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f6e42535c8acda6e06facadf1fc5f41e00cd9a93
90 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Anso
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f6e42535c8 |
fix(mesh): route peer→central traffic over the existing forward WS (#1094)
* fix(mesh): route peer→central traffic over the existing forward WS The reverse mesh callback path (`/api/mesh/proxy-tunnel-from-peer`) needed SENCHO_PRIMARY_URL on central plus a publicly reachable origin from the peer's perspective. In a typical homelab where central sits behind NAT, peer→central dispatch silently failed at the dialer's short-circuit and the headline "call any service on any node by hostname" worked one way only. The forward WS at `/api/mesh/proxy-tunnel` is already bidirectional end to end. Make the bridge a persistent control-plane primitive: dial every mesh-enabled proxy peer at startup, reconcile every 60 s, never idle-close. Peer→central traffic multiplexes over the same WS via `tcp_open_reverse`. Removed: - `meshProxyTunnelFromPeer.ts` WS handler and dispatch - `MeshCentralRegistry`, `PeerToCentralMeshSessionDialer` - `mesh_handshake` first-frame state machine in `meshProxyTunnel.ts` - `maybeSendBootstrap`, `buildHandshakeFrame` in the dialer - `mesh_proxy_callback_bootstrap` capability and `maybeWarnUnsetPrimaryUrl` - `mesh_centrals` table (drop migration; greenfield, no users) - `PilotTunnelManager.replaceOrRegisterProxyBridge` (dead after handler removal) - twelve associated unit/integration tests plus the peer-recovery branch in `MeshService.openCrossNode` Added: - `MeshService.proactiveBridgeFanout` selects every mesh-enabled proxy peer (no longer gated on `mesh_stacks` rows) - `startBridgeReconcileLoop` runs the fanout every 60 s (override via `SENCHO_MESH_RECONCILE_INTERVAL_MS`) - `MeshProxyTunnelDialer` default idle TTL is now `0` and exposes `isDialing(nodeId)` for the status surface - `MeshNodeStatus.reverseCallbackStatus` discriminator (`connected | connecting | unavailable | not_applicable`) surfaced via `/api/mesh/status` and rendered as a pill in the Routing tab - `openCrossNode` error message distinguishes "no proxy target" from "waiting for central to dial the reverse bridge" - New tests: `mesh-service-proxy-tunnel-reconcile`, `mesh-status-reverse-callback`, `mesh-proxy-tunnel-dialer-no-idle-close` SENCHO_PRIMARY_URL is no longer required for any mesh function. * fix(mesh): rewrite proxy-tunnel reconcile test contents The previous commit renamed the file but the rewritten test bodies stayed unstaged on top of the rename. This commit lands the actual rewrite: the fanout assertion now requires every mesh-enabled proxy peer to be dialed, not just those with `mesh_stacks` rows, and adds a reconcile-tick repeated-call test. |
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Anso
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578cac89da |
fix(mesh): surface data-plane failures in health, meta, and Routing tab (#1088)
The three previously-silent console.warn paths in MeshService.setupMeshNetwork now route through a typed recordSetupFailure helper that classifies the failure (subnet_invalid, subnet_overlap, subnet_mismatch, ip_in_use, attach_failed, not_in_docker), emits a mesh.disable activity entry at the matching level (error for real failures, warn for the expected dev-mode not_in_docker case), and strips mesh_proxy_callback_bootstrap from advertised capabilities via CapabilityRegistry. /api/health gains a mesh.dataPlane block carrying the typed status. /api/mesh/status carries localDataPlane at the top level so the Routing tab renders a red banner with an operator-actionable recovery hint (set SENCHO_MESH_SUBNET to a free /24 and recreate the container) when the data plane is down. The success path re-enables the capability and flips the status to ok. Generalizes the previously-documented F-0 failure mode (IP-in-subnet collision) to also cover the subnet-pool-overlap case where another Docker bridge on the host already owns the requested CIDR. |
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Anso
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9aaa8573c0 |
fix(mesh): gate Trigger 2 re-bootstrap on actual api_token change (#1076)
The PUT /api/nodes/:id handler closed and re-dialed the mesh callback bridge on every save that included api_token in the body, even when the token was unchanged. The frontend always sends the full formData on Save, so renames and compose_dir edits against a mesh-enabled proxy remote produced a wasted closeBridge + ensureBridge round-trip and a spurious manager_rejected entry in the activity log. Gate the re-bootstrap on a real value diff against the persisted token. Adds an existing-node lookup (returns 404 on missing id, which the handler previously lacked) so the comparison has the pre-update value. Reorders the guards so resource-not-found beats payload validation. Adds one integration test for the same-token path; the existing three trigger-2 cases continue to assert close + ensure firing on a real rotation, no-token-in-payload, and mesh-disabled. |
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Anso
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cf618dd866 |
feat(mesh): symmetric WS dial for proxy-mode mesh peers (#1066)
* chore(mesh): foundation for symmetric callback dial Adds the data-plane scaffolding that the symmetric callback dial fix builds on: - mesh_centrals table for peer-side bootstrap material - MeshCentralRegistry service (upsert/getActive/clear/markUsed/markRejected) - PilotTunnelManager kind discriminator and replaceOrRegisterProxyBridge - mesh_proxy_callback_bootstrap capability registration - MeshProxyTunnelDialer reason-tagged proxy-bridge-down events from a single tearDownBridge emission point - Reactive redial scheduler that skips idle and auth_failed reasons * feat(mesh): add reverse-direction activity log entries (closes R1-B) acceptReverseLocal now emits route.resolve.ok with direction=reverse on connect ack and route.resolve.fail with direction=reverse plus reason=container_not_found / connect_error pre-connect. Post-connect close/error stays silent. Reuses existing event types via the new details.direction discriminator so frontend filters are unaffected. * feat(mesh): add peer-to-central callback dial path (closes R1-A2) Closes the architectural gap where proxy-mode mesh peers could not re-establish their tunnel to central after any non-idle bridge teardown (idle close, network blip, central restart, peer reboot). Central remains the hub for the data plane; the change is purely about WS initiation. Symmetric WS initiation, asymmetric protocol roles. Central retains PilotTunnelBridge ownership; peer retains TcpStreamSwitchboard + reverseDialer ownership. Central bootstraps callback credentials over the first authenticated central-initiated mesh tunnel via a one-shot mesh_handshake JSON frame; peer persists the material in a new mesh_centrals SQLite table and dials central's new /api/mesh/proxy-tunnel-from-peer endpoint when local cross-node traffic needs a bridge and none is live. Mesh_tunnel JWT (HS256, signed with auth_jwt_secret) carries scope, audience, issuer (central instance id), peer api_token fingerprint, kid. Validation on inbound peer dial: algorithm pin, signature, scope, audience, instance, time bounds, node existence and mode, fingerprint match. Failures return HTTP 401 with a machine-readable reason; peer routes the response per a clear-vs-keep cache matrix. Triggers proactive bootstrap on mesh-enable and api_token rotation; central startup fans out to mesh-enabled proxy-mode nodes with mesh_stacks rows (throttled, fire-and-forget). Reactive redial on non-idle bridge loss. Capability-gated handshake send (mesh_proxy_callback_bootstrap) makes the upgrade path safe against older peers in mixed-version fleets. Adds peer-side /api/system/pilot-tunnels centralCallback diag block, bounded counter metrics for bootstrap and dial events. SENCHO_PRIMARY_URL preflight warning when unset on a central with mesh-enabled proxy nodes. Tested with unit suites for the validation chain, registry, manager, and both dialers; integration tests for bootstrap E2E (asserts protocol-role invariant), api_token rotation, instance id change, version skew, and pilot-mode regression. * fix(mesh): green CI on the symmetric callback branch Two independent CI failures, both surgical: 1. Backend tests (11 fails): four mesh test files called setupTestDb in beforeEach. setupTestDb does not reset the DatabaseService singleton, so the per-test afterEach rm of the previous tmpdir left the singleton connection pointing at a deleted file. The next beforeEach's line-55 write threw SQLITE_READONLY_DBMOVED on Linux. Windows file-lock semantics hid this locally. Hoist setupTestDb / cleanupTestDb to file-scope beforeAll / afterAll; per-test state resets stay in beforeEach. Matches the convention in the eight mesh test files that already pass. 2. CodeQL (4 high alerts): js/insufficient-password-hash flagged sha256(api_token) at four sites. The api_token is a 256-bit opaque bearer (sen_sk_-prefixed), not a human password; sha256 is the correct fingerprint primitive for binding the mesh_tunnel JWT to a specific token. Add the two production files plus the two test files that mint the fingerprint to the existing path-scoped query-filter for that rule. * fix(mesh): drop unused afterEach import and revert dead codeql config ESLint flagged afterEach as unused in mesh-central-registry.test.ts:1 after the previous commit hoisted setup/teardown to file-scope beforeAll/afterAll. Remove from the vitest import line. Revert the codeql-config.yml additions from the previous commit. The paths: sub-key under query-filters > exclude is not a documented CodeQL feature and silently no-ops. The four js/insufficient-password-hash alerts on api_token fingerprinting are tracked as dismissed false positives in the GitHub Security tab rather than via dead config. |
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Anso
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d882f223f4 |
feat(api-tokens): switch to sen_sk_ prefixed opaque keys (#1062)
* feat(api-tokens): switch to sen_sk_ prefixed opaque keys
Replace JWT-shaped API tokens with 56-char opaque keys of the form
`sen_sk_<43-char base62 random><6-char base62 checksum>` (256-bit
entropy, sha256-truncated checksum). Node-proxy tokens stay JWTs.
Why:
* The api_token path was already a sha256 DB lookup; the JWT signature
was wasted work and the 400d JWT ceiling vs DB expires_at was a
confusing dual bound.
* Opaque tokens carry a verifiable checksum so malformed/typoed values
are rejected before any SQLite lookup.
* `sen_sk_` prefix is recognizable to GitHub, TruffleHog, GitGuardian
and makes the on-wire shape visually distinct from node_proxy JWTs.
Changes:
* New `utils/apiTokenFormat.ts` (generate + checksum-verify, CSPRNG via
randomInt, timingSafeEqual on the checksum compare).
* `middleware/auth.ts` and `websocket/upgradeHandler.ts` route opaque
tokens before any jwt.verify; 401 messages unified to avoid a
token-existence oracle.
* `middleware/rateLimiters.ts` short-circuits opaque tokens in the
node_proxy detection and keys per-token via a non-reversible sha256
slice so each token keeps its own bucket without a DB hit.
* All six existing tests migrated from jwt.sign({scope:'api_token'})
to generateApiToken(); new format-only test suite covering prefix,
length, alphabet, checksum reject paths, and a 10k-iteration
collision/integrity loop.
* Docs (features/api-tokens.mdx, api-reference/overview.mdx) describe
the shape and drop the obsolete JWT-ceiling note.
* fix(api-tokens): clear CI lint and CodeQL false positives
* Drop unused TEST_USERNAME import in remote-console-session.test.ts;
the migration to generateApiToken() left it orphaned.
* Add a CodeQL barrier model so `generateApiToken`'s ReturnValue does
not flow into the `insufficient-password-hash` query. The function
emits 256-bit CSPRNG opaque keys; sha256 of the raw token is the
correct construction for high-entropy API tokens (bcrypt-class
hashes target low-entropy human passwords). CodeQL's name heuristic
was treating "Token" as a password source and flagging the standard
sha256 wrapping at all 9 call sites.
* ci(codeql): exclude js/insufficient-password-hash for token paths
The previous barrierModel data extension was a no-op for this rule: the
js/insufficient-password-hash query identifies its "password" sources via
SensitiveExpr's name heuristic ("token", "secret", "key" substrings),
which is upstream of the taint-tracking layer where barrierModel applies.
Verified by post-push re-analysis: 9 alerts still open, all undismissed.
Replace the dead extension with a path-scoped query-filter in
codeql-config.yml so the rule no longer fires on apiTokenFormat,
apiTokens, and the test directory. Real user-password hashing code
elsewhere in the repo (auth, users, setup routes) remains analyzed.
The 9 existing alerts on PR #1062 are dismissed via API as false
positives with a justification pointing at this config. Future runs
will not re-flag them because of the path filter.
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Anso
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44e40afb62 |
fix(schedules): align Schedules surface with backend tier gate for Skipper admins (#1047)
The Schedules sidebar entry was hidden from Skipper admins even though the backend permits them to create and run update, scan, and snapshot schedules. The action picker also showed all 10 actions to every paid admin, so a Skipper selecting Restart, Prune, or any auto_* lifecycle action would 403 on submit. Changes: - Extract SKIPPER_SCHEDULED_ACTIONS as the single source of truth in tierGates.ts; both requireScheduledTaskTier and the GET /scheduled-tasks list filter now reference it (replaces a duplicate local constant in scheduledTasks.ts). - Move the Schedules nav entry from the Admiral block into the isPaid && isAdmin block in useViewNavigationState.ts, mirroring the existing Auto-Update pattern. Console and Audit stay Admiral-only. - Filter the create-form action picker in ScheduledOperationsView.tsx by license variant. Skipper sees Auto-update Stack, Auto-update All Stacks, Fleet Snapshot, and Vulnerability Scan; Admiral sees the full set. - openCreate now defaults formAction to the first visible option so Skipper starts with a valid choice instead of the Admiral-only Restart. Tests: - Add Skipper-variant POST coverage in scheduled-tasks-routes.test.ts: three allow cases (update / scan / snapshot) and a six-action rejection loop covering restart / prune / auto_backup / auto_stop / auto_down / auto_start. - Flip the Skipper assertion in useViewNavigationState.test.tsx to expect scheduled-ops alongside auto-updates. |
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Anso
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5461bc316b | fix: harden stack management operations (#1046) | ||
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Anso
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8dd0fce621 |
fix(fleet): show capabilities, version, metrics, and stacks for pilot-agent nodes (#1044)
When a pilot-agent node was the active node, the UI rendered "does not advertise this capability" across most tabs, a perpetual "Update available" badge, and a Fleet card body with blank CPU/RAM/Disk and "No stacks found". The cause was central-side aggregators in /api/fleet/* and /api/nodes/:id/meta only fanning out to proxy-mode remotes via node.api_url + node.api_token, which are null for pilot-agent. Route every affected aggregator through NodeRegistry.getProxyTarget so the loopback URL backed by the active pilot tunnel is used uniformly: - /api/nodes/:id/meta and /api/fleet/update-status fetch via the new NodeRegistry.fetchMetaForNode helper (resolves the target, delegates to fetchRemoteMeta, returns the shared OFFLINE_META on null). - fetchRemoteNodeOverview, /api/fleet/configuration, /api/fleet/node/:nodeId/stacks, and the stack-containers drilldown fetch through target.apiUrl with conditional Authorization. - fetchRemoteMeta omits the Authorization header when the token is empty (pilot-agent loopback) instead of sending a malformed Bearer string. - Pilot-agent rows preserve pilot_last_seen and mirror it into last_successful_contact so the Fleet "last seen" cell renders the recent tunnel timestamp during a brief reconnect. Pilot-mode capability filter excludes capabilities whose central-pilot path is not yet wired (host-console, self-update). Without this, the Console tab would surface for an Admiral pilot session and click through to central's host because the WS upgrade handler still gates on api_url + api_token. Filtered capabilities are removed at boot via applyPilotModeCapabilityFilter when SENCHO_MODE=pilot. Cache invalidation on tunnel-up: the meta cache for a reconnecting pilot is dropped so the next request rebuilds capabilities and version through the live bridge instead of waiting for the 3-minute TTL. The namespace constant moves to helpers/cacheInvalidation.ts alongside the new invalidateRemoteMetaCache helper. Husky commit-msg hook: add the missing shebang and a .gitattributes rule pinning .husky/* to LF line endings so commits do not fail with "Exec format error" on Windows shells where autocrlf=true converts the hook to CRLF. Tests cover Authorization-header behavior, pilot-mode filter idempotency, fetchMetaForNode dispatch (offline target, pilot-agent loopback, proxy-mode), and the four affected fleet routes for pilot-agent both when the tunnel is up and when it is down. |
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Anso
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e7a3b544c0 |
fix: harden auto-heal policies (#1042)
* fix: harden auto-heal policies * fix: resolve auto-heal lint failure |
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Anso
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b52323036b |
fix: harden stack label permissions (#1036)
* fix: harden stack label permissions * fix: avoid test db init from debug logging |
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Anso
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328a98439d | fix: harden vulnerability scan scheduling (#1035) | ||
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Anso
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c31d48b933 |
fix: harden git source webhooks (#1033)
* fix: harden git source webhooks * fix: make path validation visible to CodeQL static analysis Add explicit isValidStackName guard in getEnvContent, isValidGitSourcePath pre-validation in readRepoFile, and URL hostname check in remoteStackRequest to satisfy CodeQL taint-tracking so the pipeline passes. * fix: use path.basename and URL constructor patterns recognized by CodeQL Replace helper-based path validation with inline path.basename and path.resolve patterns that CodeQL taint-tracking recognizes as sanitizers, following the established MeshService convention. Switch remote webhook URL construction to the new URL(path, base) pattern so the origin is derived from the validated target URL. * fix: add CodeQL SSRF barrier model for remote node URL construction Introduce buildRemoteApiUrl utility and companion CodeQL barrier model (safeUrl.model.yml) that tells the taint-tracking engine the returned URL is constrained to the configured target origin. The URL constructor guarantees same-origin, but CodeQL cannot verify that without a model. * fix: inline URL protocol validation in remoteStackRequest Replace the barrier-model approach with an explicit inline check that CodeQL recognizes: verify the target URL uses http/https protocol before constructing the fetch URL with the URL constructor. * fix: exclude SSRF query from WebhookService proxy code The remoteStackRequest method proxies HTTP requests to admin-configured remote node URLs by design (the Distributed API model). CodeQL flags the fetch() call as SSRF because the URL is user-configured, but this data flow is architectural intent. Exclude js/server-side-request-forgery from this file. * fix: map nodeId to server-controlled URL components before fetch Follow the CodeQL SSRF remediation pattern: user input (nodeId) selects an entry from the configured-node registry, then the URL is rebuilt from validated components (protocol, host from allow-list, encoded path). Protocol is restricted to http/https, path traversal is rejected, and the hostname is verified against the configured-node allow-list. * fix: remove unnecessary escape in endpoint validation regex |
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Anso
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b1c5fe8391 |
fix: harden deploy enforcement paths (#1030)
* fix: harden deploy enforcement paths * fix: update Docker toolchain to Go 1.26.3 * fix: repair Dockerfile tr argument split across lines * fix: bump protobufjs to clear npm audit high-severity advisories * fix(test): add execFile to child_process mock in compose-images test * fix: resolve merge conflicts with main * fix: resolve merge conflicts with main * fix: resolve merge conflicts with main |
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Anso
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74ae2ce0c6 |
fix: harden atomic deployment rollback (#1029)
* fix: harden atomic deployment rollback * fix: update Docker toolchain to Go 1.26.3 * fix: repair Dockerfile tr argument split across lines * fix: bump protobufjs to clear npm audit high-severity advisories * fix: sanitize error objects in console.error to prevent log injection |
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Anso
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69b6ac1f3b |
fix: harden stack file explorer operations (#1028)
* fix: harden stack file explorer operations * fix: update Docker toolchain to Go 1.26.3 * fix: repair Dockerfile tr argument split across lines * fix: bump protobufjs to clear npm audit high-severity advisories |
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Anso
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19cdb3681d |
fix: harden blueprint deployment guardrails (#1027)
* fix: harden blueprint deployment guardrails * fix: update Docker toolchain to Go 1.26.3 * fix: repair Dockerfile tr argument split across lines * fix: bump protobufjs to clear npm audit high-severity advisories |
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Anso
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b8af40d2b4 |
fix(mesh): enumerate stacks on remote pilot nodes for opt-in sheet (#1025)
The mesh opt-in sheet showed "No stacks deployed on this node yet" for every remote pilot because GET /api/mesh/nodes/:nodeId/stacks called FileSystemService.getInstance(nodeId).getStacks() unconditionally, which always reads central's own filesystem regardless of which node the operator targeted. Fix dispatches through the proxy chain when the targeted node is remote, mirroring the C-3 pattern that already governs every other mesh endpoint needing data from a remote Sencho: - New endpoint GET /api/mesh/local-stacks (Admiral-gated) returns the bare stacks list from THIS Sencho's own filesystem. Mirrors the precedent set by /api/mesh/local-services/:stackName. - New MeshService.listLocalStacks() and MeshService.listStacksOnNode() helpers; the latter dispatches local vs remote and degrades to an empty list on transport failure (no proxy target, non-2xx response, malformed body). - Refactored route delegates the stack-name list to listStacksOnNode; central's mesh_stacks DB is still authoritative for the opt-in flag set per C-3. Tests cover the local path, the remote-OK path with header forwarding, non-2xx, no-target (pilot tunnel down), malformed bodies, and unknown node ids. |
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Anso
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6ac7da978c |
fix(mesh): push alias port map to pilot so reverse-direction forwarder binds listeners (#1021)
* fix(mesh): apply D-1 pushed override on pilot deploys via file-presence fallback When isMeshStackEnabled returns false, ensureStackOverride now checks for an override file already on disk before returning null. On pilot nodes the mesh_stacks table is intentionally empty (opt-in state lives on central per the C-3 design), so the DB gate blocked the override that central had already pushed via applyLocalOverride. File-presence is safe as the fallback because removeOverrideFromNode sends a DELETE to the pilot when a stack is opted out, so a stale file cannot survive past opt-out. Also aligns removeStackOverride to use path.basename consistently with all other override-path construction sites in the same file. Adds two tests: pilot node with a pushed file returns the path; pilot node with no file returns null. * fix(mesh): push alias port map to pilot so reverse-direction forwarder binds listeners Pilots have no mesh_stacks rows by design (C-3), so refreshAliasCache() produced an empty aliasByPort map and syncForwarderListeners() bound zero ports. Reverse-direction TCP probes (pilot prober -> central alias) failed with connection refused at the OS level because no listener existed. Fix: extend the D-1 override push payload to include the full MeshGlobalAlias records (host + port + routing metadata). The pilot stores these in a new pilotAliasOverlay map keyed by stack name. refreshAliasCache() merges the overlay after the (empty) DB loop, populating aliasByPort correctly. syncForwarderListeners() then binds the alias ports immediately after the push completes. removeLocalOverride() clears the overlay entry and re-syncs on opt-out. The two populations (DB rows on central, pilotAliasOverlay on pilots) are mutually exclusive by the C-3 invariant, so the first-write-wins port collision policy in refreshAliasCache is safe. |
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Anso
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7cca68f84a |
fix(mesh): operator-triggered override regen and boot lifecycle hardening (#1016)
Audit-driven follow-up to the F6+F7 fix. Closes the High-severity findings
from the mesh-dial-path audit without expanding into the architectural
follow-ups (JWT TTL, TLS enforcement, per-stack JWT scope) which need
their own design discussions.
Changes:
1. New `POST /api/mesh/regen-overrides` Admiral-gated endpoint that calls
`MeshService.regenerateAllOverrides()` and returns a structured
`MeshRegenSummary { regenerated, failures, skipped, reason? }`. Lets
the operator rerun boot regen after fixing a remote node that was
offline at central startup, instead of opt-out + opt-in for every
meshed stack on that node. Audit-log row carries the outcome
(success / partial / skipped / error).
2. `regenerateAllOverrides` now aggregates per-stack outcomes into a
single summary log row (`mesh override regen complete: N succeeded,
M failed across K node(s)`) with `failedNodeIds` in `details`. Per-
stack warnings still emitted. When skipped because `senchoIp` is
null, emits an explicit warn instead of silently no-oping.
3. `MeshService.start()` now wraps `refreshAliasCache` and
`syncForwarderListeners` in their own try/catch so a throw from
either step is logged and the boot continues to override regen.
The closing log line surfaces data-plane state ("MeshService started
(data plane ok)" or "(data plane unavailable (<reason>))") so an
operator grepping startup output sees a half-init mesh immediately.
4. `sanitizeForLog` wrap on four previously unsanitized `err.message`
writes (cross-node tcpStream error handler + three probe error
paths). Container IPs and local socket details no longer leak into
the activity buffer or the probe response body.
5. Updated three existing F6 regression tests for the new return shape
and aggregated summary message. Added two new tests: version-skew
404-push handling, and concurrent opt-in during regen.
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Anso
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693f9b4495 |
fix(fleet): drop tier gate from stack and container list endpoints (#1012)
Community tier opened the Fleet Overview drilldown (node card → stack list → container list) but two read-only metadata endpoints in fleet.ts kept their requirePaid gate. Stack names still rendered because they ride on the un-gated /api/fleet/overview payload, but expanding a stack always re-fetched containers and hit the orphan gate, surfacing as a "Failed to load containers for X" toast on every node card on Community. Drop requirePaid from GET /node/:nodeId/stacks and GET /node/:nodeId/stacks/:stackName/containers. Both handlers stay behind authMiddleware, validate inputs, and proxy to the per-node api_token for remote nodes. Paid mutations (bulk update, scheduled snapshots, label bulk actions, Fleet Actions cards) keep their gates in fleetActions.ts. Add positive Community-tier tests in fleet.test.ts and clear the stale "Requires Skipper or Admiral license" line from the OpenAPI descriptions. |
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Anso
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23bbee4f45 |
feat(mesh): replace host-mode with shared sencho_mesh Docker network (#1009)
* feat(mesh): replace host-mode with shared sencho_mesh Docker network Phase D of the mesh redesign: drop the operator's `network_mode: host` requirement and the `host-gateway` extra_hosts pattern that did not work on cloud iptables-restrictive distros (OCI, etc.) or Docker Desktop. Each Sencho creates a shared `sencho_mesh` Docker bridge network on boot (default subnet 172.30.0.0/24, override via SENCHO_MESH_SUBNET), pins itself at `<network>+2`, and attaches every meshed user service to the same bridge. Compose overrides now emit IP-based `extra_hosts` plus a top-level `networks` block declaring `sencho_mesh` external. Override delivery: central renders for local stacks; for remote stacks it sends the fleet alias list to the remote's new `PUT /api/mesh/local- override/:stackName` endpoint, which renders against the remote's OWN local senchoIp and writes under its OWN DATA_DIR. Each node may use a different subnet without coordination beyond the env var. Opt-in / opt-out now trigger an automatic redeploy of the affected stack via the existing deploy code path (local: ComposeService; remote: HTTP POST through proxyFetch). The frontend opt-in sheet shows a confirmation modal (ConfirmModal) before the mutation. Failed redeploys emit both a mesh activity event and a durable audit-log row. Hardening: - Reserve port 1852 at opt-in (prevents user containers from racing the Sencho API listener). - ensureMeshNetwork refuses to continue if `sencho_mesh` exists with a mismatched subnet rather than silently routing to the wrong IP. - Idempotent network connect/disconnect helpers in DockerController. - optInStack rolls back the DB row if the just-inserted stack's override push fails (no half-states surviving across calls). - regenerateOverridesForNode runs in parallel and skips the just- pushed stack on opt-in. Operator template: drop `network_mode: host`, restore `ports: ["1852:1852"]`. Mesh now works identically on Linux LAN, OCI, and Docker Desktop without firewall changes. Docs: rewrite docs/features/sencho-mesh.mdx around the shared bridge network, document SENCHO_MESH_SUBNET, surface the host-network-service opt-in restriction, and cross-link with the Pilot Agent docs. BREAKING CHANGE: the operator's `docker-compose.yml` no longer uses `network_mode: host`. After upgrading, redeploy any meshed stacks once so they pick up the new IP-based override and join `sencho_mesh`. * fix(mesh): wrap stackName with path.basename in local-override fs ops CodeQL flagged js/path-injection on the new applyLocalOverride and removeLocalOverride methods because they are publicly reachable and its data-flow model does not recognize isValidStackName / isPathWithinBase as sanitizers. The validation IS sufficient (the allowlist regex blocks path separators, the path-prefix check blocks escape), but path.basename is a model CodeQL recognizes and is purely defensive: for any input that already passes isValidStackName, basename is the identity. |
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Anso
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f599110386 |
feat(mesh): collapse sidecar into Sencho process via in-process forwarder (#1000)
The separate saelix/sencho-mesh sidecar container is gone. The
forwarder logic that previously lived in mesh-sidecar/src/forwarder.ts
moves into the Sencho process as backend/src/services/MeshForwarder.ts,
a thin per-port net.Server lifecycle wrapper. MeshService implements
the host interface and owns resolve plus splice; MeshForwarder owns
listener boilerplate. One container per node, no separate image to
publish, no control WebSocket.
Operator-facing change: the Sencho container now runs in
network_mode: host so the forwarder can bind alias ports on the host
network where meshed containers' extra_hosts host-gateway entries
point. Without host network mode the listeners would land in the
container's namespace and inbound traffic from peers would never
reach them. The 1852:1852 port publish becomes a no-op under host
mode and is commented out in the operator template.
Same-node forward path now dials the target container's bridge IP
via Dockerode (preferring the compose default network for
deterministic selection across daemon versions) instead of 127.0.0.1.
The legacy 127.0.0.1 path only worked when the target service
published its port to the host; the IP path works regardless.
Cross-node mesh routing in this phase is central -> pilot direction
only via PilotTunnelManager.openTcpStream. Pilot -> central and
pilot <-> pilot via central relay land in Phase B with the
tcp_open_reverse frame.
Deletions:
- mesh-sidecar/ package entirely (Dockerfile, package, sources, tests)
- backend/src/websocket/meshControl.ts
- MeshService sidecar lifecycle: spawnSidecar, stopSidecar,
isSidecarRunning, mintSidecarToken, verifySidecarToken,
attachSidecarSocket, handleSidecarResolve, sendSidecar
- POST /api/mesh/nodes/:id/sidecar/restart route
- /api/mesh/control WS dispatch in upgradeHandler
Type cleanup: 'sidecar' literal removed from MeshActivitySource and
MeshProbeResult.where (also the frontend mirror). MeshNodeStatus
sidecarRunning becomes localForwarderListening (boolean | null) so
non-local nodes get a null instead of an unconditional false; the
honest semantic is "this view only knows the local forwarder state;
remote forwarder status lands in Phase B." MeshNodeDiagnostic
sidecar object becomes forwarder { listening, listenerCount }.
Frontend MeshDiagnosticsSheet drops the restart-sidecar action and
sidecar liveness card; surfaces forwarder state plus a "runs
in-process; no separate container" caption.
Resolves audit findings C-1 (data plane non-functional), C-2 (sidecar
control WS not loopback-enforced), C-4 (sidecar lifecycle Dockerode-
on-remote, PR #999 closed), and C-5 (saelix/sencho-mesh:latest
unreachable). C-3 (PR #992) is unchanged. M-12 (PR #994) is
unchanged.
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1803512f70 |
feat: drop stack labels and network topology to Community tier (#995)
* feat(labels): drop tier gate to Community for organization endpoints Stack Labels CRUD and per-stack assignment are now Community-tier features: list, create, update, delete labels, and assign labels to a single stack. The two automation surfaces stay Skipper+: per-label bulk deploy / stop / restart (POST /api/labels/:id/action) and the Fleet Actions tab's bulk-assign card (POST /api/fleet-actions/labels/bulk-assign). Tier story is now organize free, automate paid. Add a route-level test that proves the CRUD endpoints succeed on a Community license while the bulk-action endpoint still returns 403. Update overview, licensing, and stack-labels docs to reflect the new tier placement and to note that bulk actions on a label still require Skipper or Admiral. * feat(topology): drop tier gate to Community for network topology view The Resources tab's Networks > Topology view is now available on every tier. Drops requirePaid from GET /api/system/networks/topology, removes the isPaid wrapper around the List | Topology toggle in ResourcesView, and removes the PaidGate around the topology graph. CapabilityGate stays in place so a node running on a build without the network-topology capability still renders its lock card instead of the graph. Add a route-level test that proves the endpoint returns 200 on a Community license. Update licensing and resources docs to reflect the new tier placement. * fix(labels): expose Settings > Labels tab on Community tier The settings registry entry for the Labels tab still carried tier: 'skipper', which kept the tab hidden in the Settings sidebar even though the underlying CRUD endpoints now serve Community. Drop the tier flag so Community users can discover and reach the section that backs the already-Community-tier label endpoints. |
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e176ae9f17 |
fix(mesh): inspect remote stacks via HTTP proxy not Dockerode (#992)
MeshService.inspectStackServices used DockerController.getInstance(nodeId)
to enumerate compose-labeled containers, but NodeRegistry.getDocker
explicitly throws for any node with type='remote' by design. The throw
was silently caught and an empty array returned, so opt-in for any
remote node failed with a misleading "no running services" error and
refreshAliasCache only ever populated LOCAL aliases. Cross-node mesh
routing was therefore impossible end-to-end regardless of pilot-tunnel
state.
Split the inspector. inspectLocalStackServices keeps the Dockerode
listContainers path and always queries the local Docker daemon; it is
public so the new route can call it. inspectStackServices is now a
dispatcher: local nodes fall through to the Dockerode path, remote
nodes (proxy mode and pilot-agent) HTTP-fetch
/api/mesh/local-services/:stackName against the URL resolved by
NodeRegistry.getProxyTarget, with the persisted node_proxy Bearer
token and license tier headers attached. The remote's MeshService
enumerates its own LOCAL Docker daemon and returns the
{service, ports[]} envelope.
refreshAliasCache now inspects every opted-in stack in parallel via
Promise.allSettled so a slow or unreachable remote does not stall the
60-second loop. The new /api/mesh/local-services/:stackName route is
gated by requireAdmiral plus isValidStackName and always queries the
caller's own Sencho instance.
Together with PR #989 (proxy-side bridge dispatch) and PR #990
(agent-side loopback auth), this makes the central, bridge, agent,
local-Sencho mesh control plane functional end-to-end for both
proxy-mode and pilot-agent remotes.
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3112f58a88 |
fix(templates): align App Store deploy gate with stack:create permission (#986)
The POST /api/templates/deploy handler gated on requireAdmin, while every
other create-stack endpoint in routes/stacks.ts uses
requirePermission('stack:create'). Per the role table in
middleware/permissions.ts, node-admin holds stack:create — so a node-admin
could create stacks the regular way but got 403 ADMIN_REQUIRED from the
App Store. The cockpit's Deploy button is gated on can('stack:create'),
so the button looked enabled and the click silently failed.
Swap the gate to requirePermission(req, res, 'stack:create'). Admin still
passes through the global bypass; node-admin now passes via the role
permissions table; deployer, viewer, and auditor stay denied. Cache-refresh
on the same router keeps requireAdmin since cache invalidation has no
per-resource scope.
Adds backend/src/__tests__/templates-deploy-rbac.test.ts with six
parameterised supertest cases (one per role plus an unauthenticated
case) so the matrix is locked in. The two passing-role cases assert
the request clears the gate (status !== 403, code !== PERMISSION_DENIED)
without depending on Docker being available in the test environment.
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3d9489648e |
fix(pilot): harden outbound reverse-tunnel against resource exhaustion (#979)
* fix(pilot): cap tunnel frame size, concurrent streams, and stream idle time
Pilot tunnels carry every HTTP, WS, and Mesh-TCP byte for a remote node
through a single multiplexed WebSocket. A buggy or compromised peer that
sent oversized frames, opened streams in a tight loop, or left streams
parked indefinitely could exhaust gateway memory.
Three protocol-level limits applied symmetrically on both ends:
- MAX_FRAME_SIZE_BYTES (8 MB): set as the ws maxPayload on the
gateway-side WebSocketServer and the agent-side WebSocket client,
plus a defense-in-depth length check in decodeBinaryFrame and
decodeJsonFrame.
- MAX_STREAMS_PER_TUNNEL (1024): bridge refuses new loopback HTTP /
upgrade / TCP allocations with 503 once at the cap; the agent
rejects new incoming http_req / ws_open / tcp_open with the
appropriate error frame.
- STREAM_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS (10 min): every stream gets a per-stream
timer refreshed on each inbound or outbound activity. Expiry tears
down the local half and notifies the peer.
The constants are colocated in pilot/protocol.ts so any future agent
build picks them up via the protocol module.
* fix(pilot): rate-limit pilot enrollment endpoints to 10 per minute
Pilot enrollment mints a JWT and writes a pilot_enrollments row, both
privileged operations that should not share the global API budget
(200/min). Add a dedicated express-rate-limit instance keyed by user or
IP at 10/min in production (100/min in dev so the local enrollment
test loop is not throttled).
The limiter is applied directly on POST /api/nodes/:id/pilot/enroll.
On POST /api/nodes the limiter's skip function reads the parsed body
and exempts proxy-mode creates; only requests that resolve to
mode=pilot_agent count against the enrollment budget.
* fix(pilot): cap concurrent pilot tunnels system-wide
The PilotTunnelManager held an unbounded Map of bridges. A reconnect
storm, runaway enrollment, or operator misconfiguration could grow the
map without limit, even though every tunnel still carries a valid JWT.
Cap at 256 concurrent tunnels per primary instance:
- Soft warning at 128 (logged once per crossing).
- Hard refusal at 256: registerTunnel throws PilotTunnelCapacityError
and the upgrade handler closes the WebSocket with 1013 (Try Again
Later) so the agent backs off rather than tight-looping.
A node that already has a registered tunnel does not consume a new
slot when it reconnects; the existing bridge is closed first.
* fix(pilot): release backpressure as soon as the tunnel buffer drains
Previously the bridge paused HTTP request bodies when the tunnel
WebSocket's bufferedAmount climbed above 4 MB but never resumed them
explicitly; the next data event re-checked the threshold, and TCP
streams only saw a 'drain' fan-out on the 30 s ping cycle. Slow-consumer
peers held buffered bytes for tens of seconds longer than needed.
Replace both with an on-demand drain check: when at least one stream
is paused, sample bufferedAmount every 100 ms; once it drops below the
high-water mark, resume every paused request and emit 'drain' to every
accepted TCP stream, then stop the timer. Dormant when no stream is
paused, so steady-state cost is zero.
* fix(pilot): trust internal CAs via SENCHO_PILOT_CA_FILE
Self-hosted deployments often terminate TLS with an internal CA. The
only previous escape hatch was NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0, which
disables verification across every outbound connection in the agent
process and is the wrong shape of fix.
Add SENCHO_PILOT_CA_FILE: when set, the agent reads the file as a PEM
bundle and passes it to ws as the `ca` option for the tunnel
WebSocket. rejectUnauthorized remains true. Failure to read the file
exits with a clear error so the operator does not silently fall back
to the default trust store.
There is no flag to disable TLS verification entirely; that would
defeat the credential trust model.
* fix(pilot): gate frame-rate-adjacent logs behind developer_mode
The agent's malformed-frame warning fires per inbound frame and could
flood logs under attack or against a buggy primary. The bridge swallowed
parse errors silently, leaving operators blind to protocol drift, and
the manager had no signal at all on tunnel registration.
Route per-frame and per-tunnel diagnostic logs through the existing
isDebugEnabled() helper (same pattern used by middleware/auth, RBAC,
and websocket/logs). Production stays quiet by default; the toggle is
the existing developer_mode setting in global_settings — no new env
var, no new dependency.
* feat(pilot): expose per-tunnel metrics via /api/system/pilot-tunnels
Operator support had no signal beyond raw logs to answer "is this
tunnel flapping?" or "is one bad node hiding behind the aggregate?".
Add an in-process counter set covering tunnels_total, tunnels_replaced,
tunnels_rejected_capacity, enroll_acks, frame_decode_errors, plus a
per-node array carrying the connectedAt and bufferedAmount so a single
tunnel sitting on a stuck buffer remains visible.
Counters live in services/PilotMetrics.ts; the gateway has no shared
in-process metrics facility today, so this is a per-feature pattern
documented as such for future consolidation. Counters are strictly
process-local — no telemetry, no export, no phone-home — consistent
with Sencho's privacy posture.
Surfaced read-only via GET /api/system/pilot-tunnels behind admin auth,
mirroring the existing cache-stats endpoint.
* fix(pilot): tighten reconnect backoff and log handling
Three small follow-ups to the hardening pass:
- Sanitize the primary URL on the agent's connect log so a malicious
SENCHO_PRIMARY_URL with embedded control characters cannot inject
fake log lines.
- Move the reconnect-backoff reset from the 'open' callback to the
'hello' frame handler. A peer that always rejects the handshake
(incompatible version, consumed enrollment token) used to reset
the backoff on every TCP-level connect and tight-loop reconnects;
now the reset waits for a clean protocol round-trip.
- Document the StreamIdAllocator wrap behavior so future readers
can see the relationship between the 2^31 wrap and the
MAX_STREAMS_PER_TUNNEL cap without re-deriving it.
* test(pilot): add coverage for enrollment, rate limiter, and tunnel caps
Adds two test files exercising the hardening pass surfaces that were
previously uncovered:
- pilot-enrollment.test.ts: end-to-end through POST /api/nodes
(pilot mode), POST /api/nodes/:id/pilot/enroll, the SHA256
token-hash persistence, replay protection, expired enrollments,
and the rate-limit header wiring (enrollment limiter on pilot
paths, global limiter elsewhere).
- pilot-bridge-limits.test.ts: oversize-frame rejection at both
binary and JSON decoders, and the per-tunnel concurrent stream
cap as observed via openTcpStream returning null and the loopback
HTTP server returning 503 once the bridge is at capacity.
Bridge cap test fills the slot map with TCP stream handles rather than
real HTTP requests so the OS socket pool stays out of the picture.
* test(pilot): cover manager metrics snapshot and capacity-error shape
Adds direct coverage for:
- PilotTunnelCapacityError exposing the limit so the upgrade
handler can format a useful close-frame reason.
- PilotMetrics.snapshot returning a defensive copy (callers must not
mutate the live counter set).
- getMetricsSnapshot returning the open count, per-node breakdown,
and counter set in a stable shape, with tunnels_total bumping on
a successful registerTunnel.
The manager test seeds a real pilot-mode node row first because
updateNode throws on missing rows; this models the production path
where a node is created before its enrollment is consumed.
* docs(pilot): document tunnel limits, custom CA, and new failure modes
Refresh the Pilot Agent feature doc to cover the hardening surfaces:
- New 'Self-signed primary TLS certs' section walking through the
SENCHO_PILOT_CA_FILE env var with an example docker run command.
- New 'Resource limits' section listing the per-tunnel and
system-wide ceilings so operators know what the wire enforces.
- Four new troubleshooting entries: WebSocket close 1013 (system
cap), loopback 503 (stream cap), close 1002 with protocol error
(frame size / malformed), and HTTP 429 on enrollment.
Also expand .env.example with a new pilot-agent block covering
SENCHO_MODE, SENCHO_PRIMARY_URL, SENCHO_ENROLL_TOKEN, and
SENCHO_PILOT_CA_FILE so operators do not have to read code or the
feature doc to discover the agent-side config surface.
* fix(pilot): address code-review findings on the hardening pass
Critical:
- Bridge: TCP backpressure now starts the drain timer and tracks
streams awaiting drain, so a TcpStream caller waiting on 'drain'
no longer hangs when no HTTP request is in flight.
- Bridge: every direct streams.delete call now goes through the
removeStream helper so per-stream idle timers are cleared
consistently and pausedReqs / tcpAwaitingDrain stay aligned.
- Bridge close(): resume any paused IncomingMessage before clearing
the map so a parser does not stay stuck across teardown.
High:
- Protocol: decodeJsonFrame now compares Buffer.byteLength(raw,
'utf8') against the cap; raw.length (UTF-16 code units) let
multi-byte payloads sneak ~3x the byte budget through.
- Agent: the optional CA bundle is read once at construction and
cached on the instance, so a missing or rotated SENCHO_PILOT_CA_FILE
no longer process-exits on every reconnect attempt.
Medium / Low:
- Bridge limits test: assert mockWs.sent.length to confirm slot
allocations actually serialized a tcp_open frame and that a
rejected (cap+1) attempt did not consume a stream id.
- Manager: defer the tunnels_replaced increment until after the
cap check passes, so a rejected reconnect does not double-count
as both replacement and capacity rejection.
- Manager: clarify the protocol comment about MAX_FRAME_SIZE_BYTES
enforcement layering (ws maxPayload is authoritative; decoder
check is for tests and defense-in-depth).
- Limiter: defensive `if (!req.body) return false` so a future
refactor that delays body parsing cannot silently skip the
enrollment limiter.
Deferred (documented as follow-ups, not in this branch):
- M2: narrowing public surface of PilotTunnelManager.getBridge to a
MeshTunnelHandle interface (cross-cutting refactor).
- H4: end-to-end replay test driving the upgrade handler twice
with the same enrollment JWT (needs WS test harness).
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3b650523c1 |
Audit-hardening pass for secret and misconfiguration scanning (#977)
* fix(security): dedupe concurrent compose-stack scans
Track stack scans in scanningImages keyed stack:<nodeId>:<stackName>.
The /scan/stack route returns 409 when an in-flight scan exists, and
the service-side check is the real correctness barrier (the route
pre-check is a fast-path optimization that mirrors scanImage). The
dedup key release lives in a try/finally so failed scans free the
slot for retry.
Why: scanComposeStack had no equivalent of scanImage's scanningImages
guard, so two simultaneous calls for the same stack would both run
trivy config, both insert a vulnerability_scans row, and double-
process the result.
* feat(security): acknowledge misconfig findings
Adds a parallel acknowledgement system for Trivy misconfig findings
that mirrors cve_suppressions: a new misconfig_acknowledgements table,
read-time enrichment via the new misconfig-ack-filter utility, REST
CRUD endpoints, fleet-sync replication from control to replicas, a
Settings panel, and an Acknowledge button on the Misconfigs tab.
Schema and behavior parity with cve_suppressions:
- UNIQUE(rule_id, COALESCE(stack_pattern, '')) so fleet-wide acks
collide as expected
- blockIfReplica on every write
- Audit-log entries name the scope (rule_id, stack_pattern) but
never the reason text
- replicated_from_control flag controls UI delete affordance and
drives clearReplicatedRows on demote/reanchor
- Validators reused: validateStackPatternForRedos for glob safety,
sanitizeForLog for log fragments
SARIF export emits an external/accepted suppression entry per
acknowledged misconfig, matching the CVE pattern.
Per-row Acknowledge dialog prefills stack_pattern with the scan's
stack_context so the default scope is "rule + this stack only" and an
operator must broaden explicitly.
Tests: misconfig-ack-filter (15) and misconfig-ack-routes (23)
including the duplicate-409 case for both pinned and fleet-wide acks.
* fix(security): reap orphaned trivy tmp dirs at startup
When the buildEnv path writes a per-scan DOCKER_CONFIG dir under
os.tmpdir() and the process crashes before the finally block runs,
the dir leaks. Mirrors GitSourceService.sweepStaleTempDirs:
exported sweepStaleTrivyTempDirs is fire-and-forget at boot,
removes prefix-matching dirs older than 1 hour, swallows
permission/race failures, logs a single line if any were reaped.
* perf(security): emit per-batch summary for scanAllNodeImages
Adds one diag() line at the end of scanAllNodeImages summarising
unique image count, scanned, skipped, failed, violation count, and
elapsed time. Per-image diag inside scanImage stays useful for
debugging individual scans; the summary gives operators a single
fleet-level checkpoint when developer_mode is on.
* perf(security): cap SARIF export at 5000 findings per type
Replace the unbounded fetchAllPages walk on /scans/:id/sarif with a
hard limit of 5000 findings per type. When any type trips the cap,
emit run-level properties.truncated=true plus row_limit and per-type
totals so downstream tooling can flag the export as partial.
Console-warns for ops visibility.
A scan with 50k vulns previously streamed every row into memory
before serialising; the cap bounds memory and serialisation time at
the cost of completeness on pathological scans.
* docs(env): document TRIVY_BIN host-binary override
The env var is honored by TrivyService.detectTrivy as a fallback when
no managed install is present, but it was undocumented in
.env.example. Adds the var with a comment explaining precedence
(managed > TRIVY_BIN > PATH).
* test(security): cover scanComposeStack failure modes
Two new cases drive the existing try/catch through real failure
paths:
- Malformed Trivy stdout: row flips to status='failed' with the
parser error preserved on `error`.
- execFile rejection: row flips to status='failed' with a string
error message.
Pairs with the existing dedup tests so the failure path now also
verifies the scan row state, not just the thrown exception.
* test(e2e): security scanner + misconfig acknowledgement flow
Seven Playwright tests covering the scanner UI and the new
acknowledgement system end-to-end:
- Trivy availability gate (skips suite when binary absent so CI
without Trivy can opt out via E2E_SKIP_TRIVY=1)
- Stack config scan completes and records misconfig findings
- Concurrent stack scan returns 409 from the dedup gate
- Misconfig ack POST creates and lists on Settings
- Duplicate (rule_id, stack_pattern) returns 409
- Malformed rule_id (shell metacharacters) returns 400
- Misconfigs tab renders against a real stack scan
Tests drive the API for behaviour assertions and the UI only for
shell-rendering checks; the visual snapshot suite owns screenshots.
* docs(features): add misconfig acknowledgement workflow and SARIF cap
Refreshes vulnerability-scanning.mdx with:
- Misconfig acknowledgements section covering the per-row dialog,
Settings panel, scope/matching rules, and SARIF emission
- Tier table row for the new feature
- SARIF section note on the 5000 row-per-type cap and the
properties.truncated marker for partial exports
- Troubleshooting entries: SARIF cap, hidden Acknowledge button,
findings resurfacing after delete, Trivy DB phone-home, and
409 on concurrent compose-stack scans
* fix(ci): clear backend lint and CodeQL alerts
- Remove the dead fetchAllPages helper in routes/security.ts. It lost
its callers when the SARIF endpoint switched to direct paged reads
for the truncation cap. ESLint flagged it as unused.
- Switch the trivy-tmp-cleanup test helper to fs.mkdtempSync. Building
paths under os.tmpdir() with predictable names tripped CodeQL's
js/insecure-temporary-file rule (high severity), which warns about
symlink-pre-creation attacks even in test code. mkdtempSync appends
a process-random suffix and creates the dir atomically; the
sencho-trivy- prefix is preserved so the production sweep still
matches the test fixtures.
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4b1de35dda |
Audit-hardening pass for fleet-replicated CVE suppressions (#976)
* perf(security): bucket CVE suppressions by id at read time
applySuppressions now builds a Map<cve_id, suppression[]> once before the
per-finding loop, dropping per-finding work to O(matching-cve-suppressions)
rather than O(all-suppressions). At a fleet-wide cap of 10000 rows against
a multi-thousand-finding scan, the prior linear-per-finding shape drifted
into tens of millions of comparisons per render.
Public API of findSuppression and applySuppressions is unchanged.
Specificity scoring, expiry handling, and image-glob matching are
preserved bit-for-bit. Adds a regression guard that pins a 10000x2000
workload under 1.5s and asserts at least one match was actually returned.
* feat(security): record audit-log entries on control-side CVE suppression CRUD
The replica receive path already wrote an audit-log entry on apply; the
control-side POST/PUT/DELETE handlers did not. Operators reading the
audit panel saw mirrored security-rule changes from the replica view but
could not see who originated them on the control. Symmetric logging
closes that gap.
The summary records the CVE id and pinned scope (pkg, image) but never
the suppression's reason text. Reasons are free-form admin input that
replicate fleet-wide and may carry incident-tracker IDs or vendor
context the operator did not intend to broadcast.
The summary is also sanitised before emission so an operator-supplied
package name or image pattern carrying a smuggled newline plus a forged
"cve_suppression.delete:" prefix cannot inject a fake row into the audit
panel. Control characters become "?" and the field is capped to its
validator length.
Adds a Control-side audit log block to suppression-routes.test.ts that
asserts the privacy contract on each verb (scope present, reason absent),
plus a log-injection guard test, plus a regression that GET still works
when the local instance is a replica.
* test(security): cover cve_suppressions fleet-sync receive path
The existing fleet-sync route tests covered the protocol mechanics
(auth, anchor, stale push, reanchor, demote) for cve_suppressions only
with empty-rows payloads. The suppression-specific concerns were
unverified end-to-end:
- actual rows replace prior replicated rows on a fresh push
- the receive path writes an audit-log entry naming the source
fingerprint and row count
- a malformed suppression row is rejected at the validator before any
DB write
Adds a focused block exercising those three properties against the real
Express app, real SQLite, and the real apply transaction.
* docs(features): refresh CVE suppressions troubleshooting and field guidance
Converts the troubleshooting section to Mintlify Accordion blocks so
each entry is foldable and the page stays scannable. Adds entries for:
- control-identity mismatch on a replica (anchor-aware reanchor flow)
- mirrored rules persisting after a control demote
- the 10000-row truncation cap on a fleet sync push
Adds a privacy note to the Reason field guidance: do not paste
credentials, tokens, or vendor secrets there, since the field replicates
fleet-wide and surfaces on every node's suppressions panel.
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|
a284732a95 |
feat(fleet-sync): hide other replicas' identity-scoped policies on a replica (#973)
GET /api/security/policies on a replica now returns only the policies
that apply to THIS replica. Replicated rows with a node_identity
targeting a sibling replica are filtered out so an operator cannot
enumerate the names and rules of policies meant for another node in
the fleet. Defense in depth: the security panel is admin-only, but a
backend filter is bypass-proof and matches Sencho's privacy posture.
Internal evaluators (getMatchingPolicy, evaluateScanAgainstPolicies)
keep using the unfiltered list because they already enforce identity
matching at evaluation time.
CVE suppressions are fleet-wide on every replica (no node_identity
column) so no analogous filter is needed.
Public surface:
- DatabaseService.getScanPoliciesForUi(role, selfIdentity): the
filtered variant, called from securityRouter.get('/policies').
Tests:
- 3 new vitest cases: control sees full set; replica hides
other-replica scoped rows; replica always includes locally created
rows.
- Full backend suite: 1795 pass / 5 skipped.
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|
4007709590 |
fix(fleet-sync): hygiene pass on receiver behavior and cleanup (#972)
A bundle of small file-local fixes to the receiver path and node-deletion flow. Changes: - F4 receiver audit log: applyIncomingSync now writes a system audit entry on every applied push so mirrored security-rule changes show up in the replica's audit panel with a clear control-side origin. - F7 pilot-agent skip: pushResource explicitly excludes pilot-agent nodes (they have no api_url for HTTP push) and warns once per node id so the operator sees they will not receive replicated policies. - B4 identity-drift notification: when targetIdentity differs from the cached fleet_self_identity, dispatch a warning so the operator can audit any identity-scoped policies that may need re-targeting. - B6 stack_pattern ReDoS guard: reject patterns with 4+ consecutive wildcards or more than 8 wildcards total. Both control-side validators (POST/PUT scan policies) and the receiver-side row validator share the helper. - B9 deleteNode cascade: clear fleet_sync_status rows for the node inside the existing transaction so the sync-status panel does not render ghost entries after a node is removed. - S6 last_error redaction: formatError strips Bearer tokens and JWT-shaped values from error messages and caps at 500 chars before storing in fleet_sync_status.last_error or logging. Tests: - 8 new vitest cases covering audit-log entry, identity-drift alert, pilot-agent warn-once, formatError redaction (Bearer + JWT), ReDoS validator rejection, and a backtracking-time smoke test. - New database-fleet-sync-cascade.test.ts: deleteNode removes fleet_sync_status rows for the deleted node and leaves siblings untouched. - Full backend suite: 1792 pass / 5 skipped. |
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|
33b15d6cba |
feat(fleet-sync): retry failed pushes and backfill on add-node (#970)
A control instance now retries fleet-sync pushes that hit a transient failure and backfills the security state on a freshly registered remote without waiting for the next policy edit. New service: - FleetSyncRetryService (singleton, start/stop) wakes 30s after boot and ticks every 5min. For each fleet resource, queries getFailedSyncTargets within a 24h window and re-pushes via FleetSyncService.pushResourceToNode through the same per-node mutex, so a normal fanout in flight serializes naturally with a retry. - After STALE_THRESHOLD_MS (1h) of continuous failure for a previously-working node, dispatches a single warning notification per cooldown window. Brand-new nodes that have never succeeded do not alert via this path; misconfigured remotes are caught by the test-connection affordance at registration time. - Wired into bootstrap startup/shutdown next to AutoHealService. Public surface: - FleetSyncService.pushResourceToNode(node, resource): targeted push to one node that re-uses the per-node mutex. Used by the retry service and any future targeted-resync flow. - routes/nodes.ts POST /api/nodes fires pushResourceAsync for both resources after a remote-proxy node row commits. Tuning constants centralized in fleetSyncConstants.ts: - RETRY_MAX_AGE_MS = 24h - STALE_THRESHOLD_MS = 1h Tests: - 8 vitest cases covering replica skip, retry dispatch, missing-node skip, alert-once-per-cooldown across the threshold window, no-alert for recent failures, no-alert for brand-new never-succeeded nodes, no-alert when the retry itself succeeds, start/stop idempotency. - Full backend suite: 1781 pass / 5 skipped. |
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7dde257e1f |
feat(fleet-sync): replica self-demote endpoint and role UX (#969)
A replica admin can now demote the instance back to a standalone
control without raw SQLite access. The Settings → Security UI surfaces
a confirm-gated button when the role is replica; the role probe also
surfaces a soft banner when it cannot determine fleet role rather
than silently defaulting to control.
Backend:
- POST /api/fleet/role/demote (admin, requires `{confirm: true}`):
flips fleet_role to 'control', clears fleet_self_identity,
fleet_control_identity, and both received_pushed_at:* watermarks,
drops every replicated_from_control row from scan_policies and
cve_suppressions, nulls out any orphaned policy_evaluation cache.
Returns 409 ALREADY_CONTROL when invoked on a control.
- DatabaseService gains `clearOrphanPolicyEvaluations()` and
`clearReplicatedRows()` helpers. Reanchor consolidates onto
clearReplicatedRows so it shares the same code path.
- `FleetSyncService.demote()` returns boolean for the route to
translate into 200 or 409.
Frontend:
- SecuritySection probes /fleet/role and now records explicit success
vs failure rather than silently treating an error as control. A
soft banner appears when probe fails.
- Replica banner gains a "Demote to control" button and a destructive
ConfirmModal explaining the wipe.
Tests:
- 4 new route-level vitest cases (401, 400 without confirm,
end-to-end demote with replica setup, 409 ALREADY_CONTROL with
explicit precondition).
- Service unit test asserts the consolidated clearReplicatedRows path.
- Full backend suite: 1773 pass / 5 skipped. Frontend: 185 pass.
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f3757b43c6 |
feat(fleet-sync): anchor replicas to a control fingerprint (#968)
A replica now binds to the first control that pushes to it. Subsequent
pushes from a different control are rejected with 409
CONTROL_IDENTITY_MISMATCH until an admin explicitly reanchors. Closes
the cross-control hijack window where any node_proxy bearer signed
against the replica's secret could overwrite security policies.
Wire protocol:
- Sender includes a stable 16-hex-char `controlIdentity` derived by
SHA-256-truncating `system_state.instance_id` (the local UUID written
once by LicenseService.initialize on first boot). Hostname rotations
do not flag drift; only a SQLite reset or explicit reanchor breaks
the binding.
- Receiver caches the fingerprint inside the same transaction that
applies the row replacement and watermark write. Three states:
null (fresh install), '' (post-reanchor), '<fingerprint>' (anchored).
- Empty `controlIdentity` is treated as legacy and accepted, so older
controls keep working during rollout.
New endpoint:
- POST /api/fleet/role/reanchor (admin, requires `{override: true}`):
clears the cached fingerprint, both `received_pushed_at:*` watermarks,
and replicated rows of both resources, all in one transaction. The
static cached fingerprint is also flushed defensively.
Public surface additions:
- `FleetSyncService.getControlIdentity()`: stable fingerprint for the
outgoing push body.
- `FleetSyncService.reanchor()`: admin-driven anchor reset.
- `ControlIdentityMismatchError`: typed sentinel the route translates
to 409 with structured body `{error, code, expected, got}`.
Tests:
- 9 new vitest cases covering first-sync persistence, mismatch
rejection, matching acceptance, empty-incoming back-compat,
post-reanchor un-anchored state, fingerprint stability, missing
instance_id fallback, route-level mismatch, route-level reanchor
with override gating.
- One ordered route-level scenario instead of cross-dependent it()
blocks so test reordering cannot silently break the suite.
- Full backend suite: 1769 pass / 5 skipped.
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27660f622b |
fix(fleet-sync): version the wire protocol and serialize per-node pushes (#967)
Hardens the scan-policy and CVE-suppression replication channel as the foundation of a multi-PR fleet sync hardening track. No new endpoints, no new tables, no schema changes; receivers still tolerate legacy payloads (absent pushedAt and controlIdentity) for rollout safety. Wire protocol: - Sender stamps every push with a strictly-increasing pushedAt and a placeholder controlIdentity. Receiver rejects strictly-older pushedAt with 409 STALE_SYNC_PUSH so the next write retries. - pushedAt comparison plus row replacement plus watermark write run in a single SQLite transaction; a partial-write window cannot leave the watermark behind the row state. Concurrency and limits: - Per-node mutex on the sender so concurrent control writes serialize per remote and never apply older state on top of newer. - Sender-side row cap at MAX_SYNC_ROWS=5000 with a 6-hour throttled truncation alert so flapping configs cannot flood the operator. - Route-level body limit raised to 5MB on POST /api/fleet/sync/:resource only; the global 100KB cap is unchanged. Oversize bodies return a structured 413 SYNC_PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE. Determinism and hygiene: - getMatchingPolicy gains an id-ASC tiebreaker so two replicas resolve the same winner when policies tie on scope class. - Inline comment documents why getMatchingPolicy filters node_id at SQL yet still relies on JS identity matching for replicated rows. - Comment on the receive endpoint documents why no requirePaid is enforced (control's tier authorizes; replica trusts the bearer). - STALE_SYNC_PUSH 409s no longer record a node failure; they are expected protocol outcomes, not health issues. Public surface additions: - DatabaseService.transaction(fn): generic SAVEPOINT-friendly wrapper. - DatabaseService.getLocalScanPolicies / getLocalCveSuppressions: SQL filter on replicated_from_control = 0. - StaleSyncPushError: typed sentinel the route translates to 409. - fleetSyncConstants: shared MAX_SYNC_ROWS, body limit, state-key and error-code maps so the wire protocol has one source of truth. Tests: - 24 new vitest cases across fleet-sync-service, fleet-sync-routes, and database-matching-policy covering monotonic pushedAt, per-node serialization, row truncation and throttle, stale-push suppression, receiver back-compat, oversize-body 413, deterministic matching. - Full backend suite: 1757 pass / 5 skipped. |
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0f0b22c51a |
feat(fleet): Fleet Secrets tab with env-var bundles (v1 MVP) (#965)
* feat(fleet): add Fleet Secrets tab with versioned env-var bundles (Skipper+) Centralized, encrypted-at-rest secret bundles that can be pushed to labeled nodes' stacks. Each save bumps a monotonic version; each push records a per-node-per-version row in `secret_pushes` plus an entry in `audit_log`. Conflict detection shows added/changed/unchanged/removed (informational) diffs before write. Overlay merge preserves keys missing from the bundle. - Adds `secrets`, `secret_versions`, `secret_pushes` tables. - New `SecretsService` reuses CryptoService for AES-256-GCM, NodeLabelService for selectors, and direct fetch + Bearer for outbound calls to remote nodes. - New `secretsRouter` with 9 endpoints under `/api/secrets`, gated by `requirePaid`. Mounted after the auth gate. - Audit summary patterns added for the new routes. - New Fleet › Secrets tab with bundle list, editor sheet (key=value rows, versions tab), and push wizard (selector, target stack, env file picker, per-node diff preview, results pills). - Documentation: docs/features/fleet-secrets.mdx + docs.json nav entry. - 26 Vitest cases cover parser, encryption, versioning, push aggregation, tier gating. * fix(fleet): use const for rawValue in env parser ESLint prefer-const flagged the let declaration as a CI-blocking error; the variable is never reassigned. |
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52b46753af |
feat(fleet): add Federation tab with cordon and pin policy (Admiral) (#964)
Ships the v1 MVP for the Federation tab as placement control, not
placement automation:
- Cordon a node: marks the node unschedulable so the BlueprintReconciler
skips it for new placements only. Existing deployments continue to
drift-check and redeploy on revision changes; cordon never triggers
withdraw or eviction. Toggle on the NodeCard kebab (Admiral, admin
role); Cordoned pill renders for all tiers.
- Pin a blueprint to a node: stores blueprints.pinned_node_id, replacing
the desired set with the pinned node regardless of selector. Pin
overrides cordon by design. Action lives only in the Federation tab;
BlueprintDetail and the deployment table show read-only Pinned
indicators.
Backend: idempotent migrations add nodes.cordoned/cordoned_at/cordoned_reason
and blueprints.pinned_node_id. New routes POST /api/nodes/:id/cordon,
POST /api/nodes/:id/uncordon, PUT /api/blueprints/:id/pin, all gated by
requireAdmiral plus requireAdmin. Audit summaries added so the existing
auditLog middleware records every operator action. deleteNode clears
dangling pins.
Reconciler: pin override evaluated before selector match; cordon filter
applied only to the new-placement branch (deploy/stateReview without an
existing deployment). 11 new Vitest cases cover cordon filter, pin
override, pin-overrides-cordon, missing pin target, pin shrinks
desired set (stateless withdraw + stateful evict_blocked), and pin
clearing on node delete.
Frontend: new FederationTab.tsx with cordoned-nodes summary and
pin-policy table. Federation moved out of the experimental flag into
{isAdmiral && (...)} + AdmiralGate, mirroring the Routing tab pattern.
Secrets stays under experimental.
Tests pass: backend tsc, full Vitest suite (1704 passed), frontend
tsc -b, ESLint (0 errors). Manual verification via the local dev
instance confirmed the tab is hidden at Community, the kebab and pill
render at Admiral, and cordon and pin endpoints round-trip end to end.
Refs cut-line-1.0.md Federation v1 MVP.
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77d5ff58d3 |
feat(fleet): add Fleet Actions tab for cross-node bulk operations (#963)
* feat(fleet): add Fleet Actions tab for cross-node bulk operations Introduces a new "Actions" sub-tab in Fleet view with two Skipper+ cards that fill gaps in the existing surface: - Stop fleet by label: matches a label name across every node and stops every stack assigned to it, reporting per-node and per-stack results. - Bulk label assign: applies the same label set to many stacks on one node in a single round trip. Other bulk operations stay in their existing homes (sidebar bulk mode, Schedules, NodeUpdatesSheet) to avoid duplicate surfaces. Backend: - POST /api/fleet/labels/fleet-stop (gateway-orchestrated, multi-node) - POST /api/fleet-actions/labels/bulk-assign (per-node, capped at 1000) - Tightens /api/fleet proxy-exempt prefix to /api/fleet/ so /api/fleet-actions/* is routed through the proxy for per-node calls. - Exports activeBulkActions from labels.ts so fleet-stop and label-action share the per-node lock and cannot double-stop the same containers. - Extracts containerActionForStack helper from stacks.ts for reuse. * chore(fleet): rename Actions tab to Fleet Actions and reorder Fleet sub-tabs - Tab label "Actions" -> "Fleet Actions" so the surface is unambiguous alongside Schedules and the sidebar bulk bar. - Reorder Fleet sub-tabs as Overview / Snapshots / Status | Deployments / Traffic / Fleet Actions, with the separator after Status. - Rename "Traffic · Routing" -> "Traffic" and update Sencho Mesh docs to match the shorter label. - Update Fleet Actions docs to the new tab name and placement. |
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7fe90d9f3a |
feat(blueprints): capture compose snapshot before stateful eviction (#957)
Wire the snapshot_then_evict withdraw mode to actually persist the blueprint's compose YAML to fleet_snapshots before running the eviction. The mode previously recorded intent only. Capture failure aborts the eviction with HTTP 500 rather than silently falling through to a destructive withdraw. Volume bytes remain out of scope: the snapshot holds the compose definition only. UI copy and the Blueprints docs (Withdraw note, Migrating stateful data section, two new Troubleshooting entries) clarify that operators must move volumes by hand if they need the data on another node. Adds 9 route-level tests covering the success path, snapshot DB write failure, orphan-row cleanup when insertSnapshotFiles fails, empty compose_content, evict_and_destroy unchanged, stateless unchanged, evict_blocked gate, omitted confirm field, and bad confirm value. |
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0c3ce4b224 | feat: implement file explorer context menus and dialogs (#934) | ||
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775fab7d64 |
feat(dashboard): replace duplicate Recent Activity card with Fleet Heartbeat / Stack Restart Map (#932)
* feat: open security basics, manual fleet ops, and basic fleet management to Community
Realign tier guards to the user-stated philosophy: Community covers
deploy/monitor at scale plus security basics, Skipper adds automation
and advanced fleet management, Admiral keeps enterprise control.
Community now includes:
- Trivy install / uninstall / update from the Settings Hub (admin role)
- CVE suppressions CRUD (admin role; replicates fleet-wide)
- Manual image scan with vuln, secret, and misconfig results
- Stack-config scan, scan comparison
- Manual fleet snapshots: create, list, view, restore, delete
- Per-node Sencho self-update (Check Updates + per-node Update)
- Fleet Overview search, sort, filters, node-card expand, auto-refresh
Stays paid:
- Scan policies with block_on_deploy enforcement (Skipper+)
- SBOM (SPDX, CycloneDX), SARIF export (Skipper+)
- Bulk Update All across the fleet (Skipper+)
- Scheduled snapshot create (now Skipper, was Admiral)
- Trivy auto-update toggle, fleet-wide policy push (Admiral)
The Settings -> Security tab is unhidden by setting the registry tier to
null. The SecuritySection no longer early-returns a PaidGate; the policy
list, Add Policy button, and policy dialogs are wrapped in {isPaid && }.
The Fleet view drops isPaid gates on the Snapshots tab, Check Updates
button, per-node update handlers, OverviewToolbar grid controls, the
NodeCard expand affordance, and the auto-refresh notice. The
NodeUpdatesSheet receives a canBulkUpdate prop and gates the Update All
button on it. useFleetUpdateStatus and useFleetPolling drop their isPaid
guards so polling runs for Community; useFleetOverview drops the isPaid
wrap on the filter and sort path.
Backend route guards are flipped per the matrix above. The scheduler
tick and requireScheduledTaskTier add 'snapshot' to the Skipper+ branch.
Backend test assertions are inverted for the now-Community endpoints
and a positive Skipper-snapshot-task test is added.
Documentation across features/, api-reference/, and operations/ is
updated to reflect the new tier mapping.
* feat: add node last-contact tracking, fleet latency, and stack-restart summary
- DatabaseService: add last_successful_contact column to nodes table via
idempotent migration; expose updateNodeLastContact() and getStackRestartSummary()
methods; include the column in NODE_COLUMNS so getNodes/getNode return it
- fleet.ts: record latency_ms and last_successful_contact on each remote
node overview fetch; pilot-agent nodes surface pilot_last_seen instead;
pass db singleton into fetchRemoteNodeOverview to avoid redundant getInstance calls
- dashboard.ts: replace /recent-activity with /stack-restarts endpoint that
groups notification_history events by stack and category (crash/autoheal/manual)
over a configurable window (default 7 days, max 30)
* refactor(dashboard): remove redundant per-route authMiddleware
All routes under /api/ are covered by the global auth gate in app.ts.
The inline authMiddleware arguments on /configuration and /stack-restarts
were redundant with that gate and inconsistent with every other route in
the file. Remove them and drop the now-unused import.
* refactor(backend): consolidate Date.now(), move SQL aggregation, normalize node row mapping
- Capture a single completedAt timestamp in fetchRemoteNodeOverview to
eliminate two separate Date.now() calls and ensure latency_ms and
last_successful_contact are derived from the same instant
- Inline the redundant contactedAt variable; use completedAt directly
- Move stack-restart aggregation from JS into SQL (GROUP BY stack_name
with CASE/SUM counts), replacing the Map loop in the route handler
- Export StackRestartSummary interface from DatabaseService and remove
the duplicate local definition in dashboard.ts; handler now returns
the query result directly
- Add last_successful_contact normalization in decryptNodeRow, mirroring
the existing pilot_last_seen pattern
- Add authGate reliance comment above dashboardRouter route handlers
* feat(dashboard): replace Recent Activity card with context-aware Fleet Heartbeat / Stack Restart Map
- Multi-node installs (≥1 remote node): shows Fleet Heartbeat — real-time
reachability, latency, and container count per registered node
- Local-only installs: shows Stack Restart Map — 7-day restart frequency
per stack grouped by crash / auto-heal / manual category
- Conditional wrapper (DashboardActivityCard) switches states automatically
when the node list changes, with no page reload required
- Deletes RecentActivity card and hook (duplicated data already in Recent Alerts)
- Extracts formatRelativeTime to frontend/src/lib/utils.ts for reuse
* fix(dashboard): add pilot_last_seen to FleetNodeOverview and use it in getLastSeenLabel
* fix(fleet): expose mode and pilot_last_seen in overview, consolidate formatRelativeTime, drop em dash
- Add `mode` and `pilot_last_seen` (in seconds) to the FleetNodeOverview
interface and to both the pilot-agent and HTTP-proxy return paths in
fetchRemoteNodeOverview so the frontend getLastSeenLabel pilot branch
can fire correctly
- Remove the private formatRelativeTime from RecentAlerts.tsx and use
the shared implementation from lib/utils, converting the millisecond
timestamp at the call site
- Replace the em dash in getLatencyLabel with 'n/a' per project rules
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ecf4dd5d52 |
feat: open security basics, manual fleet ops, and basic fleet management to Community (#930)
Realign tier guards to the user-stated philosophy: Community covers
deploy/monitor at scale plus security basics, Skipper adds automation
and advanced fleet management, Admiral keeps enterprise control.
Community now includes:
- Trivy install / uninstall / update from the Settings Hub (admin role)
- CVE suppressions CRUD (admin role; replicates fleet-wide)
- Manual image scan with vuln, secret, and misconfig results
- Stack-config scan, scan comparison
- Manual fleet snapshots: create, list, view, restore, delete
- Per-node Sencho self-update (Check Updates + per-node Update)
- Fleet Overview search, sort, filters, node-card expand, auto-refresh
Stays paid:
- Scan policies with block_on_deploy enforcement (Skipper+)
- SBOM (SPDX, CycloneDX), SARIF export (Skipper+)
- Bulk Update All across the fleet (Skipper+)
- Scheduled snapshot create (now Skipper, was Admiral)
- Trivy auto-update toggle, fleet-wide policy push (Admiral)
The Settings -> Security tab is unhidden by setting the registry tier to
null. The SecuritySection no longer early-returns a PaidGate; the policy
list, Add Policy button, and policy dialogs are wrapped in {isPaid && }.
The Fleet view drops isPaid gates on the Snapshots tab, Check Updates
button, per-node update handlers, OverviewToolbar grid controls, the
NodeCard expand affordance, and the auto-refresh notice. The
NodeUpdatesSheet receives a canBulkUpdate prop and gates the Update All
button on it. useFleetUpdateStatus and useFleetPolling drop their isPaid
guards so polling runs for Community; useFleetOverview drops the isPaid
wrap on the filter and sort path.
Backend route guards are flipped per the matrix above. The scheduler
tick and requireScheduledTaskTier add 'snapshot' to the Skipper+ branch.
Backend test assertions are inverted for the now-Community endpoints
and a positive Skipper-snapshot-task test is added.
Documentation across features/, api-reference/, and operations/ is
updated to reflect the new tier mapping.
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49d775c61f |
feat(volumes): add read-only volume browser (#926)
* feat(volumes): add read-only volume browser Adds a browser for the contents of any Docker named volume. Click the folder icon on a volume row (admin only) to open a sheet with a directory tree on the left and a file viewer on the right. Backend ------- New VolumeBrowserService spawns a one-shot Alpine 3.20 helper container with the target volume mounted read-only at /v. The container runs as nobody (65534:65534) with a read-only rootfs, no network, all caps dropped, no-new-privileges, and capped at 64 PIDs and 128 MiB. The helper image is pulled on first use per node. Listing and stat use a portable busybox-compatible shell loop (find -printf is not available on Alpine). Reads use head -c with an explicit -- separator; the helper's working directory is /v so user paths are passed as ./<path> argv elements and never as flags. The container lifecycle is managed manually (create, attach, start, wait, remove) to avoid the AutoRemove race where dockerode sees a 404 on its post-exit container lookup. Path safety: relative paths are sanitized server-side, rejecting parent-escape segments, absolute paths, null bytes, and oversized input. Symlinks are listed but never followed on read. Files larger than 5 MB are truncated; binary content is detected via null-byte scan and returned base64-encoded. Non-zero helper exits map to 404, 403, or 500 by classifying stderr. Routes mounted at /api/volumes: - GET /:name/list?path= - GET /:name/stat?path= - GET /:name/read?path= All three require admin. The read endpoint always inserts an audit log row (success or failure) with the actual response status code, volume name, and relative path. Frontend -------- FileTree generalized to take a loadDir callback and a sourceKey instead of a hard-coded stackName. The single existing consumer (StackFileExplorer) was updated and its tests rewritten. The loader is read through a ref so re-creating the arrow on every parent render does not re-trigger the root fetch effect. New VolumeBrowserSheet renders the tree against the volume API, shows file content (hex view for binaries), and surfaces truncation. Rapid sheet open and reopen on different volumes is generation- checked to avoid stomping the visible result with a stale read. A persistent footnote reminds the user that file reads are recorded in the audit log, and the docs page warns about the typical contents of database volumes. Tests ----- 15 new vitest cases cover the pure helpers (path traversal, volume name validation, binary detection). The Docker-facing exec path is exercised by manual end-to-end via curl against a seeded volume. * fix(volumes): truncate long volume names in browser sheet header Wide volume names overlapped the close X. Reserve right padding on the header, set min-w-0 on the flex title, mark the icon and refresh button shrink-0, and truncate the name span. * fix(volumes): satisfy lint on volume browser additions prefer-const on sanitizeRelPath's local; drop unused FileTree entry arg from the file-select callback (variance lets the arrow take fewer params than the contract). |
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7e5dc2d9ea |
feat(resources): add image details sheet with layer history (#925)
Adds a read-only inspect panel for Docker images. Click the eye icon on any image row to open a sheet showing: - Overview: ID (with copy), size, created date, arch/OS, author, tags - Config: Cmd, Entrypoint, WorkingDir, User, exposed ports, env (collapsible), labels (collapsible) - Layers: ordered history list with size, age, and build command per layer. Empty layers (metadata-only) are dimmed. Backend adds DockerController.inspectImage(id) which combines image.inspect() and image.history() in parallel, exposed via GET /api/system/images/:id. The route accepts both bare hex IDs and sha256-prefixed IDs, since the list endpoint surfaces the prefixed form. Returns 400 for malformed IDs and 404 for missing images. Documents the new panel in docs/features/resources.mdx under Images. |
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e5b1c7b22b |
refactor(backend): collapse entitlement provider abstraction back to LicenseService (#889)
Removes backend/src/entitlements/ (registry, loadProvider, CommunityEntitlementProvider, types, headers, normalize) and the two abstraction-only tests. Relocates headers/normalize/types to services/license-*.ts. Swaps 22 consumer call sites from getEntitlementProvider() to LicenseService.getInstance(). Drops the Dockerfile install step plus PRO_PACKAGE_VERSION build-arg and github_token BuildKit secret in docker-publish.yml. Removes the now stale no-restricted-imports rule in backend/eslint.config.mjs. Net: 37 files changed, ~700 lines removed, no behavior change. Local dev no longer requires GitHub Packages auth to start the backend. Rationale and revisit conditions in docs/internal/adrs/2026-05-02-collapse-entitlement-provider.md. |
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d69fb9f1da |
feat(meta): gate deferred Fleet tabs behind SENCHO_EXPERIMENTAL flag (#886)
Hide the Traffic / Routing, Deployments, Federation and Secrets Fleet tabs by default. They re-appear when the operator opts in by setting SENCHO_EXPERIMENTAL=true. Backend routes and database tables are unchanged; this is a UI discovery gate only. The /api/meta endpoint now returns experimental as a boolean. A new useExperimental hook reads it once per page load and feeds the four tab triggers and tab content panels in FleetView. |
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4b18109286 |
refactor(entitlements): migrate type-only consumers to entitlements/types (#879)
Follows the Phase 1 EntitlementProvider abstraction. Two files
imported tier types from services/LicenseService via the back-compat
re-export added in Phase 1; this PR points them at the canonical
location at entitlements/types and drops the re-export block.
Migrated:
- backend/src/types/express.ts
- backend/src/routes/dashboard.ts
After this PR, services/LicenseService.ts has no public type re-
exports. The remaining imports of services/LicenseService are:
- entitlements/loadProvider.ts: runtime import of the
LicenseService class itself, the intentional Phase 1 binding
site.
- __tests__/license-service-id-validation.test.ts: imports
SENCHO_LS_* catalog constants and resolveSenchoVariantFromMeta;
these are LemonSqueezy-implementation-specific and stay in
services/LicenseService until Phase 2 moves the file to
@studio-saelix/sencho-pro.
Phase 2's deletion of services/LicenseService.ts now requires zero
public-core consumer changes outside the loader and the LS-specific
test file.
Test results: 89/89 backend test files clean, 1657 passing tests, 5
pre-existing skips, plus the same pre-existing database-metrics
stress test flake under parallel load that consistently passes solo.
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3324616e59 |
refactor(backend): extract EntitlementProvider abstraction (Phase 1) (#878)
* refactor(backend): extract EntitlementProvider abstraction (Phase 1)
Phase 1 of the open-core hybrid extraction described in
docs/internal/adrs/2026-05-02-open-core-hybrid-strategy.md. Introduces
the abstraction without moving any code out of the public repo; Phase
2 will actually move services/LicenseService.ts to a private
@studio-saelix/sencho-pro package.
The new backend/src/entitlements/ module contains:
- types.ts. The EntitlementProvider interface plus all tier/license
types (LicenseTier, LicenseVariant, LicenseInfo, SeatLimits,
ActivationResult, etc.). The interface mirrors the existing
LicenseService public surface so the migration was mechanical.
- registry.ts. Module-scope holder for the active provider with
setEntitlementProvider, getEntitlementProvider, and a test-only
reset helper. getEntitlementProvider throws if called before
bootstrap registers a provider; the throw is intentional fail-fast
on a bootstrap-order bug rather than a silent degradation.
- CommunityEntitlementProvider.ts. Phase 2 fallback that returns
community tier and rejects activate(). NOT instantiated in
production today; a smoke test keeps it covered against bitrot.
- loadProvider.ts. Async resolver. Phase 1 returns
LicenseService.getInstance() directly. The async signature matches
what Phase 2 needs (dynamic import of @studio-saelix/sencho-pro
with a "module not found" vs "construction threw" narrowing); the
call site does not change between phases.
- headers.ts. PROXY_TIER_HEADER and PROXY_VARIANT_HEADER constants.
These are part of the wire contract between Sencho instances and
belong in the public core regardless of which entitlement provider
is bound.
- normalize.ts. isLicenseTier, isLicenseVariant, normalizeTier,
normalizeVariant. Domain knowledge about Sencho's tier model
(legacy name maps from pre-0.38.1 versions), not LemonSqueezy
internals. Phase 2 keeps these in the public core.
services/LicenseService.ts now imports its types from
entitlements/types and adds an "implements EntitlementProvider"
clause. Re-exports the types for back-compat with ~20 type-only
consumers; a follow-up PR will sweep those imports to entitlements/
types directly before Phase 2 deletes the file.
bootstrap/startup.ts awaits loadEntitlementProvider, registers the
result, then calls initialize. shutdown.ts calls
getEntitlementProvider().destroy() instead of the LicenseService
singleton.
middleware/tierGates.ts, the chokepoint for ~154 tier-check call
sites, now reads through getEntitlementProvider. Sixteen other
production files (routes/{fleet,imageUpdates,license,permissions,
scheduledTasks,security,stacks,templates,users,webhooks},
services/{BlueprintService,CloudBackupService,SchedulerService,
SSOService}, proxy/remoteNodeProxy, websocket/{hostConsole,
remoteForwarder}, middleware/auth) had their LicenseService.getInstance
calls and utility-export imports redirected to the entitlements
module. The only remaining LicenseService.getInstance in production
code is in entitlements/loadProvider.ts itself, which is the
intentional Phase-1 binding site.
Test infrastructure: setupTestDb registers
LicenseService.getInstance() as the active provider so existing
test files using the helper need no changes. The mocking pattern
many tests use, vi.spyOn(LicenseService.getInstance(), 'getTier'),
keeps working because LicenseService.getInstance() and
getEntitlementProvider() return the same singleton in Phase 1.
scheduler-service.test.ts is the only test that does not use
setupTestDb but exercises tier-gating; it now mocks
entitlements/registry alongside its existing LicenseService mock.
Adds a smoke test for CommunityEntitlementProvider so the Phase 2
fallback class stays covered.
Adds an architecture doc at
docs/internal/architecture/entitlement-provider.md covering the
runtime registry, bootstrap order invariants, and the Phase 1 vs
Phase 2 binding table.
Test results: 89/89 backend test files pass, 1657 passing tests, 5
pre-existing skips. The pre-existing database-metrics > handles
1000+ metrics stress test continues to flake under parallel load
and pass when re-run solo, same flake observed in PRs #862, #863.
* chore(backend): drop unused entitlement type imports from LicenseService
Phase 1 of the EntitlementProvider extraction left five type imports
(ActivationResult, BillingPortalError, BillingPortalResult,
DeactivationResult, ValidationResult) unreferenced after the runtime
methods that produced them began inferring their result shapes via the
EntitlementProvider interface contract. ESLint's no-unused-vars rule
flagged them as errors and failed the lint step in CI.
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Anso
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685d5d729e |
feat(blueprints): backend foundation for fleet-wide compose templates (#860)
* feat(blueprints): add backend foundation for fleet-wide compose templates
Introduces the Blueprint Model: a docker-compose.yml plus a node selector
(labels or explicit IDs) that Sencho reconciles across the fleet. Backend
foundation only; the frontend tab and documentation follow.
Schema (DatabaseService):
- node_labels table for fleet-level orchestration tagging
- blueprints table with compose content, selector, drift_mode, classification
- blueprint_deployments table for per-node materialized state
- New idempotent migrate methods following the existing pattern
Services:
- BlueprintAnalyzer: pure compose-YAML classifier (stateless / stateful /
unknown) with 17 covered cases including named volumes, bind mounts,
external volumes, and tmpfs
- NodeLabelService: label CRUD plus selector matching helper (any/all/ids)
- BlueprintService: local + remote deploy/withdraw orchestration, marker
file management, name-conflict guard, per-(blueprint,node) lock
- BlueprintReconciler: 60-second loop with three-mode drift policy
(observe/suggest/enforce), state-aware guards, and Enforce-downgrade for
volume-destroying drift
Routes (gated requirePaid + requireAdmin on mutations):
- /api/blueprints (CRUD + apply + withdraw + accept + preview + analyze)
- /api/node-labels (CRUD + listAll + listDistinct)
Notifications: four new categories registered in NotificationService for
deploy/failure/drift events.
Bootstrap: reconciler start/stop wired in startup and shutdown.
Tests: 45 new Vitest cases covering selector matching, classifier rules,
state-aware guards, drift-mode branching, and marker parsing. Full backend
suite (1625 tests) passes; tsc clean.
* fix(lint): replace bare Function type in blueprint reconciler tests
Replace 8 occurrences of `as unknown as { computeDecision: Function }`
with a properly typed `ReconcilerWithCompute` alias that mirrors the
real method signature. Export `ReconcileDecision` from
BlueprintReconciler so the test can reference it.
Resolves @typescript-eslint/no-unsafe-function-type errors that were
failing the Backend (Lint) CI step.
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Anso
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7663f4cd8b |
feat(fleet): sencho mesh in traffic and routing tab (#858)
* feat(fleet): sencho mesh in traffic and routing tab Lights up Sencho Mesh: cross-node container forwarding rendered as if the container next to you were on localhost. Builds on the dormant TCP frame plumbing from the prior PR (pilot tunnel TCP frames + sencho-mesh sidecar package) and exposes the Admiral-only orchestrator surface. Backend - New mesh_stacks table (per-node opt-ins) + nodes.mesh_enabled column via DatabaseService.migrateMeshTables. - MeshService singleton: sidecar lifecycle via Dockerode, opt-in/out with cascading override regeneration, request-based resolver from sidecar control WS, cross-node TCP forwarding via PilotTunnelManager (same-node fast path included), in-memory 1000-event activity ring buffer with durable mirror to audit_log for state-change events, per-node and per-route diagnostics, and the Test upstream probe. - MeshComposeOverride: pure YAML generator that injects extra_hosts using host-gateway. The user's docker-compose.yml is never mutated; overrides live under DATA_DIR/mesh/overrides. - ComposeService deploy/update splice the override file when the stack is opted in; non-mesh stacks behave identically to today. - Pilot agent resolveMeshTarget consults the local mesh_stacks table (defense in depth) and resolves Compose containers via Dockerode. - /api/mesh router with 13 Admiral-gated endpoints covering status, enable/disable, stack opt-in/out, alias listing, per-route diagnostic, Test upstream probe, per-node diagnostic, sidecar restart, activity log paginated and SSE. - meshControl WS slot at /api/mesh/control validates the mesh_sidecar JWT minted by MeshService; dispatched as upgrade slot 2 (canonical order preserved). Frontend - New Traffic Routing tab in FleetView, gated by isAdmiral and wrapped in AdmiralGate. Tab uses the cyan brand glyph and italic-serif state typography from the audit. - RoutingTab masthead with mesh activity drawer, per-node card grid with TogglePill, alias rows with five-state pill taxonomy (healthy / degraded / unreachable / tunnel-down / not-authorized), inline Test buttons. - Four sheets: opt-in picker with port-collision inline error, per-route detail with diagnostic + filtered activity, per-node diagnostics with active streams + resolver cache + restart action, fleet-wide activity log with filters. - meshRouteState helper centralizes pill-state mapping; pure-function tests cover all five states. Docs - User docs at /docs/features/sencho-mesh.mdx covering opt-in, troubleshooting, security model (4 guarantees + 4 explicit non-guarantees), and V1 limitations. - Internal architecture and runbook pages. - websocket-dispatch internal doc updated with the new slot. * fix(mesh): validate stack name before path use; fix test DB lifecycle Two surgical fixes against the prior PR. Path-injection (CodeQL js/path-injection): MeshService.optInStack, optOutStack, ensureStackOverride, and removeStackOverride now validate stackName via isValidStackName from utils/validation, reject malicious names at the API boundary, and additionally check isPathWithinBase on the resolved override file path for defense in depth. The dataflow from req.params.stackName to fs.writeFile no longer reaches an unsanitized path expression. Test DB lifecycle: mesh-service.test.ts used per-test setupTestDb / cleanupTestDb, which deletes the temp dir while DatabaseService still holds an open SQLite handle. On Linux CI this raises SQLITE_READONLY_DBMOVED on the next prepare() because the inode has been unlinked. Switched to file-scoped beforeAll/afterAll matching agents-routes.test.ts, with a per-test beforeEach that truncates mesh_stacks plus non-default nodes and resets the MeshService singleton in-memory state. Adds a new test case asserting the path-traversal rejection. * fix(compose): use discovered compose filename instead of hardcoded docker-compose.yml composeArgs() hardcoded `-f docker-compose.yml` for every deploy. Sencho writes its canonical compose file as `compose.yaml`, so any stack created via the UI failed to deploy with `open ...docker-compose.yml: no such file or directory`. When no mesh override applies, drop the explicit `-f` so docker compose's built-in discovery resolves the actual filename. When an override exists, look up the real base filename via FileSystemService.getComposeFilename() and pass both files explicitly. Also hoist the MeshService import to module top now that the dependency is known to be acyclic, and revert the matching unit-test assertion. |
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Anso
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3e01daf76f |
feat(stack): per-stack activity timeline with actor attribution (#852)
* feat(stack): per-stack activity timeline with actor attribution Adds an Activity tab to the Stack Anatomy panel showing a timestamped event log for each stack: deploys, restarts, starts, stops, and image updates, attributed to the user who triggered them or 'system' for automated actions. Backend: - Extends notification_history with actor_username column (idempotent migration) and a partial composite index on (node_id, stack_name, timestamp DESC) for efficient per-stack lookups. - NotificationService.dispatchAlert() accepts an optional actor that is written to the new column. - Success-side dispatchAlert calls added after deploy, bulkContainerOp (start/stop/restart), and update handlers in routes/stacks.ts so user-initiated operations are recorded, not just failures. - New GET /api/stacks/:stackName/activity?limit&before endpoint with stack:read permission gate and cursor-based pagination. Frontend: - StackAnatomyPanel grows an Anatomy / Activity tab pair using the existing Tabs primitive. - StackActivityTimeline fetches the initial 50 events, paginates on demand, and prepends live events arriving over the existing WS notifications stream without duplicates. - NotificationPanel bell dropdown suppresses user-initiated success events (start/stop/restart/deploy/update triggered by a real user), keeping the tray focused on alerts and system events. * docs(stack): add stack activity timeline feature page and internal arch docs * fix(test): add actor_username to notification-routing history assertions dispatchAlert now passes actor_username to addNotificationHistory after the activity timeline PR added the column. Update the two exact-match assertions that were failing because the expected object shape was missing this field. |