* fix(container-exec): harden with security fixes, validation, and test coverage
- Enforce admin role at WebSocket upgrade for container exec sessions
- Validate container is running before creating exec
- Fix bash-to-sh fallback (move .start() inside try/catch)
- Register container-exec as a capability for fleet visibility
- Add standard and diagnostic logging for exec lifecycle
- Fix false Admiral license claim in API docs
- Fix design system violations in BashExecModal (hardcoded colors)
- Remove duplicate legacy xterm dependencies
- Add 18-test suite covering auth, validation, fallback, and cleanup
* fix(container-exec): use correct Duplex type for exec stream
The stream variable was typed as NodeJS.ReadWriteStream, which lacks
.destroy(). Dockerode's Exec.start() returns stream.Duplex per its
type definitions. This caused tsc to fail while Vitest (which skips
full type checking) passed.
* fix(api): add tiered rate limiting to prevent polling lockouts
Replace the single global rate limiter (100 req/min/IP) with a tiered
system that separates high-frequency polling endpoints from standard
API traffic:
- Polling tier (300/min): /stats, /system/stats, /stacks/statuses,
/metrics/historical, /health, /meta, /auth/status, /auth/sso/providers,
/license. Exempt from the global limiter but governed by their own
safety net to prevent resource exhaustion.
- Standard tier (200/min): All other endpoints, raised from 100.
- Webhook tier (500/min): POST /webhooks/:id/trigger, dedicated limiter
for CI/CD platforms sharing datacenter IPs.
- Auth tier: Unchanged (5-10 attempts / 15 min).
Enterprise adaptations:
- Authenticated requests keyed by user session (JWT sub/username) instead
of IP, preventing shared NAT/VPN environments from pooling budgets.
- Internal node-to-node traffic (node_proxy tokens) bypasses all rate
limiters entirely.
Includes comprehensive stress tests (21 cases) validating tier
separation, node proxy bypass, and per-user keying.
* chore(deps): bump axios to 1.15.0 to fix SSRF vulnerability
Addresses GHSA-3p68-rc4w-qgx5 (NO_PROXY hostname normalization bypass).
Eliminate all references to "Pro" across backend, frontend, and docs.
Internal tier value renamed from 'pro' to 'paid'; user-facing text now
uses the thematic tier names (Community, Skipper, Admiral).
- Rename LicenseTier 'pro' to 'paid' in backend and frontend types
- Rename requirePro guard to requirePaid, error code PRO_REQUIRED to PAID_REQUIRED
- Rename ProGate.tsx to PaidGate.tsx with updated copy
- Fix: trial users can now see upgrade/purchase cards in Settings
- Update all docs and openapi.yaml to use correct tier names
* docs: remove security-sensitive implementation details from public documentation
Generalize or remove internal architecture details that could aid targeted
attacks — CVE tables, database schema, rate limit thresholds, proxy internals,
encryption algorithm names, and WebSocket middleware bypass info.
* test(metrics): fix flaky minute-bucket aggregation test
Floor baseTime to the start of the current minute so baseTime + 5000
never crosses a minute boundary and produces 2 buckets instead of 1.
Apply a global rate limit of 100 requests/min per IP to all /api/ routes
in production, configurable via API_RATE_LIMIT env var. Auth endpoints
retain their existing stricter limits which stack independently.
Returns 429 Too Many Requests when exceeded.
Audit found 11 routes with no stackName validation and 2 using a weaker
manual check. All 13 now use the canonical isValidStackName() guard
(^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$), returning 400 with { error: 'Invalid stack name' }.
Add a complete OpenAPI 3.1 specification covering ~55 public API endpoints
across 8 categories (Stacks, Containers, API Tokens, Webhooks, Nodes, Fleet,
Scheduled Tasks, Health). Wire it into Mintlify via native OpenAPI rendering
with an interactive "Try It" playground and a dedicated API Reference tab.
Includes an API overview page documenting authentication, token scopes,
node routing, error format, license tier requirements, and WebSocket endpoints.
Anso