Commit Graph

35 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Anso 6527bc971b feat(security): gate deploys on exploitation risk, not just severity (#1432)
Scan-policy deploy gates can now block on a known-exploited CVE (CISA KEV)
and on a fixable Critical/High finding, in addition to an optional severity
threshold. New policies default risk-first (KEV and fixable on, severity off);
existing policies keep their severity-only behavior. CVSS stays captured for
context but is never the sole basis for a block, and a finding whose
exploitability cannot be confirmed is treated as risky rather than safe
(incomplete scan detail fails closed on KEV/fixable inputs).

The decision logic is shared between the pre-deploy gate and the informational
post-scan banner via a pure helper, so the two never disagree. Block messages
and the block dialog now name the conditions an image matched. Backend and
frontend gates move together, the new inputs replicate across the fleet, and a
blocking policy with no active input is rejected on both sides.
2026-06-24 20:05:17 -04:00
Anso 2eafee3594 fix(networking): treat host-network services as host-exposed in summaries (#1430)
The exposure summaries derived a stack's exposure solely from the declared
published-port list, so a service running with network_mode: host (which
publishes every container port on the host but declares no ports:) was
under-reported as less exposed than it actually is.

Capture network_mode in the lightweight dependency parser, add an
isHostNetwork predicate, and treat a host-network service as exposed and
publishing across the Fleet networking summary, the Stack Dossier export, and
the Networking panel, matching how the Compose Doctor already flags host
networking.
2026-06-24 19:50:45 -04:00
Anso b9d8e9f490 feat(stacks): browse and edit mounted volume files in the explorer (#1403)
* feat(stacks): browse and edit mounted volume files in the explorer

Reposition the stack file explorer around runtime configuration access:
discover a stack's declared mounts and expose each as a safe, stack-scoped
file root. The explorer opens on a Volumes group (bind mounts and named
Docker volumes) by default, with the stack source directory as a secondary
group, on a "Files & Volumes" tab.

- Discover roots from the rendered effective compose model; resolve named
  volumes to their Docker name and browse/edit them through the hardened
  helper container, with bind mounts handled directly when reachable.
- Re-derive the allowed roots server-side on every file operation and match
  the client root id against them, so a request can never address a path the
  stack did not declare. Block dangerous host mounts and binds that overlap
  Sencho's managed directories; reject writes to read-only mounts.
- Thread an optional root id through the existing file endpoints and an
  opaque, parseable optimistic-concurrency token through read, conflict,
  and write, for both filesystem and helper backends.
- Keep compose and env file protection on the stack source root only.

* fix(stacks): theme the Files & Volumes root switcher

Replace the raw native select in the file-root switcher with the design
system Select component. The native control did not honour the dark theme,
so the panel rendered white with unreadable text. The themed Select gives a
dark popover with grouped Volumes / Stack source labels and disabled items.

* fix(stacks): contain the bind-root probe and de-taint the file-op error log

Gate the volume-root bind probe's realpath/stat behind a compose-base
containment check (mirroring the storage host-path probe) so they never run
on an unvalidated host path; a source outside the compose dir is unreachable
in the containerized deployment anyway and is reported non-accessible without
touching the filesystem. Log the helper-backed file-op failure through a
constant format string with sanitized arguments instead of an interpolated
template literal.

* fix(stacks): inline the bind-probe containment guard at the fs sinks

The wrapped containment predicate was not recognized as a path barrier, so
the bind probe's realpath/stat still flagged as uncontrolled-data-in-path.
Inline the path.resolve + startsWith check directly at each filesystem sink
(and re-check the resolved canonical before stat, so a within-base symlink
that resolves outside the compose dir is also rejected).

* fix(stacks): harden file-root lifecycle, upload race, and helper errors

Address review findings on the Files & Volumes feature:

- Invalidate the file-root allowlist on stack create/delete/import/from-git
  (wire StackFileRootsService.invalidateNode into invalidateNodeCaches), so a
  stack deleted and recreated under the same name cannot serve the old stack's
  roots from the 15s cache.
- Use the atomic exclusive write for a non-overwrite upload so a file created
  by another writer after the existence check is not silently clobbered.
- Let the helper's real cd errno through and map permission failures to 403
  consistently across list/stat/read/write/mkdir/delete/pathKind, instead of
  reporting EACCES as 404/500; pathKind no longer reports a permission-denied
  parent as absent.
- Document the realpath-then-open TOCTOU as a known, pre-existing limitation of
  every file op (O_NOFOLLOW is not viable because config volumes legitimately
  contain symlinks); the bind root is contained to the compose dir and the op
  requires stack:edit.
- Docs: drop a missing screenshot reference and correct the protected-file
  delete behavior (stack-root compose/.env cannot be deleted via the explorer).
2026-06-21 18:16:20 -04:00
Anso 57a0856ffc feat(stacks): per-stack environment inventory and secret-safe guardrails (#1397)
* feat(stacks): per-stack environment inventory and secret-safe guardrails

Add an Environment tab to Stack Anatomy that derives a per-stack inventory
of environment variables from the compose files and env files. Each variable
shows its source, whether Compose interpolates it or injects it into a
container, and a status (present, missing, unused, duplicate, or shell-only),
plus likely-secret classification. The inventory works from variable names
only: a value is never read, returned, or logged, and a likely secret shows
presence only. A copy env checklist action exports names and status without
values.

Surface a missing required env_file as a Compose Doctor preflight finding,
and add an opt-in node setting that refuses a deploy or update when a
required ${VAR:?...} variable is unset or empty, before any backup, pull, or
up runs. Default off.

The Environment tab is capability-gated so it hides on older remote nodes.

* fix(stacks): harden env-file reader against a stat-then-open race

Open the env-file handle first and fstat the open handle instead of
stat-ing the path before opening, removing the check-then-use window in
readEnvFileKeys. Use a secure mkdtemp directory for the out-of-base test
path instead of a predictable name in the temp root.

* fix(stacks): resolve nested env_file paths per compose file, reconcile inline keys per service

Resolve each env_file relative to the directory of the compose file that
declared it, so a nested multi-file Git override (infra/prod.yml referencing
./prod.env) lands next to that file instead of the stack root. The root
compose file is unaffected, since its directory is the stack directory.

Reconcile inline environment provenance per service, so a key an override
removed from one service's effective env is not labeled compose-inline just
because another service injects the same name from a different source.
2026-06-20 11:58:42 -04:00
Anso d26ab58189 feat(fleet): cross-node bulk label assign with authoritative label discovery (#1389)
* feat(fleet): cross-node bulk label assign with authoritative label discovery

Make Fleet Actions > Bulk label assign work across the fleet. Pick a stack
label that exists anywhere in the fleet, select stacks on one or more nodes,
and the control orchestrates: each target node resolves the label by name,
creating it with the same name and color if missing, then adds it to the
selected stacks while preserving their existing labels. The local node runs
in process; each remote runs its own admin-only local-assign receiver over
the node proxy. Per-node failures (unknown node, no proxy target, unreachable,
mixed-version remote) degrade that node only and are reported per node in the
result. Assignment writes use a transactional INSERT OR IGNORE so the
add-preserve path is idempotent and race-free.

Also make the shared fleet label discovery authoritative: suggestions,
match-preview, and the fleet-stop remote leg now read each node's labels live
over the proxy instead of the control database, which does not mirror remote
labels. A propagated label therefore appears in, and is stoppable by,
Stop-by-label across the fleet, and unreachable nodes are surfaced rather than
silently dropped.

Fleet Actions runs against the unfiltered node list, so overview filters no
longer narrow its scope. The previous node-scoped, replace-by-id bulk-assign
endpoint is removed.

* fix(fleet): treat malformed remote label responses as per-node failures

A 200 response from a remote node whose body is not the expected shape was
treated as a benign empty result, so a malformed remote could read as a clean
zero-stack assign or a "matched, nothing to stop" no-op and even surface a
success toast. Validate the wire shape in the bulk-assign and fleet-stop remote
legs and in the authoritative label discovery fan-out; on a malformed body,
report the node as a per-node failure with the error attributed to its stacks
instead of silently dropping it.

* chore: drop accidentally committed temp file
2026-06-20 11:52:28 -04:00
Anso 2821e87d3f fix: gate fleet stop-by-label on a resolved preview and validate remote stop responses (#1392)
* fix: gate fleet stop-by-label on a resolved preview and validate remote stop responses

The destructive "Stop fleet by label" action could run before its blast
radius was known, and a malformed remote response could be rendered as a
successful zero-stack stop. Both are release blockers for the fleet
stop-by-label flow.

Gate the "Stop fleet" button on a resolved blast radius: the live
match-preview resolving to at least one matching stack, or a dry run of the
current label when the preview endpoint is unavailable. Carry the resolved
node and stack list into the confirm modal so the operator confirms against
the concrete targets rather than a label name alone. Editing the label
invalidates a prior dry-run snapshot, so a stale blast radius cannot
re-enable the action.

Validate the remote local-stop 200 body before trusting it. A body that is
not the local-stop contract (missing matched flag, non-array results, or a
malformed result element) now fails that node with a clear error, consistent
with the non-ok and unreachable paths, instead of defaulting matched to true
and results to empty.

* fix: ignore stale fleet stop-by-label preview responses after the label changes

The debounced match-preview callback set the preview state unconditionally,
so a request issued for one label that resolved after the operator switched
to another label would mark the preview ready with the old label's blast
radius. That re-enabled the destructive Stop and showed stale nodes/stacks
in the confirm modal for a label that no longer matched them.

Guard the in-flight request with a per-run cancelled flag flipped in the
effect cleanup, so a response for a label that is no longer current cannot
set the preview. This mirrors the cancellation pattern already used by the
suggestions effect. Add a test that holds a preview request in-flight,
switches the label, then resolves the stale response and asserts Stop stays
disabled and the old targets do not leak.
2026-06-18 23:29:20 -04:00
Anso cb58cc423f fix(fleet): resolve Stop-by-label stack labels across all nodes (#1382)
* fix(fleet): resolve Stop-by-label stack labels across all nodes

The Fleet Actions "Stop by label" card only ever saw the control node's own
stack labels. The stack-label routes are proxied, so each node stores its
labels in its own database and the control holds no mirror for remote nodes.
The suggestions, match-preview, and fleet-stop endpoints all read that
nonexistent mirror, so remote-only labels were invisible and remote stacks
were skipped before the remote was ever asked.

Make all three authoritative across the fleet with a new
collectFleetLabelSummaries helper: the local node reads its own database,
and each remote is queried live through its labels and label-assignments
endpoints over the proxy, with fail-closed parsing and per-node
reachability. fleet-stop drops the mirror pre-check and always calls each
reachable remote's local-stop receiver, reporting unreachable nodes at the
node level so they never block the reachable ones.

The picker now surfaces remote-only labels, aggregates shared names once
with combined counts and the carrying node names, and flags incomplete
coverage when a node is unreachable. The preview groups matches per node,
lists unreachable nodes separately, and distinguishes no matching stacks
from "label exists but no stacks" from "remote unavailable".

* fix(fleet): harden Stop-by-label card against malformed responses

Guard the match-preview and fleet-stop response bodies so a malformed but
200 reply degrades instead of crashing or misreporting. match-preview now
validates the per-node shape before rendering (the preview reads it outside
any try/catch) and logs a malformed body; fleet-stop distinguishes a
non-array results body (a server bug, now logged and surfaced as an
unexpected-response error) from a genuine empty fleet, and guards per-node
stackResults.

Docs: an unreachable or errored remote is reported once per node, not as a
per-stack error row.
2026-06-17 13:25:12 -04:00
Anso f23b7e1bac feat: ordered multi-file Compose for Git sources (#1380)
* feat: ordered multi-file Compose for Git sources

Extend Git sources to deploy an ordered list of compose files merged with
docker compose -f base.yaml -f override.yaml ..., plus an optional project
directory.

- Pick and reorder compose files from the repository tree (drag to reorder on
  desktop, up/down arrows on phones); manual path entry is also supported.
- The ordered set drives every stack-scoped compose command (deploy, update,
  start/stop/restart/down, image scans, Compose Doctor) and the container
  lookup, so a service or image declared only in an override is handled too.
- Runtime keys off the materialized set, not the saved configuration: saving a
  source does not change deploy args until the pull is applied, and apply
  materializes from the pending snapshot rather than live config.
- The project directory is passed as --project-directory, with -p <stack>
  pinning the Compose project so container labels stay stable.
- The Mesh override is layered last; single-file sources are byte-identical to
  before, and existing rows keep working via the single-path fallback.

Docs cover the picker, ordering, project directory, and the new troubleshooting
and limitations (referenced files are not materialized; the dependency graph,
drift, and networking views read the primary file).

* fix: harden multi-file Git source (hash, unlink, collisions, node id)

- hashContent folds ordered file CONTENTS (not paths) so a clean multi-file
  stack is not flagged as locally edited: create/apply hash the fetched files
  (repo paths) while pull hashes the on-disk files (materialized paths), which
  previously disagreed and showed a false "local edits detected".
- Block unlinking a multi-file or project-directory Git source (409): the deploy
  spec lives on the source row, so removing it would silently revert deploys to
  root compose.yaml. Single-file sources still unlink.
- Reject materialized-path collisions in the selection validator: an additional
  file equal to or nested under compose.yaml, an ancestor/descendant overlap
  between selected files, and a project directory nested under a compose file
  (previously a 500 at materialization).
- DockerController.getContainersByStack uses the controller's node compose dir
  and passes its node id to the authored prefix, instead of the process default.

* fix: CI failures on multi-file Git source (test crash, aria query, path barrier)

- GitSourceFields no longer crashes when repoUrl/branch are falsy: the canBrowse
  trim() is optional-chained, so a reusable field component tolerates partial
  props. Fixes the apply-binding panel test, which feeds a minimal source object.
- GitSourcePanel tests query the footer Remove button by its exact name, so the
  picker's per-file "Remove <path>" buttons no longer collide with the broad
  /remove/i match (the test intent, footer Remove present/absent, is unchanged).
- validateCompose uses an inline resolve + startsWith barrier at the context-dir
  mkdir sink (CodeQL does not credit the wrapped isPathWithinBase helper),
  clearing the js/path-injection alert. The containment check is equivalent and
  contextDir is also validated upstream.

* test: update Git source E2E spec for the multi-file compose picker

The compose-file picker replaced the single #git-source-path input and added
per-file Remove buttons, so the E2E spec drove selectors that no longer exist:

- Drop the redundant compose.yaml fills (the picker defaults to compose.yaml).
- Select the footer Remove button by exact name so the picker's per-file
  "Remove <path>" buttons no longer make the locator ambiguous.
- Set a custom compose path through the picker (add via the manual input, press
  Enter, then remove the default compose.yaml).

* test: match the footer Remove button with an exact Playwright name

Playwright's getByRole name option is a substring match by default, so
{ name: 'Remove' } also matched the picker's "Remove <path>" buttons. Require an
exact match so only the footer Remove button is selected.
2026-06-17 13:24:55 -04:00
Anso 77f1611971 feat: Compose Network Inspector and exposure intent guard (#1360)
* feat: add Compose Network Inspector facts engine

Render a stack's authored effective model and pair it with the live
Docker snapshot to derive per-stack networking facts: project networks
with external and internal flags, service-to-network membership and
aliases, published ports with host-binding scope, network_mode, and
extra_hosts, plus runtime drift (runtime-only attachments, foreign
networks, and declared-but-unused or missing networks).

Extend the effective-model parser with service network membership,
extra_hosts, and label keys (key names only, never values), and add a
key-space normalized network model with adapters from both the rendered
model and the raw declared compose so the Inspector and drift share one
comparison. Expose GET /api/stacks/:stackName/networking: advisory and
read-only, it renders the authored model only and never returns or logs
raw stderr, env values, or label values.

* feat: store and edit per-stack and per-service exposure intent

Add a stack_exposure_intent table (intent values constrained by a CHECK,
unique per node, stack, and service) with DAO methods to read, upsert,
clear one row, and clear all rows for a stack. The classification is
stored independently of the generated networking facts so a later
mismatch stays detectable; service rows are kept separately from the
stack-level row (service '').

Expose GET and PUT /api/stacks/:stackName/exposure: GET requires read
access, PUT requires edit access and validates the intent against the
allowed set. Sending intent null clears that row, returning the scope to
unset so a service inherits the stack intent again. Intent rows are
cleared when the stack is deleted and when the owning node is removed,
so a later same-named stack never picks up stale classification.

* feat: add exposure-aware Compose Doctor findings

Feed the Compose Doctor's effective-model context with the stored
exposure intent (resolved into a stack-level value plus per-service
overrides) and the dossier's documented access-URL ports, read fail-soft
so a metadata read error skips these checks rather than failing the
preflight. Add five deterministic findings on top of that context:

- a service classified internal or same-node that publishes a host port
  (same-node tolerates a loopback bind),
- a sensitive database or admin image published on all interfaces,
- a port-publishing stack with no exposure intent set,
- a published port not reflected in the documented access URLs,
- reverse-proxy labels with no documented URL or reverse-proxy intent.

The rules stay pure functions over the preflight context; the registry
completeness test pins the new rule set.

* feat: detect compose network drift in the drift ledger

Extend the spatial drift engine with two network-level findings: a
running container attached to a stack-owned or foreign network that
compose does not declare (one finding per service), and a declared
network that no running service uses or that is absent from the runtime
(one stack-level finding, every network named by its resolved runtime
name). The comparison reuses the same helper the Network Inspector uses,
so the two surfaces never disagree.

Network drift runs only when the stack has running containers and the
runtime is reachable, preserving the existing missing-runtime,
parse-error, and unreachable behavior. The findings persist through the
existing drift ledger and surface on the Drift tab, which now labels the
two new kinds.

* feat: link a Docker network back to its owning stack

Add a cross-component open-stack event and make the owning-stack badge on
a managed network in Resources a link: clicking it loads that stack on
its node and opens the editor, reusing the existing fleet navigation. A
latest-ref keeps the window listener current without re-subscribing each
render. Image and volume badges are unchanged; only a managed network
opts in via the new optional handler.

* feat: add the Networking tab to the stack detail panel

Add a capability-gated Networking tab that reads the per-stack networking
facts and exposure intent. It shows the project networks (with external,
internal, and created-by-stack flags), per-service network membership and
aliases, published ports with their host-binding scope, network_mode and
extra_hosts, and runtime drift, degrading to the declared model when the
runtime is unavailable. Users can classify the stack and each service
(internal, LAN, reverse proxy, public, and so on) or clear a row to
inherit; the controls are read-only when the user cannot edit, and a
broken exposure response never tears down the facts view.

A new compose-networking capability is added to both registries so older
nodes hide the tab, and the tab cross-links to the Doctor for the deploy
and security findings.

* docs: document the Compose Networking tab

Add a feature page covering the Networking tab: the network facts,
published ports and host bindings, the exposure-intent classification
and inheritance, the exposure-aware Doctor findings, runtime drift, and
a troubleshooting section. Register it in the docs navigation next to
Compose Doctor.

* feat: add a redacted network summary to the Stack Dossier export

Append a network exposure section to the dossier Markdown: the stack and
per-service exposure intents, the networks with their external and
internal flags, and each service's published ports with their binding
scope. It carries only names, intents, port numbers, and scope, never an
env value or a label value.

The summary is fetched only when the user exports (copy or download), so
opening the panel costs nothing, and it degrades to omitting the section
when the data is unavailable. The whole-fleet dossier export collects the
same summary per stack, rethrowing the unauthorized sentinel like the
sibling loaders.

* feat: add a Fleet networking filter for exposure and drift

Add a per-node networking summary that classifies a node's stacks as
exposed (a host port published beyond loopback), unknown-exposure
(publishes ports with no exposure intent set), or network-drift. It
reads each stack's compose with the light dependency parser and one
Docker snapshot, so it stays cheap across a node's full stack set, and
it skips drift when the runtime is unreachable rather than inventing it.

Serve it node-locally at GET /api/networking/summary, and aggregate it
fleet-wide at GET /api/fleet/networking-summary: the hub computes its own
summary in-process and reaches each remote through its node-local route,
degrading an unreachable or older node to a skip. Because the aggregate
lives under the proxy-exempt /api/fleet prefix it is never wrongly
proxied. The Fleet overview gains a networking filter chip backed by that
aggregate, fetched fail-soft and detached so it never gates the grid.

* fix: spin the Networking refresh button while it reloads

The refresh button silently refetched the same data, so a click gave no
feedback. Track a refreshing state and spin the icon while the load is in
flight, disabling the button, matching the Compose Doctor preflight
button.

* fix: apply effective per-service exposure intent to unclassified checks

The "unclassified exposure" decisions only consulted the stack-level intent
row, so a service classified directly (with no stack row) was still reported
as unclassified, and a service explicitly marked unknown over a classified
stack was missed.

Both the exposure-unclassified preflight rule and the networking summary's
unknown-exposure bucket now resolve the effective intent per publishing
service (service row overrides stack row), matching the precedence already
used by the exposure-internal-published rule.

* fix: resolve drift network names via the compose top-level name

When a compose file sets a top-level name:, Docker prefixes resource names
with that project name instead of the stack directory. The light dependency
parser dropped name:, so network-drift normalization compared runtime
networks against directory-prefixed names and reported false
network-undeclared / network-missing findings.

Carry the parsed project name through DeclaredCompose and use it when
normalizing declared networks for drift, while still filtering containers by
the stack directory.
2026-06-12 02:15:11 -04:00
Anso 421177e4a6 feat(stacks): add compose-vs-runtime drift detection (#1329)
* feat(stacks): add compose-vs-runtime drift engine

Add a read-only engine that compares a stack's on-disk compose model
against the live Docker runtime and reports where the two diverge.

GET /api/stacks/:stackName/drift returns a per-stack report with a
status (in-sync, drifted, missing-runtime, unreachable) and typed,
service-scoped findings: a declared service with no running container,
a running container not declared in compose, an image mismatch, and a
published-port mismatch. The report is computed at request time with no
persistence and is available on every tier.

The check reuses the existing compose parser and Docker dependency
snapshot; the compose parser now also captures each service's declared
image. Boundaries fail closed: an unreadable compose file reports
drifted and an unreachable Docker daemon reports unreachable, never a
false in-sync.

* fix(stacks): keep drift hasContainers accurate on compose parse error

assembleStackDrift hardcoded hasContainers: false on the parse-error
path, contradicting the field's contract when the runtime actually has
running containers. Compute it once from the container set and reuse it
across all return paths.

Also add a route test that exercises the successful 200 path for an
existing stack on the Community tier (stubbing only the Docker boundary),
so a tier gate or handler regression after the existence check is caught.

* feat(stacks): add a drift detection tab to the stack view

Surface the compose-vs-runtime drift report on the per-stack Anatomy
panel as a read-only Drift tab. It shows the stack's status (in sync,
drifted, not running, unreachable) and, when drifted, the specific
service-scoped reasons with the declared and running values side by
side. A re-check action reruns the comparison.

The tab lives in the shared anatomy panel, so it appears on both the
desktop stack view and the mobile stack detail. Available on every tier.

* fix(stacks): sanitize the logged error in the drift report builder

The compose-read and Docker-snapshot catch blocks logged the raw error
object, whose message can embed the user-controlled stack path (e.g. an
ENOENT path). Log the error through the existing sanitizer so a crafted
stack name cannot forge log lines, matching the pattern used elsewhere
in the stacks router.
2026-06-07 15:48:04 -04:00
Anso af4083175c feat(fleet): add read-only dependency map tab (#1324)
* feat(fleet): add read-only dependency map tab

Add a fleet-wide Dependencies tab to Fleet view that maps how stacks,
services, networks, volumes, and ports relate, with flags for missing
dependencies, port conflicts, orphaned resources, and cross-stack shared
resources. Read-only; filterable by stack, node, and flag; collapsed by
default with a list-view fallback at scale.

The graph is derived at request time from Docker and compose metadata, so
no new table or persisted state is introduced. A per-node graph endpoint
feeds a hub aggregation endpoint that fans out across the fleet and
degrades gracefully, surfacing unreachable or unparseable nodes inline
while the rest of the map still renders.

* fix(fleet): harden dependency map flag detection and remote merge

Address review findings on the dependency map:
- Port-conflict detection now does pairwise host-scope overlap, so an
  unrelated bind on the same port and protocol but a different specific host
  IP is no longer flagged, and the flag lands on the exact scoped port node.
- A running service's depends_on target is only considered satisfied when it
  is actually running, so a crashed (exited) dependency is surfaced while a
  deliberately stopped stack stays quiet.
- Declared external networks and volumes are reported missing when they do
  not exist on the host instead of being assumed present.
- The hub deep-validates each remote node-graph payload before merging, so a
  reachable-but-malformed remote degrades to a single node error rather than
  failing the whole fleet map, and the validation failure is logged.
- Searching or filtering on a network, volume, or port now also reveals the
  services that claim it and their stacks.
2026-06-06 11:18:36 -04:00
Anso c6d1631afe feat(recovery): add safe-mode recovery surface and emergency CLI (#1286)
* feat(recovery): add safe-mode recovery surface and emergency CLI

Add a read-only Recovery tab under Settings (admin-only) backed by a new
GET /api/diagnostics endpoint reporting app version, database integrity,
encryption-key status, Docker reachability, account and SSO counts, and
non-secret configuration. The endpoint loads without Docker or live metrics
so it stays available when the dashboard does not, requires a genuine admin
session, and builds its config block from a non-secret allowlist so no
credentials are ever exposed.

Expand the emergency command-line toolkit beyond the two-factor reset with
seven host-level commands: reset-password, create-emergency-admin,
clear-sessions, disable-sso, diagnostics, validate-db, and backup-data. Each
prints its result, exits with a meaningful status code, and writes an audit
entry where it changes state.

Document the toolkit in a new operator guide and link it from the recovery
and two-factor pages.

* feat(recovery): download the emergency command reference as a text file

The recovery commands are needed exactly when the dashboard is unreachable,
so reading them only in-app is a chicken-and-egg problem. Add a Download
button to the command-line section that saves the full
`docker compose exec sencho ...` reference as a text file, letting operators
keep it on hand before they need it. Reuses a shared download helper with the
existing diagnostics export.

* fix(recovery): harden diagnostics, backup, and emergency-admin against edge cases

Address findings from an independent review of the recovery toolkit:

- DiagnosticsService now degrades instead of throwing when a queried table is
  missing or corrupt: each read falls back and is folded into database.ok, so a
  broken database reports "problem detected" rather than failing the whole
  endpoint or showing a misleading healthy state with zeroed counts.
- backup-data refuses a destination that resolves to the live database, which
  would otherwise report success while producing no separate copy.
- create-emergency-admin now applies the same username rule as the user-
  management route, extracted to a shared helper so both stay in sync.

Adds tests for a missing read table, a malformed emergency-admin username, and
the backup same-target rejection.
2026-06-02 16:11:24 -04:00
Anso 06b25262cc feat(stacks): guided first stack import flow (#1285)
* feat(stacks): add guided first stack import flow

Add an Import mode to the Create Stack dialog and a zero-stacks empty
state so a new user who already has compose files on disk can land their
first stack without reading the docs first.

A read-only scan of the compose directory (GET /api/stacks/import/scan)
lists the compose files it finds with a dry preview of each file's
services, ports, volumes, and env files. Each result is labelled by
placement: already a stack, loose at the root of the compose directory,
or one folder too deep, with the exact path to move misplaced files to.
The scan never writes, moves, or changes any files.

Manual stack creation (Empty, From Git, From Docker Run) is unchanged.

* fix(stacks): read import-scan candidates via a single file handle

Open the compose file once and stat plus read on the same descriptor so
the size check and the read observe the same inode, instead of resolving
the path twice (stat then readFile), which is a time-of-check/time-of-use
race. Mirrors the existing handle-based readers in FileSystemService.

* fix(stacks): confine import scan to the compose dir and refine the empty state

Harden the read-only import scan:
- Resolve symlinks and confirm the real target stays inside the compose
  directory before reading a candidate, and reject non-regular files, so a
  symlinked compose file or parent cannot expose a file outside the compose
  directory through the preview (matches resolveSafeStackPath).
- Read at most the stat-reported size (bounded by the 1 MiB cap) from the open
  handle, so a file that grows after the size check cannot exceed the cap.
- Log when the compose directory or a subdirectory cannot be read, so an access
  failure is not silently reported as "no compose files found".

Only show the first-run "No stacks yet" prompt when no filter chip is active, so
a filter that matches nothing is not mistaken for an empty fleet.
2026-06-02 16:10:05 -04:00
Anso 65a69d9ecc fix(nodes): never send stored node tokens to clients (#1281)
Node read endpoints now return a client-safe projection that omits the
stored api_token and exposes a has_token boolean instead, so a node's
long-lived proxy credential is never serialized to a browser or API
token client. The token stays encrypted at rest and is read server-side
only by the components that need it (the remote proxy, the connection
test, and the mesh dialer).

The edit form opens the API Token field blank, and a blank value keeps
the existing credential, so saving an edit without retyping the token no
longer clears it; a non-empty value rotates it. The backend enforces the
same rule defensively.

Node management actions (add, edit, delete, test connection, generate
node token) are gated in the UI to match their server-side permission
checks, so operators no longer see an action the API would reject. The
test-connection route also gains the missing server-side permission and
token-scope guards.

Also validate the x-node-id header and fall back to the default node for
malformed values instead of an obscure 404, and return 400 (not 500)
when deleting the default node.
2026-06-02 10:26:31 -04:00
Anso 9fb4ccccff fix(fleet-secrets): restrict bundle management to admin hub sessions (#1274)
* fix(fleet-secrets): restrict bundle management to admin hub sessions

Fleet Secrets exposes decrypted environment-variable values and writes
credentials across the fleet, so every route now requires an admin role,
runs only on the instance you are signed into, and rejects long-lived API
tokens:

- Add an admin-role check to all secrets routes; the frontend Secrets tab
  renders only for admin users so the affordance matches the backend gate.
- Add /api/secrets/ to the hub-only path list so a request carrying a
  remote node id cannot be proxied to read another node's decrypted values.
- Reject API tokens on every secrets route (browser admin sessions only),
  matching how registry credentials are handled.

Also adds lifecycle and developer-mode diagnostic logging (never the secret
values) and tests covering the admin boundary on every endpoint, API-token
rejection, hub-only enforcement, and diagnostic gating.

* fix(fleet-secrets): require a signed-in user session for all secrets routes

The earlier API-token rejection only blocked opaque API tokens. node_proxy
and pilot_tunnel JWTs are mapped to an admin role by the auth middleware
without an API-token scope, so they still passed the admin gate and could
read decrypted bundles via GET /api/secrets/:id.

Replace the API-token check with requireUserSession, which rejects API tokens
and node_proxy / pilot_tunnel machine credentials (userId 0) on every secrets
route, returning SESSION_REQUIRED. The admin role is still enforced after.

Tests now assert SESSION_REQUIRED for a full-admin API token across all nine
routes and for node_proxy and pilot_tunnel JWTs.

* test(fleet-secrets): mint the rejection-test token via the real endpoint

The machine-credential test reconstructed an API token by sha256-hashing a
raw key inline. That duplicated a hashing sink that CodeQL's
js/insufficient-password-hash query flags (a false positive for a 256-bit
random token, but a new occurrence in the diff). Create the token through
POST /api/api-tokens instead, so the hashing stays in the production path
and the test carries none of its own. Behavior and coverage are unchanged.
2026-06-01 19:47:06 -04:00
Anso 7e0cffa376 fix(fleet-actions): stop-by-label works on Community remote nodes (#1270)
* fix(fleet-actions): stop-by-label works on Community remote nodes

Fleet-stop's remote leg fanned out to POST /api/labels/:id/action, which
is gated to Skipper/Admiral, so on a Community fleet the control node
stopped its own stacks but every remote node returned 403. Fleet-stop
itself is admin-only and available on every license, so the remote leg
contradicted the feature's own gate.

Extract the label-match plus bulk-stop logic into a shared
runLocalLabelStop helper and add an admin-only, every-license
POST /api/fleet-actions/labels/local-stop receiver. The control now fans
out to that receiver, so remote stacks stop on every tier. Each node runs
under its own per-node bulk lock, so a fleet-stop and a per-label action
still serialize cleanly instead of double-stopping containers.

Also degrade the control's own leg per-node instead of failing the whole
fan-out when its filesystem read throws, and gate fleet-stop and
fleet-prune diagnostics behind developer_mode.

Tests: local-stop auth, tier, validation, and behavior; a remote-leg
routing guard that asserts the fan-out targets local-stop and never the
paid route; local-leg graceful degradation; and the three Fleet Action
card UIs.

* fix(fleet-actions): honor the remote stop receiver's matched flag

The control reached the remote leg only because its own mirror had the
label, then hardcoded matched:true and trusted results without guarding
its shape. A mirror-skewed control (mirror has the label, remote does
not) then showed a remote mismatch as "matched, 0 stacks" instead of
"no matching label", and a malformed 200 body could flow a non-array
into the per-stack renderers.

Honor the remote's own matched flag and coerce results to an array when
the body is malformed. Add regression tests for the matched:false skew
case and the non-array results case.
2026-06-01 14:18:44 -04:00
Anso 18762fa74b fix(registries): keep registry endpoints local to each instance (#1267)
Registry credentials are stored and resolved per instance, and the UI
only ever calls registry endpoints with localOnly. The endpoints were
not on the hub-only proxy list, so a scripted request carrying an
x-node-id for a remote node would be forwarded by the remote proxy,
carrying a plaintext registry secret to (or reading stored credentials
from) the remote instance.

Add /api/registries/ to HUB_ONLY_PREFIXES so a remote-targeted registry
request is rejected with 403 before the proxy can forward it, matching
the existing defense-in-depth for the audit log, schedules, and the
global logs feed. Add regression tests for the collection, a sub-path,
and the local pass-through. Correct a stale 409 reference in the guard
comments and test header to the 403 the guard actually returns.
2026-06-01 13:16:56 -04:00
Anso 7d4e61625f fix(notifications): harden alert dispatch crash-safety and redact webhook secrets in logs (#1255)
* fix(notifications): harden alert dispatch crash-safety and redact webhook secrets in logs

Make NotificationService.dispatchAlert never reject so the many
fire-and-forget callers (monitors, event streams, policy and image-update
paths) cannot trigger an unhandledRejection on an unhealthy database. The
whole dispatch body now sits inside a guard covering node resolution, the
history insert, channel-table reads, and the WebSocket broadcast; a
failure logs and drops the notification instead of crashing the process.
An inner guard still splits the write-success and write-failure metrics.

Also:
- Redact webhook URLs in diagnostic logs via a new maskWebhookUrl helper;
  Discord/Slack/custom webhook URLs embed their token in the path, so only
  the origin is safe to emit.
- Add error logging to four notification-history route handlers that
  previously swallowed database errors silently before returning 500.
- Snapshot the subscriber set before broadcasting so a close/error handler
  firing mid-send cannot mutate the set during iteration.
- Sanitize the admin-supplied route name in dispatch log lines.

Adds tests for dispatch crash-safety (write failure, post-write routing
failure, broadcast send failure), the success-path write metric, webhook
URL masking, and history-route error logging.

* fix(notifications): sanitize route name and patterns in create logs

Apply sanitizeForLog to the admin-supplied route name and stack patterns
in the route-creation log lines, matching the dispatch-site sanitization
and closing the remaining log-injection path on this feature.

Also extend tests: userinfo-stripping in maskWebhookUrl, subscriber-set
snapshot behavior under an unsubscribe-during-send, and error logging on
the mark-read, delete-one, and clear-all notification-history handlers.
2026-05-29 21:09:57 -04:00
Anso 69edb0dcbb fix(observability): gate global logs to admins, scope to managed containers, harden SSE (#1254)
* fix(observability): gate global logs to admins, scope to managed containers, harden SSE

Make the Logs feed an administrator view enforced on both sides (requireAdmin on
the /api/logs/global poll and SSE routes; the Logs nav item plus a redirect guard
on the frontend), and scope the feed to Sencho-managed containers only via a
shared isManagedByComposeDir helper that /stats now reuses.

Harden the SSE stream: a stateful frame demuxer that survives chunk boundaries so
a Docker frame split across reads is reassembled instead of dropped or garbled; a
per-stream error listener so one broken follow stream cannot crash the event loop
(it posts a single degraded notice and keeps the others alive); a cap on
concurrent follow streams with a truncation notice; a bounded initial tail; and
backpressure that pauses the source streams when the client is slow and resumes on
drain. Bound the polling snapshot's per-container fan-out with a concurrency limit.

Add process-local, in-memory log-stream counters exposed at the admin-only
/api/system/log-stream-metrics endpoint (active connections, lines streamed,
attach and frame errors). Collapse the view to the local hub and remove the dead
remote-node handling.

* fix(observability): close remote-proxy bypass of the global-logs admin gate

The logs feed's requireAdmin lives in the local route handler, which the remote
proxy skips when forwarding a request whose nodeId targets a remote node. A hub
user could therefore request /api/logs/global*, /api/logs/global/stream, or
/api/system/log-stream-metrics with x-node-id (or ?nodeId= for the SSE transport)
pointing at a remote node and have it served as the node-proxy admin on the far
side, sidestepping the gate entirely.

Add these paths to HUB_ONLY_PREFIXES so hubOnlyGuard rejects a remote nodeId with
403 before the proxy runs, matching the existing protection on audit-log,
scheduled-tasks, and notification-routes. Add regression tests covering the
collection path, the SSE sub-path (both the x-node-id header and the ?nodeId=
query transport), and the stream-metrics endpoint.
2026-05-29 21:09:20 -04:00
Anso 2d56ea958a fix(stack-activity): per-stack history integrity, attribution, sanitization (#1228)
* fix(stack-activity): per-stack history integrity, attribution, sanitization

Address the Stack Activity audit findings (PR 1 of 2):

- Per-stack history integrity: drop the per-insert 100-row prune in
  addNotificationHistory that evicted quieter stacks' history whenever
  another stack got chatty. Periodic cleanupOldNotifications now caps
  per (node, stack) at 500 rows and per-node unattached system events
  at 1000 rows, on top of the existing 30-day retention. Signature
  takes an options bag and returns a per-stage summary so MonitorService
  can log what actually ran each cycle.

- Actor attribution: thread req.user?.username through every
  notifyActionFailure call site and add synthetic actors at service
  emit sites (system:autoheal, system:scheduler, system:image-update,
  system:docker-events, system:blueprint, system:monitor, system:policy).
  The timeline renders system actors as "via <Label>" so an autoheal
  redeploy is no longer indistinguishable from a user redeploy.

- Message sanitization: new sanitizeNotificationMessage at
  NotificationService.dispatchAlert strips KEY=VALUE pairs whose key
  ends in TOKEN/KEY/PASSWORD/SECRET/CREDENTIALS/AUTH, scrubs HTTP basic
  auth in URLs and Bearer tokens, collapses COMPOSE_DIR paths, and
  truncates to 1000 chars. Applied to the stored history and to every
  downstream Discord/Slack/webhook channel. The ImageUpdateService
  recovery-path direct DB write also runs through the sanitizer.

- Composite pagination cursor: getStackActivity now accepts a
  (timestamp, id) cursor (?before=&beforeId=). The legacy timestamp-only
  form silently dropped events when a single compose up emitted many
  events sharing one millisecond. Route rejects beforeId without before.

- Frontend hardening: distinct error state with retry button (initial
  fetch failure no longer renders as the genuine empty state), strict
  positive-integer parsing on cursor params, overrequest-by-1 pagination
  so the last page does not leave a dead "Load more" click, runtime
  guard on liveEvents merge that validates the level union, per-minute
  day-bucket recompute so an open panel does not stay on "Today" past
  midnight.

No tier, role, or capability gate touched. Route permission gate
remains stack:read on the named stack.

* fix(stack-activity): sanitizer covers lowercase env vars and per-node compose dir

External review surfaced two leak paths in the message sanitizer:

- The sensitive-key regex was uppercase-only. Compose env names are
  conventionally uppercase but lowercase forms (db_password, jwt_secret,
  github_token) are valid and do leak through the same Docker and
  compose-parse error paths. Make the regex case-insensitive and tighten
  it to also catch bare TOKEN= / KEY= / PASSWORD= without a prefix word,
  while still leaving BYPASS, COMPASS, and similar non-secret keys alone.

- The compose-dir path collapse only read process.env.COMPOSE_DIR, but
  the real resolution chain is node.compose_dir (per-node DB override)
  -> process.env.COMPOSE_DIR -> /app/compose. A node with a custom
  compose_dir could still leak absolute paths into stored history and
  downstream channels. Route both the dispatchAlert call and the
  ImageUpdateService recovery-path direct write through
  NodeRegistry.getInstance().getComposeDir(localNodeId) so the
  collapse covers every resolution outcome.

Tests now assert lowercase keys are redacted and that BYPASS-style
non-secrets stay intact in both cases. notification-routing mock
extended to stub the new getComposeDir call.

* chore(stack-activity): a11y roles, visibility-aware tick, live-disconnect signal

Close three small follow-ups on the per-stack activity timeline:

- A11y: each day-group gets role="list" and each event row gets
  role="listitem" so screen readers traverse the timeline as a list
  instead of a wall of text. The day-group container also carries an
  aria-label naming the bucket.

- Visibility-aware day-bucket tick: the 60s setInterval that re-derives
  Today/Yesterday/Earlier now short-circuits when document.hidden, so a
  backgrounded panel does not re-render every minute for no visible
  effect.

- Live-disconnect signal: useNotifications dispatches a
  sencho:notifications-connection custom event on WebSocket open and
  close. The timeline listens and, when explicitly disconnected, shows
  a one-line "Live updates offline; reconnecting…" hint above the list.
  The sidebar ticker already surfaces fleet-wide connection state; this
  adds an in-context cue for users who are focused on a single stack.

Stack-name case normalization was considered and rejected: stack names
are case-permissive per the isValidStackName validator, and lowercasing
on read or write would silently rename or hide a user's "MyApp" stack.

* ci(stack-activity): drop unnecessary escape in URL_BASIC_AUTH regex

ESLint no-useless-escape errored on \- inside the character class
[a-zA-Z0-9+.\-] at notificationMessage.ts:14. Move the dash to the
end of the class so it's an unambiguous literal and the escape is no
longer required. Behavior is identical; sanitizer tests still pass.

* revert(stack-activity): drop unvalidated E2E spec from this PR

The spec was committed without ever running against a real Docker
daemon, then failed in CI when it ran for the first time: deploy
returned 200 but no notification appeared on the activity endpoint
within the polling window, suggesting either a deploy-notification
race or a node-id resolution mismatch in the CI environment.

Backend unit tests (route + composite cursor + sanitizer) and
frontend component tests cover the same logic. The E2E spec will
land in a dedicated follow-up once it has been authored against a
working CI environment.
2026-05-25 21:09:00 -04:00
Anso d727a55a5f feat(stacks): surface post-deploy scan attempt status (#1198)
triggerPostDeployScan was fire-and-forget. When Trivy was missing on a
node, when the registry refused the digest lookup, or when a single
image scan threw, the failure went to console.error and the user
never learned. Open the security tab later, see stale data, no
indicator that the scan even tried.

Backend:
- New stack_scan_attempts table (node_id, stack_name, status,
  attempted_at, error_message). One row per stack; latest attempt
  overwrites the previous one.
- DatabaseService gains recordStackScanAttempt /
  getStackScanAttempt / clearStackScanAttempts. Status is one of
  'ok' | 'partial' | 'failed' | 'skipped'.
- triggerPostDeployScan in helpers/policyGate.ts now records every
  exit path: 'skipped' when Trivy is unavailable or no images to
  scan; 'failed' when container enumeration or all images fail;
  'partial' when some images scan and others fail; 'ok' on full
  success.
- New GET /api/stacks/:name/scan-status returns { status,
  attemptedAt, errorMessage } or { status: null } when never tried.
- DELETE /:stackName cleanup chain now clears the row alongside
  the existing update-status / auto-update cleanups.

Frontend:
- StackAnatomyPanel fetches /scan-status on stackName change.
- Renders a small warning strip below the update banner when
  status !== 'ok' (failed / partial / skipped). Hidden when status
  is 'ok' or unknown (never attempted). Title attribute carries
  the full error message for hover inspection.

Cross-feature note: the audit doc flagged this as M-6 with a
coordination note for the pending Security feature audit. The
schema kept intentionally narrow (one row per stack, simple
status enum) so the Security audit can extend it (richer history,
per-image-row breakdown, etc.) without a destructive migration.

Resolves M-6 from the stack-management audit.
2026-05-24 15:44:12 -04:00
Anso 8d1304b0df fix(hub-only-guard): reject hub-only collection paths without trailing slash (#1142)
HUB_ONLY_PREFIXES entries are stored with a trailing slash, but
isHubOnlyPath() used a bare startsWith(). The collection paths
/api/scheduled-tasks, /api/audit-log, and /api/notification-routes
(no trailing slash) silently fell through the guard and could be
forwarded by the remote proxy, bypassing the hub-only boundary on
three path families.

The matcher now accepts the exact prefix (slash stripped) in addition
to the slash-suffixed prefix. Adds three regression tests covering
the bare-collection-path 403 for each hub-only family. Confirmed the
new tests fail without the matcher change and pass with it.
2026-05-21 16:42:18 -04:00
Anso 8dd0fce621 fix(fleet): show capabilities, version, metrics, and stacks for pilot-agent nodes (#1044)
When a pilot-agent node was the active node, the UI rendered "does not
advertise this capability" across most tabs, a perpetual "Update
available" badge, and a Fleet card body with blank CPU/RAM/Disk and "No
stacks found". The cause was central-side aggregators in /api/fleet/* and
/api/nodes/:id/meta only fanning out to proxy-mode remotes via
node.api_url + node.api_token, which are null for pilot-agent.

Route every affected aggregator through NodeRegistry.getProxyTarget so
the loopback URL backed by the active pilot tunnel is used uniformly:

- /api/nodes/:id/meta and /api/fleet/update-status fetch via the new
  NodeRegistry.fetchMetaForNode helper (resolves the target, delegates
  to fetchRemoteMeta, returns the shared OFFLINE_META on null).
- fetchRemoteNodeOverview, /api/fleet/configuration,
  /api/fleet/node/:nodeId/stacks, and the stack-containers drilldown
  fetch through target.apiUrl with conditional Authorization.
- fetchRemoteMeta omits the Authorization header when the token is empty
  (pilot-agent loopback) instead of sending a malformed Bearer string.
- Pilot-agent rows preserve pilot_last_seen and mirror it into
  last_successful_contact so the Fleet "last seen" cell renders the
  recent tunnel timestamp during a brief reconnect.

Pilot-mode capability filter excludes capabilities whose central-pilot
path is not yet wired (host-console, self-update). Without this, the
Console tab would surface for an Admiral pilot session and click
through to central's host because the WS upgrade handler still gates
on api_url + api_token. Filtered capabilities are removed at boot via
applyPilotModeCapabilityFilter when SENCHO_MODE=pilot.

Cache invalidation on tunnel-up: the meta cache for a reconnecting
pilot is dropped so the next request rebuilds capabilities and version
through the live bridge instead of waiting for the 3-minute TTL. The
namespace constant moves to helpers/cacheInvalidation.ts alongside the
new invalidateRemoteMetaCache helper.

Husky commit-msg hook: add the missing shebang and a .gitattributes
rule pinning .husky/* to LF line endings so commits do not fail with
"Exec format error" on Windows shells where autocrlf=true converts the
hook to CRLF.

Tests cover Authorization-header behavior, pilot-mode filter idempotency,
fetchMetaForNode dispatch (offline target, pilot-agent loopback,
proxy-mode), and the four affected fleet routes for pilot-agent both
when the tunnel is up and when it is down.
2026-05-14 10:21:08 -04:00
Anso b1c5fe8391 fix: harden deploy enforcement paths (#1030)
* fix: harden deploy enforcement paths

* fix: update Docker toolchain to Go 1.26.3

* fix: repair Dockerfile tr argument split across lines

* fix: bump protobufjs to clear npm audit high-severity advisories

* fix(test): add execFile to child_process mock in compose-images test

* fix: resolve merge conflicts with main

* fix: resolve merge conflicts with main

* fix: resolve merge conflicts with main
2026-05-12 19:30:49 -04:00
Anso ccad5c925b feat(nodes): hide hub-only views when active node is remote (#1007)
* feat(nodes): hide hub-only views when active node is remote

Fleet, Schedules, Audit, Logs, and Auto-Update operate on hub-owned state
(node registry, fleet schedules, centralized audit, fleet-wide log
aggregation, fleet-wide update preview). When the active node is remote,
proxying those surfaces would show that remote's own disconnected state
instead of the hub's. Hide them from the nav strip and force-redirect to
Home if one was open during the node switch.

Backend hubOnlyGuard middleware sits between nodeContextMiddleware and the
remote proxy and rejects /api/scheduled-tasks, /api/audit-log, and
/api/notification-routes with 403 + HUB_ONLY_ENDPOINT when nodeId resolves
to a remote, closing the script-bypass path the UI gating cannot reach.

Settings sub-sections were already gated via the hiddenOnRemote registry;
this extends the same model to top-level views.

* docs(nodes): note hub-only visibility on Fleet, Schedules, Audit, Logs, Auto-Update

Each of the five hub-only feature pages now points readers to the
canonical "What top-level views show when a remote node is active"
section in multi-node.mdx, so users landing directly on a feature page
understand why the nav item disappears when they switch to a remote node.
2026-05-08 22:54:58 -04:00
Anso 77d5ff58d3 feat(fleet): add Fleet Actions tab for cross-node bulk operations (#963)
* feat(fleet): add Fleet Actions tab for cross-node bulk operations

Introduces a new "Actions" sub-tab in Fleet view with two Skipper+ cards
that fill gaps in the existing surface:

- Stop fleet by label: matches a label name across every node and stops
  every stack assigned to it, reporting per-node and per-stack results.
- Bulk label assign: applies the same label set to many stacks on one
  node in a single round trip.

Other bulk operations stay in their existing homes (sidebar bulk mode,
Schedules, NodeUpdatesSheet) to avoid duplicate surfaces.

Backend:
- POST /api/fleet/labels/fleet-stop (gateway-orchestrated, multi-node)
- POST /api/fleet-actions/labels/bulk-assign (per-node, capped at 1000)
- Tightens /api/fleet proxy-exempt prefix to /api/fleet/ so
  /api/fleet-actions/* is routed through the proxy for per-node calls.
- Exports activeBulkActions from labels.ts so fleet-stop and label-action
  share the per-node lock and cannot double-stop the same containers.
- Extracts containerActionForStack helper from stacks.ts for reuse.

* chore(fleet): rename Actions tab to Fleet Actions and reorder Fleet sub-tabs

- Tab label "Actions" -> "Fleet Actions" so the surface is unambiguous
  alongside Schedules and the sidebar bulk bar.
- Reorder Fleet sub-tabs as Overview / Snapshots / Status | Deployments /
  Traffic / Fleet Actions, with the separator after Status.
- Rename "Traffic · Routing" -> "Traffic" and update Sencho Mesh docs to
  match the shorter label.
- Update Fleet Actions docs to the new tab name and placement.
2026-05-07 05:41:53 -04:00
Anso 4e5ba17710 refactor(backend): sanitize user input before logging to close CRLF injection (#807)
* refactor(backend): sanitize user input before logging to close CRLF injection

Adds a small sanitizeForLog helper that strips CR, LF, tab, and ASCII
control characters (0x00-0x1F, 0x7F) from a value before it is embedded
in a console.log/warn/error/debug call. Wraps every call site where a
user-controlled value (req.params, req.body, req.query, or a value
derived from them) flows into a log message.

Closes the bulk of the open CodeQL alerts in this family:
- 96 js/log-injection
- 28 js/tainted-format-string

The helper is in backend/src/utils/safeLog.ts. Routes still pre-validate
input at the request boundary; this is the second line of defense and
gives static analyzers a sanitizer they can trace through. JSON
responses, Docker filter labels, and other non-log call sites are
intentionally left unwrapped.

* refactor(backend): printf-style format strings for tainted-log call sites

CodeQL's js/tainted-format-string rule flags template literals in the first
arg of console.X when any interpolated value is user-controlled, regardless
of whether each value is sanitized inline. The canonical mitigation is to
use a static format string and pass values as positional args.

Converts the 28 flagged template literals to printf-style ("%s") format
strings, with sanitizeForLog applied to each positional arg. Also fills in
the log-injection wraps on 9 sites where a user-controlled value was
missed in the first sweep (agents, fleet, gitSources, imageUpdates,
GitSourceService).

No behavior change at runtime. Node's util.format substitutes %s tokens
identically to template-literal interpolation.

* fix(backend): wrap nodeId/snapshotId in fleet restore debug log

CodeQL flagged the unwrapped numeric args even though they cannot
contain control chars in practice. Apply the sanitizer for taint-flow
recognition.
2026-04-27 10:47:23 -04:00
Anso 44dba59cab feat(notifications): add structured category enum to dispatcher and history (#774)
Introduce a NotificationCategory string-literal union (11 values) and
thread it through dispatchAlert as a required second argument. All
callers (DockerEventService, AutoHealService, ImageUpdateService,
MonitorService, PolicyEnforcement, policyGate, SchedulerService,
imageUpdates route) pass an explicit category at every call site,
giving TypeScript compile-time enforcement that no new emit site can
be added without choosing a category.

DatabaseService gains an idempotent migration that adds a nullable
category TEXT column to notification_history; existing rows keep
category=NULL (displayed as Uncategorized in the UI). The
getNotificationHistory method accepts an optional category filter
that is forwarded from the GET /api/notifications/history route via
a ?category= query param.

NotificationPanel gains a category Select dropdown so users can
filter history by category. The frontend types mirror the backend
union so API responses are type-safe end-to-end.

All 75 test files (1410 tests) updated to the new 4-arg dispatchAlert
signature and passing.
2026-04-25 13:55:07 -04:00
Anso ed553f1f19 feat: change default listen port from 3000 to 1852 (#756)
Updates the backend listen port, Vite dev proxy target, Docker EXPOSE,
compose port mapping, .env.example default, GitHub Actions smoke-test
default, healthcheck URLs, and every doc/example reference. Test fixtures
that include example URLs were updated for consistency, though their
assertions are port-agnostic.

The rate-limit value of 3000 in middleware/rateLimiters.ts and the
3000 entry in WEB_UI_PORTS (which detects user containers like Grafana)
are intentionally untouched.
2026-04-24 22:23:31 -04:00
Anso ba2cf99aa6 refactor(backend): extract auto-heal, notifications, console, sso-config routers (phase 4c-1) (#739)
Move four small Round C route groups out of index.ts:
- /api/auto-heal/* -> routes/autoHeal.ts
- /api/notifications/*, /api/notification-routes/* -> routes/notifications.ts
- /api/system/console-token -> routes/console.ts
- /api/sso/config/* -> routes/ssoConfig.ts

Share NOTIFICATION_CHANNEL_TYPES, cleanStackPatterns, and validateHttpsUrl
via a new helpers/notificationChannels.ts so agents.ts and notifications.ts
consume the same allowlist and URL validator.

Handlers moved verbatim. Middleware chains and response shapes preserved.
index.ts drops from 3231 to 2739 lines.
2026-04-23 22:10:41 -04:00
Anso b329916a0c refactor(backend): extract auth/MFA/SSO routers from index.ts (phase 4a-2) (#735)
Second slice of Phase 4. Pulls the three auth-family route groups out of
index.ts into focused routers. All handlers move verbatim; index.ts drops
~845 lines.

New route files:
- routes/auth.ts: /api/auth core (status, setup, login, password, logout,
  check, generate-node-token)
- routes/mfa.ts: /api/auth/login/mfa + full /api/auth/mfa/* surface
  (status, enroll start/confirm, disable, backup-codes/regenerate,
  sso-bypass)
- routes/sso.ts: /api/auth/sso/{providers,ldap,oidc/:provider/authorize,
  oidc/:provider/callback} + getSSOBaseUrl helper. Module-load calls
  SSOService.getInstance().seedFromEnv() so env-seeded providers are
  available on the first request.

Shared lifts:
- helpers/constants.ts: MFA_REPLAY_TTL_MS + MFA_REPLAY_PURGE_INTERVAL_MS
  (used by mfa.ts and the startup purge timer in index.ts) and
  BCRYPT_SALT_ROUNDS (shared between setup and password-change handlers).
- middleware/auth.ts: new reissueSessionAfterTokenBump(req, res, userId)
  helper collapses three copies of "bump → fetch user → re-sign cookie"
  across auth.ts (password change) and mfa.ts (enrol confirm, disable).

Code review fixes:
- File-local requireEnrolledMfaUser helper in mfa.ts eliminates four
  copies of "auth check + rejectApiTokenScope + load enrolled MFA" with
  near-identical shape.
- Applied BCRYPT_SALT_ROUNDS to auth.ts setup + password handlers.

Mount order in index.ts: authRouter / mfaRouter / ssoRouter sit before
authGate because login / setup / SSO-callback are public; handlers that
need auth use authMiddleware directly on the route.
2026-04-23 20:43:32 -04:00
Anso 50e64b058b refactor(backend): extract 8 low-blast-radius route groups into routers (phase 4a-1) (#734)
First slice of Phase 4 (route extraction). Pulls 8 well-tested, mostly
independent route groups out of index.ts into focused Router files. No
behavior change; every handler body moves verbatim.

New route files under backend/src/routes/:
- meta.ts            /api/health, /api/meta (mounted before authGate)
- license.ts         /api/license/* + /api/system/update,
                     exports scheduleLocalUpdate for the fleet route
- permissions.ts     /api/permissions/me
- convert.ts         POST /api/convert
- alerts.ts          /api/alerts/*
- labels.ts          /api/labels/* + PUT /api/stacks/:name/labels
                     (exported as stackLabelsRouter)
- apiTokens.ts       /api/api-tokens/*
- auditLog.ts        /api/audit-log/*

Shared helper lifts:
- helpers/cacheInvalidation.ts: invalidateNodeCaches()
- middleware/tierGates.ts: requireBody (was inline in index.ts)
- utils/errors.ts: isSqliteUniqueViolation (was inline in index.ts)
- middleware/apiTokenScope.ts: rejectApiTokenScope() helper (new)
- utils/csv.ts: escapeCsvField() (new)

index.ts drops from ~7520 to ~6775 lines and now mounts the routers right
after enforceApiTokenScope. The remote proxy and fleet/auth/webhooks/users
routes remain inline in index.ts pending later Phase 4 slices.

Code review fixes: rejectApiTokenScope helper replaces duplicated
`if (req.apiTokenScope) 403 SCOPE_DENIED` blocks in apiTokens.ts and
license.ts; escapeCsvField replaces the inline CSV escape in auditLog.ts.
2026-04-23 20:24:37 -04:00
Anso dc3699189d refactor(backend): extract remote proxy, WebSocket upgrade handler, and server factory (phase 3) (#733)
Phase 3 of the index.ts refactor. Pulls the remote HTTP/WS proxy plumbing,
the WebSocket upgrade dispatcher, and the http/WSS construction out of the
monolith. index.ts drops roughly 620 lines.

New modules:
- proxy/websocketProxy.ts: shared httpProxy.createProxyServer singleton
  (used by both the HTTP proxy middleware and the remote WS forwarder)
- proxy/remoteNodeProxy.ts: createRemoteProxyMiddleware() factory; consumes
  the isProxyExemptPath helper instead of open-coding the prefix list
- server.ts: createServer(app) returns { server, wss, pilotTunnelWss }
- services/FleetUpdateTrackerService.ts: singleton wrapping the in-flight
  fleet update tracker Map with create()/resolve() helpers
- helpers/consoleSession.ts: mintConsoleSession(), isConsoleSessionScope()
- websocket/upgradeHandler.ts: attachUpgrade(server, deps) dispatcher that
  runs the manual cookie/JWT verify and delegates to sub-handlers
- websocket/pilotTunnel.ts: handlePilotTunnel (pilot_enroll consumption and
  pilot_tunnel registration)
- websocket/notifications.ts: /ws/notifications local subscriber
- websocket/remoteForwarder.ts: remote-node WS proxy with console_session
  token exchange for interactive paths
- websocket/logs.ts: /api/stacks/:name/logs supervisor stream
- websocket/hostConsole.ts: /api/system/host-console PTY, Admiral-gated
- websocket/generic.ts: /ws exec + streamStats action dispatch, owns the
  terminalWs single-instance reference
- websocket/reject.ts: shared rejectUpgrade helper (replaces five copies)

Service extension:
- NotificationService: setBroadcaster(fn) replaced by subscribe(ws) that
  returns an unsubscriber; broadcastToSubscribers is now internal. Subscriber
  set lives on the service rather than in index.ts.

Wiring in index.ts:
- const app = createApp() already in place from Phase 2
- const { server, wss, pilotTunnelWss } = createServer(app)
- attachUpgrade(server, { wss, pilotTunnelWss })
- app.use('/api/', createRemoteProxyMiddleware())
- /api/system/console-token route now uses mintConsoleSession()
- deploy/down/update routes read the streaming target via getTerminalWs()
  (return type is WebSocket | undefined so the || undefined fallback is gone)

Code review fixes: five duplicated reject helpers collapsed into
websocket/reject.ts; dropped the createTracker/resolveTracker bind
aliases in index.ts so call sites go through the service directly;
removed em dashes; replaced req.url! with req.url || '/'.
2026-04-23 19:31:16 -04:00
Anso 856a260a11 refactor(backend): extract rate limiters, body parsing, and request gates (phase 1) (#731)
Phase 1 of the index.ts monolith refactor. Extracts all non-auth middleware
into focused modules. Routes and authMiddleware itself stay in index.ts for
now; Phase 2 introduces createApp() and extracts authMiddleware.

New modules:
- middleware/rateLimiters.ts: globalApiLimiter, pollingLimiter,
  webhookTriggerLimiter, authRateLimiter, ssoRateLimiter, trivyInstallLimiter
  plus the hybrid rateLimitKeyGenerator and isNodeProxyRequest helper
- middleware/jsonParser.ts: conditionalJsonParser that preserves the raw
  stream for remote-proxy forwarding (via helpers/proxyExemptPaths)
- middleware/nodeContext.ts: nodeContextMiddleware
- middleware/apiTokenScope.ts: enforceApiTokenScope + DEPLOY_ALLOWED_PATTERNS
- middleware/authGate.ts: createAuthGate(authMiddleware) factory + auditLog.
  Factory takes authMiddleware as a dependency to avoid a circular import
  until Phase 2 extracts the auth module.
- middleware/errorHandler.ts: central error handler that preserves
  err.status / err.expose from body-parser and other HTTP errors
- helpers/routePatterns.ts: WEBHOOK_TRIGGER_RE shared by rateLimiters and
  authGate

index.ts drops ~290 lines. Middleware registration order is unchanged.
All 1278 tests pass.

Code review fixes: typed ApiTokenScope in apiTokenScope.ts; replaced 2
em dashes with colons (Directive 18); added local CachedProxyFlagReq
type alias for the node_proxy memoization cast; extracted deny() helper.
2026-04-23 18:22:26 -04:00
Anso 929e2fa6b1 refactor(backend): extract types, constants, and guards from index.ts (phase 0) (#730)
* refactor(backend): extract types, constants, and guards from index.ts (phase 0)

Additive, behavior-preserving first step of the modular backend refactor.
Moves purely static artifacts out of backend/src/index.ts so later phases can
extract routes and middleware without touching shared symbols.

New modules:
- types/express.ts: Express Request augmentation
- helpers/constants.ts: PORT, password policy, label colors, cookie names,
  MFA TTLs, hot-path cache TTLs
- helpers/proxyExemptPaths.ts: PROXY_EXEMPT_PREFIXES + isProxyExemptPath
- helpers/cookies.ts: isSecureRequest, getCookieOptions
- helpers/policyGate.ts: buildPolicyGateOptions, runPolicyGate,
  triggerPostDeployScan
- middleware/permissions.ts: ROLE_PERMISSIONS, checkPermission,
  requirePermission
- middleware/tierGates.ts: requirePaid, requireAdmiral, requireAdmin,
  requireNodeProxy, requireScheduledTaskTier + effectiveTier/Variant

index.ts shrinks by ~260 lines; no runtime behavior changes. All 64 vitest
files and 1,278 tests pass.

* refactor(backend): drop unused imports left after phase 0 extraction

LicenseTier, LicenseVariant, DIGEST_CACHE_TTL_MS, and isProxyExemptPath
were imported into index.ts but no longer referenced there after the
phase 0 move; CI lint flagged them as errors.

isProxyExemptPath will be re-imported in phase 1 when the JSON parser
bypass and nodeContext middleware get extracted. Silence the
no-namespace warning on the Express augmentation since the namespace
syntax is required for TypeScript module augmentation.
2026-04-23 17:58:04 -04:00