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https://github.com/Studio-Saelix/sencho.git
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7982251dc6f5fe93d14ddd64711ca3446cd82747
32 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 Anso
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3a22f59057 |
feat(security): surface Compose internet-reachability exposure in posture (#1442)
* feat(security): surface Compose internet-reachability exposure in posture Builds a per-stack per-service exposure descriptor from the rendered effective Compose model, cached at deploy/update time, and joins it into the Security action posture. A service is publicly exposed when it publishes a port on a non-loopback host IP or uses host networking. The exposure cache lives in a new stack_exposure table, refreshed inside ComposeService.deployStack and updateStack (covering all funneled paths: manual, scheduler, mesh, templates, labels, App Store, Git, webhooks). Cleanup runs on stack delete, blueprint withdrawal, and node delete. The overview route intersects the exposed image set with the existing per-image suppression-aware Critical/High tally, so a clean public nginx does not escalate posture. The scan sheet shows a "Published service" or "Internal only" evidence badge per image. * fix(test): provide fresh auto-close proc for exposure spawn in stall tests Two deployStack idle-stall tests used mockSpawn.mockReturnValue(proc) which returned the same already-closed process for the new config spawn added by the exposure refresh. The renderConfig promise hung waiting for a close event that had already fired. The fix uses mockImplementation to return the controlled proc for the first spawn (up) and a fresh auto-closing proc for the second spawn (config via refreshExposureCache). * fix(security): tighten loopback detection, clarify exposure semantics, drop internal-only badge - Expand isLoopback to cover full 127.0.0.0/8 range (127.0.0.2 etc) - Clarify that exposure is configured (Compose model), not live topology - Remove "Internal only" badge: false is not proof of non-exposure when other stacks using the same image may lack a cached descriptor |
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Anso
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bc8c051962 |
feat(scheduler): consistent action targeting in Scheduled Operations (#1431)
Give every scheduled action an explicit, predictable target model (Action then Node then Stack then Options then Schedule): - System Prune now exposes a Node picker and requires a node, so it can no longer run silently on the default node. - Vulnerability Scan and System Prune list local nodes only; both run on the hub-local Docker daemon and reject remote nodes on the backend. - Restart Stack service discovery loads services from the selected node via fetchForNode instead of the active or local node. - Fleet Snapshot shows a read-only "Scope: Entire fleet" summary. Backend gains a shared local-node guard and prune node validation on create and update, plus an executor-level remote-node guard, so the frontend and backend validation now agree for every action. |
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Anso
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6527bc971b |
feat(security): gate deploys on exploitation risk, not just severity (#1432)
Scan-policy deploy gates can now block on a known-exploited CVE (CISA KEV) and on a fixable Critical/High finding, in addition to an optional severity threshold. New policies default risk-first (KEV and fixable on, severity off); existing policies keep their severity-only behavior. CVSS stays captured for context but is never the sole basis for a block, and a finding whose exploitability cannot be confirmed is treated as risky rather than safe (incomplete scan detail fails closed on KEV/fixable inputs). The decision logic is shared between the pre-deploy gate and the informational post-scan banner via a pure helper, so the two never disagree. Block messages and the block dialog now name the conditions an image matched. Backend and frontend gates move together, the new inputs replicate across the fleet, and a blocking policy with no active input is rejected on both sides. |
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Anso
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b1630788ba |
feat(security): prioritization-led Overview charts (posture + exploit intel) (#1427)
* feat(security): rework Overview charts around posture and exploit intel Replace the three severity-variation charts (severity donut, top exposed images, findings by type) with prioritization views, keeping the risk trend for context: - Action posture: bars of fixable / known-exploited / needs-review / accepted / not-affected with a known-exploited headline, derived from the existing overview facts (no new fetch). - Top exploit-risk findings: ranked actionable Critical/High by KEV, then EPSS, then CVSS, each row opening its scan. - Severity x exploitability: a CVSS-by-EPSS quadrant that separates scary-but-not-exploitable from act-first. The two intel panels are fed by a new bounded GET /security/overview/exploit-intel (latest-scan Critical/High, suppression-filtered, KEV/EPSS joined at read time) and degrade to clear empty states until exploit intel is fetched and images are rescanned. * fix(security): drop the redundant SECURITY kicker from the desktop masthead The desktop nav strip already names the page, so the masthead's "SECURITY" label above the posture word was redundant. Make PageMasthead's kicker optional (pages that pass one render unchanged) and omit it on the Security masthead. The mobile masthead keeps its kicker, since on the phone layout it is the page identity and there is no nav strip. * docs(security): describe the prioritization-led Overview charts Update the Security overview docs for the reworked chart set (risk trend, action posture, top exploit-risk, and the severity-by-exploitability quadrant) and note the exploit-risk charts populate once exploit intelligence is enabled. * fix(security): move the scanner-detections note into a masthead info icon Replace the standing "scanner detections show vulnerable components..." caption below the masthead (desktop and mobile) with an info affordance next to the scanned-images count in the masthead subtitle. Declutters the overview while keeping the disclaimer one hover away. * fix(security): apply "assume it's automatable" to exploit-risk ranking Absence of exploitability evidence must not be treated as low risk. Rank the top exploit-risk list by tier (known-exploited > known-high EPSS > unknown EPSS > known-low EPSS) so an unrated finding outranks one with evidence of low likelihood; label unrated findings "EPSS n/a"; and reword the quadrant footnote so excluded findings read as unrated rather than lower risk. |
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Anso
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f794702171 |
feat(security): action-posture Security dashboard with exploit intel and triage (#1424)
* feat(security): reframe masthead as action posture, not worst-CVE severity Derive the Security masthead from an action posture (Action needed / Monitoring / Secure / Unknown) instead of raw scanner severity, and label the raw Critical/High counts as scanner detections. "Secure" now means nothing is actionable right now, never a claim that no vulnerabilities exist; Unknown covers a missing scanner or a node with no completed scan. Phase-1 bootstrap: "actionable" is approximated from the overview facts that already exist (fixable findings, secrets, misconfigs); a later phase moves the bucketing to the backend. * feat(security): derive overview action posture from triaged facts Add deriveSecurityPosture as the single bucketing function and extend /security/overview with posture facts (fixableCriticalHigh, dangerousCompose, accepted, rawCritical/rawHigh, plus knownExploited/publiclyExposed placeholders that later phases populate) and the derived posture verb. Suppression- and acknowledgement-aware counts come from one bounded read-time pass over the latest-scan Critical/High findings, grouped per image so the existing read-time filters apply unchanged. The pass is capped and flags posturePartial, so a large node degrades gracefully instead of scanning every detail row. The masthead now prefers the backend posture and keeps the local bootstrap only as a fallback for older remote nodes reached through the proxy. * feat(security): capture Trivy finding enrichment (status, CVSS, vendor, purl, layer) parseTrivyOutput now keeps the per-finding fields Trivy already returns and we previously discarded: Status (fixed / will_not_fix / end_of_life / ...), CVSS (score + vector, preferring the NVD source then falling back), vendor severity, package URL, package path, and layer digest. Persisted on vulnerability_details via additive nullable columns (guarded ALTER), bound null when absent, and carried through the cached-scan reconstruction path. These fields separate scary from exploitable and feed the action posture and the per-finding evidence tags. Field paths verified against Trivy's documented image-scan JSON; covered by parse and insert/read round-trip tests. * feat(security): add CVE exploit-intel service (CISA KEV + FIRST EPSS) Add CveIntelService, a daily background cache of CISA KEV membership and FIRST EPSS scores stored in a new cve_intel table and joined to findings at read time by CVE id (never frozen onto scan rows, so a CVE entering KEV later lights up on scans already stored). EPSS is fetched only for CVE ids present in stored findings, batched; both feeds are best-effort and keep the last cache on failure, so the Security page degrades gracefully offline. Wired into startup/shutdown like the other background services. The overview now counts known-exploited Critical/High findings, and KEV membership escalates posture to Action needed even when no fix is available. A per-instance "Exploit intelligence" toggle on the scanner setup surface lets air-gapped or firewalled hosts disable the outbound fetch; the daily tick keeps running but skips the fetch body when it is off. * feat(security): show per-finding evidence tags (KEV, EPSS, vendor status, CVSS) The vulnerabilities endpoint joins read-time exploit intel (KEV membership and EPSS score) onto each finding by CVE id, and the scan sheet renders evidence tags beside each CVE: known-exploited, EPSS probability, vendor will-not-fix / end-of-life, and the CVSS score. Severity becomes one signal among several so an operator can tell scary from exploitable, with no invented composite score. * feat(security): evolve CVE suppressions into triage decisions Layer a triage status and optional OpenVEX justification onto CVE suppressions. Statuses: needs review / affected / not affected / accepted risk / fixed / false positive / ignored. Dismissing states (not affected, accepted, fixed, false positive, ignored) stop a finding from driving the action posture; needs review and affected stay actionable and are surfaced as counts. Existing rows default to "accepted" (the prior suppress behavior), so nothing changes for them. The overview now reports needsReview / notAffected / accepted as distinct facts derived from the triage status. The decision replicates across the fleet (snapshot + replicated-insert carry status + justification) so a replica's posture matches the control node. The inline suppress dialog gains a triage decision selector; the read-time filter surfaces the status and justification on every finding. * feat(security): export fleet triage decisions as OpenVEX (Admiral) Add an OpenVEX exporter that turns the instance's CVE triage decisions into a standard VEX document (not_affected / fixed / affected / under_investigation, with justifications), and a GET /security/vex/export endpoint to download it. Authoring fleet VEX is a governance capability, so it is gated to Admiral (paid) plus admin, mirroring the SARIF export gate; the Suppressions panel shows an Export VEX action only on Admiral. * docs(security): document action posture, evidence tags, exploit intel, and triage Update the Security page and CVE suppressions docs for the action-posture masthead (scanner detections vs product posture), per-finding evidence tags (KEV / EPSS / CVSS / vendor status), the exploit-intelligence toggle (CISA KEV + FIRST EPSS) on scanner setup, triage decisions layered on suppressions, and OpenVEX export of fleet triage decisions. * test(security): match intel hosts exactly in CveIntelService test Route the fetch stub and its call assertions by exact hostname (www.cisa.gov / api.first.org) instead of a domain substring check. Resolves the js/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization code-scanning alerts on the test's URL routing; behavior is unchanged. |
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Anso
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7ce045accb |
feat: pre-deploy scan visibility and pinned scanner version (#1378)
* feat: pre-deploy scan visibility and pinned scanner version Pin managed Trivy installs and add an opt-in pre-deploy scan advisory so a manual deploy can surface each image's latest scan before it runs. - Managed Trivy now installs a pinned, known-good version by default for reproducible installs. Auto-update still tracks the latest release, and an explicit update always pulls the latest. - Add an opt-in pre-deploy scan advisory: when enabled, deploying a stack from the editor first shows each image's latest cached scan severity for review. It is visibility only and never blocks; deploy enforcement is unchanged. - Backend: pre_deploy_scan_advisory setting, PUT /security/pre-deploy-scan-advisory, a cache-only GET /security/stacks/:name/pre-deploy-summary, and a node-scoped getLatestVulnScanByDigestForNode lookup. - Frontend: advisory toggle on the Security page scanner setup, and a PreDeployScanDialog wired into the editor deploy flow that fails open when the summary is unavailable. - Docs: scanner configuration, version pinning, and the advisory. * fix: harden pre-deploy advisory guard, toggle visibility, and installer busy state Addresses review findings on the pre-deploy advisory. - Block a second editor deploy during the async advisory window with a synchronous pending ref, cleared on cancel and in the deploy's finally, so a double-click can no longer start two deploys. - Keep the pre-deploy advisory toggle visible to admins whenever the setting is on, so it can still be turned off after the scanner becomes unavailable. - Resolve the managed Trivy version inside the install lock so the busy state and serialization cover the latest-version fetch and the managed-install check. |
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Anso
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058cf8f2c7 |
feat: make image-update check cadence configurable and visible (#1377)
* feat: make image-update check cadence configurable and visible The background image-update scanner polled registries on a hardcoded 6-hour interval, with no way to see when it last ran or when the next run was due. Operators testing updates read this as auto-update being unreliable: a manual update checks the registry immediately and applies, so the slow background scan rarely raised the "update available" notification before the stack was already current. Backend: - ImageUpdateService reads image_update_check_interval_minutes (15-1440, default 120) and drives a single generation-guarded self-rescheduling timer with 10% per-run jitter so fleet nodes do not poll in lockstep. restartPolling() applies a new interval live, with no restart, and cannot leave a duplicate timer when a save lands mid-scan. - GET /api/image-updates/status now returns checking, intervalMinutes, lastCheckedAt, nextCheckAt, and the manual-cooldown fields. New admin-only PUT /api/image-updates/interval persists the setting and reschedules. Frontend: - New Settings > Automation > Image update checks section to choose the interval (read-only for non-admins; admin enforced on the backend). - The Auto-Update readiness view shows last-checked, next-check, and a ticking manual-recheck cooldown, and the copy distinguishes registry detection from scheduled auto-update execution. Adds backend unit and route tests and frontend component tests, and updates the auto-update documentation. * fix: drop stale image-update status response in the readiness strip loadCadence() ran on mount and again after a Recheck with no request token, so a slow initial /image-updates/status response could resolve after the recheck-triggered one and overwrite the fresh cooldown with stale data, or set state after the view unmounted. Guard setCadence with a monotonic token mirroring loadReadiness, and bump it on unmount. Adds a regression test for the out-of-order resolution. |
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Anso
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3c116466d9 |
refactor: drop the advisory policy-packs section and the findings cursor tooltip (#1369)
* refactor: drop the advisory policy-packs section and the findings cursor tooltip Two Security-page cleanups from review. - Remove the advisory policy-packs catalog from the Policies tab. It was information-only and disconnected from the scan_policies enforcement engine, so it read as duplicated. The tab now hosts only the enforcement manager, which is paid, so the Policies tab is hidden for Community (with a deep-link guard) and the Overview's enforcement hint is gated to match. The backend policy-packs catalog and route are kept as a dormant foundation. Delete the orphaned PolicyPacksTab component, its test, and the unused frontend pack types. - Drop the cursor-follow tooltip from the findings severity badge (Secrets and Compose risks), matching the Images table. - Clarify that Compose risks is a Trivy security-misconfig audit, distinct from Compose Doctor's deploy-readiness preflight, in the tab copy and the docs. * chore: re-run CI |
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Anso
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3d39d856a3 |
feat: chart-led Security overview with sortable Images and History tables (#1364)
* feat: chart-led Security overview with sortable Images and History tables Refine the Security page around the existing design system and add the data the dashboard needs. - Overview leads with four charts (30-day risk trend, severity donut, top exposed images, findings by type); the signal-rail counts become a secondary summary, and the scanner and deploy-enforcement posture follow. - Images becomes a recessed table with search, a severity filter, sortable columns, a last-scan column, and inline scan actions; the findings cell is clickable into the scan sheet, and the per-row cursor tooltip is dropped where the columns already carry that information. - Policies puts deploy-enforcement first, collapses the policy packs into an accordion, and uses the standard primary button for Add policy. - Suppressions and acknowledgements move their titles and Add buttons outside the cards, matching the Fleet tab layout. - History switches from the detail sheet to an inline table (search, sortable columns, two-scan compare, pagination); the now-unreachable scan-history overlay is removed. - Add GET /api/security/overview/trend, a node-scoped daily critical/high rollup backing the risk-trend chart. - Extract the shared image-scan hook and the severity classifier, and harden the overview data fetch so a malformed non-critical response can never read as a clean security state. * fix: treat malformed Security responses as errors, not empty or clean states Address an independent review of the data-fetch paths so a 200 with an unexpected shape can never read as a benign "no findings" view. - SecurityView: validate that the image-summaries body is a scan-summary map; an unexpected shape now sets the error state instead of an empty map. Isolate the trend fetch in its own self-catching promise so a transport failure on the non-critical chart can no longer poison the overview or summaries error state. - useImageScan: only a "completed" poll counts as success (a malformed or unknown status now throws), and a failed post-scan summaries refresh is logged instead of silently dropped. - HistoryTab: a 200 whose body lacks an items array is treated as an error, not an empty "no completed scans" list. |
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Anso
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2a4955f56d |
feat: add dedicated Security page and policy-pack foundation (#1362)
* feat: add dedicated Security page and policy-pack foundation Bring vulnerability scanning, scan history, suppressions, Compose risks, secrets, policy packs, and scanner setup into one node-scoped Security command center instead of scattering them across Resources and Settings. - New top-level Security view with Overview, Images, Compose risks, Secrets, Policies, Suppressions, History, and Scanner setup tabs (status masthead + signal rail; controlled tabs with deep-link support). - Backend: GET /security/overview rollup and GET /security/policy-packs static catalog (auth-only, Community). DatabaseService gains an uncapped scan-status count and a node-eligible block-policy count, and getImageScanSummaries now projects secret and misconfig counts. - Reuse existing surfaces: the scan-history sheet, the control-governed suppression and acknowledgement panels, and the scan-detail sheet (now with an initial-tab prop so it opens on the matching finding type). - Extract a shared SeverityBadge (from Resources) and a TrivyManager (from Settings) so both surfaces render identical controls. - Resources "Scan history" now links into the Security page History tab. - Docs for the new Security surface and tests for the new endpoints, helpers, nav wiring, and tabs. * refactor: consolidate scanner and policy management onto the Security page Remove the Settings "Vulnerability Scanning" section now that the Security page covers the same ground, with every option preserved: - Scanner install / update / uninstall / auto-update live on the Scanner setup tab (TrivyManager). - Scan policies, the honor-suppressions toggle, and the replica managed-by-control / demote controls move into a new ScanPolicyManager on the Policies tab (paid; Community sees only the policy-pack catalog). - CVE suppressions and acknowledgements remain on the Suppressions tab. Wiring removed: the registry section and the now-empty Security settings group, the SectionId, the SettingsSectionContent case and the isPaid prop it was the sole consumer of, and SecuritySection itself. The dashboard configuration-status "Vulnerability scanning" row now navigates to the Security page Policies tab. Docs that pointed at "Settings -> Security -> Vulnerability Scanning" are swept to the relevant Security page tabs. * fix: harden Security page scanner refresh, policy-load errors, and secret-only badges Address independent-review findings on the Security page: - Scanner setup now refreshes Trivy state when the active node changes, so the displayed scanner status matches the node TrivyManager's actions target (both follow x-node-id). Previously, switching nodes on the tab left stale state. - ScanPolicyManager surfaces an explicit error state on a failed policy fetch instead of falling through to a false "No scan policies configured". - The shared SeverityBadge and the Images findings column no longer label a scan "clean" when it has secrets or misconfigurations but no CVE severity (highest_severity is derived from vulnerabilities only); they show a "Findings" state and the secret/misconfig counts instead. - The Overview enforcement note points to the Policies tab, not the removed Settings section. - The History tab auto-opens the scan-history sheet only on a deep-link (mount with the History tab active), not on every manual tab selection. Adds tests for the badge secret/misconfig state and the policy-load error state. |
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Anso
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085267b466 |
feat(security): make CVE suppressions optionally honored by deploy-block policies (#1269)
* feat(security): make CVE suppressions optionally honored by deploy-block policies
Block-on-deploy policies evaluate the raw scan result, so a CVE an admin
has accepted in CVE Suppressions still blocks the deploy. Add an opt-in,
per-instance toggle ("Honor suppressions in deploy blocks", Settings ->
Security) that, when on, re-derives each image's severity from the
suppression-filtered findings before comparing to the policy threshold. A
deploy that proceeds only because suppressions dropped it below the gate is
recorded in the audit log. Default off, so the strict raw-scan behavior is
unchanged unless an operator enables it.
The setting governs the instance that runs the deploy and is not
fleet-replicated. The gate fails safe: a suppression-read error or an
empty detail set falls back to raw scan severity rather than dropping it.
Also surface a previously swallowed error in the CVE suppressions and
misconfig acknowledgement settings panels so a failed list load shows a
toast instead of an empty list.
* fix(security): gate on raw severity when preflight detail rows are truncated
The suppression-aware deploy gate re-derived image severity from the stored
vulnerability_details rows, assuming any non-empty set was complete. A cached
pre-deploy scan keeps the full aggregate counts but copies only a bounded slice
of detail rows, so recomputing from that slice could drop an unsuppressed
blocking CVE below the threshold and let a deploy through.
Guard the recompute: when the loaded detail rows do not match the scan's total
finding count, gate on the raw scan severity (never drops severity). Suppression
awareness still applies for scans whose details are stored in full, which is the
common case.
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Anso
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aa3d99a594 |
fix(mesh): re-evaluate data plane every 10s and add opt-in auto-recreate (#1184)
* fix(mesh): re-evaluate data plane every 10s and add opt-in auto-recreate MeshService.dataPlaneStatus was written exactly once at boot in setupMeshNetwork() and never re-evaluated. After the operator removed sencho_mesh at runtime (or it was recreated externally, or Sencho was disconnected from it), /api/health and the dashboard banner kept returning the stale boot-time discriminator until the next process restart. Adds a 10s revalidator that inspects the current Docker truth in one network-inspect call and transitions dataPlaneStatus to reflect it. Short-circuits in not_started / not_in_docker / subnet_invalid (states that cannot change within this process) and in concurrent ticks. Transitions are idempotent on stable state, so the timer can tick indefinitely on a healthy mesh without log noise. New 'not_found' reason value for the network-was-removed-at-runtime case. Existing reasons (subnet_mismatch, subnet_overlap, attach_failed) also surface from the revalidator when their underlying conditions arise post-boot. transitionDataPlane keeps message and subnet fields fresh across consecutive observations even when reason is unchanged, so /api/health never reports stale numbers (e.g. two consecutive subnet_mismatch observations against different external subnets). Adds an opt-in mesh_auto_recreate global setting (default off). When on, the revalidator additionally calls attemptInPlaceRecreate() after surfacing not_found. The helper hard-prefers the boot-chosen subnet (this.meshSubnet) and never iterates candidates, because changing the subnet here would invalidate every existing extra_hosts override on disk. A real conflict on the original subnet is reported as subnet_overlap and preserved during the 60s recreate throttle window so the operator-actionable reason is not flapped back to not_found between attempts. Self-attachment is checked via Name match (operator --hostname X matches container Name /X) or full container-ID prefix for hex HOSTNAMEs >= 12 chars (Docker default short ID). Non-hex HOSTNAMEs cannot collide with container IDs at all so a Name miss is conclusive; short hex HOSTNAMEs preserve the prior status as 'unknown' rather than risking a false-positive prefix match. Frontend surfaces: - types/mesh.ts: 'not_found' added to MeshDataPlaneReason. - MeshDataPlaneBanner: 'not_found' headline copy. - Settings > System > Mesh data plane: TogglePill bound to mesh_auto_recreate, default off, helper text explains the tradeoff. Backend coverage in backend/src/__tests__/mesh-data-plane-revalidate.test.ts (25 cases): short-circuits, idempotent stable-state, recovery from subnet_mismatch / subnet_overlap, transition to not_found / subnet_mismatch / attach_failed, transient-Docker anti-flap, re-entrancy guard, name match path, ID-prefix path, short hex hostname ambiguity, non-hex hostname certainty, transition message refresh on observation drift, auto-recreate off (default), auto-recreate success with senchoIp preservation, auto-recreate overlap classification with no subnet drift, throttle window preserves classified reason, throttle release. Lifecycle test covers timer wiring in start()/stop(). Existing mesh-setup-error-classification suite (27 cases) still green. Resolves: F-4 in the v1.0 audit tracker. * fix(mesh): address Codex review of PR #1184 Three findings from the independent review: BLOCKER: attemptInPlaceRecreate() called recordSetupFailure() on create / attach failures, which clears this.senchoIp. The next revalidator tick's attachment check is guarded on senchoIp, so with it null the check is skipped and the snapshot path can silently flip the status back to ok against a network where Sencho is in fact not attached. Also: a later successful recreate would call ensureSelfAttached() with senchoIp null, which short-circuits, so the network gets recreated without binding Sencho. Replaced the recordSetupFailure() calls in attemptInPlaceRecreate with a new recordRecreateFailure() that uses transitionDataPlane and preserves senchoIp. Added two tests: create-fails-then-succeeds (verifies senchoIp survives the failure and the later retry binds Sencho correctly) and create-succeeds-attach-fails-then-next-tick (verifies the snapshot path surfaces attach_failed on the next tick instead of falsely reporting ok). SHOULD-FIX 1: single-key POST /api/settings wrote String(value) without re-validating against the per-key schema, so an allowlisted enum-shaped key like mesh_auto_recreate could persist arbitrary strings ('banana', 'true') that the bulk PATCH would later refuse. Routed the single-key path through SettingsPatchSchema.safeParse so both write paths validate identically. Added regression tests for an invalid mesh_auto_recreate value, a valid mesh_auto_recreate write, and an out-of-range numeric value. SHOULD-FIX 2: the new Mesh data plane subsection lived inside a section the registry exposes to non-admins, who would see the toggle and only learn it was admin-only after the save 403'd. Gated the subsection on `isAdmin` from useAuth so non-admins do not see the control. The other system controls keep their existing visibility pattern (read-only for non-admins). 71/71 backend tests green (revalidate + mesh-setup + settings-routes). 276/276 frontend tests green. tsc clean on backend + frontend. |
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Anso
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c460bb87a8 |
fix(mesh): probe upstream synchronously in route diagnostic (F-11) (#1100)
GET /api/mesh/aliases/:alias/diagnostic returned a cached state derived from the last latency/error maps. Those maps only mutated when someone called POST .../test or when a cross-node connect logged an event, so once an upstream stopped the diagnostic kept reporting "healthy" until the 60 s alias-cache refresh pruned the alias entirely. The GET now calls testUpstream synchronously after the alias-resolved, opted-in, tunnel-up short-circuits. Probe failures land in routeErrorMap via logActivity (cross-node already did this; same-node timeout/error paths now log probe.fail in the same shape), so the state computation flips to "unreachable" on the same request that exposed the stopped upstream. A new routeProbeAtMap stamps freshness and surfaces in the response as lastProbeAt; the route detail sheet renders "Last probe <age> · <ms>" using the existing formatTimeAgo helper. |
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554f662563 |
fix(mesh): surface stopped-stack opt-ins on routing node cards (#1098)
Add `currentlyResolvable: boolean` per entry in `MeshNodeStatus.optedInStacks`, derived from the existing alias cache so the new field stays consistent with `/api/mesh/aliases` without any extra Dockerode or cross-node inspect on the status path. The Routing tab renders an amber `suspended` pill for entries whose stack is opted in but currently has no running services, plus a single explanatory caption below the suspended list. Resolves the contradictory `Mesh stacks: 1 / Aliases: 0 / No mesh services on this node yet` copy on the node card when a meshed stack's container has been stopped; the misleading line is now only shown when the node truly has no opt-ins. The opt-in itself remains sticky: when the stack starts again, its aliases reappear automatically on the next refresh. Defensive de-dup in the UI filters suspended entries against the live alias snapshot to handle the transient gap where `/mesh/status` and `/mesh/aliases` return slightly inconsistent views from their separate fetches. Tests: - new `mesh-status-resolvability.test.ts` (6 cases) locks the resolvable / suspended / mixed / empty / per-node-scoping / stale-alias-no-phantom invariants for `getStatus`. - `mesh-topology-layout.test.ts` gains a `stacksKey` resolvability-flip case and a `meshNodeStateEqual` case asserting a resolvability flip on an otherwise identical stack registers as a state change so the topology layout re-runs. Operator docs gain one new troubleshooting accordion in `/docs/features/sencho-mesh.mdx` explaining the suspended state. |
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Anso
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f6e42535c8 |
fix(mesh): route peer→central traffic over the existing forward WS (#1094)
* fix(mesh): route peer→central traffic over the existing forward WS The reverse mesh callback path (`/api/mesh/proxy-tunnel-from-peer`) needed SENCHO_PRIMARY_URL on central plus a publicly reachable origin from the peer's perspective. In a typical homelab where central sits behind NAT, peer→central dispatch silently failed at the dialer's short-circuit and the headline "call any service on any node by hostname" worked one way only. The forward WS at `/api/mesh/proxy-tunnel` is already bidirectional end to end. Make the bridge a persistent control-plane primitive: dial every mesh-enabled proxy peer at startup, reconcile every 60 s, never idle-close. Peer→central traffic multiplexes over the same WS via `tcp_open_reverse`. Removed: - `meshProxyTunnelFromPeer.ts` WS handler and dispatch - `MeshCentralRegistry`, `PeerToCentralMeshSessionDialer` - `mesh_handshake` first-frame state machine in `meshProxyTunnel.ts` - `maybeSendBootstrap`, `buildHandshakeFrame` in the dialer - `mesh_proxy_callback_bootstrap` capability and `maybeWarnUnsetPrimaryUrl` - `mesh_centrals` table (drop migration; greenfield, no users) - `PilotTunnelManager.replaceOrRegisterProxyBridge` (dead after handler removal) - twelve associated unit/integration tests plus the peer-recovery branch in `MeshService.openCrossNode` Added: - `MeshService.proactiveBridgeFanout` selects every mesh-enabled proxy peer (no longer gated on `mesh_stacks` rows) - `startBridgeReconcileLoop` runs the fanout every 60 s (override via `SENCHO_MESH_RECONCILE_INTERVAL_MS`) - `MeshProxyTunnelDialer` default idle TTL is now `0` and exposes `isDialing(nodeId)` for the status surface - `MeshNodeStatus.reverseCallbackStatus` discriminator (`connected | connecting | unavailable | not_applicable`) surfaced via `/api/mesh/status` and rendered as a pill in the Routing tab - `openCrossNode` error message distinguishes "no proxy target" from "waiting for central to dial the reverse bridge" - New tests: `mesh-service-proxy-tunnel-reconcile`, `mesh-status-reverse-callback`, `mesh-proxy-tunnel-dialer-no-idle-close` SENCHO_PRIMARY_URL is no longer required for any mesh function. * fix(mesh): rewrite proxy-tunnel reconcile test contents The previous commit renamed the file but the rewritten test bodies stayed unstaged on top of the rename. This commit lands the actual rewrite: the fanout assertion now requires every mesh-enabled proxy peer to be dialed, not just those with `mesh_stacks` rows, and adds a reconcile-tick repeated-call test. |
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578cac89da |
fix(mesh): surface data-plane failures in health, meta, and Routing tab (#1088)
The three previously-silent console.warn paths in MeshService.setupMeshNetwork now route through a typed recordSetupFailure helper that classifies the failure (subnet_invalid, subnet_overlap, subnet_mismatch, ip_in_use, attach_failed, not_in_docker), emits a mesh.disable activity entry at the matching level (error for real failures, warn for the expected dev-mode not_in_docker case), and strips mesh_proxy_callback_bootstrap from advertised capabilities via CapabilityRegistry. /api/health gains a mesh.dataPlane block carrying the typed status. /api/mesh/status carries localDataPlane at the top level so the Routing tab renders a red banner with an operator-actionable recovery hint (set SENCHO_MESH_SUBNET to a free /24 and recreate the container) when the data plane is down. The success path re-enables the capability and flips the status to ok. Generalizes the previously-documented F-0 failure mode (IP-in-subnet collision) to also cover the subnet-pool-overlap case where another Docker bridge on the host already owns the requested CIDR. |
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a38a3e0226 |
feat(mesh): route mesh traffic over Distributed API remotes (#1048)
* refactor(mesh): extract shared TCP stream switchboard
Pull the `tcp_open` / `tcp_open_ack` / `tcp_open_reverse` / `tcp_close`
+ `TcpData` handling out of the pilot agent into a reusable module so a
second caller (the upcoming proxy-mode WS handler) can run the same
frame parser, stream allocator, idle timers, and Compose-label
resolver. One parser, two callers, zero drift on a
security-sensitive protocol surface.
The pilot agent keeps its public `openMeshTcpStream` API and delegates
to a per-connection switchboard constructed in `connect()` and torn
down in `cleanupAfterDisconnect`. Existing reverse-stream and resolver
tests are rewritten to exercise the shared module directly.
* feat(mesh): route mesh traffic over Distributed API remotes
Sencho Mesh now works against remotes in Distributed API mode in
addition to Pilot Agent mode. Central opens a short-lived WebSocket
tunnel to the remote's new `/api/mesh/proxy-tunnel` endpoint on demand
and tears it down after 5 minutes of idle (configurable via
`SENCHO_MESH_PROXY_TUNNEL_IDLE_MS`). Mesh dispatch is mode-agnostic at
the routing layer; `PilotTunnelManager.ensureBridge` resolves an
existing tunnel or asks the new `MeshProxyTunnelDialer` to dial.
The Routing tab badges now use a `reachableMode` classifier: `★ Local`
for local, `pilot offline` red badge for a pilot with a down tunnel,
and a new `unreachable` red badge surfacing the specific reason
(missing token, scope not full-admin, TLS failure, remote does not
support proxy mesh). Distributed API remotes with valid credentials
show no negative badge; the tunnel opens on first dial.
Auth: the proxy-tunnel WS upgrade requires an `Authorization: Bearer`
API token with the `full-admin` scope. Lower-scoped tokens are
rejected at upgrade time so a leaked read-only token cannot reach the
mesh data plane.
Bidirectional: the proxy-mode WS handler registers itself as the
local `MeshService` reverse dialer (compare-and-swap), so meshed
containers on a Distributed API remote can dial cross-node aliases
via `tcp_open_reverse` over the same tunnel. Cross-node relays
(`PilotTunnelBridge.acceptReverseRelay`) await `ensureBridge` so
proxy-to-proxy mesh works without standing tunnels.
* docs(mesh): describe Distributed API mesh and unreachable troubleshooting
Refresh the user-facing mesh documentation to reflect that mesh works
over both Pilot Agent and Distributed API remotes. Adds a
Troubleshooting accordion entry for the new `unreachable` Routing tab
badge so operators can match a tooltip reason ("api token rejected
(scope must be full-admin)", "remote does not support proxy mesh",
"TLS handshake failed", "api_url not set", "api token missing") to a
concrete fix.
* refactor(mesh): apply /simplify review findings
Five cleanups surfaced by the post-implementation code review pass.
No behaviour change for fleets running on `main`; only internal
structure improves.
- **Deterministic container IP shared.** Extract the compose-default
network preference (`pickContainerIp`) and the conventional-name
fast path (`lookupContainerIp`) into `backend/src/mesh/containerLookup.ts`.
Both `MeshService.resolveContainerIp` (existing same-node fast
path) and the switchboard's `resolveByComposeLabels` (proxy/pilot
inbound dial) now use the same logic. Earlier the switchboard
helper grabbed the first `Object.values(Networks)` IP, which
could flip across daemon versions on multi-network containers;
fixed.
- **WS URL upgrade extracted.** New `backend/src/utils/wsUrl.ts`
exposes `httpUrlToWs(baseUrl)` that maps `http://` to `ws://` and
`https://` to `wss://`. Used in both `pilot/agent.ts` and the
proxy-tunnel dialer. The previous inline `replace(/^http/, 'ws')`
silently downgraded `https://` to `ws://` (cleartext).
- **`computeReachable` takes the pre-fetched node.** `getStatus`
already iterated `db.getNodes()`; the helper previously re-queried
by id per node (N+1 reads). Pass the row in.
- **Reachable-reason ternary -> const map.** Replace the nested
ternary in `MeshService.computeReachable` with a
`Record<DialFailureCode, string>` lookup keyed on the dialer's
failure code.
- **Activity-type ternary -> const map.** Same flattening inside
`MeshProxyTunnelDialer.logActivity`.
All mesh tests pass (85/85). Full backend suite green (2126/2126).
* fix(mesh): cache proxy dial failures and contain WS handshake errors
`ensureBridge` now consults the recent-failure cache before dialing so a
continuous mesh workload against a misconfigured proxy-mode remote does
not produce one upgrade attempt per cross-node TCP open. `recordFailure`
emits at most one activity-log entry per cache window per (nodeId, code)
so a connect-loop on a single bad remote cannot flush the ring buffer.
Failure messages run through `redactSensitiveText` before reaching the
log so any embedded Bearer / JWT / inline-URL credentials are scrubbed.
`stop()` clears the inflight map and `dial()` checks `this.stopped`
between awaits so a shutdown does not leak a half-opened bridge.
When `awaitOpen` rejects (401, 4403, TLS), the dialer attaches a noop
'error' listener before calling `ws.close()`. Without it the ws library
emits a tail 'error' on a still-CONNECTING socket that propagates as an
unhandled exception. Surfaced by a live-network test against a real
proxy-mode peer.
Adds `mesh-proxy-tunnel-live.test.ts` (skipped unless MESH_AUDIT_URL
and MESH_AUDIT_TOKEN_FILE env vars are set) covering both the happy
path and the auth-rejected path against an actual remote Sencho.
* feat(mesh): instrument proxy tunnel observability
Adds three counters to `PilotMetrics`:
- `proxy_bridges_total` (incremented on `registerProxyBridge` success)
- `proxy_dials_failed` (every failed dial attempt, not deduped)
- `proxy_idle_closes` (idle-sweep teardowns)
All three surface automatically via `GET /api/system/pilot-tunnels`
since the route returns the full `Counters` snapshot.
Gates two pre-existing always-on `console.warn` calls in
`tcpStreamSwitchboard.ts` (mid-stream socket errors and Docker resolve
failures) behind `isDebugEnabled()`. Both fire on per-stream events and
would otherwise violate the diagnostic-log safety rule under load.
Adds `mesh-tcp-stream-switchboard.test.ts` covering the forward
`tcp_open` path: real localhost dial, resolver errors (no_target,
denied), per-tunnel cap saturation, frame-routing fall-through
invariants, `tcp_close` socket teardown.
Drops `MESH_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_MS` from the public surface; only the
switchboard itself uses it.
* fix(mesh): tighten Routing tab unreachable handling
`RoutingNodeCard.tsx`: the **Add stack to mesh** button now disables
when `reachableMode === 'unreachable'`, matching the existing
TogglePill behavior. Without this, an operator on an unreachable node
could open the opt-in sheet, confirm, and watch the redeploy proceed
against a target whose mesh data plane will silently fail to route.
Also drops the leftover `status.nodeId !== -1` guard on the pilot-
offline badge.
`MeshService.ts`: renames `isMeshReachable` to `isMeshConfigured` with
the new predicate that returns true for proxy-mode remotes whose creds
are valid (the tunnel is opened on demand). `getRouteDiagnostic` now
distinguishes "routable" (configured) from "pilotLive" (live tunnel
state, only meaningful for pilot mode); without the split, every idle
proxy-mode route would report `tunnel down`.
`MeshService.setReverseDialer` warns when the unconditional install
path silently overwrites a non-null current dialer. By topology a
Sencho is either pilot or central, so the branch flags a misconfigured
deployment rather than an expected race.
Drops the dead `export { ReverseTcpStreamHandle }` re-export from
`pilot/agent.ts`; its only consumer imports straight from
`mesh/tcpStreamSwitchboard.ts`. Fixes a stale doc comment in
`MeshService.ts` that referenced the wrong source file.
Adds `mesh-proxy-tunnel-handler.test.ts` covering the WS handler
lifecycle: pilot-mode 404 rejection, post-upgrade reverse-dialer
install, concurrent-upgrade 1013 rejection (single-tenant slot), and
error-path teardown.
Updates the troubleshooting accordion in the user docs to mention the
disabled-state behavior.
* fix(mesh): close ESLint and CodeQL findings on the proxy-tunnel diag logs
Remove the unused `reverseDialer` local in `meshProxyTunnel.ts`; the
closure target is `localDialer` above and this assignment was always
dead. Strip line breaks inline on the three `MeshProxyTunnelDialer`
diag log lines so CodeQL `js/log-injection` data flow recognises the
sanitisation that `sanitizeForLog` already performs.
No behaviour change; the diag logs render the same characters they
do today.
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f599110386 |
feat(mesh): collapse sidecar into Sencho process via in-process forwarder (#1000)
The separate saelix/sencho-mesh sidecar container is gone. The
forwarder logic that previously lived in mesh-sidecar/src/forwarder.ts
moves into the Sencho process as backend/src/services/MeshForwarder.ts,
a thin per-port net.Server lifecycle wrapper. MeshService implements
the host interface and owns resolve plus splice; MeshForwarder owns
listener boilerplate. One container per node, no separate image to
publish, no control WebSocket.
Operator-facing change: the Sencho container now runs in
network_mode: host so the forwarder can bind alias ports on the host
network where meshed containers' extra_hosts host-gateway entries
point. Without host network mode the listeners would land in the
container's namespace and inbound traffic from peers would never
reach them. The 1852:1852 port publish becomes a no-op under host
mode and is commented out in the operator template.
Same-node forward path now dials the target container's bridge IP
via Dockerode (preferring the compose default network for
deterministic selection across daemon versions) instead of 127.0.0.1.
The legacy 127.0.0.1 path only worked when the target service
published its port to the host; the IP path works regardless.
Cross-node mesh routing in this phase is central -> pilot direction
only via PilotTunnelManager.openTcpStream. Pilot -> central and
pilot <-> pilot via central relay land in Phase B with the
tcp_open_reverse frame.
Deletions:
- mesh-sidecar/ package entirely (Dockerfile, package, sources, tests)
- backend/src/websocket/meshControl.ts
- MeshService sidecar lifecycle: spawnSidecar, stopSidecar,
isSidecarRunning, mintSidecarToken, verifySidecarToken,
attachSidecarSocket, handleSidecarResolve, sendSidecar
- POST /api/mesh/nodes/:id/sidecar/restart route
- /api/mesh/control WS dispatch in upgradeHandler
Type cleanup: 'sidecar' literal removed from MeshActivitySource and
MeshProbeResult.where (also the frontend mirror). MeshNodeStatus
sidecarRunning becomes localForwarderListening (boolean | null) so
non-local nodes get a null instead of an unconditional false; the
honest semantic is "this view only knows the local forwarder state;
remote forwarder status lands in Phase B." MeshNodeDiagnostic
sidecar object becomes forwarder { listening, listenerCount }.
Frontend MeshDiagnosticsSheet drops the restart-sidecar action and
sidecar liveness card; surfaces forwarder state plus a "runs
in-process; no separate container" caption.
Resolves audit findings C-1 (data plane non-functional), C-2 (sidecar
control WS not loopback-enforced), C-4 (sidecar lifecycle Dockerode-
on-remote, PR #999 closed), and C-5 (saelix/sencho-mesh:latest
unreachable). C-3 (PR #992) is unchanged. M-12 (PR #994) is
unchanged.
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3b650523c1 |
Audit-hardening pass for secret and misconfiguration scanning (#977)
* fix(security): dedupe concurrent compose-stack scans
Track stack scans in scanningImages keyed stack:<nodeId>:<stackName>.
The /scan/stack route returns 409 when an in-flight scan exists, and
the service-side check is the real correctness barrier (the route
pre-check is a fast-path optimization that mirrors scanImage). The
dedup key release lives in a try/finally so failed scans free the
slot for retry.
Why: scanComposeStack had no equivalent of scanImage's scanningImages
guard, so two simultaneous calls for the same stack would both run
trivy config, both insert a vulnerability_scans row, and double-
process the result.
* feat(security): acknowledge misconfig findings
Adds a parallel acknowledgement system for Trivy misconfig findings
that mirrors cve_suppressions: a new misconfig_acknowledgements table,
read-time enrichment via the new misconfig-ack-filter utility, REST
CRUD endpoints, fleet-sync replication from control to replicas, a
Settings panel, and an Acknowledge button on the Misconfigs tab.
Schema and behavior parity with cve_suppressions:
- UNIQUE(rule_id, COALESCE(stack_pattern, '')) so fleet-wide acks
collide as expected
- blockIfReplica on every write
- Audit-log entries name the scope (rule_id, stack_pattern) but
never the reason text
- replicated_from_control flag controls UI delete affordance and
drives clearReplicatedRows on demote/reanchor
- Validators reused: validateStackPatternForRedos for glob safety,
sanitizeForLog for log fragments
SARIF export emits an external/accepted suppression entry per
acknowledged misconfig, matching the CVE pattern.
Per-row Acknowledge dialog prefills stack_pattern with the scan's
stack_context so the default scope is "rule + this stack only" and an
operator must broaden explicitly.
Tests: misconfig-ack-filter (15) and misconfig-ack-routes (23)
including the duplicate-409 case for both pinned and fleet-wide acks.
* fix(security): reap orphaned trivy tmp dirs at startup
When the buildEnv path writes a per-scan DOCKER_CONFIG dir under
os.tmpdir() and the process crashes before the finally block runs,
the dir leaks. Mirrors GitSourceService.sweepStaleTempDirs:
exported sweepStaleTrivyTempDirs is fire-and-forget at boot,
removes prefix-matching dirs older than 1 hour, swallows
permission/race failures, logs a single line if any were reaped.
* perf(security): emit per-batch summary for scanAllNodeImages
Adds one diag() line at the end of scanAllNodeImages summarising
unique image count, scanned, skipped, failed, violation count, and
elapsed time. Per-image diag inside scanImage stays useful for
debugging individual scans; the summary gives operators a single
fleet-level checkpoint when developer_mode is on.
* perf(security): cap SARIF export at 5000 findings per type
Replace the unbounded fetchAllPages walk on /scans/:id/sarif with a
hard limit of 5000 findings per type. When any type trips the cap,
emit run-level properties.truncated=true plus row_limit and per-type
totals so downstream tooling can flag the export as partial.
Console-warns for ops visibility.
A scan with 50k vulns previously streamed every row into memory
before serialising; the cap bounds memory and serialisation time at
the cost of completeness on pathological scans.
* docs(env): document TRIVY_BIN host-binary override
The env var is honored by TrivyService.detectTrivy as a fallback when
no managed install is present, but it was undocumented in
.env.example. Adds the var with a comment explaining precedence
(managed > TRIVY_BIN > PATH).
* test(security): cover scanComposeStack failure modes
Two new cases drive the existing try/catch through real failure
paths:
- Malformed Trivy stdout: row flips to status='failed' with the
parser error preserved on `error`.
- execFile rejection: row flips to status='failed' with a string
error message.
Pairs with the existing dedup tests so the failure path now also
verifies the scan row state, not just the thrown exception.
* test(e2e): security scanner + misconfig acknowledgement flow
Seven Playwright tests covering the scanner UI and the new
acknowledgement system end-to-end:
- Trivy availability gate (skips suite when binary absent so CI
without Trivy can opt out via E2E_SKIP_TRIVY=1)
- Stack config scan completes and records misconfig findings
- Concurrent stack scan returns 409 from the dedup gate
- Misconfig ack POST creates and lists on Settings
- Duplicate (rule_id, stack_pattern) returns 409
- Malformed rule_id (shell metacharacters) returns 400
- Misconfigs tab renders against a real stack scan
Tests drive the API for behaviour assertions and the UI only for
shell-rendering checks; the visual snapshot suite owns screenshots.
* docs(features): add misconfig acknowledgement workflow and SARIF cap
Refreshes vulnerability-scanning.mdx with:
- Misconfig acknowledgements section covering the per-row dialog,
Settings panel, scope/matching rules, and SARIF emission
- Tier table row for the new feature
- SARIF section note on the 5000 row-per-type cap and the
properties.truncated marker for partial exports
- Troubleshooting entries: SARIF cap, hidden Acknowledge button,
findings resurfacing after delete, Trivy DB phone-home, and
409 on concurrent compose-stack scans
* fix(ci): clear backend lint and CodeQL alerts
- Remove the dead fetchAllPages helper in routes/security.ts. It lost
its callers when the SARIF endpoint switched to direct paged reads
for the truncation cap. ESLint flagged it as unused.
- Switch the trivy-tmp-cleanup test helper to fs.mkdtempSync. Building
paths under os.tmpdir() with predictable names tripped CodeQL's
js/insecure-temporary-file rule (high severity), which warns about
symlink-pre-creation attacks even in test code. mkdtempSync appends
a process-random suffix and creates the dir atomically; the
sencho-trivy- prefix is preserved so the production sweep still
matches the test fixtures.
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Anso
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7663f4cd8b |
feat(fleet): sencho mesh in traffic and routing tab (#858)
* feat(fleet): sencho mesh in traffic and routing tab Lights up Sencho Mesh: cross-node container forwarding rendered as if the container next to you were on localhost. Builds on the dormant TCP frame plumbing from the prior PR (pilot tunnel TCP frames + sencho-mesh sidecar package) and exposes the Admiral-only orchestrator surface. Backend - New mesh_stacks table (per-node opt-ins) + nodes.mesh_enabled column via DatabaseService.migrateMeshTables. - MeshService singleton: sidecar lifecycle via Dockerode, opt-in/out with cascading override regeneration, request-based resolver from sidecar control WS, cross-node TCP forwarding via PilotTunnelManager (same-node fast path included), in-memory 1000-event activity ring buffer with durable mirror to audit_log for state-change events, per-node and per-route diagnostics, and the Test upstream probe. - MeshComposeOverride: pure YAML generator that injects extra_hosts using host-gateway. The user's docker-compose.yml is never mutated; overrides live under DATA_DIR/mesh/overrides. - ComposeService deploy/update splice the override file when the stack is opted in; non-mesh stacks behave identically to today. - Pilot agent resolveMeshTarget consults the local mesh_stacks table (defense in depth) and resolves Compose containers via Dockerode. - /api/mesh router with 13 Admiral-gated endpoints covering status, enable/disable, stack opt-in/out, alias listing, per-route diagnostic, Test upstream probe, per-node diagnostic, sidecar restart, activity log paginated and SSE. - meshControl WS slot at /api/mesh/control validates the mesh_sidecar JWT minted by MeshService; dispatched as upgrade slot 2 (canonical order preserved). Frontend - New Traffic Routing tab in FleetView, gated by isAdmiral and wrapped in AdmiralGate. Tab uses the cyan brand glyph and italic-serif state typography from the audit. - RoutingTab masthead with mesh activity drawer, per-node card grid with TogglePill, alias rows with five-state pill taxonomy (healthy / degraded / unreachable / tunnel-down / not-authorized), inline Test buttons. - Four sheets: opt-in picker with port-collision inline error, per-route detail with diagnostic + filtered activity, per-node diagnostics with active streams + resolver cache + restart action, fleet-wide activity log with filters. - meshRouteState helper centralizes pill-state mapping; pure-function tests cover all five states. Docs - User docs at /docs/features/sencho-mesh.mdx covering opt-in, troubleshooting, security model (4 guarantees + 4 explicit non-guarantees), and V1 limitations. - Internal architecture and runbook pages. - websocket-dispatch internal doc updated with the new slot. * fix(mesh): validate stack name before path use; fix test DB lifecycle Two surgical fixes against the prior PR. Path-injection (CodeQL js/path-injection): MeshService.optInStack, optOutStack, ensureStackOverride, and removeStackOverride now validate stackName via isValidStackName from utils/validation, reject malicious names at the API boundary, and additionally check isPathWithinBase on the resolved override file path for defense in depth. The dataflow from req.params.stackName to fs.writeFile no longer reaches an unsanitized path expression. Test DB lifecycle: mesh-service.test.ts used per-test setupTestDb / cleanupTestDb, which deletes the temp dir while DatabaseService still holds an open SQLite handle. On Linux CI this raises SQLITE_READONLY_DBMOVED on the next prepare() because the inode has been unlinked. Switched to file-scoped beforeAll/afterAll matching agents-routes.test.ts, with a per-test beforeEach that truncates mesh_stacks plus non-default nodes and resets the MeshService singleton in-memory state. Adds a new test case asserting the path-traversal rejection. * fix(compose): use discovered compose filename instead of hardcoded docker-compose.yml composeArgs() hardcoded `-f docker-compose.yml` for every deploy. Sencho writes its canonical compose file as `compose.yaml`, so any stack created via the UI failed to deploy with `open ...docker-compose.yml: no such file or directory`. When no mesh override applies, drop the explicit `-f` so docker compose's built-in discovery resolves the actual filename. When an override exists, look up the real base filename via FileSystemService.getComposeFilename() and pass both files explicitly. Also hoist the MeshService import to module top now that the dependency is known to be acyclic, and revert the matching unit-test assertion. |
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abee078741 |
feat(scheduler): add auto_backup, auto_stop, auto_down, auto_start and delete_after_run one-shot mode (#777)
* feat(scheduler): add auto_backup, auto_stop, auto_down, auto_start actions and delete_after_run one-shot mode Extends the scheduler with four new stack-targeted actions: - auto_backup: backs up stack compose files and .env using the existing FileSystemService.backupStackFiles primitive - auto_stop: runs compose stop (containers preserved) - auto_down: runs compose down (containers removed) - auto_start: runs compose up -d via deployStack (universal start for both stopped and down stacks) Adds delete_after_run boolean column to scheduled_tasks. When enabled, the task self-deletes after its first successful execution; failures keep the task so the user can debug and retry. All four new actions gate at Admiral tier, consistent with restart/snapshot/prune. Migration is idempotent (maybeAddCol). * docs(scheduler): update scheduled-operations doc with new lifecycle actions and delete-after-run Adds the four new actions (Backup Stack Files, Stop Stack, Take Stack Down, Start Stack) to the action table. Documents the delete-after-run one-shot mode with its success-only deletion semantics. Adds the Stack Lifecycle Scheduling section explaining stop-vs-down semantics and the local-execution boundary. Adds three troubleshooting entries: auto-start on a missing compose folder, auto-backup single-slot overwrite by design, and one-shot task disappearing after successful run. Updates the timeline description from four to five lanes. Refreshes screenshots to show the new dialog layout with the Lifecycle lane visible. |
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Anso
|
12c2b37510 |
feat(security): polish scan sheets, fix CVE links, surface policy violations (#721)
* feat(security): polish scan sheets, fix CVE links, surface policy violations Adds cveUrl helper that rewrites Trivy's 404-ing avd.aquasec.com links to cve.org for CVE-prefixed IDs (GHSA and misconfig URLs pass through unchanged). Redesigns both scan sheets with shadow-card-bevel chips, tracked-mono kickers, severity row tinting with a left accent rail, and tabular-nums timestamps. Surfaces a destructive policy-violation banner on scans whose policy_evaluation row flags a block, and fixes the compare sheet's delta ribbon so CRITICAL net-positive deltas render in destructive (not warning) tone. Backend parses the JSON policy_evaluation column at the API boundary so the UI receives a structured object. * chore(security): suppress CVE-2026-32281 and CVE-2026-32283 in Trivy scan Both CVEs affect Go stdlib crypto/x509 and TLS in Docker CLI 29.4.0 (Go 1.26.1) and Compose v5.1.2 (Go 1.25.8). No upstream static binary has been released with the patched Go 1.26.2 or 1.25.9 runtimes yet. Exposure analysis: the Docker CLI and compose plugin connect to the local Docker socket (Unix socket, no TLS) and to public registries with well-known CAs. Neither CVE is exploitable in this configuration. Added alongside sibling entries already in .trivyignore for the same binary versions. Revisit on next Docker CLI and Compose upstream release. |
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Anso
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95278843cf |
feat(schedules): next-24h timeline + merge auto-update into schedules (#681)
* feat(backend): add stack update-preview endpoint for readiness board Adds GET /api/stacks/:stackName/update-preview that returns per-image semver diff, bump classification, and a stack-level summary powering the Auto-Update readiness board. - New UpdatePreviewService parses compose images, inspects local digests, fetches remote digests and tag lists, and finds the highest compatible semver tag. - Major bumps are flagged blocked until human review; unknown bumps rank below real semver so they cannot mask a major. - Rollback target is reconstructed through parseImageRef to preserve registry ports and drop the Docker Hub library/ prefix. - Registry helpers (httpGet, auth token, digest, tag list, ref parse) are extracted into registry-api.ts and shared with ImageUpdateService. - 28 Vitest cases cover parse, selection, bump math, digest rebuilds, blocked policy, and rollback target construction. * feat(schedules): next-24h timeline, merge auto-update crud, add readiness board Replace the flat task table with a Timeline view as the default, showing the next 24 hours of scheduled work across four lanes (Restart, Update, Scan, Prune) with a live now rail and per-firing pills. The All tasks tab preserves the existing CRUD surface. Merge Auto-update Stack into Schedules as a first-class action and replace the standalone Auto-Update Policies view with a per-stack Readiness board that surfaces version diffs, risk tags, changelog previews, and rollback targets sourced from the stack update-preview endpoint. |
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Anso
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c211f655c3 |
fix(security): signal when scan comparison is truncated (#658)
Compare endpoint loads up to 1000 findings per scan. When a scan exceeds this cap, the response now includes truncated=true and row_limit, and the comparison sheet surfaces a banner so users understand the diff may be incomplete. Also exposes total_vulnerabilities on scanA/scanB for UI use and logs a warning when truncation occurs. |
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Anso
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29ed0524c1 |
feat(security): severity-aware scheduled scan notifications (#654)
Enrich scheduled vulnerability scan completion notifications with per-severity CVE counts so recipients can triage from the message body alone. Expose the scan action in the schedule creation UI, require an explicit node_id, and harden fire-and-forget alert dispatches so a failing webhook cannot crash the scheduler. Notification body now reports scanned/skipped/failed counts plus critical/high/medium totals aggregated across fresh and cached scans, reflecting the current node posture rather than only what was newly scanned on this run. |
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Anso
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a95bf1ff33 |
feat(security): secret and misconfiguration scanning (#651)
Extends Trivy scans with secret detection in image filesystems and misconfiguration scanning for Compose stacks. Adds tabs to the scan drawer for vulnerabilities, secrets, and misconfigs. Secret matches are redacted server-side (first 8 chars + ellipsis) before storage. - TrivyService: --scanners vuln,secret for images; trivy config for stacks - DB: scanners_used/secret_count/misconfig_count cols; secret_findings, misconfig_findings tables; cache key scoped by scanners - Routes: POST /security/scan accepts scanners array (requirePaid when secret requested); POST /security/scan/stack; GET .../secrets and .../misconfigs (paid-tier reads) - UI: tabs in VulnerabilityScanSheet; scan-options dropdown on images; Scan config button on stack header |
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Anso
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732fc95415 |
feat(security): fleet-replicated CVE suppression list (#650)
Operators can accept known-benign findings once and have Sencho filter them out of scan drawers, comparison views, and other read surfaces. Suppressions replicate from the control instance to every remote node. * New cve_suppressions table with a COALESCE-based unique index so NULL scope slots collide the way users expect * Admin + paid-tier CRUD routes; writes are rejected on replicas * Read-time filter enriches vulnerability details and compare payloads without mutating stored counts * Settings > Security panel for managing rules, per-CVE suppress action in the scan drawer, dimmed rows with a shield-off indicator * Vitest unit tests for the filter (glob, expiry, specificity) and route tests (auth, tier, replica, UNIQUE conflict) |
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Anso
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708d15b2b3 |
feat(fleet): replicate scan policies across managed nodes (#649)
Scan policies now propagate from the control Sencho instance to every registered remote. The control is the source of truth; replicas render rules read-only with a managed-by-control banner. Pushes fire on every policy write, record per-node success and failure on a new fleet_sync_status table, and use node_proxy Bearer tokens exclusively so only sibling Senchos can apply incoming sync payloads. Policy scope now travels as a string identity (api_url or a local sentinel) so node-scoped rules evaluate correctly on each target. |
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Anso
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8ee0c0c476 |
feat(security): scan comparison UI (#648)
Side-by-side vulnerability scan comparison with two entry points: - Compare button plus inline baseline picker inside the scan drawer. - New Scan History page reachable from the Resources Hub, grouping completed scans by image with a checkbox selection flow. The comparison sheet shows a severity delta ribbon, Added/Removed/Unchanged filters, and a paginated CVE table. Cross-image comparisons are allowed but flagged with a warning. Compare access is gated to Skipper and Admiral tiers; the underlying /security/compare endpoint is unchanged. |
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Anso
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61bac08027 |
feat(security): one-click managed Trivy install (#643)
* feat(security): one-click managed Trivy install Add a Vulnerability Scanner card to Settings, Security with install, update, uninstall, and auto-update controls (Admiral-only). The installer downloads a verified Trivy release into the existing data volume at /app/data/bin/trivy and defaults the cache to /app/data/trivy-cache, so no host mounts or extra env vars are required. Detection probes the managed path, a TRIVY_BIN override, and the host PATH, distinguishing managed vs host installs. A daily scheduled check surfaces available Trivy updates, installs them automatically when opted in, and dedupes notifications per version. * fix(frontend): silence react-hooks/set-state-in-effect in useTrivyStatus The initial status fetch and managed-source update check both call setState from the effect body. Match the existing pattern used in useDashboardData / SSOSection and disable the rule at the call site. |
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Anso
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c9cd6990d2 |
feat(images): Trivy-powered vulnerability scanning (#635)
* feat(images): Trivy-powered vulnerability scanning Scan container images for known CVEs via Trivy. On-demand scanning and severity badges are available on every tier; scheduled scans, scan policies, SBOM generation, and scan history are gated to Skipper+. - New TrivyService (binary detection, per-image scan, SBOM, digest cache) - Three new tables: vulnerability_scans, vulnerability_details, scan_policies - 12 routes under /api/security (scan, results, summaries, SBOM, policies, compare) - Post-deploy async scans wired into all five deploy paths, with a per-deploy opt-out toggle in the App Store deploy sheet - "scan" action type added to SchedulerService for fleet-wide recurring scans - Frontend: severity badges in Resources Hub with animated cursor detail, scan results drawer with vulnerability table and filters, and a new Security section in Settings for scan policy CRUD - Policy threshold violations dispatch a warning or critical alert based on the policy's block_on_deploy flag; deploys themselves are never blocked * fix(security): compute scan age in useEffect to satisfy react-hooks/purity |
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44e8fdfba9 |
fix(scheduler): harden scheduled operations with stale cleanup, cron validation, and design fixes (#549)
* fix(scheduler): clean up stale runs on startup and auto-disable invalid cron tasks
- Add markStaleRunsAsFailed() bulk DB method with status index
- Clean up orphaned 'running' records on scheduler startup
- Auto-disable tasks when cron expression becomes invalid at execution time
- Promote CRUD debug logs to standard logs for scheduled task admin actions
- Add diagnostic logging for task pre-checks, action timing, and prune fallback
* refactor(scheduling): extract shared types and fix design system violations
- Extract ScheduledTask, TaskRun, NodeOption to shared types file
- Extract getCronDescription and formatTimestamp to shared utilities
- Fix formatTimestamp falsy-zero null check
- Tighten last_status type to 'success' | 'failure' | null
- Add strokeWidth={1.5} to all action icons per design system
- Add sr-only DialogDescription for accessibility
- Wrap Sheet run history in ScrollArea
- Fix delete button styling to match design system pattern
- Change manual trigger toast from "executed" to "triggered"
* test(scheduler): add tests for snapshot, remote update, stale cleanup, and cron invalidation
- Add stale run cleanup tests (bulk markStaleRunsAsFailed, logging)
- Add cron invalidation test (auto-disable, error message)
- Add executeSnapshot tests (fleet capture, empty stacks)
- Add executeUpdateRemote tests (proxy success, remote error)
- Document stale run cleanup and cron auto-disable in troubleshooting docs
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