Commit Graph

8 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Anso c613010199 feat: account for VM memory ballooning in host memory reporting (#1750)
* feat: account for VM memory ballooning in host memory reporting

Extend hostMemory.ts with a readBalloonedMemory() function that parses the
Balloon: field from /proc/meminfo, following the same fail-open pattern as
the ZFS ARC integration. When a nonzero balloon is detected, effective
memory fields (effectiveUsed, effectiveFree, effectiveUsagePercent) are
computed and exposed through /api/system/stats and /api/fleet/overview.

All consumers that derive meaning from host memory now prefer effective
values when present: the dashboard gauge, Fleet card RAM bar, mobile
views, health verdict, health status bar stat tile, and host RAM alerts.

Backward compatible: missing /proc/meminfo or absent Balloon: line
preserves exact current behavior. Old remote nodes without the new fields
continue rendering normally.

* refactor: extract shared helpers for balloon memory wiring

Extract readCandidateFile() and logSelectedPath() in hostMemory.ts to
deduplicate ARC and balloon file-read logic. Add memoryToWire() to
centralize the optional-field spread used by /api/system/stats and
/api/fleet/overview. Add getNodeMemUsed()/getNodeMemTotal() helpers
in nodeUtils.ts for frontend byte-text consumers.

* fix: make desktop fleet masthead aggregate balloon-aware

The desktop fleet overview's memory aggregate in useFleetOverview.ts still
summed raw memory.used, while the mobile fleet aggregate and per-node cards
already used effective values. Update to use getNodeMemUsed/getNodeMemTotal
helpers.

* fix: revert balloon adjustment from alerting and health decisions

Ballooned memory is host-reclaimed (unlike ZFS ARC, which the guest can
reclaim on demand). The guest cannot get ballooned pages back until the
hypervisor deflates them, so treating ballooned memory as available for
alerting or health can mask real memory pressure.

Keep balloon parsing, wire fields, and the dashboard context line as
informational-only. The memory gauge, health verdict, and host RAM alerts
now use the standard ARC-adjusted working-set percentage regardless of
balloon. Updated configuration.mdx and dashboard.mdx to document that
balloon data is informational and does not influence alerting.
2026-08-02 20:48:38 -04:00
Anso 98667e0d6f fix: make host memory usage ZFS ARC-aware (#1547) 2026-07-01 23:08:49 -04:00
Anso 42fc8048fe fix(metrics): host memory usage excludes reclaimable page cache (#1297)
* fix(metrics): host memory usage excludes reclaimable page cache

Host RAM was computed as mem.used / mem.total via systeminformation, but mem.used counts
reclaimable buffers/cache as used, so a busy Linux host read ~99%. Switch the dashboard stats,
the fleet node self-report, and the host-RAM alert threshold to mem.active / mem.total
(cache-excluded), and report used: mem.active and free: mem.available so the byte readout stays
consistent with the percentage. Add regression tests for a cache-heavy host (no false alert) and
a genuinely busy host (alert still fires).

* test(metrics): assert system stats memory excludes reclaimable cache

The cached /api/system/stats test mocked si.mem() without active/available, so after
the route switched to the cache-excluded fields it produced a NaN percentage that the
shape-only assertions did not catch. Fill the mock with a realistic shape and assert the
route reports the active working set, not the cache-inclusive used/free.
2026-06-03 16:11:00 -04:00
Anso 69edb0dcbb fix(observability): gate global logs to admins, scope to managed containers, harden SSE (#1254)
* fix(observability): gate global logs to admins, scope to managed containers, harden SSE

Make the Logs feed an administrator view enforced on both sides (requireAdmin on
the /api/logs/global poll and SSE routes; the Logs nav item plus a redirect guard
on the frontend), and scope the feed to Sencho-managed containers only via a
shared isManagedByComposeDir helper that /stats now reuses.

Harden the SSE stream: a stateful frame demuxer that survives chunk boundaries so
a Docker frame split across reads is reassembled instead of dropped or garbled; a
per-stream error listener so one broken follow stream cannot crash the event loop
(it posts a single degraded notice and keeps the others alive); a cap on
concurrent follow streams with a truncation notice; a bounded initial tail; and
backpressure that pauses the source streams when the client is slow and resumes on
drain. Bound the polling snapshot's per-container fan-out with a concurrency limit.

Add process-local, in-memory log-stream counters exposed at the admin-only
/api/system/log-stream-metrics endpoint (active connections, lines streamed,
attach and frame errors). Collapse the view to the local hub and remove the dead
remote-node handling.

* fix(observability): close remote-proxy bypass of the global-logs admin gate

The logs feed's requireAdmin lives in the local route handler, which the remote
proxy skips when forwarding a request whose nodeId targets a remote node. A hub
user could therefore request /api/logs/global*, /api/logs/global/stream, or
/api/system/log-stream-metrics with x-node-id (or ?nodeId= for the SSE transport)
pointing at a remote node and have it served as the node-proxy admin on the far
side, sidestepping the gate entirely.

Add these paths to HUB_ONLY_PREFIXES so hubOnlyGuard rejects a remote nodeId with
403 before the proxy runs, matching the existing protection on audit-log,
scheduled-tasks, and notification-routes. Add regression tests covering the
collection path, the SSE sub-path (both the x-node-id header and the ?nodeId=
query transport), and the stream-metrics endpoint.
2026-05-29 21:09:20 -04:00
Anso f6e42535c8 fix(mesh): route peer→central traffic over the existing forward WS (#1094)
* fix(mesh): route peer→central traffic over the existing forward WS

The reverse mesh callback path (`/api/mesh/proxy-tunnel-from-peer`) needed
SENCHO_PRIMARY_URL on central plus a publicly reachable origin from the
peer's perspective. In a typical homelab where central sits behind NAT,
peer→central dispatch silently failed at the dialer's short-circuit and
the headline "call any service on any node by hostname" worked one way
only.

The forward WS at `/api/mesh/proxy-tunnel` is already bidirectional end
to end. Make the bridge a persistent control-plane primitive: dial every
mesh-enabled proxy peer at startup, reconcile every 60 s, never idle-close.
Peer→central traffic multiplexes over the same WS via `tcp_open_reverse`.

Removed:
- `meshProxyTunnelFromPeer.ts` WS handler and dispatch
- `MeshCentralRegistry`, `PeerToCentralMeshSessionDialer`
- `mesh_handshake` first-frame state machine in `meshProxyTunnel.ts`
- `maybeSendBootstrap`, `buildHandshakeFrame` in the dialer
- `mesh_proxy_callback_bootstrap` capability and `maybeWarnUnsetPrimaryUrl`
- `mesh_centrals` table (drop migration; greenfield, no users)
- `PilotTunnelManager.replaceOrRegisterProxyBridge` (dead after handler removal)
- twelve associated unit/integration tests plus the peer-recovery branch
  in `MeshService.openCrossNode`

Added:
- `MeshService.proactiveBridgeFanout` selects every mesh-enabled proxy
  peer (no longer gated on `mesh_stacks` rows)
- `startBridgeReconcileLoop` runs the fanout every 60 s (override via
  `SENCHO_MESH_RECONCILE_INTERVAL_MS`)
- `MeshProxyTunnelDialer` default idle TTL is now `0` and exposes
  `isDialing(nodeId)` for the status surface
- `MeshNodeStatus.reverseCallbackStatus` discriminator
  (`connected | connecting | unavailable | not_applicable`) surfaced via
  `/api/mesh/status` and rendered as a pill in the Routing tab
- `openCrossNode` error message distinguishes "no proxy target" from
  "waiting for central to dial the reverse bridge"
- New tests: `mesh-service-proxy-tunnel-reconcile`,
  `mesh-status-reverse-callback`, `mesh-proxy-tunnel-dialer-no-idle-close`

SENCHO_PRIMARY_URL is no longer required for any mesh function.

* fix(mesh): rewrite proxy-tunnel reconcile test contents

The previous commit renamed the file but the rewritten test bodies stayed
unstaged on top of the rename. This commit lands the actual rewrite: the
fanout assertion now requires every mesh-enabled proxy peer to be dialed,
not just those with `mesh_stacks` rows, and adds a reconcile-tick
repeated-call test.
2026-05-17 22:00:31 -04:00
Anso cf618dd866 feat(mesh): symmetric WS dial for proxy-mode mesh peers (#1066)
* chore(mesh): foundation for symmetric callback dial

Adds the data-plane scaffolding that the symmetric callback dial fix
builds on:
- mesh_centrals table for peer-side bootstrap material
- MeshCentralRegistry service (upsert/getActive/clear/markUsed/markRejected)
- PilotTunnelManager kind discriminator and replaceOrRegisterProxyBridge
- mesh_proxy_callback_bootstrap capability registration
- MeshProxyTunnelDialer reason-tagged proxy-bridge-down events from a
  single tearDownBridge emission point
- Reactive redial scheduler that skips idle and auth_failed reasons

* feat(mesh): add reverse-direction activity log entries (closes R1-B)

acceptReverseLocal now emits route.resolve.ok with direction=reverse on
connect ack and route.resolve.fail with direction=reverse plus
reason=container_not_found / connect_error pre-connect. Post-connect
close/error stays silent. Reuses existing event types via the new
details.direction discriminator so frontend filters are unaffected.

* feat(mesh): add peer-to-central callback dial path (closes R1-A2)

Closes the architectural gap where proxy-mode mesh peers could not
re-establish their tunnel to central after any non-idle bridge teardown
(idle close, network blip, central restart, peer reboot). Central remains
the hub for the data plane; the change is purely about WS initiation.

Symmetric WS initiation, asymmetric protocol roles. Central retains
PilotTunnelBridge ownership; peer retains TcpStreamSwitchboard +
reverseDialer ownership. Central bootstraps callback credentials over
the first authenticated central-initiated mesh tunnel via a one-shot
mesh_handshake JSON frame; peer persists the material in a new
mesh_centrals SQLite table and dials central's new
/api/mesh/proxy-tunnel-from-peer endpoint when local cross-node traffic
needs a bridge and none is live.

Mesh_tunnel JWT (HS256, signed with auth_jwt_secret) carries scope, audience,
issuer (central instance id), peer api_token fingerprint, kid. Validation
on inbound peer dial: algorithm pin, signature, scope, audience, instance,
time bounds, node existence and mode, fingerprint match. Failures return
HTTP 401 with a machine-readable reason; peer routes the response per a
clear-vs-keep cache matrix.

Triggers proactive bootstrap on mesh-enable and api_token rotation; central
startup fans out to mesh-enabled proxy-mode nodes with mesh_stacks rows
(throttled, fire-and-forget). Reactive redial on non-idle bridge loss.

Capability-gated handshake send (mesh_proxy_callback_bootstrap) makes the
upgrade path safe against older peers in mixed-version fleets.

Adds peer-side /api/system/pilot-tunnels centralCallback diag block,
bounded counter metrics for bootstrap and dial events. SENCHO_PRIMARY_URL
preflight warning when unset on a central with mesh-enabled proxy nodes.

Tested with unit suites for the validation chain, registry, manager, and
both dialers; integration tests for bootstrap E2E (asserts protocol-role
invariant), api_token rotation, instance id change, version skew, and
pilot-mode regression.

* fix(mesh): green CI on the symmetric callback branch

Two independent CI failures, both surgical:

1. Backend tests (11 fails): four mesh test files called setupTestDb in
   beforeEach. setupTestDb does not reset the DatabaseService singleton,
   so the per-test afterEach rm of the previous tmpdir left the singleton
   connection pointing at a deleted file. The next beforeEach's line-55
   write threw SQLITE_READONLY_DBMOVED on Linux. Windows file-lock
   semantics hid this locally. Hoist setupTestDb / cleanupTestDb to
   file-scope beforeAll / afterAll; per-test state resets stay in
   beforeEach. Matches the convention in the eight mesh test files that
   already pass.

2. CodeQL (4 high alerts): js/insufficient-password-hash flagged
   sha256(api_token) at four sites. The api_token is a 256-bit opaque
   bearer (sen_sk_-prefixed), not a human password; sha256 is the
   correct fingerprint primitive for binding the mesh_tunnel JWT to a
   specific token. Add the two production files plus the two test
   files that mint the fingerprint to the existing path-scoped
   query-filter for that rule.

* fix(mesh): drop unused afterEach import and revert dead codeql config

ESLint flagged afterEach as unused in mesh-central-registry.test.ts:1
after the previous commit hoisted setup/teardown to file-scope
beforeAll/afterAll. Remove from the vitest import line.

Revert the codeql-config.yml additions from the previous commit. The
paths: sub-key under query-filters > exclude is not a documented CodeQL
feature and silently no-ops. The four js/insufficient-password-hash
alerts on api_token fingerprinting are tracked as dismissed false
positives in the GitHub Security tab rather than via dead config.
2026-05-16 14:58:19 -04:00
Anso 3d9489648e fix(pilot): harden outbound reverse-tunnel against resource exhaustion (#979)
* fix(pilot): cap tunnel frame size, concurrent streams, and stream idle time

Pilot tunnels carry every HTTP, WS, and Mesh-TCP byte for a remote node
through a single multiplexed WebSocket. A buggy or compromised peer that
sent oversized frames, opened streams in a tight loop, or left streams
parked indefinitely could exhaust gateway memory.

Three protocol-level limits applied symmetrically on both ends:

  - MAX_FRAME_SIZE_BYTES (8 MB): set as the ws maxPayload on the
    gateway-side WebSocketServer and the agent-side WebSocket client,
    plus a defense-in-depth length check in decodeBinaryFrame and
    decodeJsonFrame.
  - MAX_STREAMS_PER_TUNNEL (1024): bridge refuses new loopback HTTP /
    upgrade / TCP allocations with 503 once at the cap; the agent
    rejects new incoming http_req / ws_open / tcp_open with the
    appropriate error frame.
  - STREAM_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS (10 min): every stream gets a per-stream
    timer refreshed on each inbound or outbound activity. Expiry tears
    down the local half and notifies the peer.

The constants are colocated in pilot/protocol.ts so any future agent
build picks them up via the protocol module.

* fix(pilot): rate-limit pilot enrollment endpoints to 10 per minute

Pilot enrollment mints a JWT and writes a pilot_enrollments row, both
privileged operations that should not share the global API budget
(200/min). Add a dedicated express-rate-limit instance keyed by user or
IP at 10/min in production (100/min in dev so the local enrollment
test loop is not throttled).

The limiter is applied directly on POST /api/nodes/:id/pilot/enroll.
On POST /api/nodes the limiter's skip function reads the parsed body
and exempts proxy-mode creates; only requests that resolve to
mode=pilot_agent count against the enrollment budget.

* fix(pilot): cap concurrent pilot tunnels system-wide

The PilotTunnelManager held an unbounded Map of bridges. A reconnect
storm, runaway enrollment, or operator misconfiguration could grow the
map without limit, even though every tunnel still carries a valid JWT.

Cap at 256 concurrent tunnels per primary instance:

  - Soft warning at 128 (logged once per crossing).
  - Hard refusal at 256: registerTunnel throws PilotTunnelCapacityError
    and the upgrade handler closes the WebSocket with 1013 (Try Again
    Later) so the agent backs off rather than tight-looping.

A node that already has a registered tunnel does not consume a new
slot when it reconnects; the existing bridge is closed first.

* fix(pilot): release backpressure as soon as the tunnel buffer drains

Previously the bridge paused HTTP request bodies when the tunnel
WebSocket's bufferedAmount climbed above 4 MB but never resumed them
explicitly; the next data event re-checked the threshold, and TCP
streams only saw a 'drain' fan-out on the 30 s ping cycle. Slow-consumer
peers held buffered bytes for tens of seconds longer than needed.

Replace both with an on-demand drain check: when at least one stream
is paused, sample bufferedAmount every 100 ms; once it drops below the
high-water mark, resume every paused request and emit 'drain' to every
accepted TCP stream, then stop the timer. Dormant when no stream is
paused, so steady-state cost is zero.

* fix(pilot): trust internal CAs via SENCHO_PILOT_CA_FILE

Self-hosted deployments often terminate TLS with an internal CA. The
only previous escape hatch was NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0, which
disables verification across every outbound connection in the agent
process and is the wrong shape of fix.

Add SENCHO_PILOT_CA_FILE: when set, the agent reads the file as a PEM
bundle and passes it to ws as the `ca` option for the tunnel
WebSocket. rejectUnauthorized remains true. Failure to read the file
exits with a clear error so the operator does not silently fall back
to the default trust store.

There is no flag to disable TLS verification entirely; that would
defeat the credential trust model.

* fix(pilot): gate frame-rate-adjacent logs behind developer_mode

The agent's malformed-frame warning fires per inbound frame and could
flood logs under attack or against a buggy primary. The bridge swallowed
parse errors silently, leaving operators blind to protocol drift, and
the manager had no signal at all on tunnel registration.

Route per-frame and per-tunnel diagnostic logs through the existing
isDebugEnabled() helper (same pattern used by middleware/auth, RBAC,
and websocket/logs). Production stays quiet by default; the toggle is
the existing developer_mode setting in global_settings — no new env
var, no new dependency.

* feat(pilot): expose per-tunnel metrics via /api/system/pilot-tunnels

Operator support had no signal beyond raw logs to answer "is this
tunnel flapping?" or "is one bad node hiding behind the aggregate?".
Add an in-process counter set covering tunnels_total, tunnels_replaced,
tunnels_rejected_capacity, enroll_acks, frame_decode_errors, plus a
per-node array carrying the connectedAt and bufferedAmount so a single
tunnel sitting on a stuck buffer remains visible.

Counters live in services/PilotMetrics.ts; the gateway has no shared
in-process metrics facility today, so this is a per-feature pattern
documented as such for future consolidation. Counters are strictly
process-local — no telemetry, no export, no phone-home — consistent
with Sencho's privacy posture.

Surfaced read-only via GET /api/system/pilot-tunnels behind admin auth,
mirroring the existing cache-stats endpoint.

* fix(pilot): tighten reconnect backoff and log handling

Three small follow-ups to the hardening pass:

  - Sanitize the primary URL on the agent's connect log so a malicious
    SENCHO_PRIMARY_URL with embedded control characters cannot inject
    fake log lines.
  - Move the reconnect-backoff reset from the 'open' callback to the
    'hello' frame handler. A peer that always rejects the handshake
    (incompatible version, consumed enrollment token) used to reset
    the backoff on every TCP-level connect and tight-loop reconnects;
    now the reset waits for a clean protocol round-trip.
  - Document the StreamIdAllocator wrap behavior so future readers
    can see the relationship between the 2^31 wrap and the
    MAX_STREAMS_PER_TUNNEL cap without re-deriving it.

* test(pilot): add coverage for enrollment, rate limiter, and tunnel caps

Adds two test files exercising the hardening pass surfaces that were
previously uncovered:

  - pilot-enrollment.test.ts: end-to-end through POST /api/nodes
    (pilot mode), POST /api/nodes/:id/pilot/enroll, the SHA256
    token-hash persistence, replay protection, expired enrollments,
    and the rate-limit header wiring (enrollment limiter on pilot
    paths, global limiter elsewhere).
  - pilot-bridge-limits.test.ts: oversize-frame rejection at both
    binary and JSON decoders, and the per-tunnel concurrent stream
    cap as observed via openTcpStream returning null and the loopback
    HTTP server returning 503 once the bridge is at capacity.

Bridge cap test fills the slot map with TCP stream handles rather than
real HTTP requests so the OS socket pool stays out of the picture.

* test(pilot): cover manager metrics snapshot and capacity-error shape

Adds direct coverage for:

  - PilotTunnelCapacityError exposing the limit so the upgrade
    handler can format a useful close-frame reason.
  - PilotMetrics.snapshot returning a defensive copy (callers must not
    mutate the live counter set).
  - getMetricsSnapshot returning the open count, per-node breakdown,
    and counter set in a stable shape, with tunnels_total bumping on
    a successful registerTunnel.

The manager test seeds a real pilot-mode node row first because
updateNode throws on missing rows; this models the production path
where a node is created before its enrollment is consumed.

* docs(pilot): document tunnel limits, custom CA, and new failure modes

Refresh the Pilot Agent feature doc to cover the hardening surfaces:

  - New 'Self-signed primary TLS certs' section walking through the
    SENCHO_PILOT_CA_FILE env var with an example docker run command.
  - New 'Resource limits' section listing the per-tunnel and
    system-wide ceilings so operators know what the wire enforces.
  - Four new troubleshooting entries: WebSocket close 1013 (system
    cap), loopback 503 (stream cap), close 1002 with protocol error
    (frame size / malformed), and HTTP 429 on enrollment.

Also expand .env.example with a new pilot-agent block covering
SENCHO_MODE, SENCHO_PRIMARY_URL, SENCHO_ENROLL_TOKEN, and
SENCHO_PILOT_CA_FILE so operators do not have to read code or the
feature doc to discover the agent-side config surface.

* fix(pilot): address code-review findings on the hardening pass

Critical:
  - Bridge: TCP backpressure now starts the drain timer and tracks
    streams awaiting drain, so a TcpStream caller waiting on 'drain'
    no longer hangs when no HTTP request is in flight.
  - Bridge: every direct streams.delete call now goes through the
    removeStream helper so per-stream idle timers are cleared
    consistently and pausedReqs / tcpAwaitingDrain stay aligned.
  - Bridge close(): resume any paused IncomingMessage before clearing
    the map so a parser does not stay stuck across teardown.

High:
  - Protocol: decodeJsonFrame now compares Buffer.byteLength(raw,
    'utf8') against the cap; raw.length (UTF-16 code units) let
    multi-byte payloads sneak ~3x the byte budget through.
  - Agent: the optional CA bundle is read once at construction and
    cached on the instance, so a missing or rotated SENCHO_PILOT_CA_FILE
    no longer process-exits on every reconnect attempt.

Medium / Low:
  - Bridge limits test: assert mockWs.sent.length to confirm slot
    allocations actually serialized a tcp_open frame and that a
    rejected (cap+1) attempt did not consume a stream id.
  - Manager: defer the tunnels_replaced increment until after the
    cap check passes, so a rejected reconnect does not double-count
    as both replacement and capacity rejection.
  - Manager: clarify the protocol comment about MAX_FRAME_SIZE_BYTES
    enforcement layering (ws maxPayload is authoritative; decoder
    check is for tests and defense-in-depth).
  - Limiter: defensive `if (!req.body) return false` so a future
    refactor that delays body parsing cannot silently skip the
    enrollment limiter.

Deferred (documented as follow-ups, not in this branch):
  - M2: narrowing public surface of PilotTunnelManager.getBridge to a
    MeshTunnelHandle interface (cross-cutting refactor).
  - H4: end-to-end replay test driving the upgrade handler twice
    with the same enrollment JWT (needs WS test harness).
2026-05-07 21:28:35 -04:00
Anso f5eb993f48 refactor(backend): add tests then extract metrics and image-updates routers (phase 4b follow-up) (#738)
Wraps up Phase 4 Round B by tackling the two deferred groups. 25 new
integration tests land first and run green against the inline monolith,
then each group is extracted byte-for-byte.

index.ts drops from ~3,678 to ~3,231 lines; test count rises 1,320 → 1,345.

New coverage:
- metrics-routes.test.ts (11) — auth + shape checks for /api/stats,
  /api/metrics/historical, /api/system/stats, /api/system/cache-stats
  (admin-only), and SSE headers for /api/logs/global/stream
- image-updates-routes.test.ts (14) — auth, admin gating, rate-limit
  tolerance on /refresh, fleet aggregation, /auto-update/execute input
  validation and no-stacks short-circuit

New route files:
- routes/metrics.ts — /stats, /metrics/historical, /logs/global (+ SSE
  /stream), /system/stats, /system/cache-stats. Mounted at /api so the
  mixed sub-paths line up.
- routes/imageUpdates.ts — /api/image-updates CRUD + fleet aggregation,
  plus a separate autoUpdateRouter mounted at /api/auto-update that
  owns the /execute handler. Same split pattern as license.ts +
  systemUpdateRouter.

index.ts trims unused imports left behind by the extraction:
globalDockerNetwork, si, STATS_CACHE_TTL_MS, SYSTEM_STATS_CACHE_TTL_MS,
GlobalLogEntry + log-parsing helpers.
2026-04-23 21:49:58 -04:00