mirror of
https://github.com/Studio-Saelix/sencho.git
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bf192133017b60cff5fd40c2b8c7783f4962411b
74 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Anso
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b0b423b234 |
feat(fleet): reapply Compose configuration without a version update (#1716)
* feat(fleet): reapply Compose configuration without a version update Add a distinct Fleet Reapply configuration path so Compose-managed nodes can recreate Sencho from the current on-disk project when already up to date, without pulling or rewriting the image reference. * fix(fleet): confirm remote reapply and close concurrent tracker race Require confirmation for remote compose reapply, and lock dispatch before the remote POST so a second request cannot overwrite a successful in-flight tracker. * fix(ui): icon-only Reapply control so Up to date badge can breathe Collapse the Node updates Reapply label into a tooltip so the status pill no longer wraps in the Status column. * feat(editor): Save & Reapply self-stack via fleet compose reapply (#1726) * feat(editor): Save & Reapply self-stack via fleet compose reapply Eligible admins can apply on-disk Compose edits to Sencho's own stack from the editor using the same confirm, dispatch, and reconnect path as Fleet Node Updates. * fix(editor): gate Save & Reapply label to self-stack only Ordinary stacks were labeled Save & Reapply whenever the node was reapply-eligible. Require the selected file to be the self-stack for the toolbar label and diff confirm CTA. * fix(ui): move compose diff action label helper out of dialog module Keep ComposeDiffPreviewDialog component-only so react-refresh Fast Refresh lint passes after the Save and reapply stacked merge. |
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Anso
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e175db8e62 |
feat(auth): add SSO-only authentication mode (#1714)
* feat(auth): add SSO-only authentication mode Let administrators disable interactive local password login when SSO is configured, with backend enforcement, activation safeguards, and host CLI recovery. Closes #1709 * fix: resolve CI failures in auth mode PR - Add useLicense mock to SSOSection test to prevent crash from AuthenticationModePanel rendering without LicenseProvider - Remove username from authMode console.log calls that CodeQL flags as clear-text logging of sensitive information * fix(auth): keep SSO-only on named disableSso and fail-closed login Named provider disable no longer reverts authentication_mode. Login initializes localLoginEnabled false so a status fetch failure cannot reveal the password form. Center a single OIDC provider button on the login card. * fix(auth): move SSO-only authentication mode from Admiral to Community tier Security-hardening features belong on the Community tier per the existing Community rebalance. The reporter of #1709 noted that disabling local password login after configuring SSO is a basic security measure, not an enterprise governance feature. LDAP provider configuration remains Admiral-gated via requireTierForSsoProvider. * fix(ui): keep SSO Active badge and ON toggle in sync Provider cards mounted before config fetch finished with enabled:false, so a saved Active provider showed OFF until the local draft was resynced. Drive both the badge and TogglePill from the synced local config. * feat(auth): auto-redirect to sole OIDC provider under SSO-only When authentication mode is SSO only and exactly one OIDC provider is enabled (no LDAP), skip the login chooser and send the browser to that provider's authorize URL. Returning sso_error stays on the login page so the failure message remains visible. * fix(ui): move oidcAutoRedirectUrl out of Login for fast refresh Exporting the helper alongside the Login component tripped react-refresh/only-export-components and failed Frontend lint CI. Keep Login as a component-only module and colocate the helper with its unit tests under lib/. |
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Anso
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79914fe750 |
fix: recognize clean one-shot completions in health gate and drift (#1691)
* fix: recognize clean one-shot completions in health gate and drift Treat exit 0 with restart policy no/absent as successful completion so init and migration jobs no longer fail post-update observation or show as service-missing, while long-running restart policies still fail closed. * fix: ignore residual health on clean one-shots and honor deploy.restart_policy Completed exit-0 jobs with no-restart intent no longer fail the health gate on leftover starting/unhealthy state, and Drift treats deploy.restart_policy with Compose precedence so any/on-failure services are not mistaken for one-shots. * fix: require explicit Compose restart no for one-shot recognition Docker inspect reports restart no for both intentional jobs and bare services that omit restart, so Health Gate and Drift now require declared restart:""no"" (or deploy.restart_policy condition none) and load Compose intent once per gate. |
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Anso
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972f2b9483 |
feat: stack glob patterns and route severity levels (#1651)
* feat: add stack glob patterns and route severity levels Operators can filter notification routes and mute rules with anchored * globs, and routes can target info, warning, or error. Matching is fail-closed for unsafe stored patterns; write paths keep partial-PUT semantics and ReDoS caps. * test: split mute and routing chip tests to avoid dialog race * fix: move stack pattern client validator out of PatternChips * fix: bound stack glob matching and atomic pattern chip saves |
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Anso
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8980910153 |
feat: node-scoped Networking operator page (#1603)
* feat: add node-scoped Networking operator page Adds a Networking view with overview, topology, inventory, and findings. Shared aggregate reads back the page; Resources keeps prune and redirects here. Includes fail-closed network delete guards, operator docs, and /nodes/:slug/networking routing. * fix: rename unused variable n to _n to satisfy no-unused-vars lint * fix: keep top bar search clickable when nav grows * feat: complete Compose-first Networking Phase 2 operator assistant * fix: move networking action visibility helper out of component module * feat(networking): complete Compose-first Networking operator page Finish the node-scoped Networking page (Overview, Networks, Topology, Findings) with design-system parity and correct finding semantics. - Rebuild detail sheets on SystemSheet/SheetSection; align the tab band, masthead, and mobile tone with Fleet and Security. - Encode the host-mode and exposure severity matrix; fix collision counts so intentional shared externals are not flagged; add one typed drift predicate shared by inventory, topology, badges, and overview counts. - Preserve per-container attachments and IPs on topology node clicks; drawer-only click with an explicit logs action; ownership and boolean filters; bound large graphs before layout. - Aggregate cached Compose Doctor findings into the Findings tab with honest source labels, structural merge and dedupe, staleness reconciliation, and a shared exposure-context helper both engines use. - Networks tab: privacy-safe service search, precise ownership counts, schema v3 with version-2 adapters on every endpoint, pre-confirm delete reasons, and the shared sortable table with an internal scroll region. - Interop: Fleet node-card networking signal with pending-intent navigation, stack-to-node backlink, and Dossier/Drift deep links. - Enrich sanitized inspect with an allowlisted connected-container list; fetch topology once and filter client-side. - Docs and tests across every new finding kind, adapter, and flow. * fix(networking): correct drift count, exposure fail-soft, and inspect crash paths Address code-review findings on the Networking page implementation: - Fix the Overview drift count to use the shared drift-kind predicate instead of a hardcoded list that omitted external-network-missing. - Gate Compose Doctor's unclassified-exposure and reverse-proxy-undocumented rules on exposure-context availability, so a DB read failure no longer fabricates findings (mirrors the live engine's existing fail-soft behavior). - Guard the per-stack exposure-intent read in topology aggregation so a transient DB failure degrades to unknown intent instead of failing the whole response. - Harden the network detail drawer against a partial inspect payload from an older remote node, and log the real error instead of a bare catch. - Remove now-duplicated severity-rank and drift-kind helpers in favor of the shared modules; drop dead backend-only exports; widen the frontend schema version type to a plain number instead of casting past a literal type. - Add coverage for the delete-guard precedence, the full host-mode severity matrix, the schema-2 compatibility adapter, and the sanitized connected- container allowlist; tighten two tests that were not exercising the behavior they claimed to. * fix: add missing onOpenNodeNetworking prop to FleetView experimental test The added required prop on FleetViewProps broke the merge-build when the test file (on main but not on this branch) was compiled against the updated FleetView interface. |
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Anso
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b70a529656 |
feat: add developer-mode startup and stack hydration timing (#1619)
* feat: add developer-mode startup and stack hydration timing Instrument boot-to-list and detail hydration with commit-aligned milestones, truthful request stages, and destination/gateway debug duration logs so performance work is guided by measurements. * fix: redact stack names and complete hydration request stages Stop logging stack identifiers in containers debug timing, and record state_dispatch (plus detail fetch spans) so copied reports match the advertised stage breakdown. |
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Anso
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381ed2a91f |
feat: add Admiral Hardened Build channel and business assurance surfaces (#1629)
* feat: add Admiral Hardened Build channel and business assurance surfaces Introduce Studio Saelix entitlement-backed Hardened Build switching, a single-flight image operation coordinator, Recovery Vault naming, Admiral Account settings, and typed Fleet update failures while preserving Community custom-repo and targetless pull-current updates. * fix: harden image-op paths and clear CI CodeQL/pilot flake Validate operation IDs before filesystem use, use hostname checks in Fleet fetch mocks, sanitize registry probe logs, and swallow expected TCP teardown errors in the pilot reverse-route post-handshake test. * fix: sanitize image-op docker config write and probe logs Allowlist-copy registry host keys and base64 auth before writing the temp DOCKER_CONFIG, and log registry probe failures with a fixed message so CodeQL no longer flags network-to-file and log-injection mediums. * fix: address Admiral Hardened Build audit blockers Expose imageChannel so hardened Fleet peers still POST for typed rejection, claim community updates before 202, terminalize helper failures, gate Hardened on paid, and align support/docs/e2e wording. * fix: terminalize image ops on helper survival and aborted claims * fix: prevent recreating persist from overwriting helper-exit failure * test: assert helper-exit failure lands before recreating persist * fix: keep current pointer when acknowledging a stale image operation |
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Anso
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213d3d5d3a |
feat(resources): bind prune to fingerprinted itemized plans (#1611)
* feat(resources): bind prune to fingerprinted itemized plans * fix(resources): repair prune plan volume usage and preview list Source volume RefCount from docker df, keep preview rows from flex-shrinking, tighten managed image attribution and becomesFree, and stop audit summaries from claiming success on rejected prunes. |
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Anso
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d113004359 |
feat: add confirmed Take down stack action with optional volume removal (#1599)
* feat: add confirmed Take down stack action with optional volume removal Expose Take down in the stack header and sidebar with a confirmation dialog that runs compose down while keeping the stack definition on disk. Optional volume removal is gated by node capability and stack:deploy permission, with remote gateway preflight before proxying removeVolumes requests. Closes #1582 * fix: reset take-down volume checkbox when dialog closes * test: align getStackMenuVisibility assertions with showTakeDown key getStackMenuVisibility now returns a fifth lifecycle flag, showTakeDown, but three exhaustive toEqual assertions still listed only the prior four keys and failed. Add the expected showTakeDown value to each: true for the partial and exited running-stack cases, false for the self stack. * test: cover Take down visibility for running non-self stacks The getStackMenuVisibility assertions exercised the partial and exited branches and the self-stack guard, but not the raw === 'running' literal that drives showTakeDown for a normal running stack. Add a case so a regression dropping 'running' from that check is caught. * fix: drop Take down from header overflow and wire activity shortcut Remove duplicate Take down from More actions. Keep inline button when running, sidebar menu, and Cmd+ArrowDown. Record stack_taken_down in activity on successful POST /down. |
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Anso
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e12602091a |
fix: repin semver compose tags during fleet self-update (#1587)
* fix: repin semver compose tags during fleet self-update Fleet updates failed when docker-compose.yml pinned a semver tag because recreate reused the on-disk pin. Pull the target image first, rewrite semver pins via the update helper, and block digest or unresolved pins with fast 409s. * fix: update OFFLINE_META shape in capability and node-registry meta tests |
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Anso
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4077546492 |
feat: acknowledge Compose Doctor preflight findings per stack (#1560)
* feat: acknowledge Compose Doctor preflight findings per stack Add node-scoped preflight acknowledgements with read-time filtering. Supports four expiry modes and activeStatus for banner, tab dot, and readiness. * fix: align preflight acknowledge UI with design system Use Combobox, modal chrome, mono fields, and non-destructive clear confirm. * fix: update test mocks to match new preflight field names The preflight-acknowledgements feature renamed status-\>activeStatus and highestSeverity-\>activeHighestSeverity in the preflight report shape. The corresponding test mocks in three files still used the old field names, causing 6 test failures across backend and frontend. - backend: update-guard-service mock now passes activeStatus - frontend PreflightPanel: Report interface and report() helper now include activeStatus, activeHighestSeverity, activeCount, acknowledgedCount - frontend StackAnatomyPanel doctor: mock API response now includes activeHighestSeverity and activeStatus |
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Anso
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10fb93dcb1 |
feat(scheduler): schedule container restart, stop, and start (#1526)
* feat(scheduler): schedule container restart, stop, and start Add container as a scheduled-task target type so operators can automate lifecycle actions against standalone containers by node and name, with matching UI pickers, validation, execution on local and remote nodes, and tests. * fix(scheduler): stack service matching and container picker hygiene Backfill Service on smartFallback containers so per-service stack restarts work when container_name is set. Match services by compose label and container name in stack routes and scheduled restarts. Exclude Sencho from GET /api/containers lists. Hide the Restart Stack service picker when a stack has only one service. * test(scheduler): scope service checkbox assertion to Services block The create dialog also has a Delete after run checkbox. Count checkboxes only inside the Services section so CI does not include unrelated form controls. * fix(scheduler): narrow closest() result to HTMLElement in schedule test The service-checkbox assertion passed an Element from closest() into within(), which requires an HTMLElement, failing tsc -b in the frontend build and Docker build stages. Use the closest<HTMLElement>() type argument so the value type-checks without an unsafe cast. * fix(scheduler): hide Sencho container on remote node picker lists Remote container lists are proxied from peer Sencho instances, so id-only self filtering missed peers on older builds. Await SelfIdentity init, match ImageID, and drop official saelix/sencho images. Apply the same heuristic in the scheduled-operations UI and when the hub fetches remote containers for scheduled runs. * test(monitor): add missing DatabaseService mocks for scan history cleanup * test(scheduler): add missing markStaleScansAsFailed mock SchedulerService.tick() calls db.markStaleScansAsFailed() to sweep stale vulnerability scans. The scheduler-service test was missing this method in its DatabaseService mock, causing TypeError failures during test initialization. Added mockMarkStaleScansAsFailed to hoisted mocks and DatabaseService mock object, returning safe default of 0 scans marked as failed. * test(compose): add missing FileSystemService mocks for getStackContent/getEnvContent * test(containers-route): mock SelfIdentityService to prevent initialize() crash The excludeSelfContainers() helper calls SelfIdentityService.initialize(), which tries to access DockerController. Without a proper SelfIdentityService mock, the initialize() call fails silently, causing a 500 error on GET /api/containers. Added SelfIdentityService mock with initialize(), isOwnContainer(), and isOwnImage() methods to prevent the crash. |
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Anso
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b65daf6845 |
feat: add notification suppression rules (#1525)
* feat: add notification suppression rules * fix: restore label routing and routing test mocks for suppression * fix: allow bell mute shortcuts for history-only notification categories Suppression rule validation used the routable category whitelist, which rejected history-only categories such as update_started that appear in the bell during stack updates. * feat: expand Mute Rules UX with compose-first entry points and activity badges * fix: add missing NodeContext mocks for notification suppression tests |
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Anso
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624b586887 |
chore: gate self-update prompts on published registry images (#1519)
GitHub Releases appear before docker-publish.yml finishes pushing images. Probe Docker Hub and GHCR manifests before advertising a version as available. Sanitize registry probe debug logs for CodeQL log-injection. |
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Anso
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41dc339c26 |
fix: enforce 1:1 compose path mapping for Pilot agent mounts (#1516)
* fix: enforce 1:1 compose path mapping for Pilot agent mounts Pilot enrollment now generates validated 1:1 bind mounts so every agent path maps to a unique compose directory. Persisted agent paths reconcile during startup to catch drift. Unsafe relative-bind redeploys are blocked before container removal to prevent path escapes. - Add composePathMapping utility with strict path validation - Generate COMPOSE_DIR and validated mounts during Pilot enrollment - Reconcile persisted agent paths during startup bootstrap - Block redeploy when a relative-bind mount would escape the compose root - Default Pilot UI path to /opt/docker/sencho - Update multi-node and pilot-agent documentation - Add regression tests for enrollment, bootstrap, compose-service, and environment-check paths * fix: update E2E enrollment regexes for YAML-quoted token values |
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Anso
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ca496c89dc |
fix: name matched risk inputs in policy block messages (#1471)
The auto-update, bulk-label, scheduler, and blueprint deploy block messages hardcoded "image(s) exceed <max_severity>", which is wrong under the risk-first policy model: a block can be driven by a known-exploited (KEV) or fixable Critical/High input while the severity threshold was never the trigger. In those cases the message named a severity ceiling the policy did not enforce. Route all four message paths through a shared summarizeBlockReasons helper (the same reason text the deploy-gate 409 response and the block dialog already use), so every surface names the inputs that actually matched. Falls back to a generic phrase when no reason was recorded. |
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Anso
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315e8b6379 |
feat: add node update alerts with changelog tab and skip-version handling (#1463)
* feat: add node update alerts with changelog tab and skip-version handling - Add node_update_available notification category with blue/brand bell dot - Route node_update_available notifications to Fleet -> Node updates sheet - Add Changelog tab to NodeUpdatesSheet with GitHub release notes - Add per-node skip-version persistence (node_update_skips table) - Skip hides update CTA on node card and sheet; re-surfaces on newer version - Skipped nodes excluded from Update all backend filter - Add pulsating dot indicator on Changelog tab when updates available - Always-visible View changelog action in notification row bottom - Admin-only for all mutating controls (skip, unskip, update) - Backend tests for skip-version semantics (15 tests) - Update fleet-view.mdx, remote-updates.mdx, and OpenAPI spec * fix: address audit findings - nested button, stale changelog, semver normalization, mobile intent - Move View changelog button outside routable button (sibling element) - Fix aria-label for node_update_available notification rows - Support ?recheck=true on release-notes endpoint - Invalidate release notes cache on forced recheck - Store normalized semver (semver.valid strips v prefix) - Skip fleetUpdatesIntent on mobile (desktop only) - Add v-prefix normalization test * fix: restore View changelog on same line as timestamp, opposite sides The button is always visible at the bottom right of the notification card, on the same row as the timestamp (just now), using justify-between layout. * fix: update tests for node_update_available category and release-notes fetch - Backend: monitor-service tests now expect node_update_available instead of system - Frontend: NodeUpdatesSheet tests mock release-notes API call to prevent undefined then() * fix: resolve ci lint failures |
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Anso
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a698aaa926 |
feat: add per-stack project env file selection for Docker Compose (#1457)
* feat: add per-stack project env file selection for Docker Compose
Allow users to configure an ordered list of env files per stack that serve
as the project environment file(s) for Docker Compose ${VAR} interpolation.
The selected files are passed via repeated --env-file flags during all
compose commands.
Backend:
- Add stack_project_env_files table (node-scoped, ordered)
- Extend authoredComposeEnvFileArgs to emit --env-file for configured files
- Add GET/PUT /stacks/:name/project-env-files and /candidates endpoints
- Update resolveStackEnvSources to use configured files as interpolation source
- Update resolveAllEnvFilePaths to merge injection + interpolation sources
- Add discoverStackLocalEnvFiles for candidate discovery
- Extend backupStackFiles and snapshotStackFiles for project env files
- Add project-env-files capability to CapabilityRegistry
Frontend:
- Add project env file selector to EnvironmentPanel (capability-gated)
- Update EditorView banner to generic "project environment file" language
- Add project-env-files capability to capabilities.ts
Issue: #1454
* fix: add realpath validation, clear all stale backup files, reject nested paths
- authoredComposeEnvFileArgs: use fsPromises.realpath + isPathWithinBase
for symlink escape defense at use time
- backupStackFiles: clear ALL non-marker files from backup slot before
writing, not just PROTECTED_STACK_FILES (handles stale old.env)
- PUT project-env-files: reject paths containing / or \ (root-level
only, matching Compose auto-discovery behavior)
* fix: add getStackProjectEnvFiles to compose-service mock
The new authoredComposeEnvFileArgs calls getStackProjectEnvFiles
on the DatabaseService singleton. The compose-service mesh-override
tests mock that singleton without the new method, causing 6 failures.
Add getStackProjectEnvFiles: () => [] (empty = fall back to legacy
behavior, which is what these tests exercise).
* fix: add getStackProjectEnvFiles to remaining service mocks
The new authoredComposeEnvFileArgs calls getStackProjectEnvFiles,
which is missing from the mock in compose-images.test.ts (6 failures)
and image-update-service.test.ts (proactive fix).
* fix: apply inline path-injection barrier at fs sink for CodeQL
The PUT project-env-files route resolved paths via isPathWithinBase
before calling fsp.stat, but CodeQL does not credit a containment check
separated from the sink. Apply the canonical inline barrier pattern
(path.resolve + startsWith at the sink) used throughout the codebase.
* fix: resolve stackDir from the same canonical root as safePath
Prevents a containment bypass when the compose base directory is
a symlink: stackDir was previously joined from the unresolved
baseDir while the inline barrier used path.resolve(baseDir),
which could differ for symlinked paths. Now both stackDir and
safePath are resolved from a single canonical root, then each is
containment-checked against it.
* fix: remove unused isPathWithinBase import
The inline path-injection barrier refactor replaced isPathWithinBase
with an inline startsWith check at the fs sink, so the import is now
unused and fails ESLint no-unused-vars.
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Anso
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6527bc971b |
feat(security): gate deploys on exploitation risk, not just severity (#1432)
Scan-policy deploy gates can now block on a known-exploited CVE (CISA KEV) and on a fixable Critical/High finding, in addition to an optional severity threshold. New policies default risk-first (KEV and fixable on, severity off); existing policies keep their severity-only behavior. CVSS stays captured for context but is never the sole basis for a block, and a finding whose exploitability cannot be confirmed is treated as risky rather than safe (incomplete scan detail fails closed on KEV/fixable inputs). The decision logic is shared between the pre-deploy gate and the informational post-scan banner via a pure helper, so the two never disagree. Block messages and the block dialog now name the conditions an image matched. Backend and frontend gates move together, the new inputs replicate across the fleet, and a blocking policy with no active input is rejected on both sides. |
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Anso
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96b3c49359 |
fix(deploy): verify atomic-deploy backup integrity before restore (#1422)
* fix(deploy): verify atomic-deploy backup integrity before restore Atomic deploy and the Rollback action restore a stack from a backup of its compose file and .env. A backup truncated or corrupted at write time (out of disk, interrupted copy) was copied back silently, overwriting a working stack with bad content. The backup now writes a .checksums manifest holding a SHA-256 of each backed-up file, and a restore re-hashes every file and compares it before touching the stack. A mismatch aborts the restore with a clear error and leaves the live files unchanged. Backups without a manifest, and files with no recorded checksum, are restored unverified so a rollback is never blocked by missing integrity data. * fix(deploy): guard backup source reads with an inline path barrier The integrity change reads each managed file from the stack directory before hashing it. Static analysis flags those reads because the source path derives from the user-provided stack name and the containment check lived in a helper it does not trace. Re-establish containment inline at each read sink, resolving against the compose base and confirming the path stays within it, mirroring snapshotStackFiles. Behavior is unchanged for valid stacks; the guard only rejects a path that escapes the compose directory, which validation already prevents. * test(deploy): assert compose stays put when the backup .env is corrupt Strengthen the .env-corruption test so it also mutates the live compose.yaml and asserts it is left untouched, proving the integrity abort halts before any file is copied back rather than relying on the backup happening to match. Also note on the test hash oracle that it matches production for UTF-8 text fixtures. |
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Anso
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f794702171 |
feat(security): action-posture Security dashboard with exploit intel and triage (#1424)
* feat(security): reframe masthead as action posture, not worst-CVE severity Derive the Security masthead from an action posture (Action needed / Monitoring / Secure / Unknown) instead of raw scanner severity, and label the raw Critical/High counts as scanner detections. "Secure" now means nothing is actionable right now, never a claim that no vulnerabilities exist; Unknown covers a missing scanner or a node with no completed scan. Phase-1 bootstrap: "actionable" is approximated from the overview facts that already exist (fixable findings, secrets, misconfigs); a later phase moves the bucketing to the backend. * feat(security): derive overview action posture from triaged facts Add deriveSecurityPosture as the single bucketing function and extend /security/overview with posture facts (fixableCriticalHigh, dangerousCompose, accepted, rawCritical/rawHigh, plus knownExploited/publiclyExposed placeholders that later phases populate) and the derived posture verb. Suppression- and acknowledgement-aware counts come from one bounded read-time pass over the latest-scan Critical/High findings, grouped per image so the existing read-time filters apply unchanged. The pass is capped and flags posturePartial, so a large node degrades gracefully instead of scanning every detail row. The masthead now prefers the backend posture and keeps the local bootstrap only as a fallback for older remote nodes reached through the proxy. * feat(security): capture Trivy finding enrichment (status, CVSS, vendor, purl, layer) parseTrivyOutput now keeps the per-finding fields Trivy already returns and we previously discarded: Status (fixed / will_not_fix / end_of_life / ...), CVSS (score + vector, preferring the NVD source then falling back), vendor severity, package URL, package path, and layer digest. Persisted on vulnerability_details via additive nullable columns (guarded ALTER), bound null when absent, and carried through the cached-scan reconstruction path. These fields separate scary from exploitable and feed the action posture and the per-finding evidence tags. Field paths verified against Trivy's documented image-scan JSON; covered by parse and insert/read round-trip tests. * feat(security): add CVE exploit-intel service (CISA KEV + FIRST EPSS) Add CveIntelService, a daily background cache of CISA KEV membership and FIRST EPSS scores stored in a new cve_intel table and joined to findings at read time by CVE id (never frozen onto scan rows, so a CVE entering KEV later lights up on scans already stored). EPSS is fetched only for CVE ids present in stored findings, batched; both feeds are best-effort and keep the last cache on failure, so the Security page degrades gracefully offline. Wired into startup/shutdown like the other background services. The overview now counts known-exploited Critical/High findings, and KEV membership escalates posture to Action needed even when no fix is available. A per-instance "Exploit intelligence" toggle on the scanner setup surface lets air-gapped or firewalled hosts disable the outbound fetch; the daily tick keeps running but skips the fetch body when it is off. * feat(security): show per-finding evidence tags (KEV, EPSS, vendor status, CVSS) The vulnerabilities endpoint joins read-time exploit intel (KEV membership and EPSS score) onto each finding by CVE id, and the scan sheet renders evidence tags beside each CVE: known-exploited, EPSS probability, vendor will-not-fix / end-of-life, and the CVSS score. Severity becomes one signal among several so an operator can tell scary from exploitable, with no invented composite score. * feat(security): evolve CVE suppressions into triage decisions Layer a triage status and optional OpenVEX justification onto CVE suppressions. Statuses: needs review / affected / not affected / accepted risk / fixed / false positive / ignored. Dismissing states (not affected, accepted, fixed, false positive, ignored) stop a finding from driving the action posture; needs review and affected stay actionable and are surfaced as counts. Existing rows default to "accepted" (the prior suppress behavior), so nothing changes for them. The overview now reports needsReview / notAffected / accepted as distinct facts derived from the triage status. The decision replicates across the fleet (snapshot + replicated-insert carry status + justification) so a replica's posture matches the control node. The inline suppress dialog gains a triage decision selector; the read-time filter surfaces the status and justification on every finding. * feat(security): export fleet triage decisions as OpenVEX (Admiral) Add an OpenVEX exporter that turns the instance's CVE triage decisions into a standard VEX document (not_affected / fixed / affected / under_investigation, with justifications), and a GET /security/vex/export endpoint to download it. Authoring fleet VEX is a governance capability, so it is gated to Admiral (paid) plus admin, mirroring the SARIF export gate; the Suppressions panel shows an Export VEX action only on Admiral. * docs(security): document action posture, evidence tags, exploit intel, and triage Update the Security page and CVE suppressions docs for the action-posture masthead (scanner detections vs product posture), per-finding evidence tags (KEV / EPSS / CVSS / vendor status), the exploit-intelligence toggle (CISA KEV + FIRST EPSS) on scanner setup, triage decisions layered on suppressions, and OpenVEX export of fleet triage decisions. * test(security): match intel hosts exactly in CveIntelService test Route the fetch stub and its call assertions by exact hostname (www.cisa.gov / api.first.org) instead of a domain substring check. Resolves the js/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization code-scanning alerts on the test's URL routing; behavior is unchanged. |
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Anso
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37e6e48b40 |
feat(files): copy & duplicate, bulk actions, disk-backed uploads, and an accessible file tree (#1409)
* perf(files): spool uploads to disk instead of buffering in memory
Switch the stack file-explorer upload from multer memoryStorage to
diskStorage and stream the spooled temp file through the file-root
gateway, so an upload is never held fully in RAM. Authorization and
root resolution now run before multer spools, so an unauthorized or
read-only-root request is rejected without writing a temp file, and the
spool is removed on every exit path. The named-volume helper write
verifies the written byte count, since cat cannot report a short write.
* feat(files): copy and duplicate files in the explorer
Add a copy capability to the stack file explorer: a same-folder
Duplicate (auto-suffixed name) and a "Copy to..." destination picker,
on both filesystem and named-volume roots. Copying is within-root,
symlink-leaf-safe, blocks a directory copy into its own subtree, and
refuses to create a protected name (compose/.env) at the stack root
while still allowing a protected file to be duplicated under a new name.
* feat(files): make the file tree keyboard accessible
Bring the stack file explorer tree to the WCAG tree pattern: rows are
treeitems carrying aria-level, aria-selected, and aria-expanded, with a
single roving tabindex and full keyboard navigation (arrow keys,
Home/End, Enter/Space) over a flattened visible-node list that stays in
lockstep with the rendered rows. A polite live region announces the
selected file. No visual change to the tree.
* feat(files): bulk select, delete, move, and download files
Add multi-select to the stack file explorer (checkboxes plus Shift and
Ctrl/Cmd click over the visible order) driving three bulk actions:
delete, move, and download as a streamed .tar.gz. All run within the
active root on both filesystem and named-volume backends, report
per-item results so partial failures surface (with the failed items
kept selected for retry), normalize ancestor/descendant selections
server-side, and cap the archive entry and byte counts before any
bytes are streamed. Protected compose/.env files are excluded from
bulk delete and move but may still be downloaded.
* docs(files): document copy, bulk actions, and keyboard navigation
Add the copy/duplicate and multi-select bulk delete/move/download
sections to the Files & Volumes page, a keyboard-navigation note for the
tree, an updated context-menu reference, and bulk troubleshooting entries.
* fix(files): inline path-injection barriers at the new file-op sinks
CodeQL js/path-injection does not credit the wrapped isPathWithinBase
containment check, so the new copy/bulk/disk-upload flows tripped the
gate. Inline the canonical path.resolve + startsWith barrier at the
realpath sink in resolveSafePathWithin (covers every user-relPath flow)
and confirm the multer spool path resolves within UPLOAD_TMP_DIR before
unlinking it or streaming it onward. Behavior is unchanged; the paths
were already validated.
* fix(files): guard the ancestor-walk realpath sink too
The first barrier covered realpath(target), but the ENOENT ancestor
walk re-derives the path via path.dirname, which static analysis treats
as a fresh tainted value. Add the same inline containment barrier before
that realpath and resolve the root case via the untainted base, so the
only tainted realpath input is one the startsWith check has cleared.
Behavior is unchanged.
* fix(files): resolve the root case off the taint path in the ancestor walk
The compound guard on existing (the same variable as the startsWith
subject) was not credited as a sanitizer. Handle the root case before
the barrier by resolving the untainted base directly, leaving a plain
canonical startsWith guard on the strictly-within ancestor. Behavior is
unchanged.
* fix(files): harden helper-backend bulk download and uploads
Address three issues found in the named-volume (helper) backend:
- Bulk download could send 200 headers before discovering a file the
helper download path refuses, tearing the archive mid-stream. The
prewalk now rejects symlinks, non-regular ("other") entries, and
files over the per-file download cap before any header (400/413).
FileEntry gains an 'other' type so non-regular entries stay distinct
from regular files as they pass through the gateway.
- The helper directory listing was fully buffered before the archive
entry cap could fire. listDir now accepts a limit; the list script
stops after limit+1 rows and the gateway reports truncation.
- A stdin pipeline error during a helper upload masked the container's
real nonzero exit code (and its 4xx mapping) as a generic 500. The
nonzero exit now wins; the masked stream error is logged.
* feat(files): add a New file toolbar button with server-enforced create-only
The stack file explorer could create a folder from a toolbar button but a
new file only from a folder's right-click menu, so a file could not be
created at the stack root at all. Add a New file toolbar button beside New
folder, targeting the current directory.
Creating a file now routes through a new createEmptyStackFile helper that
posts a zero-byte file through the existing upload endpoint with overwrite
off, so the server's exclusive-create path rejects an existing name instead
of clobbering it. A file collision surfaces inline in the dialog; a folder
collision and other failures surface as a toast.
* fix(files): widen the tree row hit area and add horizontal scroll for long names
Right-clicking a file tree row only opened the Sencho context menu when the
click landed on the filename; the rest of the row fell through to the native
browser menu, and long names were truncated with no way to read them.
Make each row span the full pane width (and grow with its content) so the
whole row is the context-menu trigger, and let the tree scroll horizontally
so a long name is reachable instead of clipped. A new opt-in horizontal prop
on ScrollArea adds the styled horizontal scrollbar without clamping content
width.
* docs(files): document the New file button, full-row right-click, and long-name scrolling
* test(files): cover createEmptyStackFile targeting the stack root
Add an API-layer case for the empty-directory (stack root) create path, the
primary reason the New file toolbar button exists, so a regression in the
root-level URL would be caught at unit speed rather than only in e2e.
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ba09e6f69e |
fix: base Git multi-file Compose deploy env and dossier on the effective config (#1391)
* fix: resolve the root .env at deploy and render time for Git context-dir stacks A Git multi-file source with a context dir set --project-directory to that dir, so Docker Compose looked for .env there and missed the root .env Sencho writes. Validation already passed the root .env with --env-file, so a stack could validate with one effective config but deploy or render another. Add authoredComposeEnvFileArgs, which appends --env-file <stackDir>/.env when the applied deploy spec has a context dir and a root .env exists, and wire it into the deploy/update, image-scan, render, and container-listing compose invocations so they all resolve env from the same file the validator used. A non-ENOENT access error surfaces instead of silently dropping the flag. * fix: base multi-file Git dossier and doc-drift on the effective Compose model The Stack Dossier and its documentation-drift check parsed only the stored root compose file. For a multi-file Git source, services, ports, networks, or volumes that an override file adds were invisible, so the dossier showed incomplete facts and doc-drift could falsely warn that a documented port is unpublished when an override actually publishes it. Add a secret-safe GET /stacks/:name/effective-anatomy that renders the merged effective model and extracts only structural facts (services, ports, volumes, networks, restart), never env, label, or command values. StackAnatomyPanel fetches it for multi-file Git stacks and feeds those facts into the dossier and doc-drift, falling back to the root-only parse for single-file or non-git stacks and whenever the render is unavailable. * fix: add an inline path-injection barrier to the Git env-file resolver CodeQL js/path-injection flagged the fs.access in authoredComposeEnvFileArgs because the env path derives from the route-supplied stack name and the only containment check lived in the callers, not at the sink. Resolve the stack dir against the compose base and assert containment with startsWith inline, then derive the .env path from the validated dir, mirroring the existing inline guards in renderConfig and validateCompose. Valid stack names are unaffected; a name that escapes the base now yields no --env-file. * test: stabilize the dossier doc-drift e2e against the dossier-load race The first assertion filled the access_urls field as soon as the Dossier panel was visible, but the panel's GET /stacks/:name/dossier resolves by overwriting the fields from the server (empty access_urls) and only then flips the doc-drift gate on. When the GET landed after the fill, it clobbered the typed value and the warning never rendered, so the test failed intermittently under CI timing. Wait for that GET to land before typing, mirroring the spec's openStack helper. |
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f23b7e1bac |
feat: ordered multi-file Compose for Git sources (#1380)
* feat: ordered multi-file Compose for Git sources
Extend Git sources to deploy an ordered list of compose files merged with
docker compose -f base.yaml -f override.yaml ..., plus an optional project
directory.
- Pick and reorder compose files from the repository tree (drag to reorder on
desktop, up/down arrows on phones); manual path entry is also supported.
- The ordered set drives every stack-scoped compose command (deploy, update,
start/stop/restart/down, image scans, Compose Doctor) and the container
lookup, so a service or image declared only in an override is handled too.
- Runtime keys off the materialized set, not the saved configuration: saving a
source does not change deploy args until the pull is applied, and apply
materializes from the pending snapshot rather than live config.
- The project directory is passed as --project-directory, with -p <stack>
pinning the Compose project so container labels stay stable.
- The Mesh override is layered last; single-file sources are byte-identical to
before, and existing rows keep working via the single-path fallback.
Docs cover the picker, ordering, project directory, and the new troubleshooting
and limitations (referenced files are not materialized; the dependency graph,
drift, and networking views read the primary file).
* fix: harden multi-file Git source (hash, unlink, collisions, node id)
- hashContent folds ordered file CONTENTS (not paths) so a clean multi-file
stack is not flagged as locally edited: create/apply hash the fetched files
(repo paths) while pull hashes the on-disk files (materialized paths), which
previously disagreed and showed a false "local edits detected".
- Block unlinking a multi-file or project-directory Git source (409): the deploy
spec lives on the source row, so removing it would silently revert deploys to
root compose.yaml. Single-file sources still unlink.
- Reject materialized-path collisions in the selection validator: an additional
file equal to or nested under compose.yaml, an ancestor/descendant overlap
between selected files, and a project directory nested under a compose file
(previously a 500 at materialization).
- DockerController.getContainersByStack uses the controller's node compose dir
and passes its node id to the authored prefix, instead of the process default.
* fix: CI failures on multi-file Git source (test crash, aria query, path barrier)
- GitSourceFields no longer crashes when repoUrl/branch are falsy: the canBrowse
trim() is optional-chained, so a reusable field component tolerates partial
props. Fixes the apply-binding panel test, which feeds a minimal source object.
- GitSourcePanel tests query the footer Remove button by its exact name, so the
picker's per-file "Remove <path>" buttons no longer collide with the broad
/remove/i match (the test intent, footer Remove present/absent, is unchanged).
- validateCompose uses an inline resolve + startsWith barrier at the context-dir
mkdir sink (CodeQL does not credit the wrapped isPathWithinBase helper),
clearing the js/path-injection alert. The containment check is equivalent and
contextDir is also validated upstream.
* test: update Git source E2E spec for the multi-file compose picker
The compose-file picker replaced the single #git-source-path input and added
per-file Remove buttons, so the E2E spec drove selectors that no longer exist:
- Drop the redundant compose.yaml fills (the picker defaults to compose.yaml).
- Select the footer Remove button by exact name so the picker's per-file
"Remove <path>" buttons no longer make the locator ambiguous.
- Set a custom compose path through the picker (add via the manual input, press
Enter, then remove the default compose.yaml).
* test: match the footer Remove button with an exact Playwright name
Playwright's getByRole name option is a substring match by default, so
{ name: 'Remove' } also matched the picker's "Remove <path>" buttons. Require an
exact match so only the footer Remove button is selected.
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710647a44f |
feat(snapshots): preserve stack dossiers with fleet snapshots (#1339)
* feat(snapshots): preserve stack dossiers with fleet snapshots Fleet snapshots can now optionally capture each stack's Dossier notes alongside its compose and .env files, so a recovery restores the operational knowledge around a stack, not just its configuration. - Opt-in global setting "snapshot_documentation" (default off), toggled from the renamed Fleet settings section. - Capture reads local dossiers from the database and remote dossiers over the Distributed API proxy; only stacks with notes are recorded, and secret values are never included. - Captured notes are stored encrypted at rest in a new fleet_snapshots column and surfaced in the snapshot detail view behind a badge. - Cloud and downloaded archives gain a documentation.json (archive_version 2). - Restore stays conservative: dossier notes are written back only when the operator explicitly opts in, on both single-stack and restore-all paths. - Existing snapshots and archives remain valid; behavior is unchanged when the setting is off. * fix(snapshots): harden dossier-notes restore against bad input and partial failures Address review findings on the documentation-snapshots restore path: - Parse `restoreNotes` strictly (=== true) on single-stack restore, matching restore-all, so a stray non-boolean can never opt in to overwriting notes. - Guard findSnapshotDossier: require an array of stacks and real dossier content, so a malformed or all-blank entry can't clobber current notes. - Make the dossier-notes write non-fatal relative to the file restore: a notes failure (e.g. a remote dossier PUT) is caught, reported via `notesError`, and no longer 500s the single restore or fails the stack in restore-all once the files are already written. - Surface the partial outcome in the UI: a warning toast on single restore, a summary note on restore-all, and gate the "Documentation captured" badge and restore-all notes control on captured stacks while rendering capture warnings. Adds tests for strict parsing, malformed/blank blobs, remote notes restore (success + non-fatal failure, single and bulk), and scheduled capture-on. * fix(snapshots): drop unused binding in restore-all remote notes test The restore-all remote notes test destructured a node id it never uses (restore-all is driven by snapshot id alone), tripping no-unused-vars and failing the lint step. Bind only the snapshot id. |
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b21324f97a |
feat(stacks): persist a drift ledger with temporal source-change detection (#1333)
* feat(stacks): persist a drift ledger with temporal source-change detection Build on the read-only compose-vs-runtime drift check so a stack's drift is remembered over time, not just shown at a glance. - Record a deploy baseline: on a successful deploy, update, or rollback, store the deployed compose file's source and rendered-model hashes on the stack so the Drift tab can tell whether the file has changed since the last deploy. - Surface temporal drift in the Drift tab: "matches last deploy", "source changed since last deploy" (distinguishing a model change from a formatting-only edit), or "no deploy baseline yet". - Persist findings into a drift ledger: a re-check reconciles the current findings, recording newly detected ones and resolving cleared ones, and shows a short drift history under the findings. The drift report read stays side-effect-free; only an explicit re-check (and a deploy) writes the ledger. - Write drift detected/resolved events to the stack Activity timeline so the provenance sits alongside deploys and restarts. Node-local and available on the Community tier. Reconciliation is skipped when a check is not authoritative (Docker unreachable or a compose parse error) so an open finding is never falsely cleared. * fix(stacks): record the drift baseline for every deploy path and harden the ledger Address review feedback on the drift ledger: - Record the deploy baseline in ComposeService.deployStack/updateStack instead of only the manual route, so bulk, Git-source, App Store, scheduler, and webhook deploys all capture source/rendered hashes. Reconciliation stays on the explicit re-check. - Store no rendered baseline when the local parser cannot model the compose (for example a file over the parse cap) rather than a sentinel that would make a later real change read as unchanged. - Let temporal-overlay failures surface as a 500 instead of being hidden behind a neutral "no baseline"; only the compose read stays best-effort. - Omit the temporal card entirely when a report (for example from an older remote node) carries no temporal data, instead of showing a misleading "no baseline". - Keep drift_detected / drift_resolved history-only by excluding them from the routable-category whitelist, so they are never offered as a channel route that would never fire. - Use a JSON separator for the finding identity key so the source file is plain text (no embedded control byte). * fix(stacks): sanitize logged errors in the drift report handlers The drift report and re-check handlers logged the caught error object raw alongside the stack name, which a code scan flagged as a log-injection vector: a crafted stack name surfacing inside an error message or stack could forge log lines. Route the error through the log sanitizer so control characters are stripped before writing. Render it with util.inspect first so the stack trace, cause chain, and underlying error codes are preserved for debugging. |
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2435da232b |
fix(api-tokens): harden rate limiting and surface list-load errors (#1292)
* fix(api-tokens): scope per-token rate limits to live tokens Forged or token-shaped Authorization headers no longer mint their own rate-limit budget. The key generator now grants a per-token budget only to a real, active token and falls back to per-IP keying for anything else, so a single source cannot evade the global limiter by rotating fake tokens. The validated token is memoized on the request, so authentication reuses it without a second database lookup. Token validation (format, checksum, lookup, revocation, expiry) is now a single shared helper used by the HTTP auth middleware, the WebSocket upgrade handler, and the rate-limit key generator, replacing two near-identical inline copies that could drift apart. The last-used timestamp write is throttled so a busy token no longer writes to the database on every request. * fix(api-tokens): surface token list-load failures with a retry A failed load of the API tokens list was swallowed: a server error rendered the empty "no tokens yet" state with no sign that anything went wrong. The list now shows an error card with a Retry action and raises a toast on any non-ok response or network error, matching the create and revoke flows. Adds a troubleshooting entry for the error. * test(api-tokens): seed tokens via the shared test helper The new hardening and WS-scope suites computed sha256 of a raw token directly, which CodeQL flags as js/insufficient-password-hash (a false positive: these are 256-bit CSPRNG opaque tokens, not passwords). Route token creation through the existing apiTokenTestHelper and read the stored token_hash back from the row, so the suites no longer hash anything themselves. Also removes the duplicated createToken helpers. * fix(api-tokens): key the rate limiter by the same credential auth uses The rate-limit key generator checked the session cookie before the Authorization bearer, while authMiddleware authenticates bearer-over-cookie (bearerToken || cookieToken). A request could send a Bearer API token plus a forged cookie and be keyed by the cookie's (forgeable, rotatable) username, sidestepping the per-token / per-IP keying the limiter applies to API tokens: a valid token would lose its own bucket, and a forged token-shaped bearer would no longer collapse to per-IP. Reorder the generator to mirror auth: process the bearer first (validate the API token and key per-token or fall back to per-IP; otherwise decode the JWT by username/sub), and consult the cookie only when there is no bearer. Regression tests cover a valid and a forged sen_sk_ bearer, each sent with a forged cookie. |
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c11a550b6a |
fix(fleet-snapshots): gate reads on admin role and encrypt content at rest (#1273)
* fix(fleet-snapshots): gate reads on admin role and encrypt content at rest Fleet snapshots capture every node's compose.yaml and .env, so the data is as sensitive as the live stacks. This hardens access and reliability across the snapshot pipeline. - Restrict snapshot reads to administrators. GET /api/fleet/snapshots and /:id now require the admin role, matching create, restore, and delete; the Fleet "Snapshots" tab and its panel render only for admins. Previously any authenticated user could enumerate snapshots and read every node's .env. - Encrypt snapshot file contents at rest with the instance key. Restore and cloud-archive paths decrypt on read, so cloud archives stay portable and a database copy no longer exposes stack secrets in plaintext. Rows written before this change still read back as plaintext. - Surface partial captures. A stack whose compose file cannot be read or fetched, or a file over the 1 MB capture cap, is recorded as a warning and shown on the snapshot instead of being silently dropped, so a snapshot is never mistaken for complete. Remote .env read errors are now distinguished from a genuinely absent .env. Adds route-authz, capture-warning, and encryption round-trip tests; updates the Fleet-Wide Backups feature docs. * fix(fleet-snapshots): gate cloud snapshot reads on admin role The cloud snapshot read routes were guarded by provider/license only, not by role, while their write counterparts (upload, delete) already required admin and the Cloud Backup settings surface is admin-only. Because a downloaded archive contains plaintext compose and .env files, a non-admin could list and download cloud snapshots and read every node's secrets, the same exposure the local snapshot reads were just closed against. - Require admin on GET /api/cloud-backup/snapshots, /status/:id, and /object/:keyB64/download, matching the local snapshot reads and the admin-only Cloud Backup settings section. - When capturing a remote node, treat a 200 response carrying X-Env-Exists: false as a stack with no .env (matching the local ENOENT path) instead of storing an empty .env that restore would later write back. Adds non-admin authorization tests for the cloud read routes and a remote absent-.env capture test. |
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b61388c675 |
fix(rbac): enforce admin seat cap on promotion and harden last-admin and audit paths (#1266)
Promoting a user to admin now respects the per-tier admin seat limit the same way user creation does, closing a path that let an operator exceed the cap by creating an account and then editing its role to admin. The last-admin guard for demote and delete now runs the admin-count re-check and the write in a single transaction, so two concurrent admin changes can no longer race the admin count to zero and lock everyone out. Admin two-factor resets are now recorded once with their own audit summary instead of being mislabeled as a user creation by the audit middleware. |
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5e66b54153 |
fix(audit-log): neutralize CSV export injection, clamp pagination, bound anomaly history (#1259)
* fix(audit-log): neutralize CSV export injection, clamp pagination, bound anomaly history Harden the Admiral audit log without changing its tier or hub-only gating. - CSV export now defuses formula injection: any field that a spreadsheet would evaluate as a formula (leading = + - @, or a trigger behind leading whitespace, or a leading tab/CR) is prefixed with a single quote before RFC 4180 quoting. Audit summaries embed user-controlled resource names, so this closes a path where a crafted name could execute on export open. - Clamp page and limit to positive bounds on the list endpoint so a negative limit can no longer reach SQLite as "unlimited" and dump the whole table. - Bound the anomaly and stats history reads to a capped slice of recent rows so the analysis paths stay within fixed memory and latency on large histories instead of scanning the full retention window per request. - Surface failed audit list and stats fetches through the standard error toast instead of leaving the view silently stale. - Add a developer-mode-gated diagnostic log to the stats endpoint for parity with the list and export handlers. Covered by new unit and HTTP-integration tests (CSV neutralization through the real export route, pagination clamps, bounded history, stats endpoint, anomaly annotation) and verified end to end in the browser. * fix(audit-log): compute signal-rail stats with exact SQL aggregates Address review feedback on the earlier history-cap change. The cap was correct for the anomaly baseline but made the stats tiles (events, actors, failure rate, hourly series) silently undercount on a hub with more than the cap's worth of rows in the window, since they were derived from the capped row slice. - Add DatabaseService.getAuditStatsInputs: exact counts via SQL COUNT / COUNT(DISTINCT) / GROUP BY hour, and new-ip detection over the small DISTINCT (user, ip) pair sets. No row cap, so the tiles stay exact at any window size while memory stays bounded. - Reduce computeAuditStats to a pure formatter over those aggregates. - Keep the bounded history read only for the list endpoint's anomaly annotation, where a recent-activity baseline is an acceptable heuristic. - Skip the redundant load-failure toast when a fetch fails with a handled 401, so an expired session does not stack toasts on top of logout. Adds exactness tests for the aggregate counts, distinct-actor handling, and new-ip detection, and strengthens the pagination-clamp tests. * fix(audit-log): exclude future-dated rows and make the new-ip sample deterministic Two small parity fixes on the stats aggregates: upper-bound every current window by `now` so a future-dated row (clock skew or a fixture) cannot inflate the live counts, and order the new-ip pair scan so the sample actor shown in the tile detail is stable. Adds a test asserting a future row is excluded. |
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69edb0dcbb |
fix(observability): gate global logs to admins, scope to managed containers, harden SSE (#1254)
* fix(observability): gate global logs to admins, scope to managed containers, harden SSE Make the Logs feed an administrator view enforced on both sides (requireAdmin on the /api/logs/global poll and SSE routes; the Logs nav item plus a redirect guard on the frontend), and scope the feed to Sencho-managed containers only via a shared isManagedByComposeDir helper that /stats now reuses. Harden the SSE stream: a stateful frame demuxer that survives chunk boundaries so a Docker frame split across reads is reassembled instead of dropped or garbled; a per-stream error listener so one broken follow stream cannot crash the event loop (it posts a single degraded notice and keeps the others alive); a cap on concurrent follow streams with a truncation notice; a bounded initial tail; and backpressure that pauses the source streams when the client is slow and resumes on drain. Bound the polling snapshot's per-container fan-out with a concurrency limit. Add process-local, in-memory log-stream counters exposed at the admin-only /api/system/log-stream-metrics endpoint (active connections, lines streamed, attach and frame errors). Collapse the view to the local hub and remove the dead remote-node handling. * fix(observability): close remote-proxy bypass of the global-logs admin gate The logs feed's requireAdmin lives in the local route handler, which the remote proxy skips when forwarding a request whose nodeId targets a remote node. A hub user could therefore request /api/logs/global*, /api/logs/global/stream, or /api/system/log-stream-metrics with x-node-id (or ?nodeId= for the SSE transport) pointing at a remote node and have it served as the node-proxy admin on the far side, sidestepping the gate entirely. Add these paths to HUB_ONLY_PREFIXES so hubOnlyGuard rejects a remote nodeId with 403 before the proxy runs, matching the existing protection on audit-log, scheduled-tasks, and notification-routes. Add regression tests covering the collection path, the SSE sub-path (both the x-node-id header and the ?nodeId= query transport), and the stream-metrics endpoint. |
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2844f606cd |
fix(git-sources): harden webhook delivery, transport errors, and clone limits (#1249)
* fix(git-sources): harden webhook delivery, transport errors, and clone limits Map webhook-pull outcomes to real HTTP status codes (200 success, 202 debounced, 404 no source, 422 failure) instead of always returning 200, so a Git provider and any monitoring on it can tell when a delivery actually failed. Close a concurrent webhook fan-out gap: the debounce window is now re-checked inside the per-stack lock, so simultaneous deliveries for one push run a single clone instead of one per request. The whole pull/apply critical section runs under a single lock acquisition. Unwrap fetch transport causes (ENOTFOUND, ECONNREFUSED, ECONNRESET, TLS) so a clone failure surfaces an actionable, host-qualified message instead of a bare "fetch failed". Cap how many bytes a single clone may download to protect the host disk; operators can tune it with GITSOURCE_MAX_CLONE_BYTES (default 100 MB). Log webhook pull failures server-side, since the webhook path is unattended. * test(git-sources): assert surfaced host via toContain to satisfy CodeQL * fix(git-sources): bound per-file read, treat debounced webhooks as non-failure, correct clone-cap docs * docs(git-sources): correct clone-cap comment to describe a download bound, not disk |
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2d56ea958a |
fix(stack-activity): per-stack history integrity, attribution, sanitization (#1228)
* fix(stack-activity): per-stack history integrity, attribution, sanitization Address the Stack Activity audit findings (PR 1 of 2): - Per-stack history integrity: drop the per-insert 100-row prune in addNotificationHistory that evicted quieter stacks' history whenever another stack got chatty. Periodic cleanupOldNotifications now caps per (node, stack) at 500 rows and per-node unattached system events at 1000 rows, on top of the existing 30-day retention. Signature takes an options bag and returns a per-stage summary so MonitorService can log what actually ran each cycle. - Actor attribution: thread req.user?.username through every notifyActionFailure call site and add synthetic actors at service emit sites (system:autoheal, system:scheduler, system:image-update, system:docker-events, system:blueprint, system:monitor, system:policy). The timeline renders system actors as "via <Label>" so an autoheal redeploy is no longer indistinguishable from a user redeploy. - Message sanitization: new sanitizeNotificationMessage at NotificationService.dispatchAlert strips KEY=VALUE pairs whose key ends in TOKEN/KEY/PASSWORD/SECRET/CREDENTIALS/AUTH, scrubs HTTP basic auth in URLs and Bearer tokens, collapses COMPOSE_DIR paths, and truncates to 1000 chars. Applied to the stored history and to every downstream Discord/Slack/webhook channel. The ImageUpdateService recovery-path direct DB write also runs through the sanitizer. - Composite pagination cursor: getStackActivity now accepts a (timestamp, id) cursor (?before=&beforeId=). The legacy timestamp-only form silently dropped events when a single compose up emitted many events sharing one millisecond. Route rejects beforeId without before. - Frontend hardening: distinct error state with retry button (initial fetch failure no longer renders as the genuine empty state), strict positive-integer parsing on cursor params, overrequest-by-1 pagination so the last page does not leave a dead "Load more" click, runtime guard on liveEvents merge that validates the level union, per-minute day-bucket recompute so an open panel does not stay on "Today" past midnight. No tier, role, or capability gate touched. Route permission gate remains stack:read on the named stack. * fix(stack-activity): sanitizer covers lowercase env vars and per-node compose dir External review surfaced two leak paths in the message sanitizer: - The sensitive-key regex was uppercase-only. Compose env names are conventionally uppercase but lowercase forms (db_password, jwt_secret, github_token) are valid and do leak through the same Docker and compose-parse error paths. Make the regex case-insensitive and tighten it to also catch bare TOKEN= / KEY= / PASSWORD= without a prefix word, while still leaving BYPASS, COMPASS, and similar non-secret keys alone. - The compose-dir path collapse only read process.env.COMPOSE_DIR, but the real resolution chain is node.compose_dir (per-node DB override) -> process.env.COMPOSE_DIR -> /app/compose. A node with a custom compose_dir could still leak absolute paths into stored history and downstream channels. Route both the dispatchAlert call and the ImageUpdateService recovery-path direct write through NodeRegistry.getInstance().getComposeDir(localNodeId) so the collapse covers every resolution outcome. Tests now assert lowercase keys are redacted and that BYPASS-style non-secrets stay intact in both cases. notification-routing mock extended to stub the new getComposeDir call. * chore(stack-activity): a11y roles, visibility-aware tick, live-disconnect signal Close three small follow-ups on the per-stack activity timeline: - A11y: each day-group gets role="list" and each event row gets role="listitem" so screen readers traverse the timeline as a list instead of a wall of text. The day-group container also carries an aria-label naming the bucket. - Visibility-aware day-bucket tick: the 60s setInterval that re-derives Today/Yesterday/Earlier now short-circuits when document.hidden, so a backgrounded panel does not re-render every minute for no visible effect. - Live-disconnect signal: useNotifications dispatches a sencho:notifications-connection custom event on WebSocket open and close. The timeline listens and, when explicitly disconnected, shows a one-line "Live updates offline; reconnecting…" hint above the list. The sidebar ticker already surfaces fleet-wide connection state; this adds an in-context cue for users who are focused on a single stack. Stack-name case normalization was considered and rejected: stack names are case-permissive per the isValidStackName validator, and lowercasing on read or write would silently rename or hide a user's "MyApp" stack. * ci(stack-activity): drop unnecessary escape in URL_BASIC_AUTH regex ESLint no-useless-escape errored on \- inside the character class [a-zA-Z0-9+.\-] at notificationMessage.ts:14. Move the dash to the end of the class so it's an unambiguous literal and the escape is no longer required. Behavior is identical; sanitizer tests still pass. * revert(stack-activity): drop unvalidated E2E spec from this PR The spec was committed without ever running against a real Docker daemon, then failed in CI when it ran for the first time: deploy returned 200 but no notification appeared on the activity endpoint within the polling window, suggesting either a deploy-notification race or a node-id resolution mismatch in the CI environment. Backend unit tests (route + composite cursor + sanitizer) and frontend component tests cover the same logic. The E2E spec will land in a dedicated follow-up once it has been authored against a working CI environment. |
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Anso
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f03c9dc7b6 |
fix(webhooks): address Codex review of PR #1177 (#1181)
* fix(webhooks): close HMAC timing oracle on trigger reject paths The trigger handler in PR #1177 returned a uniform 404 for every unauthenticated rejection, but only the wrong-signature path computed an HMAC over the request body. The other reject paths (unknown id, disabled webhook, non-paid tier, missing X-Webhook-Signature header, missing rawBody) short-circuited before any HMAC work. Repeated near-rate-limit probes with a large attacker-controlled body could distinguish a valid-and-enabled paid webhook id from the other reject cases through response latency. WebhookService.validateSignature is now constant-time over every input shape: it always runs crypto.createHmac and crypto.timingSafeEqual against fixed-length 32-byte buffers regardless of whether the signature is missing, has the wrong prefix, is malformed hex, or is the wrong length. The trigger handler calls it unconditionally before any reject branch fires, using a stable per-process decoy secret (WebhookService.getDecoySecret) when the webhook does not exist and an empty buffer when the request has no body. Response timing now depends only on the size of the request body, which the attacker already controls and which reveals nothing webhook-specific. Six new tests pin the behaviour: validateSignature is observed firing on the unknown-id and missing-signature paths through a spy assertion, and four direct-call tests confirm validateSignature returns false without throwing for empty, wrong-prefix, malformed-hex, and wrong-length signatures. * fix(safe-log): redact Basic auth and lowercase Windows drive letters The redactSensitiveText helper now covers two cases the prior chain missed: * Authorization: Basic <base64> previously left the base64 payload intact. The existing key/value regex caught only the literal word Basic before stopping at the space. A new Basic\s+[A-Za-z0-9+/=]+ replacement runs before the key/value regex so the credential is scrubbed first. * Windows homedir paths like c:\Users\<user>\... with a lowercase drive letter previously slipped through because the regex required [A-Z]. Changed to [A-Za-z] so both letter cases are covered. Two new tests pin both fixes. * docs(webhooks): document 429, fix shared schema, comply with D27/D31 * Trigger endpoint declares the 429 response that webhookTriggerLimiter can return (500 requests per minute per source IP); both docs/openapi.yaml and the response table in docs/features/webhooks.mdx carry the new row, and a new troubleshooting accordion explains the shared-NAT scenario. * Shared Webhook schema in docs/openapi.yaml extends the action enum to include git-pull and documents the node_id property. The GET list endpoint returns these fields; the prior schema would have failed validation for any git-pull row. * docs/features/webhooks.mdx:7 rewritten from a customer-side role enumeration ("non-admins on a paid tier can view the list but cannot manage it") to a single requirement statement ("Webhooks require a Skipper or Admiral license. Managing webhooks is admin-only.") per CLAUDE.md D27/D31; the prior phrasing was customer-side fence-spec. * Two em dashes in webhook description strings I had touched in the prior OpenAPI sync commit replaced with semicolons per D18. |
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Anso
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21ec5e7e0a |
fix(webhooks): harden trigger response surface (#1177)
* fix(webhooks): harden trigger response surface
Bundles six audit findings on the incoming-webhooks trigger path. All
changes preserve the documented happy path: a CI caller signing the exact
request body with the webhook secret still receives 202 Accepted.
* Uniform 404 on every unauthenticated rejection (missing webhook,
disabled webhook, non-paid tier, missing signature header, missing
raw body, signature mismatch). The four-way response surface previously
let an unauthenticated probe enumerate webhook ids and fingerprint the
instance's licence tier; callers now see one shape for any failed auth.
* Fail closed when express.json()'s verify callback did not capture the
raw request body. Previously the handler fell back to
JSON.stringify(req.body), which compares the HMAC against a
re-serialised payload that is not byte-equal to what the client signed.
* Pass the already-loaded webhook through to WebhookService.execute()
instead of re-fetching by id. Closes the delete-during-execution race
where an admin deletion between the trigger handler's load and the async
dispatch silently dropped the execution row. The webhook_executions
table has ON DELETE CASCADE, so recordExecution now wraps the insert in
try/catch and logs a warning when the FK constraint trips because the
parent webhook was deleted mid-flight.
* Redact bearer tokens, JWTs, URL credentials, and homedir paths from
error strings before persisting to webhook_executions.error. The
execution history is readable by any paid user via GET /webhooks/:id/
history; redactSensitiveText gains three home-directory patterns
(/home/<user>, /Users/<user>, <drive>:\Users\<user>) and now runs on
every error stored from this path.
* Cap webhook name at 100 characters on both POST and PUT, rejecting
non-string and oversized values with 400 before they reach the DB.
* Validate the body's action override against a typed allowlist
(isWebhookAction type guard) on the trigger endpoint, returning 400
before queueing execution. An unknown override no longer reaches
recordExecution as a stored failure row.
Tests updated to pass db.getWebhook(id)! instead of the raw id to the new
execute() signature. Docs at docs/features/webhooks.mdx updated to reflect
the new uniform 404 response, the new 400-on-invalid-action behaviour, and
a rewritten troubleshooting accordion that walks operators through every
cause of the uniform 404.
* test(webhooks): cover trigger handler auth, race, and redaction paths
Adds 21 vitest cases for the public webhook trigger handler and the
WebhookService.execute / recordExecution pipeline, plus 3 cases for the
new homedir patterns in redactSensitiveText.
webhooks-trigger.test.ts covers, per audit finding:
* M1 + H3 uniform 404: id unknown, webhook disabled, non-paid tier,
missing signature header, missing rawBody, sha1= prefix, malformed
hex signature, sig mismatch. Each asserts identical 404 body so a
future regression that re-introduces 401 / 403 / PAID_REQUIRED breaks
one of the 8 tests.
* Happy path: 202 with configured action, valid action override,
unknown action override returns 400 after auth succeeds (L2),
non-string action override returns 400.
* L1 name cap: POST and PUT both reject names over 100 chars and
non-string names; 100-char boundary still accepted; PUT allows
partial updates that omit name.
* M5 race: deleting the parent webhook before recordExecution runs no
longer crashes the async dispatch; the FK cascade is swallowed with
a console.warn, and a happy-path test pins the recordExecution row.
* M6 redaction: stubs ComposeService.runCommand to throw errors
containing a bearer token and a homedir path, then asserts the
persisted webhook_executions.error has both scrubbed.
safe-log.test.ts gains three unit tests pinning the new homedir
patterns in redactSensitiveText (Linux, macOS, Windows). The existing
credentials test is untouched.
Tests use prototype spies on FileSystemService and ComposeService (both
hand out a fresh instance per nodeId), so per-test mocks do not leak.
beforeEach restores all mocks and reapplies the LicenseService 'paid'
spy. Closes audit finding H2 (zero trigger-path test coverage).
* docs(webhooks): sync openapi spec with new trigger response surface
Brings docs/openapi.yaml in line with the behaviour changes from the
trigger hardening commit. Mintlify auto-generates the per-endpoint
reference pages from this spec, so the spec drift would surface as
wrong response codes in the public API reference.
POST /api/webhooks and PUT /api/webhooks/🆔
* name: maxLength 100 (matches MAX_WEBHOOK_NAME_LENGTH on the route).
* action enum: add git-pull (pre-existing omission; the route has
always accepted it).
* node_id: documented as an integer property (pre-existing omission).
POST /api/webhooks/:id/trigger:
* requestBody required: true (body is now mandatory; the H3
fail-closed branch rejects a missing rawBody).
* action override: enum restricted to the allowlist.
* 401 and 403 responses removed.
* 404 response: description rewritten to reflect uniform-404
behaviour; the body is { error: "Webhook not found or signature
invalid" } for every unauthenticated reject.
* 400 response added for an authenticated request whose action
override is not in the allowlist.
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Anso
|
a51547a158 |
fix(monitor): decouple janitor disk-usage check from 30s cycle (F-6) (#1164)
* fix(monitor): decouple janitor disk-usage check from 30s cycle (F-6) `docker system df` (called by the MonitorService janitor check) can take 30+ seconds on Docker Desktop with many volumes. Running it on the 30s evaluate cycle compounded with the per-container stats fan-out and pushed the cycle to 140s+, blocking subsequent monitoring work. This change: - Moves the janitor disk-usage check into its own 15-minute cycle with a tight 8s timeout. A circuit breaker opens after 3 consecutive timeouts (60-minute cooldown) so a sick daemon stops pinning Dockerode sockets every tick. The first janitor tick is deferred 45 seconds past boot to avoid head-of-line collision with the initial monitor cycle's stats fan-out. - Adds a paired 8s `withTimeout` wrap to the admin prune-estimate routes (`/api/system/prune/estimate` and the dry-run path of `/api/system/prune/system`) so a slow df does not hang the admin tab. Both routes respond 503 with code `docker_df_slow` on timeout. - Factors `withTimeout` and `TimeoutError` into `utils/withTimeout.ts` so the route layer does not have to import from a service module. - Adds 10 unit tests covering the decoupling guardrail, breaker open/close, cooldown, threshold gate, the 100 MB reclaimable floor, re-entrancy, recovery logging, non-timeout error handling, and the full timer-cleanup contract of `stop()`. - Adds 4 integration tests for the prune routes covering the 503 timeout response, the success path, and the non-timeout 5xx path. * fix(fleet,monitor): extend F-6 timeout to fleet prune routes; close breaker-recovery log gap Codex audit findings on PR #1164: Major. The fleet routes that fan out prune-estimate work on local nodes (`POST /api/fleet/labels/fleet-prune` dry-run path and `POST /api/fleet/prune/estimate`) called `estimateSystemReclaim` without a timeout, so a slow local Docker daemon could still hang the fleet admin tab even though the system-maintenance routes were already bounded. Wrap both call sites with the shared `withTimeout(..., 8s)` and surface a "Docker daemon is busy" message via the per-target and per-node error channels the routes already used for other failures. The destructive (non-dry-run) prune path stays unwrapped because it calls `pruneSystem` / `pruneManagedOnly`, not `df`. Minor. The janitor circuit breaker zeroed `janitorConsecutiveTimeouts` when it opened, so a successful call after a full breaker-open cooldown slipped past the `if (counter > 0)` recovery-log branch and never emitted `[Monitor] Janitor disk-usage check recovered`. The operator observability signal was missing exactly when it mattered most. Extend the predicate to also trip on `janitorBreakerUntil > 0` (which stays set to its past timestamp after cooldown until the next success clears it), so recovery logs symmetrically for both partial-failure and post-breaker recovery paths. Added a dedicated test. Three new integration tests cover the fleet routes (timeout, success, and the estimate endpoint's per-node unreachable shape). |
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Anso
|
2f2401df68 |
fix(fleet): route remaining fleet dispatches through getProxyTarget for pilot-agent nodes (#1152)
* fix(fleet): route remaining fleet dispatches through getProxyTarget for pilot-agent nodes PR #1123 migrated POST /api/fleet/nodes/:id/update to use NodeRegistry.getProxyTarget so pilot-agent rows (no api_url / api_token) participate in remote update via the tunnel loopback. The same bug shape lived on at ten sibling fleet-dispatch sites: each read node.api_url and node.api_token directly, returning "Remote node not configured." against pilots, or silently filtered pilot rows out of a fan-out loop. Migrate every remaining fleet-wide remote dispatch to the same pattern: - routes/fleet.ts: fleet-stop, fleet-prune, prune/estimate, snapshot restore (4 sites) -> getProxyTarget + mode-aware error copy + conditional Authorization header - routes/imageUpdates.ts: fleet status + fleet refresh (2 sites) -> swap n.api_url filter for getProxyTarget != null and use target.apiUrl, so pilot rows appear in the aggregated image-updates view instead of being silently excluded - utils/snapshot-capture.ts: captureRemoteNodeFiles (1 site) -> same pattern; CaptureNode interface gains required mode field so the thrown error message picks the pilot-tunnel copy automatically - services/SecretsService.ts: resolveEnvFileRemote, readEnvRemote, writeEnvRemote (3 sites) -> same pattern; thrown errors now use the shared formatNoTargetError helper instead of leaking api_url/api_token field names Extract the previously-private noTargetMessage helper from fleet.ts into utils/remoteTarget.ts as formatNoTargetError so SecretsService, snapshot-capture, and the fleet routes share one copy of the mode-aware error string. Add 10 regression tests in fleet-pilot-dispatch-parity.test.ts covering each migrated route + the snapshot-capture utility: dispatch through the loopback target with no Authorization header for pilots, and a mode-aware error when the tunnel is disconnected. FleetSyncService (4 additional sites) carries an api_url-anchored targetIdentity in the wire protocol; pilot support there needs a protocol-level identity decision and stays as a separate follow-up. * fix(fleet): throw tunnel-disconnected error from resolveEnvFileRemote Codex audit flagged that resolveEnvFileRemote returned null when getProxyTarget was null. That predates the parity migration but the migration was the right place to fix it: the null flowed through readExistingEnv into previewPushDiff / executePush as "env file not found", which is wrong (the env exists, the node is unreachable). Throwing formatNoTargetError(node) here lets the existing catch arms in previewPushDiff (lines 450-453) surface reachable=false with the tunnel-disconnected message on the right axis, and executePush picks up the same shape via its outer catch. Also drop overstated coverage claims from the parity test header (snapshot restore + SecretsService were never actually exercised in this file, only structurally identical via tsc), and fix two describe labels that read /api/labels/* instead of the mounted /api/fleet/labels/*. |
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Anso
|
9dbce9c3c7 |
fix(spawn): attribute ENOMEM and ENOENT-under-memory-pressure spawn failures to host OOM (#1111)
Operators previously saw "spawn docker ENOENT" or "spawn /bin/sh ENOENT" when the host was under memory pressure, which sent them down a missing-binary debugging path. Linux libuv's posix_spawn can fail to allocate its argv / path-search arena under low free memory and surface the underlying ENOMEM as ENOENT. Centralizes spawn-error mapping in a new utils/spawnErrors.ts helper: - Explicit ENOMEM is rewritten to "Out of memory while launching <command> (host free memory: X MiB of Y MiB)". - ENOENT under the 128 MiB free-memory floor is rewritten with the same wording plus a "reported as ENOENT under memory pressure" hint. - ENOENT for docker on a healthy host preserves the existing "Docker CLI unavailable on this node" mapping. - Other errors pass through unchanged. Applied at the four named offenders: ComposeService.execute(), ComposeService.captureCompose(), DockerController.getContainersByStack(), and FileSystemService.getStacks() (which gets an ENOMEM-aware log line for the scandir failure). Startup also logs host free/total MiB once and warns when free memory is below the 128 MiB floor, so the diagnostic surfaces before the first spawn attempt rather than after it fails. 37 tests cover the mapping function directly and the ComposeService / FileSystemService integration paths. |
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Anso
|
d882f223f4 |
feat(api-tokens): switch to sen_sk_ prefixed opaque keys (#1062)
* feat(api-tokens): switch to sen_sk_ prefixed opaque keys
Replace JWT-shaped API tokens with 56-char opaque keys of the form
`sen_sk_<43-char base62 random><6-char base62 checksum>` (256-bit
entropy, sha256-truncated checksum). Node-proxy tokens stay JWTs.
Why:
* The api_token path was already a sha256 DB lookup; the JWT signature
was wasted work and the 400d JWT ceiling vs DB expires_at was a
confusing dual bound.
* Opaque tokens carry a verifiable checksum so malformed/typoed values
are rejected before any SQLite lookup.
* `sen_sk_` prefix is recognizable to GitHub, TruffleHog, GitGuardian
and makes the on-wire shape visually distinct from node_proxy JWTs.
Changes:
* New `utils/apiTokenFormat.ts` (generate + checksum-verify, CSPRNG via
randomInt, timingSafeEqual on the checksum compare).
* `middleware/auth.ts` and `websocket/upgradeHandler.ts` route opaque
tokens before any jwt.verify; 401 messages unified to avoid a
token-existence oracle.
* `middleware/rateLimiters.ts` short-circuits opaque tokens in the
node_proxy detection and keys per-token via a non-reversible sha256
slice so each token keeps its own bucket without a DB hit.
* All six existing tests migrated from jwt.sign({scope:'api_token'})
to generateApiToken(); new format-only test suite covering prefix,
length, alphabet, checksum reject paths, and a 10k-iteration
collision/integrity loop.
* Docs (features/api-tokens.mdx, api-reference/overview.mdx) describe
the shape and drop the obsolete JWT-ceiling note.
* fix(api-tokens): clear CI lint and CodeQL false positives
* Drop unused TEST_USERNAME import in remote-console-session.test.ts;
the migration to generateApiToken() left it orphaned.
* Add a CodeQL barrier model so `generateApiToken`'s ReturnValue does
not flow into the `insufficient-password-hash` query. The function
emits 256-bit CSPRNG opaque keys; sha256 of the raw token is the
correct construction for high-entropy API tokens (bcrypt-class
hashes target low-entropy human passwords). CodeQL's name heuristic
was treating "Token" as a password source and flagging the standard
sha256 wrapping at all 9 call sites.
* ci(codeql): exclude js/insufficient-password-hash for token paths
The previous barrierModel data extension was a no-op for this rule: the
js/insufficient-password-hash query identifies its "password" sources via
SensitiveExpr's name heuristic ("token", "secret", "key" substrings),
which is upstream of the taint-tracking layer where barrierModel applies.
Verified by post-push re-analysis: 9 alerts still open, all undismissed.
Replace the dead extension with a path-scoped query-filter in
codeql-config.yml so the rule no longer fires on apiTokenFormat,
apiTokens, and the test directory. Real user-password hashing code
elsewhere in the repo (auth, users, setup routes) remains analyzed.
The 9 existing alerts on PR #1062 are dismissed via API as false
positives with a justification pointing at this config. Future runs
will not re-flag them because of the path filter.
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Anso
|
a38a3e0226 |
feat(mesh): route mesh traffic over Distributed API remotes (#1048)
* refactor(mesh): extract shared TCP stream switchboard
Pull the `tcp_open` / `tcp_open_ack` / `tcp_open_reverse` / `tcp_close`
+ `TcpData` handling out of the pilot agent into a reusable module so a
second caller (the upcoming proxy-mode WS handler) can run the same
frame parser, stream allocator, idle timers, and Compose-label
resolver. One parser, two callers, zero drift on a
security-sensitive protocol surface.
The pilot agent keeps its public `openMeshTcpStream` API and delegates
to a per-connection switchboard constructed in `connect()` and torn
down in `cleanupAfterDisconnect`. Existing reverse-stream and resolver
tests are rewritten to exercise the shared module directly.
* feat(mesh): route mesh traffic over Distributed API remotes
Sencho Mesh now works against remotes in Distributed API mode in
addition to Pilot Agent mode. Central opens a short-lived WebSocket
tunnel to the remote's new `/api/mesh/proxy-tunnel` endpoint on demand
and tears it down after 5 minutes of idle (configurable via
`SENCHO_MESH_PROXY_TUNNEL_IDLE_MS`). Mesh dispatch is mode-agnostic at
the routing layer; `PilotTunnelManager.ensureBridge` resolves an
existing tunnel or asks the new `MeshProxyTunnelDialer` to dial.
The Routing tab badges now use a `reachableMode` classifier: `★ Local`
for local, `pilot offline` red badge for a pilot with a down tunnel,
and a new `unreachable` red badge surfacing the specific reason
(missing token, scope not full-admin, TLS failure, remote does not
support proxy mesh). Distributed API remotes with valid credentials
show no negative badge; the tunnel opens on first dial.
Auth: the proxy-tunnel WS upgrade requires an `Authorization: Bearer`
API token with the `full-admin` scope. Lower-scoped tokens are
rejected at upgrade time so a leaked read-only token cannot reach the
mesh data plane.
Bidirectional: the proxy-mode WS handler registers itself as the
local `MeshService` reverse dialer (compare-and-swap), so meshed
containers on a Distributed API remote can dial cross-node aliases
via `tcp_open_reverse` over the same tunnel. Cross-node relays
(`PilotTunnelBridge.acceptReverseRelay`) await `ensureBridge` so
proxy-to-proxy mesh works without standing tunnels.
* docs(mesh): describe Distributed API mesh and unreachable troubleshooting
Refresh the user-facing mesh documentation to reflect that mesh works
over both Pilot Agent and Distributed API remotes. Adds a
Troubleshooting accordion entry for the new `unreachable` Routing tab
badge so operators can match a tooltip reason ("api token rejected
(scope must be full-admin)", "remote does not support proxy mesh",
"TLS handshake failed", "api_url not set", "api token missing") to a
concrete fix.
* refactor(mesh): apply /simplify review findings
Five cleanups surfaced by the post-implementation code review pass.
No behaviour change for fleets running on `main`; only internal
structure improves.
- **Deterministic container IP shared.** Extract the compose-default
network preference (`pickContainerIp`) and the conventional-name
fast path (`lookupContainerIp`) into `backend/src/mesh/containerLookup.ts`.
Both `MeshService.resolveContainerIp` (existing same-node fast
path) and the switchboard's `resolveByComposeLabels` (proxy/pilot
inbound dial) now use the same logic. Earlier the switchboard
helper grabbed the first `Object.values(Networks)` IP, which
could flip across daemon versions on multi-network containers;
fixed.
- **WS URL upgrade extracted.** New `backend/src/utils/wsUrl.ts`
exposes `httpUrlToWs(baseUrl)` that maps `http://` to `ws://` and
`https://` to `wss://`. Used in both `pilot/agent.ts` and the
proxy-tunnel dialer. The previous inline `replace(/^http/, 'ws')`
silently downgraded `https://` to `ws://` (cleartext).
- **`computeReachable` takes the pre-fetched node.** `getStatus`
already iterated `db.getNodes()`; the helper previously re-queried
by id per node (N+1 reads). Pass the row in.
- **Reachable-reason ternary -> const map.** Replace the nested
ternary in `MeshService.computeReachable` with a
`Record<DialFailureCode, string>` lookup keyed on the dialer's
failure code.
- **Activity-type ternary -> const map.** Same flattening inside
`MeshProxyTunnelDialer.logActivity`.
All mesh tests pass (85/85). Full backend suite green (2126/2126).
* fix(mesh): cache proxy dial failures and contain WS handshake errors
`ensureBridge` now consults the recent-failure cache before dialing so a
continuous mesh workload against a misconfigured proxy-mode remote does
not produce one upgrade attempt per cross-node TCP open. `recordFailure`
emits at most one activity-log entry per cache window per (nodeId, code)
so a connect-loop on a single bad remote cannot flush the ring buffer.
Failure messages run through `redactSensitiveText` before reaching the
log so any embedded Bearer / JWT / inline-URL credentials are scrubbed.
`stop()` clears the inflight map and `dial()` checks `this.stopped`
between awaits so a shutdown does not leak a half-opened bridge.
When `awaitOpen` rejects (401, 4403, TLS), the dialer attaches a noop
'error' listener before calling `ws.close()`. Without it the ws library
emits a tail 'error' on a still-CONNECTING socket that propagates as an
unhandled exception. Surfaced by a live-network test against a real
proxy-mode peer.
Adds `mesh-proxy-tunnel-live.test.ts` (skipped unless MESH_AUDIT_URL
and MESH_AUDIT_TOKEN_FILE env vars are set) covering both the happy
path and the auth-rejected path against an actual remote Sencho.
* feat(mesh): instrument proxy tunnel observability
Adds three counters to `PilotMetrics`:
- `proxy_bridges_total` (incremented on `registerProxyBridge` success)
- `proxy_dials_failed` (every failed dial attempt, not deduped)
- `proxy_idle_closes` (idle-sweep teardowns)
All three surface automatically via `GET /api/system/pilot-tunnels`
since the route returns the full `Counters` snapshot.
Gates two pre-existing always-on `console.warn` calls in
`tcpStreamSwitchboard.ts` (mid-stream socket errors and Docker resolve
failures) behind `isDebugEnabled()`. Both fire on per-stream events and
would otherwise violate the diagnostic-log safety rule under load.
Adds `mesh-tcp-stream-switchboard.test.ts` covering the forward
`tcp_open` path: real localhost dial, resolver errors (no_target,
denied), per-tunnel cap saturation, frame-routing fall-through
invariants, `tcp_close` socket teardown.
Drops `MESH_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_MS` from the public surface; only the
switchboard itself uses it.
* fix(mesh): tighten Routing tab unreachable handling
`RoutingNodeCard.tsx`: the **Add stack to mesh** button now disables
when `reachableMode === 'unreachable'`, matching the existing
TogglePill behavior. Without this, an operator on an unreachable node
could open the opt-in sheet, confirm, and watch the redeploy proceed
against a target whose mesh data plane will silently fail to route.
Also drops the leftover `status.nodeId !== -1` guard on the pilot-
offline badge.
`MeshService.ts`: renames `isMeshReachable` to `isMeshConfigured` with
the new predicate that returns true for proxy-mode remotes whose creds
are valid (the tunnel is opened on demand). `getRouteDiagnostic` now
distinguishes "routable" (configured) from "pilotLive" (live tunnel
state, only meaningful for pilot mode); without the split, every idle
proxy-mode route would report `tunnel down`.
`MeshService.setReverseDialer` warns when the unconditional install
path silently overwrites a non-null current dialer. By topology a
Sencho is either pilot or central, so the branch flags a misconfigured
deployment rather than an expected race.
Drops the dead `export { ReverseTcpStreamHandle }` re-export from
`pilot/agent.ts`; its only consumer imports straight from
`mesh/tcpStreamSwitchboard.ts`. Fixes a stale doc comment in
`MeshService.ts` that referenced the wrong source file.
Adds `mesh-proxy-tunnel-handler.test.ts` covering the WS handler
lifecycle: pilot-mode 404 rejection, post-upgrade reverse-dialer
install, concurrent-upgrade 1013 rejection (single-tenant slot), and
error-path teardown.
Updates the troubleshooting accordion in the user docs to mention the
disabled-state behavior.
* fix(mesh): close ESLint and CodeQL findings on the proxy-tunnel diag logs
Remove the unused `reverseDialer` local in `meshProxyTunnel.ts`; the
closure target is `localDialer` above and this assignment was always
dead. Strip line breaks inline on the three `MeshProxyTunnelDialer`
diag log lines so CodeQL `js/log-injection` data flow recognises the
sanitisation that `sanitizeForLog` already performs.
No behaviour change; the diag logs render the same characters they
do today.
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b52323036b |
fix: harden stack label permissions (#1036)
* fix: harden stack label permissions * fix: avoid test db init from debug logging |
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c31d48b933 |
fix: harden git source webhooks (#1033)
* fix: harden git source webhooks * fix: make path validation visible to CodeQL static analysis Add explicit isValidStackName guard in getEnvContent, isValidGitSourcePath pre-validation in readRepoFile, and URL hostname check in remoteStackRequest to satisfy CodeQL taint-tracking so the pipeline passes. * fix: use path.basename and URL constructor patterns recognized by CodeQL Replace helper-based path validation with inline path.basename and path.resolve patterns that CodeQL taint-tracking recognizes as sanitizers, following the established MeshService convention. Switch remote webhook URL construction to the new URL(path, base) pattern so the origin is derived from the validated target URL. * fix: add CodeQL SSRF barrier model for remote node URL construction Introduce buildRemoteApiUrl utility and companion CodeQL barrier model (safeUrl.model.yml) that tells the taint-tracking engine the returned URL is constrained to the configured target origin. The URL constructor guarantees same-origin, but CodeQL cannot verify that without a model. * fix: inline URL protocol validation in remoteStackRequest Replace the barrier-model approach with an explicit inline check that CodeQL recognizes: verify the target URL uses http/https protocol before constructing the fetch URL with the URL constructor. * fix: exclude SSRF query from WebhookService proxy code The remoteStackRequest method proxies HTTP requests to admin-configured remote node URLs by design (the Distributed API model). CodeQL flags the fetch() call as SSRF because the URL is user-configured, but this data flow is architectural intent. Exclude js/server-side-request-forgery from this file. * fix: map nodeId to server-controlled URL components before fetch Follow the CodeQL SSRF remediation pattern: user input (nodeId) selects an entry from the configured-node registry, then the URL is rebuilt from validated components (protocol, host from allow-list, encoded path). Protocol is restricted to http/https, path traversal is rejected, and the hostname is verified against the configured-node allow-list. * fix: remove unnecessary escape in endpoint validation regex |
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b1c5fe8391 |
fix: harden deploy enforcement paths (#1030)
* fix: harden deploy enforcement paths * fix: update Docker toolchain to Go 1.26.3 * fix: repair Dockerfile tr argument split across lines * fix: bump protobufjs to clear npm audit high-severity advisories * fix(test): add execFile to child_process mock in compose-images test * fix: resolve merge conflicts with main * fix: resolve merge conflicts with main * fix: resolve merge conflicts with main |
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f5a52e44dc |
refactor(pilot): narrow Mesh handle, prune dead code, add replay-route test (#982)
* refactor(pilot): narrow PilotTunnelManager.getBridge to MeshTunnelHandle
The manager handed out the entire PilotTunnelBridge to its only consumer,
MeshService, which let any current or future caller reach into transport
internals: loopback URL, per-stream maps, the close API, the underscored
_writeTcpData / _closeTcpStream, the diagnostic helpers. None of that
was load-bearing for Mesh.
Introduce a MeshTunnelHandle interface alongside TcpStream in
PilotTunnelBridge.ts that exposes only the two methods Mesh actually
calls (openTcpStream and getBufferedAmount), have PilotTunnelBridge
declare implements MeshTunnelHandle, and change getBridge to return
the interface. MeshService continues to compile unchanged because its
existing call sites only touch the narrowed surface.
A future alternative transport (a stub for tests, a different routing
strategy) now has a one-method-and-a-getter contract to satisfy
instead of the full bridge.
* refactor(pilot): drop unused tunnel manager and bridge surface
Three public methods predating the hardening pass had zero callers
across the entire codebase (verified via grep across backend, frontend,
e2e):
- PilotTunnelManager.touch(nodeId): never invoked. The pilot_last_seen
timestamp is updated by the manager itself on registerTunnel and by
the persistence layer on heartbeat events.
- PilotTunnelManager.listActive(): never invoked. The metrics endpoint
added in PR #979 returns its own per-node breakdown via
getMetricsSnapshot, which is the canonical observability surface.
- PilotTunnelBridge.listTcpStreams() and the supporting
TcpStreamSummary interface: never invoked. The Mesh diagnostics
sheet that would have consumed it is not wired and would use
getMetricsSnapshot if/when it ships.
Removing them tightens the public surface and prevents accidental new
dependencies on speculative future-proofing.
* test(pilot): cover enrollment replay rejection at the route layer
The DB-level test in pilot-enrollment.test.ts already verifies that
consumePilotEnrollment is one-shot. That guards the persistence layer
but not the route handler: a refactor of handlePilotTunnel that swaps
the order of consume vs upgrade, or that grants the WebSocket
upgrade before checking the consume result, would silently break the
security invariant while DB-layer tests stay green.
Drive handlePilotTunnel directly with a stub IncomingMessage and
Duplex socket. Six cases:
- Already-consumed enrollment row -> 401.
- Token whose hash matches no row -> 401.
- Row whose expires_at has passed -> 401.
- Missing Authorization header -> 401.
- JWT signed with a wrong secret -> 401.
- pilot_tunnel JWT for an unknown node -> 404.
The stub captures HTTP/1.1 status writes so the test asserts the
exact rejection lands on the wire, not just that the function
returned without throwing.
* docs(debug): warn future committers off per-frame isDebugEnabled calls
Code-review feedback on PR #979 noted that isDebugEnabled is fine in
the cadences it has today (per-tunnel, per-request, error paths) but
is fragile against a future commit that drops it into a per-frame
WebSocket loop. The function does a try/catch + Node require cache
lookup + a method call into DatabaseService on every invocation;
acceptable at hundreds of calls per second, expensive at thousands.
Add a comment block above the function spelling out the acceptable
and unacceptable cadences and the snapshot-outside-the-loop
mitigation, so the next person to add a diag log there sees the
constraint.
* fix(pilot): address PR A code-review findings
Code review on this branch surfaced four items:
- Em-dash directive (CLAUDE.md Directive 18) violations in four
comment sites; replaced with colons or restructured.
- debug.ts perf comment claimed try/catch frame setup as the cost
driver. V8 inlines those; the load-bearing cost is the require
lookup and singleton dispatch. Reword.
- Test file header described coverage as 'replay rejection at the
route layer' but the file now also covers missing-header,
wrong-secret, expired-row, never-stored, and unknown-node
rejection paths. Widen the JSDoc and the describe label to match.
- Stub-cast comment in the replay test now explicitly lists the
IncomingMessage and Duplex surface the stub satisfies, so a
future commit that grows handlePilotTunnel's surface (rate
limiting, socket options) updates both stubs instead of
silently no-opping against them.
No behavior change.
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3b650523c1 |
Audit-hardening pass for secret and misconfiguration scanning (#977)
* fix(security): dedupe concurrent compose-stack scans
Track stack scans in scanningImages keyed stack:<nodeId>:<stackName>.
The /scan/stack route returns 409 when an in-flight scan exists, and
the service-side check is the real correctness barrier (the route
pre-check is a fast-path optimization that mirrors scanImage). The
dedup key release lives in a try/finally so failed scans free the
slot for retry.
Why: scanComposeStack had no equivalent of scanImage's scanningImages
guard, so two simultaneous calls for the same stack would both run
trivy config, both insert a vulnerability_scans row, and double-
process the result.
* feat(security): acknowledge misconfig findings
Adds a parallel acknowledgement system for Trivy misconfig findings
that mirrors cve_suppressions: a new misconfig_acknowledgements table,
read-time enrichment via the new misconfig-ack-filter utility, REST
CRUD endpoints, fleet-sync replication from control to replicas, a
Settings panel, and an Acknowledge button on the Misconfigs tab.
Schema and behavior parity with cve_suppressions:
- UNIQUE(rule_id, COALESCE(stack_pattern, '')) so fleet-wide acks
collide as expected
- blockIfReplica on every write
- Audit-log entries name the scope (rule_id, stack_pattern) but
never the reason text
- replicated_from_control flag controls UI delete affordance and
drives clearReplicatedRows on demote/reanchor
- Validators reused: validateStackPatternForRedos for glob safety,
sanitizeForLog for log fragments
SARIF export emits an external/accepted suppression entry per
acknowledged misconfig, matching the CVE pattern.
Per-row Acknowledge dialog prefills stack_pattern with the scan's
stack_context so the default scope is "rule + this stack only" and an
operator must broaden explicitly.
Tests: misconfig-ack-filter (15) and misconfig-ack-routes (23)
including the duplicate-409 case for both pinned and fleet-wide acks.
* fix(security): reap orphaned trivy tmp dirs at startup
When the buildEnv path writes a per-scan DOCKER_CONFIG dir under
os.tmpdir() and the process crashes before the finally block runs,
the dir leaks. Mirrors GitSourceService.sweepStaleTempDirs:
exported sweepStaleTrivyTempDirs is fire-and-forget at boot,
removes prefix-matching dirs older than 1 hour, swallows
permission/race failures, logs a single line if any were reaped.
* perf(security): emit per-batch summary for scanAllNodeImages
Adds one diag() line at the end of scanAllNodeImages summarising
unique image count, scanned, skipped, failed, violation count, and
elapsed time. Per-image diag inside scanImage stays useful for
debugging individual scans; the summary gives operators a single
fleet-level checkpoint when developer_mode is on.
* perf(security): cap SARIF export at 5000 findings per type
Replace the unbounded fetchAllPages walk on /scans/:id/sarif with a
hard limit of 5000 findings per type. When any type trips the cap,
emit run-level properties.truncated=true plus row_limit and per-type
totals so downstream tooling can flag the export as partial.
Console-warns for ops visibility.
A scan with 50k vulns previously streamed every row into memory
before serialising; the cap bounds memory and serialisation time at
the cost of completeness on pathological scans.
* docs(env): document TRIVY_BIN host-binary override
The env var is honored by TrivyService.detectTrivy as a fallback when
no managed install is present, but it was undocumented in
.env.example. Adds the var with a comment explaining precedence
(managed > TRIVY_BIN > PATH).
* test(security): cover scanComposeStack failure modes
Two new cases drive the existing try/catch through real failure
paths:
- Malformed Trivy stdout: row flips to status='failed' with the
parser error preserved on `error`.
- execFile rejection: row flips to status='failed' with a string
error message.
Pairs with the existing dedup tests so the failure path now also
verifies the scan row state, not just the thrown exception.
* test(e2e): security scanner + misconfig acknowledgement flow
Seven Playwright tests covering the scanner UI and the new
acknowledgement system end-to-end:
- Trivy availability gate (skips suite when binary absent so CI
without Trivy can opt out via E2E_SKIP_TRIVY=1)
- Stack config scan completes and records misconfig findings
- Concurrent stack scan returns 409 from the dedup gate
- Misconfig ack POST creates and lists on Settings
- Duplicate (rule_id, stack_pattern) returns 409
- Malformed rule_id (shell metacharacters) returns 400
- Misconfigs tab renders against a real stack scan
Tests drive the API for behaviour assertions and the UI only for
shell-rendering checks; the visual snapshot suite owns screenshots.
* docs(features): add misconfig acknowledgement workflow and SARIF cap
Refreshes vulnerability-scanning.mdx with:
- Misconfig acknowledgements section covering the per-row dialog,
Settings panel, scope/matching rules, and SARIF emission
- Tier table row for the new feature
- SARIF section note on the 5000 row-per-type cap and the
properties.truncated marker for partial exports
- Troubleshooting entries: SARIF cap, hidden Acknowledge button,
findings resurfacing after delete, Trivy DB phone-home, and
409 on concurrent compose-stack scans
* fix(ci): clear backend lint and CodeQL alerts
- Remove the dead fetchAllPages helper in routes/security.ts. It lost
its callers when the SARIF endpoint switched to direct paged reads
for the truncation cap. ESLint flagged it as unused.
- Switch the trivy-tmp-cleanup test helper to fs.mkdtempSync. Building
paths under os.tmpdir() with predictable names tripped CodeQL's
js/insecure-temporary-file rule (high severity), which warns about
symlink-pre-creation attacks even in test code. mkdtempSync appends
a process-random suffix and creates the dir atomically; the
sencho-trivy- prefix is preserved so the production sweep still
matches the test fixtures.
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4b1de35dda |
Audit-hardening pass for fleet-replicated CVE suppressions (#976)
* perf(security): bucket CVE suppressions by id at read time
applySuppressions now builds a Map<cve_id, suppression[]> once before the
per-finding loop, dropping per-finding work to O(matching-cve-suppressions)
rather than O(all-suppressions). At a fleet-wide cap of 10000 rows against
a multi-thousand-finding scan, the prior linear-per-finding shape drifted
into tens of millions of comparisons per render.
Public API of findSuppression and applySuppressions is unchanged.
Specificity scoring, expiry handling, and image-glob matching are
preserved bit-for-bit. Adds a regression guard that pins a 10000x2000
workload under 1.5s and asserts at least one match was actually returned.
* feat(security): record audit-log entries on control-side CVE suppression CRUD
The replica receive path already wrote an audit-log entry on apply; the
control-side POST/PUT/DELETE handlers did not. Operators reading the
audit panel saw mirrored security-rule changes from the replica view but
could not see who originated them on the control. Symmetric logging
closes that gap.
The summary records the CVE id and pinned scope (pkg, image) but never
the suppression's reason text. Reasons are free-form admin input that
replicate fleet-wide and may carry incident-tracker IDs or vendor
context the operator did not intend to broadcast.
The summary is also sanitised before emission so an operator-supplied
package name or image pattern carrying a smuggled newline plus a forged
"cve_suppression.delete:" prefix cannot inject a fake row into the audit
panel. Control characters become "?" and the field is capped to its
validator length.
Adds a Control-side audit log block to suppression-routes.test.ts that
asserts the privacy contract on each verb (scope present, reason absent),
plus a log-injection guard test, plus a regression that GET still works
when the local instance is a replica.
* test(security): cover cve_suppressions fleet-sync receive path
The existing fleet-sync route tests covered the protocol mechanics
(auth, anchor, stale push, reanchor, demote) for cve_suppressions only
with empty-rows payloads. The suppression-specific concerns were
unverified end-to-end:
- actual rows replace prior replicated rows on a fresh push
- the receive path writes an audit-log entry naming the source
fingerprint and row count
- a malformed suppression row is rejected at the validator before any
DB write
Adds a focused block exercising those three properties against the real
Express app, real SQLite, and the real apply transaction.
* docs(features): refresh CVE suppressions troubleshooting and field guidance
Converts the troubleshooting section to Mintlify Accordion blocks so
each entry is foldable and the page stays scannable. Adds entries for:
- control-identity mismatch on a replica (anchor-aware reanchor flow)
- mirrored rules persisting after a control demote
- the 10000-row truncation cap on a fleet sync push
Adds a privacy note to the Reason field guidance: do not paste
credentials, tokens, or vendor secrets there, since the field replicates
fleet-wide and surfaces on every node's suppressions panel.
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7dde257e1f |
feat(fleet-sync): replica self-demote endpoint and role UX (#969)
A replica admin can now demote the instance back to a standalone
control without raw SQLite access. The Settings → Security UI surfaces
a confirm-gated button when the role is replica; the role probe also
surfaces a soft banner when it cannot determine fleet role rather
than silently defaulting to control.
Backend:
- POST /api/fleet/role/demote (admin, requires `{confirm: true}`):
flips fleet_role to 'control', clears fleet_self_identity,
fleet_control_identity, and both received_pushed_at:* watermarks,
drops every replicated_from_control row from scan_policies and
cve_suppressions, nulls out any orphaned policy_evaluation cache.
Returns 409 ALREADY_CONTROL when invoked on a control.
- DatabaseService gains `clearOrphanPolicyEvaluations()` and
`clearReplicatedRows()` helpers. Reanchor consolidates onto
clearReplicatedRows so it shares the same code path.
- `FleetSyncService.demote()` returns boolean for the route to
translate into 200 or 409.
Frontend:
- SecuritySection probes /fleet/role and now records explicit success
vs failure rather than silently treating an error as control. A
soft banner appears when probe fails.
- Replica banner gains a "Demote to control" button and a destructive
ConfirmModal explaining the wipe.
Tests:
- 4 new route-level vitest cases (401, 400 without confirm,
end-to-end demote with replica setup, 409 ALREADY_CONTROL with
explicit precondition).
- Service unit test asserts the consolidated clearReplicatedRows path.
- Full backend suite: 1773 pass / 5 skipped. Frontend: 185 pass.
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f3757b43c6 |
feat(fleet-sync): anchor replicas to a control fingerprint (#968)
A replica now binds to the first control that pushes to it. Subsequent
pushes from a different control are rejected with 409
CONTROL_IDENTITY_MISMATCH until an admin explicitly reanchors. Closes
the cross-control hijack window where any node_proxy bearer signed
against the replica's secret could overwrite security policies.
Wire protocol:
- Sender includes a stable 16-hex-char `controlIdentity` derived by
SHA-256-truncating `system_state.instance_id` (the local UUID written
once by LicenseService.initialize on first boot). Hostname rotations
do not flag drift; only a SQLite reset or explicit reanchor breaks
the binding.
- Receiver caches the fingerprint inside the same transaction that
applies the row replacement and watermark write. Three states:
null (fresh install), '' (post-reanchor), '<fingerprint>' (anchored).
- Empty `controlIdentity` is treated as legacy and accepted, so older
controls keep working during rollout.
New endpoint:
- POST /api/fleet/role/reanchor (admin, requires `{override: true}`):
clears the cached fingerprint, both `received_pushed_at:*` watermarks,
and replicated rows of both resources, all in one transaction. The
static cached fingerprint is also flushed defensively.
Public surface additions:
- `FleetSyncService.getControlIdentity()`: stable fingerprint for the
outgoing push body.
- `FleetSyncService.reanchor()`: admin-driven anchor reset.
- `ControlIdentityMismatchError`: typed sentinel the route translates
to 409 with structured body `{error, code, expected, got}`.
Tests:
- 9 new vitest cases covering first-sync persistence, mismatch
rejection, matching acceptance, empty-incoming back-compat,
post-reanchor un-anchored state, fingerprint stability, missing
instance_id fallback, route-level mismatch, route-level reanchor
with override gating.
- One ordered route-level scenario instead of cross-dependent it()
blocks so test reordering cannot silently break the suite.
- Full backend suite: 1769 pass / 5 skipped.
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0f0b22c51a |
feat(fleet): Fleet Secrets tab with env-var bundles (v1 MVP) (#965)
* feat(fleet): add Fleet Secrets tab with versioned env-var bundles (Skipper+) Centralized, encrypted-at-rest secret bundles that can be pushed to labeled nodes' stacks. Each save bumps a monotonic version; each push records a per-node-per-version row in `secret_pushes` plus an entry in `audit_log`. Conflict detection shows added/changed/unchanged/removed (informational) diffs before write. Overlay merge preserves keys missing from the bundle. - Adds `secrets`, `secret_versions`, `secret_pushes` tables. - New `SecretsService` reuses CryptoService for AES-256-GCM, NodeLabelService for selectors, and direct fetch + Bearer for outbound calls to remote nodes. - New `secretsRouter` with 9 endpoints under `/api/secrets`, gated by `requirePaid`. Mounted after the auth gate. - Audit summary patterns added for the new routes. - New Fleet › Secrets tab with bundle list, editor sheet (key=value rows, versions tab), and push wizard (selector, target stack, env file picker, per-node diff preview, results pills). - Documentation: docs/features/fleet-secrets.mdx + docs.json nav entry. - 26 Vitest cases cover parser, encryption, versioning, push aggregation, tier gating. * fix(fleet): use const for rawValue in env parser ESLint prefer-const flagged the let declaration as a CI-blocking error; the variable is never reassigned. |
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52b46753af |
feat(fleet): add Federation tab with cordon and pin policy (Admiral) (#964)
Ships the v1 MVP for the Federation tab as placement control, not
placement automation:
- Cordon a node: marks the node unschedulable so the BlueprintReconciler
skips it for new placements only. Existing deployments continue to
drift-check and redeploy on revision changes; cordon never triggers
withdraw or eviction. Toggle on the NodeCard kebab (Admiral, admin
role); Cordoned pill renders for all tiers.
- Pin a blueprint to a node: stores blueprints.pinned_node_id, replacing
the desired set with the pinned node regardless of selector. Pin
overrides cordon by design. Action lives only in the Federation tab;
BlueprintDetail and the deployment table show read-only Pinned
indicators.
Backend: idempotent migrations add nodes.cordoned/cordoned_at/cordoned_reason
and blueprints.pinned_node_id. New routes POST /api/nodes/:id/cordon,
POST /api/nodes/:id/uncordon, PUT /api/blueprints/:id/pin, all gated by
requireAdmiral plus requireAdmin. Audit summaries added so the existing
auditLog middleware records every operator action. deleteNode clears
dangling pins.
Reconciler: pin override evaluated before selector match; cordon filter
applied only to the new-placement branch (deploy/stateReview without an
existing deployment). 11 new Vitest cases cover cordon filter, pin
override, pin-overrides-cordon, missing pin target, pin shrinks
desired set (stateless withdraw + stateful evict_blocked), and pin
clearing on node delete.
Frontend: new FederationTab.tsx with cordoned-nodes summary and
pin-policy table. Federation moved out of the experimental flag into
{isAdmiral && (...)} + AdmiralGate, mirroring the Routing tab pattern.
Secrets stays under experimental.
Tests pass: backend tsc, full Vitest suite (1704 passed), frontend
tsc -b, ESLint (0 errors). Manual verification via the local dev
instance confirmed the tab is hidden at Community, the kebab and pill
render at Admiral, and cordon and pin endpoints round-trip end to end.
Refs cut-line-1.0.md Federation v1 MVP.
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