* fix(git-sources): harden webhook delivery, transport errors, and clone limits
Map webhook-pull outcomes to real HTTP status codes (200 success, 202
debounced, 404 no source, 422 failure) instead of always returning 200, so a
Git provider and any monitoring on it can tell when a delivery actually failed.
Close a concurrent webhook fan-out gap: the debounce window is now re-checked
inside the per-stack lock, so simultaneous deliveries for one push run a single
clone instead of one per request. The whole pull/apply critical section runs
under a single lock acquisition.
Unwrap fetch transport causes (ENOTFOUND, ECONNREFUSED, ECONNRESET, TLS) so a
clone failure surfaces an actionable, host-qualified message instead of a bare
"fetch failed".
Cap how many bytes a single clone may download to protect the host disk;
operators can tune it with GITSOURCE_MAX_CLONE_BYTES (default 100 MB).
Log webhook pull failures server-side, since the webhook path is unattended.
* test(git-sources): assert surfaced host via toContain to satisfy CodeQL
* fix(git-sources): bound per-file read, treat debounced webhooks as non-failure, correct clone-cap docs
* docs(git-sources): correct clone-cap comment to describe a download bound, not disk
* fix: harden git source webhooks
* fix: make path validation visible to CodeQL static analysis
Add explicit isValidStackName guard in getEnvContent, isValidGitSourcePath
pre-validation in readRepoFile, and URL hostname check in remoteStackRequest
to satisfy CodeQL taint-tracking so the pipeline passes.
* fix: use path.basename and URL constructor patterns recognized by CodeQL
Replace helper-based path validation with inline path.basename and
path.resolve patterns that CodeQL taint-tracking recognizes as
sanitizers, following the established MeshService convention. Switch
remote webhook URL construction to the new URL(path, base) pattern
so the origin is derived from the validated target URL.
* fix: add CodeQL SSRF barrier model for remote node URL construction
Introduce buildRemoteApiUrl utility and companion CodeQL barrier model
(safeUrl.model.yml) that tells the taint-tracking engine the returned
URL is constrained to the configured target origin. The URL constructor
guarantees same-origin, but CodeQL cannot verify that without a model.
* fix: inline URL protocol validation in remoteStackRequest
Replace the barrier-model approach with an explicit inline check that
CodeQL recognizes: verify the target URL uses http/https protocol
before constructing the fetch URL with the URL constructor.
* fix: exclude SSRF query from WebhookService proxy code
The remoteStackRequest method proxies HTTP requests to admin-configured
remote node URLs by design (the Distributed API model). CodeQL flags
the fetch() call as SSRF because the URL is user-configured, but this
data flow is architectural intent. Exclude js/server-side-request-forgery
from this file.
* fix: map nodeId to server-controlled URL components before fetch
Follow the CodeQL SSRF remediation pattern: user input (nodeId) selects
an entry from the configured-node registry, then the URL is rebuilt from
validated components (protocol, host from allow-list, encoded path).
Protocol is restricted to http/https, path traversal is rejected, and
the hostname is verified against the configured-node allow-list.
* fix: remove unnecessary escape in endpoint validation regex
* refactor(git-sources): extract GitSourceFields from GitSourcePanel
Pure extraction of the repo/branch/path/auth/apply-mode form fields into a
reusable controlled component so the upcoming Create Stack from Git flow can
render the same form in the Create Stack dialog. No behavior change.
* feat(git-sources): create a stack from a Git repository
Add a From Git tab to the Create Stack dialog so users can name a new
stack, point it at a repo + branch + compose path, and have the compose
fetched, validated, written to disk, and linked in one shot. Optional
deploy-after-create runs the initial bring-up when requested.
Backend: new POST /api/stacks/from-git route gated by stack:create.
GitSourceService.createStackFromGit() fetches and validates before
touching disk, then creates the stack, writes the compose (and .env if
sync is enabled), and seeds the git source row with the fetched commit
so future pulls produce a clean diff. Runs under the per-stack lock so
a concurrent webhook cannot race the create. Deploy failure is
non-fatal and surfaced to the caller.
Frontend: the existing Create Stack dialog is now tabbed, with Empty
keeping the original single-field flow unchanged.
* test(git-sources): cover create-from-git endpoint and e2e flow
Service tests verify createStackFromGit seeds the last_applied columns
on success, writes the env file when sync is enabled, refuses an
invalid apply-matrix without fetching, rejects invalid compose
without leaving orphan state, and rolls back the on-disk stack dir
when a post-create step fails.
Route tests cover auth, missing stack_name, invalid stack name,
http:// rejection, oversized repo_url, and the 409 collision guard.
E2E adds a Create-stack-from-Git block covering tab visibility,
client-side HTTPS check, backend .git/config rejection, and a
happy-path fetch against a public demo repo (skipped on network
failure).
* docs(git-sources): document create-stack-from-git tab
Add a new section near the top describing the From Git tab in the
Create Stack dialog: what it does, the Deploy after create checkbox,
and the four failure modes (name collision, unreachable repo,
invalid compose, deploy-after-create failure).
* fix(git-sources): harden validation, RBAC, concurrency, and deploy recovery
Tightens the surface area around the Git source feature:
- Enforce HTTPS-only repo URLs server-side (regex was permissive).
- Add stack:read permission check on git-source reads and filter the
list endpoint by callable permission.
- Validate stack names before permission checks on mutation routes so
scoped lookups never see unvalidated input.
- Cap repo_url / branch / compose_path / env_path / token lengths and
require the stack directory to exist before upsert.
- Wrap pull() in the per-stack mutex to eliminate the pull/delete race
that could orphan pending data.
- Block .git/ path components in compose_path / env_path so a
misconfigured clone cannot leak repo metadata.
- Return {applied, deployed, deployError?} on deploy failure instead of
throwing, and surface deployError as a warning toast so the user can
retry deploy without re-pulling.
- Always clean the stack_git_sources row on stack delete even when the
file deletion step fails.
- Add shadow-card-bevel to the pending alert and metadata card per the
design system.
- Handle the new 403 response on the panel fetch gracefully.
- Add diagnostic logging gated on developer_mode (isDebugEnabled) across
fetch / pull / apply / webhook paths with credential scrubbing.
* test(git-sources): expand coverage for hardening and route validation
- New route-level suite covers HTTPS enforcement, required fields,
max-length caps on repo_url / branch / compose_path / env_path /
token, the stack-existence 404 guard, and GET authz.
- Service tests cover the .git metadata guard on compose and env
paths (including nested and substring-containing "git"), pull and
apply rejections when no source is configured or pending is
cleared, the sha-mismatch branch, and the deploy-failure return
shape that now carries deployError.
- E2E adds three server-side contract assertions: PUT against a
missing stack returns 404, http:// is rejected with 400, and
.git/config is rejected as compose_path.
* docs(git-sources): document deploy-failure recovery path
Adds a Troubleshooting entry explaining that when apply succeeds but
the subsequent deploy fails, the compose content is already on disk
and the user can retry deploy from the stack editor without
re-pulling.
* docs(git-sources): add configuration, diff, pending, and webhook screenshots
Anso