04-12 05:43:15 -04:00