* feat(stacks): browse and edit mounted volume files in the explorer
Reposition the stack file explorer around runtime configuration access:
discover a stack's declared mounts and expose each as a safe, stack-scoped
file root. The explorer opens on a Volumes group (bind mounts and named
Docker volumes) by default, with the stack source directory as a secondary
group, on a "Files & Volumes" tab.
- Discover roots from the rendered effective compose model; resolve named
volumes to their Docker name and browse/edit them through the hardened
helper container, with bind mounts handled directly when reachable.
- Re-derive the allowed roots server-side on every file operation and match
the client root id against them, so a request can never address a path the
stack did not declare. Block dangerous host mounts and binds that overlap
Sencho's managed directories; reject writes to read-only mounts.
- Thread an optional root id through the existing file endpoints and an
opaque, parseable optimistic-concurrency token through read, conflict,
and write, for both filesystem and helper backends.
- Keep compose and env file protection on the stack source root only.
* fix(stacks): theme the Files & Volumes root switcher
Replace the raw native select in the file-root switcher with the design
system Select component. The native control did not honour the dark theme,
so the panel rendered white with unreadable text. The themed Select gives a
dark popover with grouped Volumes / Stack source labels and disabled items.
* fix(stacks): contain the bind-root probe and de-taint the file-op error log
Gate the volume-root bind probe's realpath/stat behind a compose-base
containment check (mirroring the storage host-path probe) so they never run
on an unvalidated host path; a source outside the compose dir is unreachable
in the containerized deployment anyway and is reported non-accessible without
touching the filesystem. Log the helper-backed file-op failure through a
constant format string with sanitized arguments instead of an interpolated
template literal.
* fix(stacks): inline the bind-probe containment guard at the fs sinks
The wrapped containment predicate was not recognized as a path barrier, so
the bind probe's realpath/stat still flagged as uncontrolled-data-in-path.
Inline the path.resolve + startsWith check directly at each filesystem sink
(and re-check the resolved canonical before stat, so a within-base symlink
that resolves outside the compose dir is also rejected).
* fix(stacks): harden file-root lifecycle, upload race, and helper errors
Address review findings on the Files & Volumes feature:
- Invalidate the file-root allowlist on stack create/delete/import/from-git
(wire StackFileRootsService.invalidateNode into invalidateNodeCaches), so a
stack deleted and recreated under the same name cannot serve the old stack's
roots from the 15s cache.
- Use the atomic exclusive write for a non-overwrite upload so a file created
by another writer after the existence check is not silently clobbered.
- Let the helper's real cd errno through and map permission failures to 403
consistently across list/stat/read/write/mkdir/delete/pathKind, instead of
reporting EACCES as 404/500; pathKind no longer reports a permission-denied
parent as absent.
- Document the realpath-then-open TOCTOU as a known, pre-existing limitation of
every file op (O_NOFOLLOW is not viable because config volumes legitimately
contain symlinks); the bind root is contained to the compose dir and the op
requires stack:edit.
- Docs: drop a missing screenshot reference and correct the protected-file
delete behavior (stack-root compose/.env cannot be deleted via the explorer).
* feat(files): open stack file explorer to every tier
Drop the `requirePaid` guard from the seven stack-file write routes
(download, upload, write-content, delete, mkdir, rename, chmod) and
remove every matching `isPaid` check from the file-explorer frontend.
Stack edit permission (RBAC) continues to gate every write end-to-end.
The file explorer is the primary way a user touches a stack's on-disk
surface; gating it behind a paid tier conflicted with the principle
that Community covers single user-initiated actions while paid tiers
add automation and governance.
* docs(files): treat download as a read action, not a write
Download has no `requirePermission('stack:edit')` on the route and no
`canEdit` gate in the UI, so viewer accounts can download. Update the
top paragraph to list download under reads, and rewrite the
troubleshooting accordion to describe the actual gating (a file must be
selected) instead of asserting a role gate that does not exist.
* test(e2e): align stack-files spec with the new tier rule
The community-tier describe block asserted that the Upload control is
absent and the editor shows a `Read-only` chip; the admin-tier block
skipped on Community via `test.skip(tier !== 'paid')`. Both rules
reflected the previous gate, where writes required a paid tier.
Writes are now gated on the `stack:edit` role, not on the license tier.
Repurpose the community describe to assert that a Community admin
under a mocked community license still sees the Upload control and an
editable Save button. Drop the obsolete tier-skip in the admin describe
so upload, edit, delete, and download exercise on every tier. Update
stale comments to reference the role gate.
Anso