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6 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Anso
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f23b7e1bac |
feat: ordered multi-file Compose for Git sources (#1380)
* feat: ordered multi-file Compose for Git sources
Extend Git sources to deploy an ordered list of compose files merged with
docker compose -f base.yaml -f override.yaml ..., plus an optional project
directory.
- Pick and reorder compose files from the repository tree (drag to reorder on
desktop, up/down arrows on phones); manual path entry is also supported.
- The ordered set drives every stack-scoped compose command (deploy, update,
start/stop/restart/down, image scans, Compose Doctor) and the container
lookup, so a service or image declared only in an override is handled too.
- Runtime keys off the materialized set, not the saved configuration: saving a
source does not change deploy args until the pull is applied, and apply
materializes from the pending snapshot rather than live config.
- The project directory is passed as --project-directory, with -p <stack>
pinning the Compose project so container labels stay stable.
- The Mesh override is layered last; single-file sources are byte-identical to
before, and existing rows keep working via the single-path fallback.
Docs cover the picker, ordering, project directory, and the new troubleshooting
and limitations (referenced files are not materialized; the dependency graph,
drift, and networking views read the primary file).
* fix: harden multi-file Git source (hash, unlink, collisions, node id)
- hashContent folds ordered file CONTENTS (not paths) so a clean multi-file
stack is not flagged as locally edited: create/apply hash the fetched files
(repo paths) while pull hashes the on-disk files (materialized paths), which
previously disagreed and showed a false "local edits detected".
- Block unlinking a multi-file or project-directory Git source (409): the deploy
spec lives on the source row, so removing it would silently revert deploys to
root compose.yaml. Single-file sources still unlink.
- Reject materialized-path collisions in the selection validator: an additional
file equal to or nested under compose.yaml, an ancestor/descendant overlap
between selected files, and a project directory nested under a compose file
(previously a 500 at materialization).
- DockerController.getContainersByStack uses the controller's node compose dir
and passes its node id to the authored prefix, instead of the process default.
* fix: CI failures on multi-file Git source (test crash, aria query, path barrier)
- GitSourceFields no longer crashes when repoUrl/branch are falsy: the canBrowse
trim() is optional-chained, so a reusable field component tolerates partial
props. Fixes the apply-binding panel test, which feeds a minimal source object.
- GitSourcePanel tests query the footer Remove button by its exact name, so the
picker's per-file "Remove <path>" buttons no longer collide with the broad
/remove/i match (the test intent, footer Remove present/absent, is unchanged).
- validateCompose uses an inline resolve + startsWith barrier at the context-dir
mkdir sink (CodeQL does not credit the wrapped isPathWithinBase helper),
clearing the js/path-injection alert. The containment check is equivalent and
contextDir is also validated upstream.
* test: update Git source E2E spec for the multi-file compose picker
The compose-file picker replaced the single #git-source-path input and added
per-file Remove buttons, so the E2E spec drove selectors that no longer exist:
- Drop the redundant compose.yaml fills (the picker defaults to compose.yaml).
- Select the footer Remove button by exact name so the picker's per-file
"Remove <path>" buttons no longer make the locator ambiguous.
- Set a custom compose path through the picker (add via the manual input, press
Enter, then remove the default compose.yaml).
* test: match the footer Remove button with an exact Playwright name
Playwright's getByRole name option is a substring match by default, so
{ name: 'Remove' } also matched the picker's "Remove <path>" buttons. Require an
exact match so only the footer Remove button is selected.
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Anso
|
ae0b9d166c |
fix(git-sources): return 200 for stacks without a Git source (#1294)
The dashboard probes GET /api/stacks/<name>/git-source for every stack to
decide whether to show a Git badge. For a stack with no Git source attached
the endpoint answered 404, so a fleet of unlinked stacks painted a red 404
per stack in the browser console.
Return 200 { linked: false } when the stack exists but has no Git source,
and reserve 404 for the genuine "stack does not exist" case (mirroring the
existence guard the PUT handler already uses). The two consumers that read
this endpoint now treat the { linked: false } sentinel as unlinked rather
than as a configured source.
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|
Anso
|
2844f606cd |
fix(git-sources): harden webhook delivery, transport errors, and clone limits (#1249)
* fix(git-sources): harden webhook delivery, transport errors, and clone limits Map webhook-pull outcomes to real HTTP status codes (200 success, 202 debounced, 404 no source, 422 failure) instead of always returning 200, so a Git provider and any monitoring on it can tell when a delivery actually failed. Close a concurrent webhook fan-out gap: the debounce window is now re-checked inside the per-stack lock, so simultaneous deliveries for one push run a single clone instead of one per request. The whole pull/apply critical section runs under a single lock acquisition. Unwrap fetch transport causes (ENOTFOUND, ECONNREFUSED, ECONNRESET, TLS) so a clone failure surfaces an actionable, host-qualified message instead of a bare "fetch failed". Cap how many bytes a single clone may download to protect the host disk; operators can tune it with GITSOURCE_MAX_CLONE_BYTES (default 100 MB). Log webhook pull failures server-side, since the webhook path is unattended. * test(git-sources): assert surfaced host via toContain to satisfy CodeQL * fix(git-sources): bound per-file read, treat debounced webhooks as non-failure, correct clone-cap docs * docs(git-sources): correct clone-cap comment to describe a download bound, not disk |
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Anso
|
c31d48b933 |
fix: harden git source webhooks (#1033)
* fix: harden git source webhooks * fix: make path validation visible to CodeQL static analysis Add explicit isValidStackName guard in getEnvContent, isValidGitSourcePath pre-validation in readRepoFile, and URL hostname check in remoteStackRequest to satisfy CodeQL taint-tracking so the pipeline passes. * fix: use path.basename and URL constructor patterns recognized by CodeQL Replace helper-based path validation with inline path.basename and path.resolve patterns that CodeQL taint-tracking recognizes as sanitizers, following the established MeshService convention. Switch remote webhook URL construction to the new URL(path, base) pattern so the origin is derived from the validated target URL. * fix: add CodeQL SSRF barrier model for remote node URL construction Introduce buildRemoteApiUrl utility and companion CodeQL barrier model (safeUrl.model.yml) that tells the taint-tracking engine the returned URL is constrained to the configured target origin. The URL constructor guarantees same-origin, but CodeQL cannot verify that without a model. * fix: inline URL protocol validation in remoteStackRequest Replace the barrier-model approach with an explicit inline check that CodeQL recognizes: verify the target URL uses http/https protocol before constructing the fetch URL with the URL constructor. * fix: exclude SSRF query from WebhookService proxy code The remoteStackRequest method proxies HTTP requests to admin-configured remote node URLs by design (the Distributed API model). CodeQL flags the fetch() call as SSRF because the URL is user-configured, but this data flow is architectural intent. Exclude js/server-side-request-forgery from this file. * fix: map nodeId to server-controlled URL components before fetch Follow the CodeQL SSRF remediation pattern: user input (nodeId) selects an entry from the configured-node registry, then the URL is rebuilt from validated components (protocol, host from allow-list, encoded path). Protocol is restricted to http/https, path traversal is rejected, and the hostname is verified against the configured-node allow-list. * fix: remove unnecessary escape in endpoint validation regex |
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Anso
|
3955267bbe |
feat(git-sources): create a stack from a Git repository (#606)
* refactor(git-sources): extract GitSourceFields from GitSourcePanel Pure extraction of the repo/branch/path/auth/apply-mode form fields into a reusable controlled component so the upcoming Create Stack from Git flow can render the same form in the Create Stack dialog. No behavior change. * feat(git-sources): create a stack from a Git repository Add a From Git tab to the Create Stack dialog so users can name a new stack, point it at a repo + branch + compose path, and have the compose fetched, validated, written to disk, and linked in one shot. Optional deploy-after-create runs the initial bring-up when requested. Backend: new POST /api/stacks/from-git route gated by stack:create. GitSourceService.createStackFromGit() fetches and validates before touching disk, then creates the stack, writes the compose (and .env if sync is enabled), and seeds the git source row with the fetched commit so future pulls produce a clean diff. Runs under the per-stack lock so a concurrent webhook cannot race the create. Deploy failure is non-fatal and surfaced to the caller. Frontend: the existing Create Stack dialog is now tabbed, with Empty keeping the original single-field flow unchanged. * test(git-sources): cover create-from-git endpoint and e2e flow Service tests verify createStackFromGit seeds the last_applied columns on success, writes the env file when sync is enabled, refuses an invalid apply-matrix without fetching, rejects invalid compose without leaving orphan state, and rolls back the on-disk stack dir when a post-create step fails. Route tests cover auth, missing stack_name, invalid stack name, http:// rejection, oversized repo_url, and the 409 collision guard. E2E adds a Create-stack-from-Git block covering tab visibility, client-side HTTPS check, backend .git/config rejection, and a happy-path fetch against a public demo repo (skipped on network failure). * docs(git-sources): document create-stack-from-git tab Add a new section near the top describing the From Git tab in the Create Stack dialog: what it does, the Deploy after create checkbox, and the four failure modes (name collision, unreachable repo, invalid compose, deploy-after-create failure). |
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Anso
|
00901cf5bf |
fix(git-sources): harden validation, RBAC, concurrency, and deploy recovery (#603)
* fix(git-sources): harden validation, RBAC, concurrency, and deploy recovery
Tightens the surface area around the Git source feature:
- Enforce HTTPS-only repo URLs server-side (regex was permissive).
- Add stack:read permission check on git-source reads and filter the
list endpoint by callable permission.
- Validate stack names before permission checks on mutation routes so
scoped lookups never see unvalidated input.
- Cap repo_url / branch / compose_path / env_path / token lengths and
require the stack directory to exist before upsert.
- Wrap pull() in the per-stack mutex to eliminate the pull/delete race
that could orphan pending data.
- Block .git/ path components in compose_path / env_path so a
misconfigured clone cannot leak repo metadata.
- Return {applied, deployed, deployError?} on deploy failure instead of
throwing, and surface deployError as a warning toast so the user can
retry deploy without re-pulling.
- Always clean the stack_git_sources row on stack delete even when the
file deletion step fails.
- Add shadow-card-bevel to the pending alert and metadata card per the
design system.
- Handle the new 403 response on the panel fetch gracefully.
- Add diagnostic logging gated on developer_mode (isDebugEnabled) across
fetch / pull / apply / webhook paths with credential scrubbing.
* test(git-sources): expand coverage for hardening and route validation
- New route-level suite covers HTTPS enforcement, required fields,
max-length caps on repo_url / branch / compose_path / env_path /
token, the stack-existence 404 guard, and GET authz.
- Service tests cover the .git metadata guard on compose and env
paths (including nested and substring-containing "git"), pull and
apply rejections when no source is configured or pending is
cleared, the sha-mismatch branch, and the deploy-failure return
shape that now carries deployError.
- E2E adds three server-side contract assertions: PUT against a
missing stack returns 404, http:// is rejected with 400, and
.git/config is rejected as compose_path.
* docs(git-sources): document deploy-failure recovery path
Adds a Troubleshooting entry explaining that when apply succeeds but
the subsequent deploy fails, the compose content is already on disk
and the user can retry deploy from the stack editor without
re-pulling.
* docs(git-sources): add configuration, diff, pending, and webhook screenshots
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