* feat(resources): protect Sencho's own image, network, volumes from deletion
Adds SelfIdentityService that reads HOSTNAME at startup and inspects the
running Sencho container via Dockerode to record its image ID, attached
networks, named volumes, and container ID. The classification API marks
these with isSencho:true, destructive delete routes return 423 Locked when
the target matches self, the orphan-containers API filters the Sencho
container out so it cannot be selected and purged from the Unmanaged tab,
and the managed-prune path adds an explicit self filter for
defense-in-depth on top of Docker's in-use semantics.
The Resources view renders a Sencho pill alongside the managed badge on
matching rows and disables the trash control with a hover tooltip.
When Sencho runs outside Docker (dev mode), inspect returns 404, the
service stays empty, and every isOwn* returns false so today's behaviour
is preserved.
* fix(resources): handle sha256-prefixed image IDs and custom hostnames
Addresses independent-review findings on PR #1149:
- Strip sha256: prefix in POST /api/system/images/delete before validating
the ID, matching the inspect route's handling. Without this, /system/images
responses round-trip through the UI as sha256:<hex> and got 400 Invalid
image ID format before rejectIfSelf could run.
- Add /proc/self/cgroup fallback to SelfIdentityService so custom
--hostname, Compose hostname:, or --uts=host setups still self-identify.
HOSTNAME inspect runs first; on 404 the service parses the cgroup file
for a 64-hex container ID (cgroupv1 docker, cgroupv2 docker, podman
libpod formats all covered) and retries inspect with that ID.
- Restrict prefix matching in isOwnNetwork / matchesId to hex-shaped
candidates (12 to 64 hex chars), so a non-Sencho network whose name
happens to start with a hex prefix of Sencho's network ID is no longer
flagged as self.
- Trim the resources.mdx Note to customer-visible behaviour without
enumerating every tab.
- New tests: prefixed-image-ID 200 path, three cgroup file format
parses (v1, v2, podman) plus the no-match and missing-file cases,
HOSTNAME-404-then-cgroup-success fallback path, name-collision
regression for the hex-only prefix rule, and an empty-cache
no-regression check. Test hygiene: mockReset on the inspect stub and
restoreAllMocks in afterEach so spies do not leak across tests.
* chore(security): VEX not_affected for CVE-2026-46680 (containerd in docker-compose)
Trivy now flags CVE-2026-46680 HIGH on
usr/local/lib/docker/cli-plugins/docker-compose, which statically embeds
github.com/containerd/containerd/v2 v2.2.3 (compose v5.1.3's resolved
module graph).
The CVE is a runtime-executor flaw: containerd's runc invocation can be
tricked into running a Kubernetes pod marked runAsNonRoot as root via
crafted user ID handling. The vulnerable code path is reached only by
containerd-shim executing a container with a populated OCI runtime spec
on the daemon side. docker-compose vendors the containerd Go module
purely as a client (gRPC stubs, API types, shared utilities); it never
executes containers and never enforces runAsNonRoot. Sencho's compose
usage (up / down / ps against user-authored files) cannot construct a
Kubernetes pod security context. The vulnerable path is unreachable.
Adds a not_affected entry to security/vex/sencho.openvex.json with
justification vulnerable_code_not_in_execute_path, bumps version 5 to 6,
and updates last_updated to 2026-05-22 per Directive 23.
Anso