mirror of
https://github.com/Studio-Saelix/sencho.git
synced 2026-08-09 10:21:03 +00:00
96c5f05cdcb547ec0069b125135c0bd6a14baae0
326 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Anso
|
96c5f05cdc |
fix(app-store): harden template deploy, registry fetch, and catalogue refresh (#1250)
* fix(app-store): harden template deploy, registry fetch, and catalogue refresh Serialize generated compose through the YAML emitter so registry-supplied values are escaped correctly instead of interpolated into hand-built lines. Cap the registry response size so an oversized or runaway catalogue cannot exhaust backend memory, and surface the fetch failure to the caller. Reload the catalogue when the active node changes, since the registry is node-scoped. Add developer-mode deploy diagnostics (counts only, no values) and extend the unit tests with YAML round-trip, LinuxServer.io mapping, and size-cap coverage. * fix(app-store): reset node-scoped catalogue state on fetch and bound deploy diagnostics Clear the templates list and Trivy availability at the start of each catalogue load so a failed fetch after a node switch shows the new node's empty state instead of the previous node's catalogue or scan toggle. Bound the developer-mode diagnostic template title/source length, and document that the registry cache serves the last-known-good catalogue on a transient fetch failure (the size cap still protects memory in every case). |
||
|
Anso
|
2844f606cd |
fix(git-sources): harden webhook delivery, transport errors, and clone limits (#1249)
* fix(git-sources): harden webhook delivery, transport errors, and clone limits Map webhook-pull outcomes to real HTTP status codes (200 success, 202 debounced, 404 no source, 422 failure) instead of always returning 200, so a Git provider and any monitoring on it can tell when a delivery actually failed. Close a concurrent webhook fan-out gap: the debounce window is now re-checked inside the per-stack lock, so simultaneous deliveries for one push run a single clone instead of one per request. The whole pull/apply critical section runs under a single lock acquisition. Unwrap fetch transport causes (ENOTFOUND, ECONNREFUSED, ECONNRESET, TLS) so a clone failure surfaces an actionable, host-qualified message instead of a bare "fetch failed". Cap how many bytes a single clone may download to protect the host disk; operators can tune it with GITSOURCE_MAX_CLONE_BYTES (default 100 MB). Log webhook pull failures server-side, since the webhook path is unattended. * test(git-sources): assert surfaced host via toContain to satisfy CodeQL * fix(git-sources): bound per-file read, treat debounced webhooks as non-failure, correct clone-cap docs * docs(git-sources): correct clone-cap comment to describe a download bound, not disk |
||
|
Anso
|
b33a0e8422 |
fix(deploy-enforcement): surface scan-policy blocks on update and sidebar deploys (#1248)
* fix(deploy-enforcement): surface scan-policy blocks on update and sidebar deploys A blocked deploy only opened the policy dialog from the editor deploy button. The update action and the sidebar context-menu deploy/update fell through to a generic error toast, so an admin could not review the violations or bypass the block from those entry points. Route the 409 policy response through a shared handler on all three paths and make the "Deploy anyway" bypass retry the originating action (deploy or update) so an update bypass still re-pulls images. Also: - Correct the "Block on deploy" policy-editor helper text, which described post-deploy alerting rather than the pre-flight rejection it actually performs. - Dispatch the documented scan_finding warning (policy name and the offending images) when a scheduled auto-update or auto-start is blocked, instead of recording an opaque failure. - Add a standard log line when the gate blocks a deploy, plus developer-mode diagnostics for the matched policy and per-image severity decision. - Fix deploy-enforcement docs: complete the enforced entry-point list, correct the policy-precedence wording, and remove inaccurate tier and audit-actor claims. * fix(deploy-enforcement): surface policy block on rollback and name images in remote auto-update alert Addresses two gaps found in independent review: - Rollback is a policy-gated deploy path (it restores the saved files then re-runs the gate before redeploying), but the frontend treated a blocked rollback as a generic error toast. Route the 409 through the same handler as deploy and update so the block dialog opens, and let an admin "Deploy anyway" retry the rollback with the bypass flag (the rollback route already honors it). - The remote auto-update path dispatched its policy-block warning without the offending image refs, unlike the local scheduler. Append the images so the alert matches the documented contract on every node. Also list rollback as an enforced entry point in the docs and clarify that Git Source enforcement covers both the create-time deploy and a manual apply-with-deploy. |
||
|
Anso
|
45844b92ca |
fix(atomic-deploy): harden rollback locking, restore fidelity, and tier gating (#1247)
* fix(atomic-deploy): harden rollback locking, restore fidelity, and tier gating Hardens the Atomic Deployments feature found during a full audit: - Rollback now holds the per-stack lifecycle lock (deploy/update already do), so a rollback can no longer race a concurrent deploy on the same compose files. Adds a 'rollback' lifecycle action and releases the lock in finally. - restoreStackFiles is now a faithful revert: it removes managed compose/.env files added after the backup before copying, so a rollback no longer leaves a hybrid of old and new configuration. Scope is the protected file set only; user data is untouched. Aborts (rather than reporting success) if a stale managed file cannot be removed. - The scheduled image-update path derives the atomic flag from the licence tier instead of hardcoding it on, keeping the paid capability explicit at the call site (the scheduler is already paid-gated; this prevents silent drift). - The backup-metadata read (GET /stacks/:name/backup) now requires a paid licence, matching the rollback flow that is the only caller. - Manual rollback dispatches a success/failure notification, alongside the existing audit-log entry. Adds route integration tests (lock acquisition/release, tier 403, notifications, no-backup 404), filesystem tests for the faithful restore (orphan removal, variant switch, abort path, non-managed files preserved), a community-tier scheduler test, and a developer-mode logging matrix. Documents the restore semantics and reconciles the scheduled-update wording in the feature guide. * fix(atomic-deploy): assert restore target stays within the compose dir before unlink The orphan-removal step in restoreStackFiles joins the stack directory with a managed filename and unlinks it. The stack directory is already validated and contained by resolveStackDir (allowlist stack name + within-base assertion), but the containment guard was not reapplied to the joined target at the delete sink, so static analysis flagged the path as derived from user input. Reassert containment on the final path before unlinking, matching the barrier the other write/read helpers in this service already apply. No behavior change for valid stacks; defense-in-depth at the sink. * fix(atomic-deploy): inline the path-containment barrier at the restore unlink sink The wrapped within-base assertion was not recognized as a sanitizer by the static path-injection analysis, which still traced the stack name to the unlink sink. Replace it with the inline path.resolve + startsWith containment check the other write helpers in this service already use (the recognized barrier), kept in the same scope as the sink. Behavior is unchanged for valid stack names. * fix(atomic-deploy): clear stale managed files from the backup slot before writing The backup directory is reused across runs and was only ever added to, never cleared. A managed file removed from the stack since the last backup (e.g. a deleted .env or a switched compose variant) lingered in the slot, so a later rollback restored a file that did not exist immediately before the failed run, contradicting the faithful-revert guarantee. Clear the protected file set from the slot before copying the current files, with the same inline containment barrier the restore path uses. A clear failure is logged, not fatal, since it only risks a stale future rollback and should not block a valid deploy. |
||
|
Anso
|
5dea040ec8 |
fix(deploy-progress): decouple deploys from the live progress stream (#1246)
* fix(deploy-progress): decouple deploys from the live progress stream The deploy progress modal streamed compose output over a WebSocket, but the deploy itself was coupled to that socket in two ways that could break or silently abort a deploy: - The deploy request was gated on the progress socket connecting, so any upgrade failure (a reverse proxy blocking WebSocket upgrades, or the admin-only stream rejecting a scoped deployer) left the modal stuck on "Connecting..." and the deploy never fired. - The backend terminated the running compose process when that socket closed, so minimizing the modal, navigating away, or a network blip aborted an in-flight deploy. Make the progress socket output-only: the deploy is owned by its request and runs to completion (or the existing command timeout) regardless of the stream. The modal now degrades to a "Live progress unavailable" state and still reports success or failure from the request result. Connect failures, drops, and a connect timeout all release the deploy instead of blocking it. Also route progress output per deploy: the frontend sends a correlation id on both the connectTerminal message and the deploy request header, and the backend keys progress sockets by that id so concurrent deploys from different tabs or users no longer cross-stream each other's output. Cap the in-memory parsed log rows so a very long deploy cannot grow the modal's state unbounded. * fix(deploy-progress): generate the deploy session id with a CSPRNG The per-deploy correlation id keys which WebSocket receives a deploy's live output, so a guessable id lets one authenticated client register a victim's id and read its compose output. It was built from Math.random() plus a timestamp, which is not cryptographically secure. Generate it with crypto.getRandomValues (128 bits, hex). That is the one Crypto member available in insecure contexts, so it still works over LAN HTTP where crypto.randomUUID is unavailable. * fix(deploy-progress): stop headerless ops bleeding into a keyed progress modal Address review findings on the progress-stream routing: - Only an id-less connectTerminal registration may become the id-less fallback socket. Previously every connectTerminal (including keyed deploy modals) set the fallback, so a headerless operation (bulk update, rollback, or a legacy client) resolved via getTerminalWs() into another user's keyed deploy modal. Keyed sockets are now excluded from the fallback, and a socket that adopts a session id is removed from it. - The connect-timeout fallback now also flags the modal as "Live progress unavailable" instead of leaving it on "Connecting..." while the deploy runs. - Log only a short prefix of the deploy session id in developer diagnostics, not the full capability value. |
||
|
Anso
|
265fece988 |
fix(notifications): prevent self-container stack routing (#1242)
* fix(notifications): prevent self-container stack routing * fix(stack-files): stabilize download metrics in CI |
||
|
Anso
|
adcd04b01a |
refactor(auto-update): retire per-stack gate, drive auto-update from schedules only (#1233)
* refactor(auto-update): retire per-stack gate, drive auto-update from schedules only
The per-stack Auto-update toggle in the stack sidebar context menu wrote a
gate row to `stack_auto_update_settings`, but actual updates only ran when a
`scheduled_tasks` row with `action='update'` fired. On a fresh install the
toggle was inert: detection ran every 6h, nothing was applied.
The same context menu already exposes `Schedule task`, which opens
ScheduledOperationsView pre-filled for the stack where the user can pick
`Auto-update Stack` and any cron. Keeping the toggle alongside that flow
duplicated the same action and turned the gate table into a parallel store
of "is a covering schedule active" derivable from `scheduled_tasks` itself.
Drop the gate model entirely:
- Backend: remove the `stack_auto_update_settings` table and its four
accessors, the three routes under /api/stacks/*/auto-update, the per-stack
skip in /api/auto-update/execute and SchedulerService.executeUpdate's
fleet branch, and the clearStackAutoUpdateSetting call on stack delete.
Dashboard `autoUpdate` count derives from scheduled_tasks (action='update'
rows pinned to the node, total/enabled split).
- Frontend: drop the Auto-update entry from the sidebar context menu and its
optimistic toggle plumbing. Drop autoUpdateSettings state, the
/stacks/auto-update-settings fetch, and the auto-update-settings-changed
WebSocket branch. Slim useSidebarActivitySummary (just nextRunAt; no
enabled/total counts). AutoUpdateReadinessView's per-card autoUpdateEnabled
now means "a covering enabled action='update' schedule exists" (per-stack
row or fleet row on this node, earliest next_run_at wins, per-stack row
wins on ties), with the gate-fetch removed.
- New: scheduledTasksRouter broadcasts scope: 'scheduled-tasks' on POST,
PUT, PATCH /toggle, and DELETE so useConfigurationStatus and
useNextAutoUpdateRun refetch under the 250ms debounce instead of waiting
for the 60s poll. The broadcast is wrapped so a broken subscriber socket
cannot turn a successful mutation into a 500.
- Docs: rewrite the "Per-stack control" section of auto-update-policies.mdx
to describe the schedule-based model; update the matching troubleshooting
entry. The misleading fleet-update help text in ScheduledOperationsView
is corrected to reflect that every stack on the node is covered.
Tier parity: the surviving auto-update path (Schedule task -> Auto-update
Stack / All Stacks) is gated `requirePaid + requireAdmin` backend and
`isPaid + isAdmin` frontend, matching the gate the deleted routes carried.
The pre-commit grep returns no tier-related diff outside this PR's scope.
No data migration is provided: greenfield rules apply, and the leftover
table on already-shipped instances is harmless because no code reads or
writes it after this PR.
* docs: sweep remaining references to the per-stack auto-update toggle
The previous commit retired the per-stack Auto-update gate in favor of
configuring auto-update purely through scheduled tasks. This commit
removes the now-stale mentions of that toggle across the operator docs:
- docs/features/sidebar.mdx: drop the Auto-update entry from the Inspect
group description, the matching screenshot alt-text, and the Skipper
Note that listed it. Schedule task now carries the cross-link to
Auto-Update Policies.
- docs/features/stack-management.mdx: drop the Auto-update list item;
refresh the Schedule task entry to mention the Auto-update Stack action.
- docs/features/dashboard.mdx: rename the Configuration Status row from
"Auto-update stacks" to "Auto-update schedules" with the new value
shape, and rewrite the troubleshooting accordion to describe the
scheduled-tasks invalidation path.
- docs/features/scheduled-operations.mdx: rewrite the Auto-update All
Stacks row and helper text to reflect that every stack on the node is
covered (no per-stack opt-out from this surface anymore).
- docs/features/multi-node.mdx: rewrite the Updates column definition to
derive the Auto/Off flag from enabled Auto-update Stack / Auto-update
All Stacks schedules instead of the removed per-stack policy.
The auto-update-policies.mdx rewrite in the previous commit already
covered the main reference page. The sidebar-context-menu.png screenshot
will be refreshed on release once the new menu is live in production;
the alt text is updated in this commit so it accurately describes the
shipping state.
No website edits needed: the Auto-Update Policies feature card description
("Schedule automatic image pulls and redeployments per stack on your own
cadence") and the feature matrix labels ("Auto-update stack schedule",
"Auto-update all stacks schedule") remain accurate under the new model.
* fix(stacks): drop orphaned requireAdmin import after auto-update route removal
CI's backend lint step flagged this PR's earlier deletion of the three
/api/stacks/*/auto-update routes: those handlers were the only callers of
`requireAdmin` inside routes/stacks.ts, leaving the named import on line 15
unreferenced. `requirePaid` and `effectiveTier` from the same line are still
in use elsewhere in the file and stay.
tsc --noEmit does not flag unused named imports; ESLint's no-unused-vars
does. Local backend lint reproduces and now reports 0 errors against the
existing 334-warning baseline.
|
||
|
Anso
|
42e8d3a78c |
feat(security): per-image scroll + retention cap in scan history (#1231)
* feat(security): per-image scroll + retention cap in scan history Long scan histories for hot images used to monopolise the Scan history sheet: a single image with dozens of scans pushed every other image off screen, and the underlying vulnerability_scans table grew without bound. Each image group's table now renders inside its own ScrollArea capped at max-h-64 (~6 rows visible) so a busy image scrolls independently while the list of images stays navigable. A new global setting scan_history_per_image_limit (default 50, min 5, max 1000) backs both a window-function query that caps the response per image_ref and a prune step that runs on the existing MonitorService cleanup tick. The response now carries cappedImageRefs + perImageLimit so the UI can render a "Capped at N · older scans pruned" hint on groups sitting at the ceiling without a second settings round-trip. Single-image deep-dive (imageRef query param) bypasses the cap so a user clicking into one image can still see its full history. The prune uses self-contained subqueries to avoid SQLITE_MAX_VARIABLE_NUMBER issues on first-run installs with large backlogs, and explicitly deletes child rows from vulnerability_details, secret_findings, and misconfig_findings inside a transaction since FK cascade is not enabled at the connection level. Settings → Developer → Data retention gains a "Scan history per image" field. * fix(security): skip searchDraft debounce on mount to stop page-reset race The searchDraft debounce useEffect fires once on initial mount with the unchanged value and, 300ms later, unconditionally calls setPage(0). When a user (or a test) paginates inside that 300ms window, the pending debounce silently undoes the page advance. CI surfaced this as a flaky 3rd fetch in the "advances offset when the user pages forward" test once the per-image cap work added enough state-update overhead to push the click past the 300ms threshold on the slower Linux jsdom run. Track searchDraft with a ref and exit the effect when the value has not actually changed, so the debounce only runs in response to real user typing. |
||
|
Anso
|
80499ee18d |
feat(stack-activity): in-process metrics, structured diagnostic logs, docs (#1229)
Phase 3 + Phase 6 of the Stack Activity audit (PR 2 of 2): - StackActivityMetricsService: in-process counters and ring-buffered latency histogram (1000 samples per nodeId/op pair). Mirrors the FileExplorerMetricsService pattern shipped in #1216. No external export. Records (nodeId, op) where op is read or write, with success/error counts and p50/p95 latency on demand. - Admin endpoint GET /api/stack-activity-metrics returns the snapshot. Admin-only via requireAdmin, mounted next to the file-explorer metrics route. An operator debugging "why is the activity tab slow on this node?" can pull per-(nodeId, op) counts and latencies without scrolling logs. - Diagnostic logs: route handler emits a structured [StackActivity:diag] read entry per request (stackName, nodeId, limit, before, beforeId, returned, elapsedMs); dispatchAlert emits a [StackActivity:diag] write entry per persisted notification (category, stackName, nodeId, actor, messageLen). Both gated on developer_mode via isDebugEnabled. Same namespace so a single grep covers reads and writes on the timeline path. Per-request and per-event, never inside a poll loop. - Metric record points: the route's try/finally records a read metric with the outcome of the DB call; dispatchAlert records a write metric on both the success path and (before re-throwing) the failure path, so error rates from the insert path stay visible. - docs/features/stack-activity.mdx: refreshed to reflect PR 1's retention behavior (30 days plus per-(node, stack) 500-row cap, 1000 per-node unattached), composite (timestamp, id) cursor, error-vs- empty UI distinction, and "by username" vs "via Subsystem" actor rendering. Adds Troubleshooting entries for "Activity unavailable" (node disconnect or fetch failure), "expected event missing" (retention windows), and "same restart shows twice" (manual click vs Auto-Heal redeploy are distinct events). No tier, role, or capability gate touched. The admin metrics endpoint inherits the standard requireAdmin gate already used by /api/file- explorer-metrics and /api/stack-metrics. |
||
|
Anso
|
2d56ea958a |
fix(stack-activity): per-stack history integrity, attribution, sanitization (#1228)
* fix(stack-activity): per-stack history integrity, attribution, sanitization Address the Stack Activity audit findings (PR 1 of 2): - Per-stack history integrity: drop the per-insert 100-row prune in addNotificationHistory that evicted quieter stacks' history whenever another stack got chatty. Periodic cleanupOldNotifications now caps per (node, stack) at 500 rows and per-node unattached system events at 1000 rows, on top of the existing 30-day retention. Signature takes an options bag and returns a per-stage summary so MonitorService can log what actually ran each cycle. - Actor attribution: thread req.user?.username through every notifyActionFailure call site and add synthetic actors at service emit sites (system:autoheal, system:scheduler, system:image-update, system:docker-events, system:blueprint, system:monitor, system:policy). The timeline renders system actors as "via <Label>" so an autoheal redeploy is no longer indistinguishable from a user redeploy. - Message sanitization: new sanitizeNotificationMessage at NotificationService.dispatchAlert strips KEY=VALUE pairs whose key ends in TOKEN/KEY/PASSWORD/SECRET/CREDENTIALS/AUTH, scrubs HTTP basic auth in URLs and Bearer tokens, collapses COMPOSE_DIR paths, and truncates to 1000 chars. Applied to the stored history and to every downstream Discord/Slack/webhook channel. The ImageUpdateService recovery-path direct DB write also runs through the sanitizer. - Composite pagination cursor: getStackActivity now accepts a (timestamp, id) cursor (?before=&beforeId=). The legacy timestamp-only form silently dropped events when a single compose up emitted many events sharing one millisecond. Route rejects beforeId without before. - Frontend hardening: distinct error state with retry button (initial fetch failure no longer renders as the genuine empty state), strict positive-integer parsing on cursor params, overrequest-by-1 pagination so the last page does not leave a dead "Load more" click, runtime guard on liveEvents merge that validates the level union, per-minute day-bucket recompute so an open panel does not stay on "Today" past midnight. No tier, role, or capability gate touched. Route permission gate remains stack:read on the named stack. * fix(stack-activity): sanitizer covers lowercase env vars and per-node compose dir External review surfaced two leak paths in the message sanitizer: - The sensitive-key regex was uppercase-only. Compose env names are conventionally uppercase but lowercase forms (db_password, jwt_secret, github_token) are valid and do leak through the same Docker and compose-parse error paths. Make the regex case-insensitive and tighten it to also catch bare TOKEN= / KEY= / PASSWORD= without a prefix word, while still leaving BYPASS, COMPASS, and similar non-secret keys alone. - The compose-dir path collapse only read process.env.COMPOSE_DIR, but the real resolution chain is node.compose_dir (per-node DB override) -> process.env.COMPOSE_DIR -> /app/compose. A node with a custom compose_dir could still leak absolute paths into stored history and downstream channels. Route both the dispatchAlert call and the ImageUpdateService recovery-path direct write through NodeRegistry.getInstance().getComposeDir(localNodeId) so the collapse covers every resolution outcome. Tests now assert lowercase keys are redacted and that BYPASS-style non-secrets stay intact in both cases. notification-routing mock extended to stub the new getComposeDir call. * chore(stack-activity): a11y roles, visibility-aware tick, live-disconnect signal Close three small follow-ups on the per-stack activity timeline: - A11y: each day-group gets role="list" and each event row gets role="listitem" so screen readers traverse the timeline as a list instead of a wall of text. The day-group container also carries an aria-label naming the bucket. - Visibility-aware day-bucket tick: the 60s setInterval that re-derives Today/Yesterday/Earlier now short-circuits when document.hidden, so a backgrounded panel does not re-render every minute for no visible effect. - Live-disconnect signal: useNotifications dispatches a sencho:notifications-connection custom event on WebSocket open and close. The timeline listens and, when explicitly disconnected, shows a one-line "Live updates offline; reconnecting…" hint above the list. The sidebar ticker already surfaces fleet-wide connection state; this adds an in-context cue for users who are focused on a single stack. Stack-name case normalization was considered and rejected: stack names are case-permissive per the isValidStackName validator, and lowercasing on read or write would silently rename or hide a user's "MyApp" stack. * ci(stack-activity): drop unnecessary escape in URL_BASIC_AUTH regex ESLint no-useless-escape errored on \- inside the character class [a-zA-Z0-9+.\-] at notificationMessage.ts:14. Move the dash to the end of the class so it's an unambiguous literal and the escape is no longer required. Behavior is identical; sanitizer tests still pass. * revert(stack-activity): drop unvalidated E2E spec from this PR The spec was committed without ever running against a real Docker daemon, then failed in CI when it ran for the first time: deploy returned 200 but no notification appeared on the activity endpoint within the polling window, suggesting either a deploy-notification race or a node-id resolution mismatch in the CI environment. Backend unit tests (route + composite cursor + sanitizer) and frontend component tests cover the same logic. The E2E spec will land in a dedicated follow-up once it has been authored against a working CI environment. |
||
|
Anso
|
9f2f13f35a |
feat(stack-files): in-process metrics and structured mutation logs (#1216)
* feat(stack-files): in-process metrics and structured mutation logs
Adds FileExplorerMetricsService, an in-memory counter and latency
histogram keyed by (nodeId, op) modelled on StackOpMetricsService.
record() is called once per file-route request from a small
recordFileOp helper that wraps the metric capture; rejection paths
that ran real filesystem work (overwrite confirms, write conflicts,
multer oversize) now record an error count and a warn log instead of
disappearing from the snapshot. recordUploadBytes tracks bytes that
actually persisted so a node taking many small uploads vs a few large
ones is visible in the dashboard.
Admin-only GET /api/file-explorer-metrics returns the snapshot in the
same shape as /api/stack-metrics so an operator chasing a slow node
has a single place to look. No external telemetry; everything is
process-local and resets on restart.
Mutation INFO lines now carry op, stack, path, and bytes/mode/
recursive/overwrite/toPath in the structured details so log scrapers
can pivot on the same identity the metric uses. The existing
developer_mode gate on logFileDiag is unchanged. A new
rejectFileMutation helper centralises the log+metric+response triple
on the three rejection sites (upload DIR_EXISTS, upload FILE_EXISTS,
write PRECONDITION_FAILED) so a future rejection cannot skip the
metric.
Tests cover the service in isolation (counts, p50/p95, ring buffer cap,
upload bytes tracking, snapshot sorting), the admin route auth and
shape, and the route layer end-to-end: a real upload surfaces in
/api/file-explorer-metrics, a FILE_EXISTS rejection bumps errorCount,
and the structured INFO line carries the expected fields.
* fix(stack-files): tighten download/upload latency tracking
Two metric-accuracy bugs caught in independent review:
Download metric was recorded as a success before result.stream.pipe(res)
ran. A mid-stream read failure or a client disconnect was not counted as
an error because the recorder fired at pipe time, not stream completion.
Now the recorder hangs off res.on('finish') for success and on both the
stream's error event and res.on('close') for failure, with a flag so a
normal completion (which emits both finish and close) does not produce
two recordings.
Upload latency was inconsistent across the success and failure branches.
The multer wrapper captured startedAt at route entry, but the async
handler created its own startedAt after multer had already buffered the
body. Successful uploads therefore reported only the post-multer time
and the multipart transfer/buffer cost vanished from the histogram. The
wrapper now stashes the route-entry timestamp on the request object and
the async handler reads it back, so every metric for a given upload
shares one window.
A new test pins the download recorder behaviour: a single successful
download must produce successCount=1, count=1, errorCount=0 in the
snapshot, which would have flagged the original double-fire path the
finish+close pair could have introduced.
|
||
|
Anso
|
d8b6f8cf3b |
feat(stack-files): force-text override for misidentified binary files (#1215)
* feat(stack-files): force-text override for misidentified binary files
The binary-detection heuristic (30% non-printable / NUL in the first
8 KB) sometimes flags UTF-8 files that happen to carry an embedded NUL
or a high non-printable ratio, locking the user out of inline editing
with only a Download fallback.
readStackFile now accepts an optional { forceText: true } that bypasses
isBinaryBuffer on the small-file path and returns the bytes as UTF-8
content. The route exposes this as ?force=text on GET /files/content.
The oversized branch deliberately stays untouched: returning a multi-MB
file as JSON-encoded text is wasteful regardless of the heuristic.
SpecialFilePanel grows an optional extraAction slot. The viewer's
binary branch wires Open as text anyway, which refetches with the new
flag, clears isBinary, and routes the content through the existing
Monaco editor path. A failed override surfaces both an inline error
panel and a toast so the user knows why the click did nothing.
Backend tests pin the heuristic-vs-override behaviour pair on a file
with a literal NUL byte. The frontend test asserts that the second
readStackFile call carries forceText: true and that Monaco mounts.
Troubleshooting accordion entry updated to mention the new affordance.
* fix(stack-files): guard the binary-override path against oversized files
The override on the binary panel could open Monaco against an empty
content buffer if the backend's oversized branch ran (files past the
2 MB inline-preview cap intentionally carry no content even when
force=text is set). Saving that empty buffer would wipe the file on
disk.
Two reinforcing changes:
- Initial load now checks result.oversized before result.binary, so a
file that is both oversized and has binary bytes in the 8 KB probe
shows the Download panel rather than the binary panel. The size
signal stays in front of the operator and the override button never
surfaces for a file that cannot be safely opened inline.
- The handleForceText handler now respects result.oversized on the
refetch and transitions to the Download panel instead of clearing
isBinary and copying result.content ?? '' into Monaco.
Same handler also gains a stale-request guard via a selectedPathRef:
a slow override for file A no longer stomps on file B's state if the
user navigated away while the request was in flight.
Two regression tests pin the new behaviour: oversized+binary surfaces
the Download panel on initial load, and an oversized refetch from the
binary panel routes to the Download panel rather than Monaco.
|
||
|
Anso
|
c2357ec534 |
fix(stack-files): symlink-aware delete and chmod (#1214)
deleteStackPath now lstats the leaf and unlinks the link entry itself when it is a symbolic link, so the file the user clicked on in the tree is what gets removed (the linked target stays intact). chmodStackPath rejects with LINK_CHMOD_UNSUPPORTED on a symlink rather than silently mutating the target's permissions; Node's lchmod is macOS-only and following the link is the bug being fixed here. Path-component symlinks are still resolved via the existing resolveSafeStackPath, so a symlinked parent that escapes the stack dir still surfaces SYMLINK_ESCAPE before the leaf is inspected. Service-level tests cover delete on internal-target / external-target / broken / dir-target symlinks, chmod rejection on symlinks (including the broken case), and non-symlink regression checks. Route-level tests pin the 409 LINK_CHMOD_UNSUPPORTED mapping and the link-only-delete behaviour. The describe blocks are platform-gated; Windows symlink creation needs admin/developer-mode and is skipped along with the existing SYMLINK_ESCAPE test. Docs updated to describe both behaviours in plain product terms. |
||
|
Anso
|
fcf2222604 |
feat(stack-files): cap directory listings at 1000 + add file-tree filter (#1208)
* feat(stack-files): cap directory listings at 1000 + add file-tree filter
The file-tree route returned every entry in a directory unbounded.
A logs/ or data/ subfolder with rotated artifacts could produce a
multi-megabyte response and a frontend cap at 500 entries silently
hid the rest with no way for the user to find a specific file.
The list route now caps the response at 1000 entries (the audit's
recommended bound), advertises the unfiltered total via
X-Total-Count, and sets X-Truncated when truncation happened. The
service exposes both a bare-array listStackDirectory (unchanged
contract for callers that just want the array) and a paginated
listStackDirectoryPage that returns {entries, total, truncated}.
The FileTree now offers a search input above the scroll area that
filters loaded entries by name (case-insensitive substring). Clearing
the filter restores the full listing. A non-matching filter shows a
short hint instead of an empty pane. The client-side MAX_ENTRIES
matches the server cap so a perfectly-sized directory never shows
the truncation hint.
* fix(stack-files): filter keeps parent dirs when loaded descendants match
The original filter applied per-render-level inside renderEntries, so a
parent directory whose name did not match was filtered out even when one
of its already-loaded children did. The match was then unreachable: the
parent had been removed from the visible list and its children never got
a chance to render.
Compute matching-descendant once per directory by walking the loaded
dirContents map (no extra fetch, bounded by what the user already
expanded). Keep ancestors of any match in the visible list. Auto-expand
those ancestors for the duration of the filter so the match comes into
view without a manual click on every parent.
Filter scope is still 'what is already loaded'; unexpanded subtrees do
not contribute to ancestor-keep until the user expands them. Two new
tests pin both behaviours.
|
||
|
Anso
|
4964320f50 |
fix(stack-files): optimistic concurrency on file-tab writes via mtime ETag (#1206)
* fix(stack-files): optimistic concurrency on file-tab writes via mtime ETag PUT /api/stacks/:name/files/content previously did a blind write; two operators editing the same script lost one of the saves with no warning. The compose-file editor already had mtime optimistic concurrency (PR #1183); this brings the file-explorer write path to the same shape. GET /files/content now also returns mtimeMs and sets a weak ETag header derived from the stat. The matching PUT reads If-Match, asks FileSystemService.writeStackFileIfUnchanged to compare against the live mtime, and returns 412 PRECONDITION_FAILED with the current content and mtime when the stale-write check fails. Successful writes echo a fresh ETag so the client can pin the next save without re-GET. readStackFile and writeStackFileIfUnchanged each open the file once and stat+read through the same handle so the mtime returned to the client matches the bytes that were sent, even if the file is replaced between the two operations. PUT without If-Match still succeeds (backward compatibility with scripted clients that do not roundtrip the ETag). FileViewer now sends the loaded mtime on save, updates its local mtime from the success response, and on FileConflictError adopts the server snapshot as the new baseline so the user's follow-up edit-and-save does not loop on the same precondition. * fix(stack-files): treat deleted-target as conflict; preserve user buffer on conflict Two follow-ups from code review on the prior commit: - writeStackFileIfUnchanged now returns ok:false when expectedMtimeMs is set and the target has been deleted. The caller was editing a file that no longer exists; silently writing the buffer to the void is wrong. The client adopts the empty snapshot as 'file is gone, start over' and the user keeps control of what to save next. - The FileViewer conflict handler no longer overwrites the user's typed buffer with the server snapshot. It updates the baseline so the next save sends the fresh mtime, then leaves the editor content alone. The user sees their edits, the Save button stays enabled, and a follow-up click applies their changes on top of the new server version without silently destroying what they typed. * fix(api): preserve default headers when caller supplies a headers field apiFetch built defaultOptions.headers by merging Content-Type, x-node-id, and the caller's headers, but then spread the unmodified fetchOptions over defaultOptions at the outer level. The spread overwrote the merged headers with the caller's bare headers, silently dropping Content-Type on every request that supplied any custom header. This was latent until the file-explorer save path started sending an If-Match header. The Express body parser refused the PUT without Content-Type, the route returned 400, the editor showed an error toast instead of the success toast, and the Playwright save assertion timed out. Destructure headers out of fetchOptions before the outer spread so the already-merged defaultOptions.headers survives. Add api.test.ts with four regression cases pinning Content-Type, the If-Match merge, x-node-id presence when active, and localOnly skip. |
||
|
Anso
|
668eda6cc8 |
fix(stack-files): atomic write via tmp+rename with optional exclusive mode (#1205)
* fix(stack-files): atomic write via tmp+rename with optional exclusive mode writeStackFile and writeStackFileBuffer previously called fs.writeFile directly, which truncates the target then streams the new bytes. A crash, disk-full event, or process kill between the truncate and the write left the target with partial content and no easy way to detect the half-write at read time. A private writeStackFileAtomic helper stages every write into a sibling .sencho-tmp-<suffix> file in the same directory, fsyncs, then promotes via fs.rename. A crash now leaves either the original target intact or a leftover .sencho-tmp file (cleaned up on the next failure path); a torn target file is no longer reachable through this path. The helper accepts an optional `exclusive: true` flag that swaps the final promote step from rename to link+unlink. link is atomic against EEXIST so a caller that needs "create only if not present" gets a race-free FILE_EXISTS error instead of a clobber. The upload route's overwrite-confirm flow (PR #1204) will wire this through in a follow-up so the existence check becomes authoritative. Behaviour for current callers (writeStackFile, writeStackFileBuffer, BlueprintService deploy) is unchanged: the non-exclusive default matches the prior fs.writeFile semantics from the caller's perspective. * fix(stack-files): tighten atomic write entropy + concurrent / failure tests Tmp suffix now uses crypto.randomBytes(6) so the per-process collision window is a true 48-bit space (Math.random().toString(36).slice(2,6) could drop leading zeros and narrow entropy unpredictably). Adds a short comment on the Windows link path noting NTFS / same-FS POSIX is required, both guaranteed by tmp+target being siblings. Two new tests close coverage gaps the first round missed: - a write step that throws (writeFile rejected) leaves no tmp leak and no partial target; - concurrent non-exclusive writers settle with at least one success and the final file is exactly one of the inputs (POSIX silently overwrites; Windows EPERMs the loser, both consistent). |
||
|
Anso
|
c8b095b887 |
fix(stack-files): confirm before overwriting an existing upload target (#1204)
* fix(stack-files): confirm before overwriting an existing upload target Same-name uploads previously truncated the existing file silently. A user dragging a file with a name that matched an in-place file destroyed the original with no warning and no undo. The upload route now reads ?overwrite=0|1. When the flag is not set and the target already exists, the server returns 409 FILE_EXISTS and the original file is untouched. The frontend opens a confirm dialog and retries with overwrite=1 on the user's approval; cancel keeps the original. A new pathExists helper on FileSystemService performs the existence check through the same path-resolution barrier as the write so a malicious relPath cannot bypass the conflict check. UploadConflictError is exported so callers can distinguish the conflict case from generic upload failures without parsing error strings. * fix(stack-files): distinct DIR_EXISTS code, drop INVALID_PATH swallow in existence check |
||
|
Anso
|
37b12379c1 |
fix(stacks): refuse file-explorer delete/rename/chmod on protected stack files (#1202)
* fix(stacks): refuse file-explorer delete/rename/chmod on protected stack files Previously the per-stack file explorer treated PROTECTED_STACK_FILES (compose.yaml, compose.yml, docker-compose.yaml/.yml, .env) as a UI hint only. A direct API call from any user with stack:edit could delete or rename compose.yaml and break the stack irrecoverably because the next deploy would fail to find a compose file and the write was unrecoverable without a DB backup. The frontend DeleteFileConfirm enforced a type-to-confirm gate but a stale UI or a scripted client bypassed it. FileSystemService now refuses the destructive ops at the service layer with a new PROTECTED_FILE error code that the route layer surfaces as 409. The compose-editor save path (PUT /files/content) and the upload-overwrite path (POST /files/upload writing a same-named file) remain unblocked because both are legitimate ways to update compose.yaml. Tests pin the allowed paths so a future tightening can not silently regress them. The protection is scoped to entries at the stack root; subdirectory files happen to share a protected name (e.g., a snapshot under backups/compose.yaml) are not blocked because compose CLI only reads the root file. A trailing-slash bypass is closed by stripping trailing separators before the basename check. Frontend DeleteFileConfirm needs no change. Its existing toast.error surface renders the friendly server message. * fix(stack-files): drop polynomial regex from protected-file helpers CodeQL js/polynomial-redos flagged the /\/+$/ pattern used to strip trailing slashes from relPath in isProtectedRelPath and protectedFileError. The regex is bounded in practice (the upstream validator rejects '//' anywhere in the path) but the static analyzer cannot follow that dataflow guarantee and would have flagged any future caller that skips the validator. Replace the two callsites with a small stripTrailingSlash helper that uses endsWith + slice. Bounded O(1), no regex, no analyzer alert. The inline comment documents the upstream invariant so a future reader does not reintroduce the /+ quantifier. |
||
|
Anso
|
7ec6fe05bb |
feat(stacks): in-process per-(nodeId, action) metrics + admin endpoint (#1196)
Sencho exports no telemetry by design (privacy-first posture). That left
operators with no answer for "why is this remote node slow today?"
except scrolling logs. The audit log records mutations but has no
latency information.
Adds StackOpMetricsService - a tiny singleton holding per-(nodeId, action)
counters and a 1000-sample ring buffer of latencies for p50/p95.
Exposed through GET /api/stack-metrics (admin-only) so operators can
pull the snapshot when debugging without touching disk or scrolling
journalctl. No external export; the data never leaves the process.
Wiring: deploy, down, restart, stop, start, update routes each capture
t0 at entry, set ok=true after the success path, and record() in a
finally block so failures count too. The record() call is cheap (one
Map lookup, one push, occasional shift on the bounded ring buffer)
and bounded in memory regardless of throughput.
Resolves M-4 from the stack-management audit.
API:
GET /api/stack-metrics (admin-only)
Response: { entries: [{ nodeId, action, count, successCount,
errorCount, avgMs, p50Ms, p95Ms }, ...] }
Ordering: nodeId ascending, then action ascending.
Note on route mounting: /api/stack-metrics rather than the audit doc's
suggested /api/meta/stack-metrics because metaRouter is intentionally
mounted before authGate (public /api/health and /api/meta endpoints);
adding an admin-only route to that group would either bypass auth or
need a special inline gate that fights the existing structure. A
dedicated /api/stack-metrics router after authGate is cleaner.
Tests:
- 9 unit tests in stack-op-metrics-service.test.ts: singleton,
keyed-by-nodeId-action, p50/p95 math, ring-buffer cap at 1000,
NaN/negative/Infinity rejection, ordering, reset.
- 3 integration tests in stack-metrics-route.test.ts: 401 without
auth, empty on fresh process, shape after recording.
|
||
|
Anso
|
60247d9c2e |
chore(stacks): gate informational console.log behind developer_mode (#1194)
Rebased onto current main (post H-1 / H-2 / L-3 / M-2 / M-6 merges).
Same intent as the original M-5 commit:
- Local dlog() helper in routes/stacks.ts wrapping console.log
behind isDebugEnabled().
- All informational console.log in stacks.ts replaced with dlog().
- The 3 Exec session-lifecycle console.log in DockerController.ts
wrapped with inline if (isDebugEnabled()) gates.
console.warn and console.error remain unconditional everywhere.
Resolves M-5 from the stack-management audit.
|
||
|
Anso
|
fbd13accda |
feat(stacks): optimistic concurrency on compose and env file writes (#1183)
* feat(stacks): optimistic concurrency on compose and env file writes
Two browser tabs (or one tab + an out-of-band edit) could silently
overwrite each other's compose.yaml or .env edits. GET /api/stacks/:name
and GET /api/stacks/:name/env now emit a W/"<mtime>" ETag header. PUT
on the same endpoints reads If-Match and returns 412 with
{code: 'stack_file_changed', currentMtimeMs, currentContent} on a stale
write, so the editor can recover without losing the user's text.
The 412 path in the editor surfaces a confirm dialog: "Overwrite
their changes?" Cancel loads the latest content into the editor and
exits edit mode. OK retries the PUT with no If-Match header.
If-Match is optional. A client that doesn't send it falls through to
the previous unconditional-write behavior so partial deploys (file
explorer uploads, git source sync) don't gain a surprise 412 surface.
* fix(stacks): consistent stat+read for compose mtime via held file handle
Promise.all([readFile, stat]) lets a concurrent write interleave between
the two calls: the read can return new content while the stat returns
the old mtime (or vice versa). The next If-Match check would then either
spuriously trigger 412 or silently allow an overwrite.
Hold the file descriptor open across stat and read so both ops observe
the same inode state. A rename-replace by another writer would not
affect the held fd's view.
Adds a near-boundary mtime test (1-second bump) to confirm the
Math.floor comparison detects whole-second changes on filesystems that
round to second-level precision.
* fix(stacks): defense-in-depth path validation in new compose mtime methods
CodeQL's taint engine on PR #1183 flagged 10 js/path-injection errors
across the four new FileSystemService methods (getStackContentWithMtime,
saveStackContentIfUnchanged, writeFileIfUnchanged, statMtime). The
engine does not follow the existing assertWithinBase guard across the
resolveStackDir / getComposeFilePath helper boundary; from its view the
stackName flows straight from req.params into a filesystem sink.
Eight alerts (getStackContentWithMtime + saveStackContentIfUnchanged)
were CodeQL blind-spot: the path WAS validated inside resolveStackDir.
Two alerts (writeFileIfUnchanged + statMtime) were genuinely missing
service-level guards because those methods accept a raw targetPath
from the caller and trusted the route to have validated upstream.
Add an explicit this.assertWithinBase(filePath) at the top of each
new method. The check is redundant for the two methods that already
went through resolveStackDir but makes the safety boundary visible
both to readers and to CodeQL's taint follower.
While here, port the held-file-descriptor pattern (already applied to
getStackContentWithMtime in dd7545eb) to the stat-then-read sequence
in saveStackContentIfUnchanged and writeFileIfUnchanged. This closes
the two js/file-system-race warnings on those branches so a concurrent
rename-replace cannot interleave between the mismatch detection and
the currentContent capture returned in the 412 payload.
The two remaining js/http-to-file-access warnings ("write to file
system depends on untrusted data") are semantic and intentional: this
is the save endpoint by design. They stay as warnings (not errors),
do not block CI, and are not suppressed because the codebase does not
do CodeQL suppression annotations.
* fix(stacks): inline path.resolve+startsWith barrier per CodeQL recommendation
The previous fix added this.assertWithinBase() calls at the top of each
new method. CodeQL's taint-flow analysis does not follow that helper
call across the function boundary, so it still saw the path as
user-tainted at every fs sink (10 -> 8 alerts after the first attempt).
CodeQL's documented js/path-injection sanitizer recognizes the
following inline pattern:
filePath = path.resolve(ROOT, filePath);
if (!filePath.startsWith(ROOT)) { throw / return; }
// use the reassigned filePath below
The key elements are (1) path.resolve as the normalizer, (2) startsWith
check, (3) reject inline, (4) downstream use of the reassigned
variable. None of these can hide behind a helper call or the taint
tracker re-flags every sink.
Inlines the pattern in each of the four new methods (getStackContentWith-
Mtime, saveStackContentIfUnchanged, writeFileIfUnchanged, statMtime).
The check stays runtime-correct (it's the same logic isPathWithinBase
implements) but is now visible to static analysis.
writeFileIfUnchanged and statMtime had no service-level guard at all
before this commit (they trusted the caller); the inline barrier closes
that real gap as well as the CodeQL-recognition gap.
* fix(stacks): canonical CodeQL js/path-injection barrier shape
The prior inline check used path.resolve(filePath) with a single
argument and a compound condition (a !== b && !c.startsWith(d)).
CodeQL's path-injection sanitizer recognizer is shape-sensitive: it
matches path.resolve(SAFE_ROOT, untrusted) with the safe root as the
first argument, followed by a single unary startsWith check on the
resolved variable. The compound form and the single-arg resolve fell
outside the recognized pattern, leaving 8 alerts unchanged across the
four new methods.
Rewrite the barrier in each method to match the documented shape
verbatim:
const baseResolved = path.resolve(this.baseDir);
const safePath = path.resolve(baseResolved, untrustedInput);
if (!safePath.startsWith(baseResolved + path.sep)) {
throw ...;
}
// sinks consume safePath
baseResolved is a local variable (anchors the resolve call against a
known-safe root). safePath is the reassigned, sanitized variable that
every downstream fs.* call consumes. The single startsWith check with
path.sep appended prevents the prefix-match edge case (/foo matches
/foobar without the separator). All four affected methods get the
same form.
This is the third attempt at the CodeQL fix. The first added an
assertWithinBase helper (function call, not followed across the
boundary). The second inlined path.resolve(x) with a compound check
(non-canonical shape). This commit uses the literal recommended
sanitizer.
|
||
|
Anso
|
d727a55a5f |
feat(stacks): surface post-deploy scan attempt status (#1198)
triggerPostDeployScan was fire-and-forget. When Trivy was missing on a
node, when the registry refused the digest lookup, or when a single
image scan threw, the failure went to console.error and the user
never learned. Open the security tab later, see stale data, no
indicator that the scan even tried.
Backend:
- New stack_scan_attempts table (node_id, stack_name, status,
attempted_at, error_message). One row per stack; latest attempt
overwrites the previous one.
- DatabaseService gains recordStackScanAttempt /
getStackScanAttempt / clearStackScanAttempts. Status is one of
'ok' | 'partial' | 'failed' | 'skipped'.
- triggerPostDeployScan in helpers/policyGate.ts now records every
exit path: 'skipped' when Trivy is unavailable or no images to
scan; 'failed' when container enumeration or all images fail;
'partial' when some images scan and others fail; 'ok' on full
success.
- New GET /api/stacks/:name/scan-status returns { status,
attemptedAt, errorMessage } or { status: null } when never tried.
- DELETE /:stackName cleanup chain now clears the row alongside
the existing update-status / auto-update cleanups.
Frontend:
- StackAnatomyPanel fetches /scan-status on stackName change.
- Renders a small warning strip below the update banner when
status !== 'ok' (failed / partial / skipped). Hidden when status
is 'ok' or unknown (never attempted). Title attribute carries
the full error message for hover inspection.
Cross-feature note: the audit doc flagged this as M-6 with a
coordination note for the pending Security feature audit. The
schema kept intentionally narrow (one row per stack, simple
status enum) so the Security audit can extend it (richer history,
per-image-row breakdown, etc.) without a destructive migration.
Resolves M-6 from the stack-management audit.
|
||
|
Anso
|
60ecd574b3 |
fix(stacks): serialize concurrent lifecycle operations per stack (#1182)
* fix(stacks): serialize concurrent lifecycle operations per stack
Two simultaneous POSTs to /api/stacks/:name/{deploy,down,restart,stop,
start,update} could race against the same compose project, doubling
notifications, doubling post-deploy scans, and corrupting the
atomic-deploy backup snapshot. Each lifecycle route now acquires a
per-(nodeId, stackName) in-process lock; the second caller gets 409
with {code: 'stack_op_in_progress', inProgress: {action, startedAt,
user}} and the frontend surfaces a "X is already deploying" toast.
The lock is process-local on purpose: it shares a lifetime with the
docker compose child process. A Sencho restart clears all locks, which
matches the truth that an in-flight compose op is gone too.
The existing policy-block 409 is shape-distinguishable (has policy /
violations) and continues to work; the frontend checks the new code
discriminator first before falling through to policy handling.
* chore(stacks): validate action enum in 409 parser; cover start collision
The frontend parseStackOpInProgress used to cast the parsed action
directly to StackOpAction. A backend bug or spoofed payload returning
action='wibble' would slip through. Validate against the known enum
set before returning the parsed info.
Adds an integration test for the deploy-blocks-while-start-in-flight
case so all six lifecycle verbs have collision coverage (the existing
suite covered deploy/down/restart/stop/update; start was indirect).
|
||
|
Anso
|
8ba88755b1 |
fix(stacks): default Empty template ships ports block commented out (#1189)
The Empty branch of the Create Stack flow wrote a compose.yaml whose first service bound the host's port 8080 by default. On any workstation already running something on 8080 (traefik, caddy, librespeed, another nginx, etc.) the very first deploy failed at the docker compose networking step with "Bind for 0.0.0.0:8080 failed: port is already allocated", which made the day-one experience feel broken right after F-2 (PR #1168) tightened the dialog itself. The boilerplate in FileSystemService.createStack now emits the ports block commented out plus a one-line hint above it. A fresh deploy binds no host port, so the container starts cleanly on any host; the user uncomments the two-line block when they're ready to expose the container. The deterministic shape (no probe-and-write, no random port, no preflight scan) avoids the TOCTOU race that a free-port probe would have left between template creation and the actual compose up. Adds backend/src/__tests__/file-system-service-create-stack.test.ts (8 cases): directory + file creation, structural YAML assertions via yaml.parse to lock in the no-live-ports invariant, raw-text regex to lock in the commented hint, and the already-exists rejection path. FileSystemService.createStack had no coverage before this change. Adds e2e/default-stack-template-no-fixed-port.spec.ts (1 case): drives the dialog through Create, reads the resulting compose via the in-browser apiFetch, and asserts the live + commented invariants end-to-end. docs/features/stack-management.mdx Empty bullet rewritten to describe the minimal skeleton and the commented ports block instead of calling it "blank". Resolves: F-3 in the v1.0 audit tracker. |
||
|
Anso
|
aa3d99a594 |
fix(mesh): re-evaluate data plane every 10s and add opt-in auto-recreate (#1184)
* fix(mesh): re-evaluate data plane every 10s and add opt-in auto-recreate MeshService.dataPlaneStatus was written exactly once at boot in setupMeshNetwork() and never re-evaluated. After the operator removed sencho_mesh at runtime (or it was recreated externally, or Sencho was disconnected from it), /api/health and the dashboard banner kept returning the stale boot-time discriminator until the next process restart. Adds a 10s revalidator that inspects the current Docker truth in one network-inspect call and transitions dataPlaneStatus to reflect it. Short-circuits in not_started / not_in_docker / subnet_invalid (states that cannot change within this process) and in concurrent ticks. Transitions are idempotent on stable state, so the timer can tick indefinitely on a healthy mesh without log noise. New 'not_found' reason value for the network-was-removed-at-runtime case. Existing reasons (subnet_mismatch, subnet_overlap, attach_failed) also surface from the revalidator when their underlying conditions arise post-boot. transitionDataPlane keeps message and subnet fields fresh across consecutive observations even when reason is unchanged, so /api/health never reports stale numbers (e.g. two consecutive subnet_mismatch observations against different external subnets). Adds an opt-in mesh_auto_recreate global setting (default off). When on, the revalidator additionally calls attemptInPlaceRecreate() after surfacing not_found. The helper hard-prefers the boot-chosen subnet (this.meshSubnet) and never iterates candidates, because changing the subnet here would invalidate every existing extra_hosts override on disk. A real conflict on the original subnet is reported as subnet_overlap and preserved during the 60s recreate throttle window so the operator-actionable reason is not flapped back to not_found between attempts. Self-attachment is checked via Name match (operator --hostname X matches container Name /X) or full container-ID prefix for hex HOSTNAMEs >= 12 chars (Docker default short ID). Non-hex HOSTNAMEs cannot collide with container IDs at all so a Name miss is conclusive; short hex HOSTNAMEs preserve the prior status as 'unknown' rather than risking a false-positive prefix match. Frontend surfaces: - types/mesh.ts: 'not_found' added to MeshDataPlaneReason. - MeshDataPlaneBanner: 'not_found' headline copy. - Settings > System > Mesh data plane: TogglePill bound to mesh_auto_recreate, default off, helper text explains the tradeoff. Backend coverage in backend/src/__tests__/mesh-data-plane-revalidate.test.ts (25 cases): short-circuits, idempotent stable-state, recovery from subnet_mismatch / subnet_overlap, transition to not_found / subnet_mismatch / attach_failed, transient-Docker anti-flap, re-entrancy guard, name match path, ID-prefix path, short hex hostname ambiguity, non-hex hostname certainty, transition message refresh on observation drift, auto-recreate off (default), auto-recreate success with senchoIp preservation, auto-recreate overlap classification with no subnet drift, throttle window preserves classified reason, throttle release. Lifecycle test covers timer wiring in start()/stop(). Existing mesh-setup-error-classification suite (27 cases) still green. Resolves: F-4 in the v1.0 audit tracker. * fix(mesh): address Codex review of PR #1184 Three findings from the independent review: BLOCKER: attemptInPlaceRecreate() called recordSetupFailure() on create / attach failures, which clears this.senchoIp. The next revalidator tick's attachment check is guarded on senchoIp, so with it null the check is skipped and the snapshot path can silently flip the status back to ok against a network where Sencho is in fact not attached. Also: a later successful recreate would call ensureSelfAttached() with senchoIp null, which short-circuits, so the network gets recreated without binding Sencho. Replaced the recordSetupFailure() calls in attemptInPlaceRecreate with a new recordRecreateFailure() that uses transitionDataPlane and preserves senchoIp. Added two tests: create-fails-then-succeeds (verifies senchoIp survives the failure and the later retry binds Sencho correctly) and create-succeeds-attach-fails-then-next-tick (verifies the snapshot path surfaces attach_failed on the next tick instead of falsely reporting ok). SHOULD-FIX 1: single-key POST /api/settings wrote String(value) without re-validating against the per-key schema, so an allowlisted enum-shaped key like mesh_auto_recreate could persist arbitrary strings ('banana', 'true') that the bulk PATCH would later refuse. Routed the single-key path through SettingsPatchSchema.safeParse so both write paths validate identically. Added regression tests for an invalid mesh_auto_recreate value, a valid mesh_auto_recreate write, and an out-of-range numeric value. SHOULD-FIX 2: the new Mesh data plane subsection lived inside a section the registry exposes to non-admins, who would see the toggle and only learn it was admin-only after the save 403'd. Gated the subsection on `isAdmin` from useAuth so non-admins do not see the control. The other system controls keep their existing visibility pattern (read-only for non-admins). 71/71 backend tests green (revalidate + mesh-setup + settings-routes). 276/276 frontend tests green. tsc clean on backend + frontend. |
||
|
Anso
|
f03c9dc7b6 |
fix(webhooks): address Codex review of PR #1177 (#1181)
* fix(webhooks): close HMAC timing oracle on trigger reject paths The trigger handler in PR #1177 returned a uniform 404 for every unauthenticated rejection, but only the wrong-signature path computed an HMAC over the request body. The other reject paths (unknown id, disabled webhook, non-paid tier, missing X-Webhook-Signature header, missing rawBody) short-circuited before any HMAC work. Repeated near-rate-limit probes with a large attacker-controlled body could distinguish a valid-and-enabled paid webhook id from the other reject cases through response latency. WebhookService.validateSignature is now constant-time over every input shape: it always runs crypto.createHmac and crypto.timingSafeEqual against fixed-length 32-byte buffers regardless of whether the signature is missing, has the wrong prefix, is malformed hex, or is the wrong length. The trigger handler calls it unconditionally before any reject branch fires, using a stable per-process decoy secret (WebhookService.getDecoySecret) when the webhook does not exist and an empty buffer when the request has no body. Response timing now depends only on the size of the request body, which the attacker already controls and which reveals nothing webhook-specific. Six new tests pin the behaviour: validateSignature is observed firing on the unknown-id and missing-signature paths through a spy assertion, and four direct-call tests confirm validateSignature returns false without throwing for empty, wrong-prefix, malformed-hex, and wrong-length signatures. * fix(safe-log): redact Basic auth and lowercase Windows drive letters The redactSensitiveText helper now covers two cases the prior chain missed: * Authorization: Basic <base64> previously left the base64 payload intact. The existing key/value regex caught only the literal word Basic before stopping at the space. A new Basic\s+[A-Za-z0-9+/=]+ replacement runs before the key/value regex so the credential is scrubbed first. * Windows homedir paths like c:\Users\<user>\... with a lowercase drive letter previously slipped through because the regex required [A-Z]. Changed to [A-Za-z] so both letter cases are covered. Two new tests pin both fixes. * docs(webhooks): document 429, fix shared schema, comply with D27/D31 * Trigger endpoint declares the 429 response that webhookTriggerLimiter can return (500 requests per minute per source IP); both docs/openapi.yaml and the response table in docs/features/webhooks.mdx carry the new row, and a new troubleshooting accordion explains the shared-NAT scenario. * Shared Webhook schema in docs/openapi.yaml extends the action enum to include git-pull and documents the node_id property. The GET list endpoint returns these fields; the prior schema would have failed validation for any git-pull row. * docs/features/webhooks.mdx:7 rewritten from a customer-side role enumeration ("non-admins on a paid tier can view the list but cannot manage it") to a single requirement statement ("Webhooks require a Skipper or Admiral license. Managing webhooks is admin-only.") per CLAUDE.md D27/D31; the prior phrasing was customer-side fence-spec. * Two em dashes in webhook description strings I had touched in the prior OpenAPI sync commit replaced with semicolons per D18. |
||
|
Anso
|
21ec5e7e0a |
fix(webhooks): harden trigger response surface (#1177)
* fix(webhooks): harden trigger response surface
Bundles six audit findings on the incoming-webhooks trigger path. All
changes preserve the documented happy path: a CI caller signing the exact
request body with the webhook secret still receives 202 Accepted.
* Uniform 404 on every unauthenticated rejection (missing webhook,
disabled webhook, non-paid tier, missing signature header, missing
raw body, signature mismatch). The four-way response surface previously
let an unauthenticated probe enumerate webhook ids and fingerprint the
instance's licence tier; callers now see one shape for any failed auth.
* Fail closed when express.json()'s verify callback did not capture the
raw request body. Previously the handler fell back to
JSON.stringify(req.body), which compares the HMAC against a
re-serialised payload that is not byte-equal to what the client signed.
* Pass the already-loaded webhook through to WebhookService.execute()
instead of re-fetching by id. Closes the delete-during-execution race
where an admin deletion between the trigger handler's load and the async
dispatch silently dropped the execution row. The webhook_executions
table has ON DELETE CASCADE, so recordExecution now wraps the insert in
try/catch and logs a warning when the FK constraint trips because the
parent webhook was deleted mid-flight.
* Redact bearer tokens, JWTs, URL credentials, and homedir paths from
error strings before persisting to webhook_executions.error. The
execution history is readable by any paid user via GET /webhooks/:id/
history; redactSensitiveText gains three home-directory patterns
(/home/<user>, /Users/<user>, <drive>:\Users\<user>) and now runs on
every error stored from this path.
* Cap webhook name at 100 characters on both POST and PUT, rejecting
non-string and oversized values with 400 before they reach the DB.
* Validate the body's action override against a typed allowlist
(isWebhookAction type guard) on the trigger endpoint, returning 400
before queueing execution. An unknown override no longer reaches
recordExecution as a stored failure row.
Tests updated to pass db.getWebhook(id)! instead of the raw id to the new
execute() signature. Docs at docs/features/webhooks.mdx updated to reflect
the new uniform 404 response, the new 400-on-invalid-action behaviour, and
a rewritten troubleshooting accordion that walks operators through every
cause of the uniform 404.
* test(webhooks): cover trigger handler auth, race, and redaction paths
Adds 21 vitest cases for the public webhook trigger handler and the
WebhookService.execute / recordExecution pipeline, plus 3 cases for the
new homedir patterns in redactSensitiveText.
webhooks-trigger.test.ts covers, per audit finding:
* M1 + H3 uniform 404: id unknown, webhook disabled, non-paid tier,
missing signature header, missing rawBody, sha1= prefix, malformed
hex signature, sig mismatch. Each asserts identical 404 body so a
future regression that re-introduces 401 / 403 / PAID_REQUIRED breaks
one of the 8 tests.
* Happy path: 202 with configured action, valid action override,
unknown action override returns 400 after auth succeeds (L2),
non-string action override returns 400.
* L1 name cap: POST and PUT both reject names over 100 chars and
non-string names; 100-char boundary still accepted; PUT allows
partial updates that omit name.
* M5 race: deleting the parent webhook before recordExecution runs no
longer crashes the async dispatch; the FK cascade is swallowed with
a console.warn, and a happy-path test pins the recordExecution row.
* M6 redaction: stubs ComposeService.runCommand to throw errors
containing a bearer token and a homedir path, then asserts the
persisted webhook_executions.error has both scrubbed.
safe-log.test.ts gains three unit tests pinning the new homedir
patterns in redactSensitiveText (Linux, macOS, Windows). The existing
credentials test is untouched.
Tests use prototype spies on FileSystemService and ComposeService (both
hand out a fresh instance per nodeId), so per-test mocks do not leak.
beforeEach restores all mocks and reapplies the LicenseService 'paid'
spy. Closes audit finding H2 (zero trigger-path test coverage).
* docs(webhooks): sync openapi spec with new trigger response surface
Brings docs/openapi.yaml in line with the behaviour changes from the
trigger hardening commit. Mintlify auto-generates the per-endpoint
reference pages from this spec, so the spec drift would surface as
wrong response codes in the public API reference.
POST /api/webhooks and PUT /api/webhooks/🆔
* name: maxLength 100 (matches MAX_WEBHOOK_NAME_LENGTH on the route).
* action enum: add git-pull (pre-existing omission; the route has
always accepted it).
* node_id: documented as an integer property (pre-existing omission).
POST /api/webhooks/:id/trigger:
* requestBody required: true (body is now mandatory; the H3
fail-closed branch rejects a missing rawBody).
* action override: enum restricted to the allowlist.
* 401 and 403 responses removed.
* 404 response: description rewritten to reflect uniform-404
behaviour; the body is { error: "Webhook not found or signature
invalid" } for every unauthenticated reject.
* 400 response added for an authenticated request whose action
override is not in the allowlist.
|
||
|
Anso
|
fcff8e9047 |
fix(monitor): collapse repeated host-metric alerts into per-window summary (F-11) (#1175)
* fix(monitor): collapse repeated host-metric alerts into per-window summary (F-11) A host metric over threshold previously dispatched one notification every 5 minutes for the duration of the breach, producing 7+ identical messages in 35 minutes and spamming Discord/Slack routes. Replace the hardcoded 5-minute cooldown for CPU/RAM/disk with a per-metric suppression window (default 60 min, configurable via host_alert_suppression_mins). The first breach fires immediately; subsequent cycles within the window are silently counted; the next dispatch after the window elapses carries a summary suffix listing how many cycles were suppressed and when the breach first crossed threshold. Recovery clears the counter so re-breach fires fresh. The pattern mirrors PolicyEnforcement.notifyTrivyMissingOnce: module-scope Map, in-memory only, in-cycle dedup, with a test-reset helper. The existing system_state row keeps post-restart re-fires bounded. Janitor and per-stack alert rules are unchanged; they already have adequate cadence and per-rule cooldown respectively. * fix(ci): restore backend and frontend checks * fix(e2e): remove create button timing race * fix(e2e): harden create double-click test * fix(monitor): clear persisted F-11 timestamp on recovery + clamp suppression window Independent audit on the previous commit surfaced two issues. 1. clearHostMetricSuppression early-returned on missing in-memory state, leaving a stale system_state.last_host_*_alert_ts row alive after a process restart. Scenario: breach fires + persists timestamp, process restarts, metric recovers before another evaluate cycle re-seeds the in-memory Map, recovery cleanup early-returns. Next re-breach inside the original window hits the restart-survivability branch and is silently suppressed instead of firing fresh. Fix: read persisted state in clearHostMetricSuppression and reset to '0' independently of in-memory presence. The read-before-write also skips redundant writes when the row is already cleared. 2. host_alert_suppression_mins is validated by zod on the bulk PATCH path but the single-key POST /api/settings path accepts allowlisted keys without re-validation. A 999999999-minute value would silence host alerts for centuries. Add MAX_HOST_ALERT_SUPPRESSION_MIN = 1440 mirroring the zod max, and clamp via Math.min in evaluateGlobalSettings. Two new vitest cases (restart-then-recovery-then-rebreach; the 1440 clamp) confirmed failing before the fix, passing after. The existing "metric drop" case updated to use a mock-backed persistence pattern consistent with the new restart-scenario tests. 73/73 monitor-service tests green; full backend suite 2507/2510 (same pre-existing Windows EBUSY flake on filesystem-backup.test.ts as baseline). |
||
|
Anso
|
0947da13ae |
fix(security): collapse repeated trivy-missing pre-deploy notifications (#1166)
Scan policies on a node without Trivy installed previously fired one "Pre-deploy scan skipped" warning per deploy, flooding the notification feed during CI loops. Add a 60-minute per-(node, stack) cooldown so an operator sees one actionable warning, not one per deploy. The boot log line and the one-click managed install in Settings > Security are unchanged; this only reshapes the per-deploy fanout. Also tighten the vulnerability-scanning entry in /docs/features/overview to point first-touch users at the one-click install on first use. |
||
|
Anso
|
a51547a158 |
fix(monitor): decouple janitor disk-usage check from 30s cycle (F-6) (#1164)
* fix(monitor): decouple janitor disk-usage check from 30s cycle (F-6) `docker system df` (called by the MonitorService janitor check) can take 30+ seconds on Docker Desktop with many volumes. Running it on the 30s evaluate cycle compounded with the per-container stats fan-out and pushed the cycle to 140s+, blocking subsequent monitoring work. This change: - Moves the janitor disk-usage check into its own 15-minute cycle with a tight 8s timeout. A circuit breaker opens after 3 consecutive timeouts (60-minute cooldown) so a sick daemon stops pinning Dockerode sockets every tick. The first janitor tick is deferred 45 seconds past boot to avoid head-of-line collision with the initial monitor cycle's stats fan-out. - Adds a paired 8s `withTimeout` wrap to the admin prune-estimate routes (`/api/system/prune/estimate` and the dry-run path of `/api/system/prune/system`) so a slow df does not hang the admin tab. Both routes respond 503 with code `docker_df_slow` on timeout. - Factors `withTimeout` and `TimeoutError` into `utils/withTimeout.ts` so the route layer does not have to import from a service module. - Adds 10 unit tests covering the decoupling guardrail, breaker open/close, cooldown, threshold gate, the 100 MB reclaimable floor, re-entrancy, recovery logging, non-timeout error handling, and the full timer-cleanup contract of `stop()`. - Adds 4 integration tests for the prune routes covering the 503 timeout response, the success path, and the non-timeout 5xx path. * fix(fleet,monitor): extend F-6 timeout to fleet prune routes; close breaker-recovery log gap Codex audit findings on PR #1164: Major. The fleet routes that fan out prune-estimate work on local nodes (`POST /api/fleet/labels/fleet-prune` dry-run path and `POST /api/fleet/prune/estimate`) called `estimateSystemReclaim` without a timeout, so a slow local Docker daemon could still hang the fleet admin tab even though the system-maintenance routes were already bounded. Wrap both call sites with the shared `withTimeout(..., 8s)` and surface a "Docker daemon is busy" message via the per-target and per-node error channels the routes already used for other failures. The destructive (non-dry-run) prune path stays unwrapped because it calls `pruneSystem` / `pruneManagedOnly`, not `df`. Minor. The janitor circuit breaker zeroed `janitorConsecutiveTimeouts` when it opened, so a successful call after a full breaker-open cooldown slipped past the `if (counter > 0)` recovery-log branch and never emitted `[Monitor] Janitor disk-usage check recovered`. The operator observability signal was missing exactly when it mattered most. Extend the predicate to also trip on `janitorBreakerUntil > 0` (which stays set to its past timestamp after cooldown until the next success clears it), so recovery logs symmetrically for both partial-failure and post-breaker recovery paths. Added a dedicated test. Three new integration tests cover the fleet routes (timeout, success, and the estimate endpoint's per-node unreachable shape). |
||
|
Anso
|
64bf6344a3 |
fix(mesh): bias Sencho static IP via IPAM IPRange (F-13) (#1162)
* fix(mesh): reserve Sencho static IP via IPAM auxiliary address (F-13)
Sencho pins itself to <network>+2 on sencho_mesh, but the IPAM block only
declared Subnet, so Docker freely handed that address to any meshed
workload that restarted while Sencho was offline. A real-world hit on
arrapps-prod during a Sencho upgrade had tautulli grab 172.30.0.2, which
blocked the new Sencho container's mesh attach with "Address already in
use" and left compose in a half-state needing manual disconnect/recreate.
The fix reserves <network>+2 via AuxiliaryAddresses on the IPAM Config
when creating sencho_mesh. Aux-listed addresses are removed from the
auto-allocatable pool, so Docker refuses to hand the IP to any container
that does not explicitly request it. Sencho's own attach via
connectContainerToNetwork({ ipv4Address }) is unaffected because
explicit pins still bind aux-reserved addresses. Workload containers
without a pinned IP get .3 and up.
Wire format verified against the Docker Engine REST v1.33 OpenAPI spec:
the JSON key on POST /networks/create (and on the inspect response) is
AuxiliaryAddresses inside each IPAM.Config item, value { sencho: <ip> }.
Adopt-existing path: when Sencho boots against a sencho_mesh that
pre-dates this reservation, the data plane still comes up but a one-time
warn fires (mesh.enable activity at level: 'warn' plus a [Mesh] console
line so docker logs surfaces it). The advisory explains the squat risk
and gives the recreate recipe.
Tests: 5 cases added to mesh-setup-error-classification.test.ts covering
the explicit-env create payload, the candidate-iteration winner payload,
the adopt-legacy warn (env-unset), the adopt-already-reserved silent
path, and the TOCTOU 409 race-winner adopt-legacy warn.
Docs: one sentence added to docs/features/sencho-mesh.mdx under
"Customising the mesh subnet" describing the reservation positively.
No tier/role/capability/flag gates touched (no frontend changes).
* fix(mesh): use IPRange upper-half bias instead of aux-address reservation
The initial F-13 fix used IPAM AuxiliaryAddresses to reserve <network>+2
on sencho_mesh. Empirical probe against Docker 29.4.3 confirmed this
also blocks explicit pins via EndpointConfig.IPAMConfig.IPv4Address:
libnetwork's RequestAddress() rejects a preferred-address request when
the bit is already set by the aux reservation. Result: the freshly-
reserved network refuses Sencho's own ensureSelfAttached, and the data
plane never comes up.
The pivot uses IPRange instead. IPRange constrains Docker's auto-
allocation to the configured CIDR; preferred-address requests via
RequestAddress(prefAddress) skip the IPRange check and only consult
the subnet-wide bitmap. So setting IPRange to the upper half of the
subnet (e.g. 172.30.0.128/25 for 172.30.0.0/24) biases workloads
without an explicit IP to <network>+128 and up, while Sencho's
explicit pin to <network>+2 still succeeds.
Verified on Docker 29.4.3 with the same workstation that produced the
original audit:
- `docker run --rm --network N --ip 10.99.99.2` against a network
with `--aux-address sencho=10.99.99.2` → "Address already in use"
(rejects explicit pin).
- Same `--ip` against a network with `--ip-range 10.99.99.128/25` →
succeeds (10.99.99.2 is outside the range but inside the subnet).
- Auto-allocated workload on the IPRange network lands at .129.
Adopt-existing legacy detection now compares IPRange instead of
AuxiliaryAddresses. inspectExistingMeshSubnet returns { subnet,
ipRange } and the warn fires when ipRange differs from the expected
upper-half CIDR. Same once-per-process semantics as before.
createMeshNetwork now derives the IPRange via a new
getMeshIpRangeFromSubnet helper. The five regression tests assert
IPRange = <network>+128/<prefix+1> in the create payload and the
expected/actual IPRange in the legacy-warn details.
|
||
|
Anso
|
474290081d |
fix(mesh): log boot state to console so docker logs surfaces mesh status (#1159)
MeshService records its boot summary and setup failures only through logActivity (in-memory ring buffer + WS listeners), which the Routing tab consumes. The docker-logs surface was silent for the mesh subsystem, so operators running Sencho-in-Docker had no boot-time visibility into whether the data plane came up cleanly. Mirror the existing logActivity entries to console without replacing them: - MeshService.start() success summary: console.log / console.warn / console.error gated on the summary level. Format: [Mesh] data plane ok, self attached at <ip>, subnet <X> [Mesh] data plane unavailable (<reason>: <message>) - recordSetupFailure: console.warn for the expected dev-mode not_in_docker case, console.error for real failures. Format: [Mesh] data plane unavailable (<reason>, subnet <X>): <sanitized> The activity entries that already drive the Routing tab banner stay intact; the console lines are purely additive for the docker logs workflow. Two new unit tests assert the failure and not_in_docker console mirrors fire with the [Mesh] prefix. Fixes F-5. |
||
|
Anso
|
e4fe4cfced |
fix(mesh): address Codex audit findings on F-1 PR (#1158)
- docs(sencho-mesh): split subnet_overlap troubleshooting into env-set vs env-unset paths; rewrite the "Customising the mesh subnet" intro to describe the candidate list and the adopt-existing behavior. - backend(MeshService): preserve idempotent 409 handling in the explicit-env path. On createNetwork 409 (TOCTOU race against another process), re-inspect and treat the race-winner as success when its subnet matches the operator's request; subnet_mismatch otherwise. - frontend(MeshDataPlaneBanner): trim the card variant to a true one-line strip (headline only, truncate min-w-0). Full recovery hint stays on the Routing tab variant and in docs. - tests(mesh): add five cases covering the previously untested branches — candidate-loop non-overlap bail, adopt-existing with unparseable subnet, explicit-env generic createNetwork failure, TOCTOU 409 race-winner match, TOCTOU 409 race-winner mismatch. Architecture map (gitignored per Directive 11) updated locally with the new useMeshDataPlane hook node and the mesh.dashboardBanner flow so the local interactive viewer stays accurate. |
||
|
Anso
|
1a03cf82af |
fix(mesh): auto-fallback through candidate subnets when default overlaps (#1156)
The default mesh subnet 172.30.0.0/24 is fully contained in linuxserver/* default networks (sonarr_default 172.30.0.0/16, etc.), so libnetwork rejects the IPAM allocation with "Pool overlaps with other one on this address space" on a typical homelab Docker host. The single hard-coded default left first-run operators with a silently broken mesh. MeshService.setupMeshNetwork now resolves the subnet via three paths: 1. Operator-explicit (SENCHO_MESH_SUBNET set): use that subnet, strict. Pre-existing sencho_mesh with a different subnet still raises subnet_mismatch. 2. Adopt-existing (env unset, sencho_mesh already on the daemon): adopt the existing subnet. Docker is the source of truth across restarts. 3. Candidate iteration (env unset, no existing network): walk 172.30.0.0/24, 172.31.0.0/24, 10.42.0.0/24, 10.43.0.0/24 in order. First subnet Docker accepts wins. If every candidate overlaps, record subnet_overlap with a message naming every attempt. The dashboard's Fleet Heartbeat card now surfaces the down state via a compact banner above the per-node rows, plus a "mesh down" counter suffix on the right of the title. The existing Routing-tab banner is extracted into a shared MeshDataPlaneBanner component with tab and card variants. Dashboard polling is gated on Admiral tier so non-paid users do not fire the Admiral-only /mesh/status endpoint. Six new tests in mesh-setup-error-classification cover: iterates past first overlap, all candidates overlap, adopts existing network, inspectNetwork non-404 failure classified as attach_failed, env-matches- existing skip-create, and operator-explicit strict (no fallback). Fixes F-1 in the pre-1.0 audit. Closes the silent-failure mode that left the mesh down on the most common homelab Docker layout. |
||
|
Anso
|
cd1cde2fd4 |
fix(resources): subtract shared layers when accounting managed prune bytes (#1155)
* fix(resources): subtract shared layers when accounting managed prune bytes Both `pruneManagedOnly` and `estimateManagedReclaim` walked the Sencho-managed prunable image set and summed `img.Size` per image. That counts shared base layers once per image, so a 1 GB base layer shared across N managed images was reported as N GB freed — the same shape of inflation we just fixed for the system-scope banner. Introduce `getImageSharedSizeMap()` which reads `df.Images[].SharedSize` once and lets both code paths subtract `SharedSize` per image when totalling: `+= max(0, Size - shared)`. If `df` fails, the helper returns an empty map and the accounting degrades to the prior sum-of-Size behavior rather than failing the prune. Verified against a live daemon: `/api/system/prune/estimate` with `scope: managed, target: images` now returns the layer-aware number; the older per-image-Size sum was roughly 1.8× larger on the same set. * fix(resources): use df-delta for destructive managed prune; label estimate as lower bound The first attempt at this PR subtracted SharedSize per prunable image on both paths. That formula undercounts when prunable images share a layer exclusively with each other: Docker frees the layer once, but the per-image subtraction removes it from every referrer. The reported total is then strictly less than the truth. Split the two paths: - pruneManagedOnly (destructive) now snapshots `docker df` before and after the parallel removes and reports `max(0, before.LayersSize - after.LayersSize)`. That is the honest measurement of bytes freed. Concurrent pulls during the prune can grow the after value; the clamp treats that as 0 reclaimed for the affected delta rather than attributing the new bytes to us. - estimateManagedReclaim keeps the per-image Σ(Size - SharedSize) formula but the JSDoc now calls it a "conservative lower bound" and documents the under-report mechanism. There is no cheap way to exactly price an arbitrary prune subset without per-layer enumeration. Fallback chain when df fails on the destructive path: - before-snapshot succeeded, after failed → per-image lower bound from before-snapshot (safe; SharedSize was known at start). - before-snapshot failed → report 0 with a warn log (after-only would build a SharedSize map missing the just-pruned images, which would over-report by treating them as having no sharing). Replaces the prior `getImageSharedSizeMap()` helper with two pieces: `safeDfSnapshot()` (I/O) and a private static `mapSharedSizesFromDf()` (pure parse), reused by both code paths. New invariant test asserts `prune.reclaimedBytes >= estimate.reclaimableBytes` on the same inputs so future changes to either formula cannot flip the direction. Addresses Codex audit blocker on PR #1155. |
||
|
Anso
|
a1caf6b0dd |
fix(resources): use daemon-reported reclaimable image bytes (#1154)
* fix(resources): use daemon-reported reclaimable image bytes The Reclaim banner summed per-image `VirtualSize` (or `Size`) across every image with no running container. That counts shared base layers once per image, so an unused base layer of 1 GB shared across ten builds showed up as 10 GB of "prunable" space. The actual prune frees the layer once and reports a much smaller `SpaceReclaimed`, leaving the banner and the post-prune toast badly out of step. Prefer Docker's own `ImageUsage.Reclaimable` (API v1.44+), which is the exact value `docker system df` displays. Older daemons fall back to the Docker CLI's internal formula: `LayersSize - sum(Size - SharedSize)` for in-use images, clamped to 0, skipping any image Docker flags with the -1 unknown-size sentinel. Verified against a live daemon: the banner now matches `docker system df`'s IMAGES RECLAIMABLE byte-for-byte. * fix(resources): treat SharedSize=-1 as 0 in fallback, don't drop in-use bytes The fallback formula is `LayersSize - used`. The previous version skipped any active image whose VirtualSize or SharedSize was -1 (Docker's "unknown" sentinel). Skipping leaves the image's bytes out of `used`, which reads back as reclaimable -- the exact inflation the PR set out to fix, just on older daemons. Treat SharedSize=-1 (or absent) as 0 so the image's full size counts as in-use, and only skip when no usable size is available at all (VirtualSize and Size both unknown). Under-reporting reclaimable is the safe direction; over-reporting was the original bug. Add a test for the SharedSize=-1 case with Size known, and rename the existing test so it reflects what is actually being asserted now. Addresses Codex audit blocker on PR #1154. |
||
|
Anso
|
2f2401df68 |
fix(fleet): route remaining fleet dispatches through getProxyTarget for pilot-agent nodes (#1152)
* fix(fleet): route remaining fleet dispatches through getProxyTarget for pilot-agent nodes PR #1123 migrated POST /api/fleet/nodes/:id/update to use NodeRegistry.getProxyTarget so pilot-agent rows (no api_url / api_token) participate in remote update via the tunnel loopback. The same bug shape lived on at ten sibling fleet-dispatch sites: each read node.api_url and node.api_token directly, returning "Remote node not configured." against pilots, or silently filtered pilot rows out of a fan-out loop. Migrate every remaining fleet-wide remote dispatch to the same pattern: - routes/fleet.ts: fleet-stop, fleet-prune, prune/estimate, snapshot restore (4 sites) -> getProxyTarget + mode-aware error copy + conditional Authorization header - routes/imageUpdates.ts: fleet status + fleet refresh (2 sites) -> swap n.api_url filter for getProxyTarget != null and use target.apiUrl, so pilot rows appear in the aggregated image-updates view instead of being silently excluded - utils/snapshot-capture.ts: captureRemoteNodeFiles (1 site) -> same pattern; CaptureNode interface gains required mode field so the thrown error message picks the pilot-tunnel copy automatically - services/SecretsService.ts: resolveEnvFileRemote, readEnvRemote, writeEnvRemote (3 sites) -> same pattern; thrown errors now use the shared formatNoTargetError helper instead of leaking api_url/api_token field names Extract the previously-private noTargetMessage helper from fleet.ts into utils/remoteTarget.ts as formatNoTargetError so SecretsService, snapshot-capture, and the fleet routes share one copy of the mode-aware error string. Add 10 regression tests in fleet-pilot-dispatch-parity.test.ts covering each migrated route + the snapshot-capture utility: dispatch through the loopback target with no Authorization header for pilots, and a mode-aware error when the tunnel is disconnected. FleetSyncService (4 additional sites) carries an api_url-anchored targetIdentity in the wire protocol; pilot support there needs a protocol-level identity decision and stays as a separate follow-up. * fix(fleet): throw tunnel-disconnected error from resolveEnvFileRemote Codex audit flagged that resolveEnvFileRemote returned null when getProxyTarget was null. That predates the parity migration but the migration was the right place to fix it: the null flowed through readExistingEnv into previewPushDiff / executePush as "env file not found", which is wrong (the env exists, the node is unreachable). Throwing formatNoTargetError(node) here lets the existing catch arms in previewPushDiff (lines 450-453) surface reachable=false with the tunnel-disconnected message on the right axis, and executePush picks up the same shape via its outer catch. Also drop overstated coverage claims from the parity test header (snapshot restore + SecretsService were never actually exercised in this file, only structurally identical via tsc), and fix two describe labels that read /api/labels/* instead of the mounted /api/fleet/labels/*. |
||
|
Anso
|
b740dd1078 |
feat(resources): protect Sencho's own image, network, volumes from deletion (#1149)
* feat(resources): protect Sencho's own image, network, volumes from deletion Adds SelfIdentityService that reads HOSTNAME at startup and inspects the running Sencho container via Dockerode to record its image ID, attached networks, named volumes, and container ID. The classification API marks these with isSencho:true, destructive delete routes return 423 Locked when the target matches self, the orphan-containers API filters the Sencho container out so it cannot be selected and purged from the Unmanaged tab, and the managed-prune path adds an explicit self filter for defense-in-depth on top of Docker's in-use semantics. The Resources view renders a Sencho pill alongside the managed badge on matching rows and disables the trash control with a hover tooltip. When Sencho runs outside Docker (dev mode), inspect returns 404, the service stays empty, and every isOwn* returns false so today's behaviour is preserved. * fix(resources): handle sha256-prefixed image IDs and custom hostnames Addresses independent-review findings on PR #1149: - Strip sha256: prefix in POST /api/system/images/delete before validating the ID, matching the inspect route's handling. Without this, /system/images responses round-trip through the UI as sha256:<hex> and got 400 Invalid image ID format before rejectIfSelf could run. - Add /proc/self/cgroup fallback to SelfIdentityService so custom --hostname, Compose hostname:, or --uts=host setups still self-identify. HOSTNAME inspect runs first; on 404 the service parses the cgroup file for a 64-hex container ID (cgroupv1 docker, cgroupv2 docker, podman libpod formats all covered) and retries inspect with that ID. - Restrict prefix matching in isOwnNetwork / matchesId to hex-shaped candidates (12 to 64 hex chars), so a non-Sencho network whose name happens to start with a hex prefix of Sencho's network ID is no longer flagged as self. - Trim the resources.mdx Note to customer-visible behaviour without enumerating every tab. - New tests: prefixed-image-ID 200 path, three cgroup file format parses (v1, v2, podman) plus the no-match and missing-file cases, HOSTNAME-404-then-cgroup-success fallback path, name-collision regression for the hex-only prefix rule, and an empty-cache no-regression check. Test hygiene: mockReset on the inspect stub and restoreAllMocks in afterEach so spies do not leak across tests. * chore(security): VEX not_affected for CVE-2026-46680 (containerd in docker-compose) Trivy now flags CVE-2026-46680 HIGH on usr/local/lib/docker/cli-plugins/docker-compose, which statically embeds github.com/containerd/containerd/v2 v2.2.3 (compose v5.1.3's resolved module graph). The CVE is a runtime-executor flaw: containerd's runc invocation can be tricked into running a Kubernetes pod marked runAsNonRoot as root via crafted user ID handling. The vulnerable code path is reached only by containerd-shim executing a container with a populated OCI runtime spec on the daemon side. docker-compose vendors the containerd Go module purely as a client (gRPC stubs, API types, shared utilities); it never executes containers and never enforces runAsNonRoot. Sencho's compose usage (up / down / ps against user-authored files) cannot construct a Kubernetes pod security context. The vulnerable path is unreachable. Adds a not_affected entry to security/vex/sencho.openvex.json with justification vulnerable_code_not_in_execute_path, bumps version 5 to 6, and updates last_updated to 2026-05-22 per Directive 23. |
||
|
Anso
|
c491d309c1 |
feat(schedules): make every scheduled action available on Skipper (#1141)
Collapse the Admiral carveout that restricted restart, prune, auto_backup, auto_stop, auto_down, and auto_start schedules to the Admiral variant. Scheduled Operations stays at Skipper+ (paid). The action picker now lists every supported operation for any paid admin, and the scheduler runner executes every action on either variant. |
||
|
Anso
|
6f301e005a |
feat(fleet): redesign Fleet Action cards to the System Sheet recipe (#1137)
Lift <FleetActionCard> primitive from audit §20 / DESIGN §9.12. Migrate the three v1 cards (stop-by-label, bulk-label-assign, prune-fleet-wide) to consume it: cyan rail on every card, action class as a chip, blast radius as a live readout in the toolbar, preview section replaces the warning banner, footer carries reversibility plus freshness. Drop the per-card tone rail, the icon prop, and cards/tone.ts. Add /fleet/labels/match-preview and /fleet/prune/estimate for the live blast readouts (chrome falls back to "preview unavailable" if either 404s). Add dryRun: true to the existing fleet-stop and fleet-prune endpoints so the Dry run button rehearses the full code path (locks, per-node fan-out, remote propagation) without firing the destructive leaf call. Result flows into the existing ResultsList. Extend <SheetSection> with optional meta. Add --action-transformative semantic token. |
||
|
Anso
|
e65c5e8551 |
fix(pilot): post-merge audit followups (WS via getProxyTarget, closeTunnel lifecycle, mesh source buffer, docs) (#1128)
* fix(pilot): route remote WS upgrades through NodeRegistry.getProxyTarget Pilot-mode nodes carry empty api_url and api_token by design and expose their API on a per-tunnel loopback bridge. The upgrade handler gated the remote-forwarder branch on `node.api_url && node.api_token`, so WS requests targeting pilot nodes silently fell through to the local handlers (live logs, exec, generic) instead of tunneling to the agent. Resolve the target via NodeRegistry.getProxyTarget so pilot and proxy modes share one dispatch path, mirroring the HTTP proxy. handleRemoteForwarder now takes the resolved target and, when the target is the pilot loopback (empty token), skips the console-token exchange and the Authorization injection so the tunnel-side auth is the only source of truth on that path. Unresolvable targets reject the upgrade with HTTP 503 instead of being served gateway-local data. * fix(pilot): emit tunnel-down and mark node offline on closeTunnel PilotTunnelManager.closeTunnel closed the underlying WebSocket but skipped the cleanup the natural-disconnect path runs, so explicit closures (enrollment regenerate, node deletion) left the node row at status='online' until the next reconnect. The dashboard kept showing the stale state for the entire interval. closeTunnel now writes nodes.status='offline' and emits tunnel-down for pilot bridges, and emits proxy-bridge-down for central-initiated proxy bridges. The maps are cleared before bridge.close() so the natural 'closed' handler's bridge-identity guard short-circuits and we do not double-emit. * fix(mesh): buffer cross-node source data until tcp_open_ack arrives openCrossNode piped src socket data straight to tcpStream.write before the forward TcpStream emitted 'open'. The first packet on a fresh cross-node stream raced ahead of the agent's tcp_open_ack on the wire, which broke protocols that send immediately after connect (HTTP, TLS, Redis, Postgres) on Pilot and proxy mesh paths. Buffer src chunks in a local array capped at STREAM_PENDING_DATA_MAX_BYTES until tcpStream emits 'open', then flush them in order before any post-open writes. Tear down both sockets if the buffer overflows so a misbehaving source cannot exhaust gateway memory while waiting for the ack. * docs(pilot): clarify host-console non-parity and narrow the parity claim Pilot mode disables the host-console capability at the capability registry (the agent container has no useful host shell to surface), but the public docs listed host console among the WebSockets that ride through the tunnel and described pilot as behaving identically to proxy mode. State the shared-capability claim more carefully and call out the intentional non-parity in a dedicated subsection. |
||
|
Anso
|
982c7830b1 |
fix(mesh): address audit follow-ups (early-data, recompose, admiral gate, error codes, docs) (#1126)
* fix(mesh): buffer early TcpData on reverse-relay path
The reverse-relay code dropped the local-shaped reservation and any
TcpData frames buffered in it before acceptReverseRelay had wired up
the target stream. A peer that sent a request body immediately after
tcp_open_reverse lost those bytes when the target lived on a third
node, since reverse_local buffers them but reverse_relay did not.
Carry the reservation through acceptReverseRelay: transplant its
pendingData and pendingBytes into the new reverse_relay state, gate
TcpData writes on targetOpen, and flush buffered frames into the
target stream before sending tcp_open_ack. Mirrors the reverse_local
pattern. Regression test fires tcp_open_reverse plus an immediate
TcpData while ensureBridge is in flight and verifies the bytes
arrive intact, in order, before the ack.
* fix(mesh): recompose affected stacks when node-level mesh is disabled
disableForNode used to clear DB rows and override files but leave the
running containers attached to sencho_mesh with stale /etc/hosts
alias entries until an operator redeployed every stack by hand.
Mirror optOutStack: after the existing alias/forwarder cleanup, call
regenerateOverridesAcrossFleet, cascadeRecomposeAcrossFleet, and
triggerRedeploy for each previously meshed stack on the disabled
node so containers detach from sencho_mesh and shed the alias
entries they owned. The disabled node's mesh_stacks rows are deleted
before the cascade so listMeshStacks returns the right set with no
skip tuple required. Route threads the actor through actorFor(req)
for parity with optInStack/optOutStack. Tests cover the redeploy
fan-out, the cascade no-skip-tuple invariant, and the default actor
fallback for non-route callers.
* fix(mesh): require Admiral on the WS proxy-tunnel upgrade
HTTP mesh routes in routes/mesh.ts all enforce requireAdmiral, but
the /api/mesh/proxy-tunnel WS upgrade accepted any node_proxy or
full-admin api_token regardless of the receiver's license. A node
downgraded from Admiral kept serving mesh data-plane traffic to a
sibling central while refusing every mesh management call.
Read the receiver's local LicenseService at the upgrade and 403 when
the tier is not paid+admiral. The check sits after the existing
credential gate and uses LicenseService directly rather than
effectiveTier (which trusts forwarded proxy headers); a remote peer
dialing in cannot be trusted to assert our entitlement. Dialer and
node_proxy token format are unchanged. Three regression tests cover
community-tier node_proxy, skipper-tier node_proxy, and
community-tier full-admin api_token all rejected with 403.
* fix(mesh): handle no_target alongside push_failed in inspectStackServices
proxyFetch throws MeshError('no_target') when getProxyTarget returns
null (pilot tunnel offline, proxy bridge unreachable), but the
inspectStackServices catch branch only matched push_failed. Offline
remotes fell through to the generic 'remote unreachable' error log,
which the Routing tab surfaces as an unexpected fault.
Match both error codes and emit the operator-friendly warn message
that names the unreachable node and the error code. Regression test
spies on console.warn/console.error to pin the branch.
* docs(mesh): align env defaults and forwarder comments with current architecture
SENCHO_MESH_PROXY_TUNNEL_IDLE_MS in .env.example carried the old
five-minute idle-close value (=300000), but the code default is
DEFAULT_IDLE_TTL_MS=0 (persistent tunnel). Copying the example
silently reintroduced the idle-close behavior the dialer removed.
MeshForwarder.ts's leading docblock and inline listen comment still
described host-network mode plus extra_hosts: host-gateway as
required for forwarder reachability. Sencho runs in standard bridge
mode and attaches to the shared sencho_mesh network at a stable IP;
meshed user containers reach the forwarder by that IP directly.
Flip the env default to 0, rewrite the env comment to describe the
persistent behavior and the opt-in for idle teardown, and rewrite
both forwarder comments to match the bridge-network reality.
* fix(mesh): trust forwarded tier on proxy-tunnel WS and remove remote overrides on disable
Admiral entitlement on the WS data plane now follows the same trust model
as the HTTP mesh routes: the central asserts its tier via x-sencho-tier
and x-sencho-variant on the WS handshake, and the receiver trusts those
headers only when the upgrade carries a node_proxy credential. When no
headers are present or the credential is a full-admin api_token, the
receiver falls back to its own local license. Without this an Admiral
central could be rejected by a Community remote and a Community central
could dial a locally-Admiral remote.
disableForNode now routes through removeOverrideFromNode so override
files pushed earlier via applyLocalOverride are removed on remote nodes
via DELETE /api/mesh/local-override/:stack. Sequential awaits are wrapped
in Promise.allSettled to match regenerateOverridesForNode's parallel
push pattern.
Other changes:
- Cover the post-state-swap buffering window in the reverse-relay test
(TcpData arriving after openTcpStream returns but before target open).
- Refresh stale MeshService comments that still referenced the removed
sidecar layer and host-network listener model.
* test(mesh): pin removeOverrideFromNode remote HTTP shape
The disableForNode regression test mocks removeOverrideFromNode itself,
so a regression inside the helper would not be caught. Add a narrow
contract test that spies on global fetch and asserts the request shape:
DELETE /api/mesh/local-override/:stack against the resolved proxy
target, with Authorization Bearer plus the x-sencho-tier and
x-sencho-variant headers. Also covers the encodeURIComponent path and
the swallowed-network-error behavior the disable cascade relies on.
* test(mesh): use createTestApiToken helper in proxy-tunnel api_token gate test
The full-admin api_token branch of the WS Admiral gate test inlined the
canonical generateApiToken + sha256 + addApiToken triple that already
lives in the createTestApiToken helper. Switching to the helper removes
the duplicated insertion logic and aligns this test with the helper used
by the other api_token call sites.
|
||
|
Anso
|
ee891b093b |
fix(self-update): resolve /app/data through bind or named volume (#1124)
SelfUpdateService scanned the container's Mounts list for Type='bind' only when picking the host path to forward to the helper container. A pilot enrolled with the recommended Docker Compose snippet uses a named volume (sencho-agent-data:/app/data, Type='volume'), so the lookup returned null and the boot log read "/app/data mount not found - update error recovery will be unavailable". The helper still ran on update but could not persist UPDATE_ERROR_FILE on a failed pull, so the next gateway process had nothing to surface. Extract findDataDirHost(mounts) and accept Type='bind' or Type='volume'. Docker populates Source with the on-disk volume directory for either type, so the existing :rw bind in the helper spawn works unchanged. The independent hostBindMounts filter stays strict to Type='bind' (forwarded operator-declared compose paths only; named volumes are not in scope there). Tests: pure unit coverage for the helper across 6 cases (bind hit, volume hit, no /app/data, mixed list with siblings, empty Source, tmpfs ignored). |
||
|
Anso
|
0b50c88eb3 |
fix(fleet): route remote update trigger through getProxyTarget (#1123)
POST /api/fleet/nodes/:id/update and POST /api/fleet/update-all read node.api_url + node.api_token directly, so a pilot-agent row (which carries neither) returned "Remote node not configured." and was filtered out of bulk update. Both routes now resolve the target via NodeRegistry.getProxyTarget(), which returns the loopback URL for an active pilot tunnel and the configured api_url for proxy-mode remotes. fetchMetaForNode replaces the direct fetchRemoteMeta call for the self-update capability check. self-update is removed from PILOT_DISABLED_CAPABILITIES so a Compose-deployed pilot can advertise it; the host-console filter stays. SelfUpdateService still gates the local-end capability on the container actually carrying docker-compose labels, so a docker-run pilot self-disables and the Fleet UI sees a clean 503 instead of an ambiguous failure. Tests: new fleet-pilot-update covers the four single-node branches (success via loopback, null target, no self-update capability, meta offline) and two update-all cases (mixed-fleet dispatch, all-targets- null skip). capability-registry-pilot rewired to assert the new filter set. |
||
|
Anso
|
e05099f2a1 |
fix(fleet-sync): make control-identity-mismatch sticky and surface in UI (#1117)
Treat 409 CONTROL_IDENTITY_MISMATCH from a replica as a non-retriable
failure instead of looping the same 409 through the 5-minute retry
service forever and silently writing identical failure rows.
Backend
- DatabaseService: add `sticky_error_code`, `sticky_error_expected`,
`sticky_error_got` columns to `fleet_sync_status` via an idempotent
migration. New methods setFleetSyncSticky, getFleetSyncStickyCode,
clearFleetSyncStickyForNode. recordFleetSyncSuccess clears the sticky
flag on a clean push. getFailedSyncTargets SQL adds
`AND sticky_error_code IS NULL` so the retry loop skips sticky rows.
- FleetSyncService.executePushToNode: short-circuits at the top when
sticky is set (covers event-driven pushResourceAsync calls). On a 409
with code CONTROL_IDENTITY_MISMATCH, records the failure once and
pins sticky with the expected/got fingerprints carried in the 409 body.
- routes/nodes.ts: new POST /api/nodes/:id/fleet-sync/reset-anchor.
Admin + paid + node:manage. Proxies POST /api/fleet/role/reanchor to
the peer with `{override:true}` using the stored Bearer node_proxy
token. On peer 200, clears every sticky row for the node so the next
push re-anchors and resumes replication. Distinct 502 / 504 responses
for peer-rejected / peer-unreachable so the UI can show a useful toast.
Frontend
- New lib/fleetSyncApi.ts + hooks/useFleetSyncStatus.ts. Polling hook
(30s visibilityInterval) skips fetch when !isPaid.
- NodeManager.tsx: destructive banner per affected node listing both
fingerprints, with `Reset anchor on peer` and `Remove node` buttons.
Hidden for community-tier users via empty hook data.
- FleetConfiguration.tsx (Fleet -> Status): read-only `Policy sync`
SummaryRow per remote node card. In sync / degraded / paused with
a tooltip; no action buttons (the action lives in NodeManager).
Tests
- fleet-sync-service.test.ts: 4 new cases for sticky-set on first
mismatch, short-circuit on subsequent pushes, null fingerprints,
and non-mismatch failures not setting sticky.
- database-fleet-sync-sticky.test.ts (new): 6 cases pinning the DB
contract incl. retry-loop SQL filter and migration idempotency.
- nodes-fleet-sync-reset-anchor.test.ts (new): 6 cases covering
happy path, peer 401 -> 502, peer unreachable -> 504, local-node
rejection, unknown node id, and community-tier 403.
Gate parity (Directive 30): the new POST .../reset-anchor enforces
requireAdmin + requirePaid + node:manage (matches the existing read at
GET /api/fleet/sync-status). UI banner + SummaryRow only render when the
hook returns data, which it only does for paid-tier authed users. No
existing tier-gate file moved; this is greenfield parity.
Auth audit: the peer's POST /api/fleet/role/reanchor route already uses
requireAdmin, which accepts the central's stored node_proxy Bearer
token because authMiddleware maps `scope === 'node_proxy'` to
`req.user = { username: 'node-proxy', role: 'admin', userId: 0 }`.
No widening required.
Backend tsc clean. Frontend tsc -b clean. 59 fleet-sync tests pass; full
backend suite green minus the pre-existing Windows-only file-lock flake
on filesystem-backup.test.ts that reproduces unchanged on main.
|
||
|
Anso
|
9dbce9c3c7 |
fix(spawn): attribute ENOMEM and ENOENT-under-memory-pressure spawn failures to host OOM (#1111)
Operators previously saw "spawn docker ENOENT" or "spawn /bin/sh ENOENT" when the host was under memory pressure, which sent them down a missing-binary debugging path. Linux libuv's posix_spawn can fail to allocate its argv / path-search arena under low free memory and surface the underlying ENOMEM as ENOENT. Centralizes spawn-error mapping in a new utils/spawnErrors.ts helper: - Explicit ENOMEM is rewritten to "Out of memory while launching <command> (host free memory: X MiB of Y MiB)". - ENOENT under the 128 MiB free-memory floor is rewritten with the same wording plus a "reported as ENOENT under memory pressure" hint. - ENOENT for docker on a healthy host preserves the existing "Docker CLI unavailable on this node" mapping. - Other errors pass through unchanged. Applied at the four named offenders: ComposeService.execute(), ComposeService.captureCompose(), DockerController.getContainersByStack(), and FileSystemService.getStacks() (which gets an ENOMEM-aware log line for the scandir failure). Startup also logs host free/total MiB once and warns when free memory is below the 128 MiB floor, so the diagnostic surfaces before the first spawn attempt rather than after it fails. 37 tests cover the mapping function directly and the ComposeService / FileSystemService integration paths. |
||
|
Anso
|
523ba5854c |
fix(stacks): return 404 for nonexistent stacks on deploy/down/update (F-7) (#1108)
POST /api/stacks/:name/{deploy,down,update} previously returned HTTP 500
with body {"error":"spawn docker ENOENT"} when invoked against a stack
whose compose directory was missing. The status code was wrong (the
named resource did not exist, so 404 is the right answer) and the
message misled operators into thinking the docker CLI was unavailable.
Add a small requireStackExists(nodeId, stackName, res) helper in
routes/stacks.ts that validates the stack name and confirms a compose
file is present via FileSystemService.hasComposeFile before any of the
three handlers spawn docker compose. The helper is called immediately
after requirePermission and before runPolicyGate so unauthorized
callers still get 403 first and the policy gate never runs against a
phantom stack.
In ComposeService.execute(), narrow the child.on('error') handler so
the genuine docker-binary-missing case (ENOENT on the spawn itself)
rejects with "Docker CLI unavailable on this node" instead of the raw
"spawn docker ENOENT". This is defense in depth for the rare case the
pre-check cannot cover, and it fixes the misleading-message half of
the bug as well.
Cover the new contract with stack-actions-missing-stack.test.ts (four
cases: deploy/down/update return 404, invalid name returns 400). Mock
ComposeService as a tripwire so a future code path that bypasses the
guard would fail loudly. Fix stacks-failure-notifications.test.ts by
adding hasComposeFile to its FileSystemService partial mock so the
existing happy-path-error-handling cases continue to flow into
ComposeService.
|
||
|
Anso
|
0cffd60173 |
fix(mesh): clean up activeStreams on src socket close/error (F-10) (#1105)
The cross-node MeshService.openCrossNode handler attached src.on('close')
and src.on('error') listeners that only called tcpStream.destroy() and
never deleted the activeStreams Map entry. MeshTcpStreamLike.destroy()
sends a tcp_close frame to the remote but does not synchronously emit
the local close event; that fires only when the remote sends back a
tcp_close ack via _dispatchClose (or when the entire tunnel tears down
and the bridge force-emits close on every stream).
Failed dials whose remote ack was lost (peer gone, network drop, or the
F-9-era timeouts) therefore leaked records into activeStreams until the
tunnel itself idle-closed, producing the monotonically-climbing
activeStreamCount documented in the mesh E2E audit (F-10).
Add a cleanupRecord() closure that clears the open timer and deletes
the record idempotently, then route all four lifecycle handlers
(tcpStream.on('error'), tcpStream.on('close'), src.on('close'),
src.on('error')) through it. Map.delete is naturally idempotent so the
double-delete that fires when both sides close normally is a free
no-op. The same-node openSameNode path already had this shape via its
existing teardown() closure; this brings the cross-node path to parity.
Three new Vitest cases in mesh-service.test.ts use an EventEmitter-
backed fake src so emit('close') actually delivers to the listener
(the existing makeFakeSocket uses vi.fn for .on which records calls
but never fires them). They cover src.close, src.error, and the
idempotency case where both src and tcpStream emit close in sequence.
|
||
|
Anso
|
c460bb87a8 |
fix(mesh): probe upstream synchronously in route diagnostic (F-11) (#1100)
GET /api/mesh/aliases/:alias/diagnostic returned a cached state derived from the last latency/error maps. Those maps only mutated when someone called POST .../test or when a cross-node connect logged an event, so once an upstream stopped the diagnostic kept reporting "healthy" until the 60 s alias-cache refresh pruned the alias entirely. The GET now calls testUpstream synchronously after the alias-resolved, opted-in, tunnel-up short-circuits. Probe failures land in routeErrorMap via logActivity (cross-node already did this; same-node timeout/error paths now log probe.fail in the same shape), so the state computation flips to "unreachable" on the same request that exposed the stopped upstream. A new routeProbeAtMap stamps freshness and surfaces in the response as lastProbeAt; the route detail sheet renders "Last probe <age> · <ms>" using the existing formatTimeAgo helper. |
||
|
Anso
|
554f662563 |
fix(mesh): surface stopped-stack opt-ins on routing node cards (#1098)
Add `currentlyResolvable: boolean` per entry in `MeshNodeStatus.optedInStacks`, derived from the existing alias cache so the new field stays consistent with `/api/mesh/aliases` without any extra Dockerode or cross-node inspect on the status path. The Routing tab renders an amber `suspended` pill for entries whose stack is opted in but currently has no running services, plus a single explanatory caption below the suspended list. Resolves the contradictory `Mesh stacks: 1 / Aliases: 0 / No mesh services on this node yet` copy on the node card when a meshed stack's container has been stopped; the misleading line is now only shown when the node truly has no opt-ins. The opt-in itself remains sticky: when the stack starts again, its aliases reappear automatically on the next refresh. Defensive de-dup in the UI filters suspended entries against the live alias snapshot to handle the transient gap where `/mesh/status` and `/mesh/aliases` return slightly inconsistent views from their separate fetches. Tests: - new `mesh-status-resolvability.test.ts` (6 cases) locks the resolvable / suspended / mixed / empty / per-node-scoping / stale-alias-no-phantom invariants for `getStatus`. - `mesh-topology-layout.test.ts` gains a `stacksKey` resolvability-flip case and a `meshNodeStateEqual` case asserting a resolvability flip on an otherwise identical stack registers as a state change so the topology layout re-runs. Operator docs gain one new troubleshooting accordion in `/docs/features/sencho-mesh.mdx` explaining the suspended state. |