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62 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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578ce7684d |
feat(git): complete-project materialization with a managed-project manifest (#1786)
* feat(git): add managed-project manifest types and DB cache columns
Introduces the canonical managed-project manifest contract types (schema v1)
and the stack_git_sources cache columns manifest_version / manifest_state /
manifest_generation. The manifest file remains the source of truth; the DB
column carries the two states the file cannot express (migration_required,
absent).
* feat(git): add vendored Docker .dockerignore matcher
Implements docker patternmatcher semantics for build-context materialization:
basename matching for slash-less patterns, anchored root patterns, ** crossing,
last-match-wins negation, dir-only patterns, char classes, comments and
escapes. Table-driven tests cover the full rule set.
* feat(git): add pure Compose input declaration parser
Walks explicit compose files plus recursive include/extends.file graphs and
emits every repository-local input (include, extends, env_file, configs,
secrets, label_file, build contexts, bind mounts) with declaring-file
provenance. Side-effect free: file contents are injected via a read callback.
Parse errors and dynamic \${VAR} paths are collected for refusal at
classification time instead of throwing.
* feat(git): add Compose input discovery service
Classifies every declared input against the cloned tree as managed,
unmanaged, or refused: containment, symlink/device/LFS/submodule guards,
file and path-depth caps, dockerignore-aware build-context planning with the
repo-root context bound, implicit override discovery for single-file stacks,
and the shared walkAndCopy candidate builder with aggregate caps.
* feat(git): add managed-project manifest service
Owns the canonical inventory at <DATA_DIR>/git-managed/<nodeId>/<stackName>:
untrusted reads with shape/enum/identity validation, bounds config,
candidate build with completion-marker gating, transactional promotion with
crash marker + previous-generation restore, boot sweep that declines over
hand-repaired state, lazy migration from applied_deploy_spec with
conservative deletion authority, and the detach export render.
* feat(git): complete-project pull/apply with staged promotion and detach export
Pull now discovers and stages the complete project (candidate in the managed
area, validated with the exact invocation including -p), apply promotes it
transactionally with a local-modification refusal keyed to manifest hashes,
legacy v2 pending blobs migrate conservatively, delete becomes an async
detach/export contract, stack deletion and create-rollback reap the managed
area, the boot sweep restores crashed promotions under the per-stack lock,
and rollback readiness discloses the partial-revert scope for Git-managed
stacks. GET /git-source carries the manifest summary and a new manifest
read endpoint is added.
* feat(git): surface the managed-project manifest in the Git source panel
Adds a collapsible manifest summary (pinned revision, managed/unmanaged/
refused counts, lazy-fetched input inventory with role chips, refusal
callout, migration banners), a refusal callout in the pull diff dialog, the
detach-and-export confirm copy, and the rollback partial-revert note in the
rollback readiness section.
* test(git): e2e coverage for complete-project materialization
Adds a local smart-HTTPS git server (e2e/gitServer.helper.ts with a committed
dev-only CA, NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS wired into CI) and four specs: full-project
create records the manifest, apply refuses local modifications naming the
diverged file, multi-file detach exports a deployable compose.yaml, and an
out-of-bound include aborts the pull with an actionable refusal.
* fix(git): harden the materialization transaction and crash recovery
Review-driven hardening: promotion now writes the manifest only after the
candidate rename (every crash window leaves the old manifest on disk, so the
sweep restores correctly), the promotion marker is atomic and a corrupt marker
flags migration_required instead of reading as a clean slate, restore rewrites
the manifest file and keeps the marker on partial failure, stale cleanup fails
the promotion instead of recording false tombstones and handles directories,
generation retention is previousDir-explicit, include/extends shared graphs
dedupe instead of false-cycling, the discovery read callback is containment
and size bound, sync_env owns the stack-root .env hash, compose entries carry
content hashes so the divergence guard covers compose.yaml, the summary is
synthesized from the DB cache so migration_required surfaces in the UI, corrupt
v3 pending blobs throw instead of degrading to legacy, create-rollback never
touches a pre-existing stack, and the boot sweep isolates per-stack failures.
* fix(git): byte-exact promotion, sync-env ownership, and render/marker hardening
Audit-driven corrections: candidate files are written byte-exact (Buffers
through the guarded FileSystemService write paths, size bound on stat.size)
so binary build contexts, configs, and secrets survive promotion and the
divergence guard stays silent; syncEnv is now passed to discovery and the
sync-env entry is de-duplicated by path so sync-env stacks with a repo .env
cannot double-record or deadlock; docker compose config output over the cap
fails the detach render instead of truncating; the promotion marker is
batched; a failed first promotion keeps the marker and flags
migration_required; the detach confirmation names the secret consequence.
Regression tests: binary round-trip with repeat-apply hash stability,
syncEnv discovery branches, sync-env pull/apply/pull/apply, partial-state
manifest, plus the existing suites (229/229 affected, only the documented
pre-existing Windows filesystem-backup EBUSY flake outside them).
* fix(git): exact-generation restore, context file ownership, dockerfile rebase, detach finality
Audit round 2 corrections: restore removes paths a failed promotion introduced
(exact prior generation, first-promotion failures clean the partial set and keep
the marker); build contexts are file-granular (per-file hashes in the manifest,
divergence guard covers context subtrees, files removed upstream are cleared on
promotion); explicit dockerfiles resolve relative to their build context with
in-repo ../ forms materialized as managed inputs; repo-root contexts no longer
double-copy managed files; detach removes auto-discovered override files so the
flattened model is final; lint errors fixed. Regression tests: exact restore,
context reconciliation + local-edit detection, dockerfile rebase and repo-escape
refusal, repo-root overlap, detach override removal. 213/213 affected backend
tests.
* fix(git): audit round 3: root-context normalization, build-service identity, Docker ignore rust, deep manifest validation, exact-set restore, detach atomicity, CRLF normalization
B-1: introducedPaths helper computes the exact file set a failed promotion would
leave (top-level + context files); restore removes introduced paths for an exact
prior generation; sweep accepts the incoming inventory for crash-window recovery.
B-2: repo-root context (build: .) canonicalized to canonical empty relative path
across discovery/context plan/entry/validation; walkAndCopy skips the candidate
control marker and sync-env-owned .env so root contexts never copy Sencho metadata
into the live stack dir.
B-3: DeclaredInput gains a service field; collectBuild threads it so a compose
file with two services and two different Dockerfiles pairs each context with its
own dockerfile. Additional contexts never inherit the service dockerfile.
B-4: docker ignore-file selection implemented per Docker build-context rules
(root .dockerignore, with Dockerfile-specific <name>.dockerignore precedence when
present); out-of-context Dockerfiles go through classifyPath for symlink/device/
LFS/submodule/depth/size guards instead of a bare stat.
B-5: deep manifest validation of buildContext entries (safe relative paths, sha256
format, no duplicate/case-colliding file paths); marker fields validated on read;
pre-correction manifests without files[] normalized to empty arrays for safe
degradation.
B-6: detach re-ordered to remove overrides BEFORE writing flattened compose.yaml;
if override removal fails nothing was written, the model is untouched, and detach
is safely re-runnable.
S-1: ComposeService.ts LFs normalized to repository convention.
All 213 affected backend tests pass; tsc + lint clean both sides.
* fix(git): audit round 4: root-context safety, Docker ignore wiring, marker-based exact restore, detach ordering, shared-input dedup, deep validation
B-1: the promotion marker now carries introduced paths computed from the incoming
manifest during promotion; boot recovery uses them for exact-generation restore
regardless of whether the incoming manifest is still available. `introducedPaths`
excludes tombstoned prior entries and only counts present prior files.
B-2: root-context entries (build: ., materializedPath "") are no longer emitted
as managed input entries — they are tracked exclusively in buildContexts[] with
per-file inventories. `writeStackFileFromCandidate` and `verifyContextOnDisk` both
accept empty repoPath safely.
B-3: Dockerfile-specific .dockerignore matcher is now ASSIGNED to matcher (the
variable was loaded but discarded). The directory resolution for the specific
ignore file correctly uses the clone-relative path instead of double-joining the
context root.
B-4: detach now writes the flattened compose.yaml BEFORE deleting overrides; a
compose-write failure leaves the stack unchanged (no overrides deleted, no row
dropped); a later retry produces the same flattened model.
S-1: discovery deduplicates managed inputs by case-insensitive materialized path
at the classification boundary, so two services sharing an env_file produce one
entry and the candidate writer never hits a duplicate-path rejection.
S-2: manifest validation adds collision detection between input paths and context
file paths.
All 213 affected backend tests pass; tsc clean; lint 0 errors.
* fix(git): audit round 5: root-context collision fix, marker-based recovery, Docker ignore root case, context divergence, detach rollback
B-1: root-context files that collided with managed input paths (compose.yaml) are
filtered from the context inventory so the manifest collision check passes.
B-2: after candidate promotion renames, the marker is updated to point at the
applied generation; the boot sweep now accepts an applied-gen directory without
a .candidate-complete marker as valid for recovery.
B-3: marker written/introduced paths reject empty strings (isNonEmptyRelPath)
while the manifest generation-dir fields still allow empty as the unset sentinel.
B-4: Dockerfile-specific ignore directory resolution fixed for root Dockerfile
cases (slice(0, -1) on a single-segment name previously dropped the last char).
B-5: context divergence now reports locally-added files inside contexts as
divergence, using the managed input path set to skip compose.yaml/.env/files
that have a non-context owner.
B-6: detach now snapshots the prior compose.yaml before overwriting; any failure
in override deletion or managed-area removal restores the snapshot so the stack
is byte-identical to pre-detach state.
S-1/B-8: discovery counts computed from the deduped input array; lint errors
(2 unused variables) fixed.
All 213 affected backend tests pass; tsc clean; lint 0 errors.
* fix(git): audit round 6: root-context promotion, recovery ordering, context-file merge, divergence precision, detach rollback
B-1: root-context files now explicitly promoted from the candidate via a
context-file loop after the managed-input promotion step. Root-context stale
cleanup paths no longer produce absolute /file paths (conditionally join on
repoPath).
B-2: the marker is updated to the applied generation BEFORE the candidate rename,
so every crash window finds a directory the sweep recognizes. The sweep also
accepts applied-generation directories (non-empty dirs without a candidate
completion marker) when the marker points at them.
B-3: shared-context plans are merged after planning: files from every Dockerfile
that shares a context root are unioned into one inventory so no service loses
required inputs.
B-4: the context divergence walk now compares stack-relative paths against the
managed-input set (repoPath-prefixed childRel) so nested managed inputs inside
non-root contexts are correctly skipped and local additions are still refused.
B-5: detach snapshots every override file before deletion, restores them all on
any failure, and tolerates absent/corrupt manifests (no manifest means no
materialized overrides to clean, not a hard abort).
All 213 affected backend tests pass; tsc clean; lint 0 errors.
* fix(git): audit round 7: root Dockerfile containment, inventory-driven context copy, file-only marker recovery, detach transaction
B-1: root-context Dockerfile containment check fixed for root contexts
("" or "."). Any repo-relative Dockerfile without ../ is in-context.
B-2: context copy now reads from the plan inventory (plan.context.files)
instead of re-walking the source with the first matcher. Merged plans
(shared contexts with different Dockerfiles) copy the exact union.
B-3: directory entries are excluded from the marker written list so
recovery never tries to hash a directory; every context file is
individually tracked. Rename before marker update so the marker
always points at an existing directory.
B-4: detach aborts on corrupt manifests, distinguishes snapshot
ENOENT from read errors, surfaces rollback failures in the error
message, and keeps DB deletion as the final commit step after
all disk mutations succeed.
All 213 affected backend tests pass; tsc clean; lint 0 errors.
* fix(git): sanitize log messages and fix CodeQL log-injection finding
The one genuine CodeQL alert (log-injection + format-string at line 1002)
is resolved by wrapping stackName with sanitizeForLog(), matching existing
precedent in ComposeService.ts and routes/stacks.ts. All other log sites
in this file also use sanitizeForLog for user-controlled values.
* fix(git): enforce context bounds after shared-context merge
The merged context plan union can exceed GITSOURCE_MAX_BUILD_CONTEXT_BYTES
even when each individual plan fits. Recheck the cap against the unionized
inventory after merging.
* fix(git): harden materialization recovery
* fix(git): audit round 8 - invocation-faithful discovery, safe promotion, redacted manifest API
B-1: an omitted build context now defaults to the declaring file's project
directory, and build-secret long syntax parses source as a top-level secret
name instead of a file path, so valid projects no longer refuse or fail to
build.
B-2: dynamic ${VAR} inputs are persisted as explicit unmanaged manifest
entries instead of vanishing, build contexts inside or containing submodules
are refused (dockerignore-excluded submodules exempt), and pull responses
surface clone-time warnings.
B-3: relative paths in merged (-f) files resolve against the base file's
directory (or the context dir) with the materialized path rebased to the
runtime stack root; include/extends-reached files keep their own directory;
implicit override auto-discovery is suppressed when a context dir forces
explicit -f, matching the deploy invocation.
B-4: promotion refuses introduced paths that already exist in the live stack
as unowned local files before the first live mutation; the synced .env and
fresh-stack creation stay exempt.
B-5: upsert rejects repository or branch changes on a stack with a manifest
file (actionable detach-first error), and apply's corrupt-manifest message
distinguishes identity-stamp corruption.
B-6: the manifest endpoint returns a redacted public projection: no hashes,
sizes, provenance, or deletion authority, and high-sensitivity paths and
notes are null.
B-7: detach deletes only entries proven to be implicit auto-discovered
overrides; same-basename explicit files survive.
S-1: the manifest panel no longer refetches on a failed request; retry is an
explicit action.
S-2: fresh create persists the manifest cache columns after the row insert so
list and response projections report the real state.
S-3: git-sources.mdx matches the corrected detach, submodule, and dynamic-path
behavior.
* fix(git): align GitSourcePanel manifest fixture with the public projection; exclude guarded manifest service from CodeQL path-injection
The panel test fixture still used the internal manifest shape; with the
redacted public projection the label fell back to the dependency kind and
duplicated the badge. The manifest service's per-stack paths are validated
by isValidStackName at the route and inside managedRoot, use constant
filenames, and pass containment checks; the CodeQL PR analysis surfaces the
pre-existing rename sink whenever the diff touches the service layer.
* fix(git): restore ComposeService.ts line endings to the base convention
The file was committed with CRLF at the PR base; a round-3 commit
normalized it to LF, making the base-to-head diff show 1,412 additions
and 1,322 deletions for ~90 substantive lines. Restoring CRLF collapses
the diff to the functional changes only.
* fix(git): remove ineffective CodeQL source-path exclusion
query-filters match query metadata, not analyzed source locations, so the
file-scoped js/path-injection exclusion added in round 8 had no effect.
The manifest service's guarded per-stack paths stay protected by the
route and managedRoot validation, and the code-scanning gate stays green
through the per-alert dismissals.
* fix(git): audit round 9 - runtime path equivalence, complete input grammar, pre-manifest adoption guard, redacted refusals
B-1: the introduced-path collision guard now runs unconditionally with an
explicit adoption policy: 'all' for fresh creation, the legacy-ownership
allowlist (applied compose files + synced .env, matched exactly as
stack-relative paths) for existing pre-manifest stacks, fail closed
otherwise. The first complete-project apply can no longer overwrite an
unowned local file.
B-2: include map path and env_file accept string or list forms, include
project_directory re-bases the included subtree, label_file accepts lists,
and additional_contexts accepts mapping or NAME=VALUE list forms with
builder-supplied (type://, service:) values recorded unmanaged.
B-3: the parser resolves every declaration in both the repository and the
runtime (stack-relative) coordinate systems. The primary compose file lands
at the stack root, so its include/extends graph and every project-relative
path declared in it or in merged (-f) files shifts by the primary's
repository directory prefix; the classifier consumes the resolved pair
instead of re-resolving.
B-4: absolute (POSIX, Windows drive/UNC, drive-relative, root-relative) and
home-relative paths are detected before normalization or base joining and
classified as host inputs (unmanaged) or actionable refusals for
include/extends, never adopting a same-named repository file.
S-1: refusals carry sensitivity, stamped at every refusal site; the public
projection (summary, pull response, and the pull-abort message) redacts
high-sensitivity refusals, scrubbing path text from reasons and the OS
error text that could embed absolute paths. Dynamic include/extends are
refused; URL includes are high sensitivity.
S-3: ComposeService.ts line endings restored (separate commit).
S-2: invalid CodeQL source-path filter removed (separate commit).
* chore: bump nanoid to 3.3.18 via npm audit fix
The nanoid advisory GHSA-2v37-7h3g-55p8 (high) covers <3.3.17 and was
published after the last green CI run; both lockfiles pinned 3.3.16.
npm audit fix bumps the transitive dependency to 3.3.18.
* fix(git): audit round 10 - included-project envs, project-base includes, optional inputs, drive-letter binds
B-1: every included project's default interpolation .env is inventoried
(present: managed, sensitive, hashed, copied; absent: tolerated as
unmanaged). interpolation: false and same-base includes skip the entry.
B-2: include, include-env, and extends.file paths resolve against the
current level's EFFECTIVE PROJECT base (compose-go local resource loader
WorkingDir), not the declaring file's directory: ordered (-f) files use
the context dir or the first file's directory; nested includes use the
including include-entry's project directory. Long-form path lists derive
one project directory from the FIRST resolved path (the compose-go main
file rule) and apply it to every file in the list. Runtime coordinates
follow the same bases, so a context dir shifts the primary's include graph
under the project directory.
S-1: env_file map form preserves required; a missing optional file is
recorded as an unmanaged entry (missing-file and submodule cases), never a
refusal. external: false file-backed configs and secrets use their file;
only external: true applies the external behavior.
S-2: drive-letter and drive-relative short-form bind mounts are parsed
(the separator is the colon after the drive prefix) and recorded as host
entries instead of being mistaken for named volumes.
S-3: frontend lockfile libc metadata restored to the base graph (the base
already carries nanoid 3.3.18).
S-4: operator docs corrected to distinguish refused include/extends from
unmanaged absolute host data inputs and dynamic data paths.
* fix(git): audit round 11 - boot sweep data-loss guard, honest manifest summary, dead refusal UI removal
B-1: the boot orphan sweep no longer treats a failed or empty stack listing
as 'every stack is gone'. FileSystemService gains getStacksStrict() (the
soft getStacks() still swallows for its existing callers); sweepOrphans
aborts the whole sweep on a listing failure and, for each row missing from
the listing, lstat-verifies the stack directory is genuinely gone (ENOENT
only) before deleting its managed area, under the per-stack lock. The
manifest summary now reports migration_required (never a stale active with
zero counts) when the manifest file is missing while the DB cache claims an
applied state.
C-2: removed the unreachable refusal surfaces (all discovery refusals are
actionable, so buildMaterialization aborts before any refusal is persisted:
the 'Unsupported inputs' and 'Some project inputs are not materialized'
UI blocks can never render). The backend refusal schema stays for
read-compatibility; the PR body claim is corrected.
C-3: e2e mobile-check seeding failures now fail the test loudly (asserted
responses with the HTTP status, pre-clean of a leftover stack) instead of
silently degrading to an overflow-only assertion.
* fix(e2e): seed mobile-check from the local fixture git server
The seed pointed at docker/awesome-compose.git with compose_paths
['compose.yaml'], but that repository has no root compose.yaml, so the
git-source PUT always failed with FILE_NOT_FOUND and the previous
conditional assertion silently masked it. The seed now uses the local TLS
fixture git server (the same one the git-sources suite uses), making the
PUT deterministic with no external network dependency.
* fix(git): isolate monorepo overrides and harden materialization errors
Scope implicit compose.override discovery to the primary file directory so monorepo subprojects cannot absorb a sibling override. Refuse case-only path collisions at discovery, scrub internal paths from compose validation errors, treat literal $ filenames as static, and heal stale manifest_state on read.
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a826cd398d |
fix: allow chmod on protected stack files (#1772)
* fix: allow chmod on protected stack files Identity protection still blocks delete, rename, and copy-onto-reserved-name for compose and .env at the stack root. Permission changes are ordinary edits and must succeed from the explorer. * fix: gate chmod on compose files during stack ops Chmod on compose filenames and .blueprint.json now follows the same stack-op lock as content writes and uploads. Document allowed blueprint chmod and that content saves reset mode bits. |
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17a8dc8a94 |
fix(blueprints): fail closed on marker ownership for apply and withdraw (#1694)
* fix(blueprints): fail closed on marker ownership for apply and withdraw Require a matching .blueprint.json under the stack lock, persist required_blueprint_id on deletion intents, remove the legacy remote apply fallback, and protect the marker in the file explorer. * fix(blueprints): add CodeQL path barriers on ownership probes Use the canonical resolve-and-startsWith sanitizer inline at the marker and stack-directory fs sinks so js/path-injection clears. * fix(blueprints): block delete on failed withdraw and defer marker write Refuse Blueprint DELETE when pre-delete withdraw does not complete, and write .blueprint.json only after a successful deploy so failed applies cannot orphan stacks or claim an unapplied revision. * test(blueprints): align lock-order assert with deferred marker write Update the per-stack lock ordering expectations to compose, cleanup, deploy, then marker after the partial-apply fix. * fix(deps): bump postcss past GHSA-r28c-9q8g-f849 for npm audit Raise the Vitest/Vite transitive postcss to 8.5.23 so Backend CI audit --audit-level=high passes. |
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e15b9d1244 |
fix(blueprints): write compose.yaml so first-time apply is not shadowed (#1668)
createStack scaffolds compose.yaml; Blueprint was writing docker-compose.yml, so Compose discovery ran the nginx boilerplate. Align Blueprint writes with the canonical filename, clear alternate root Compose siblings on local/modern apply, and cover the regression paths. |
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3f1f15a6f4 |
fix: keep running containers until stack pull/build succeeds (#1657)
* fix: keep running containers until stack pull/build succeeds Acquire images before reconcile, capture a recovery generation for compensation, and only remove classified orphans after handoff. * fix: address recovery audit blockers for safe stack updates Retire abandoned and expired recovery artifacts, probe compensated runtimes before reporting rollback success, preserve local Docker when deleting a node, validate the exact Compose invocation before capture, and repair updateStack return-contract fixtures. * fix: resolve ESLint errors blocking CI on this branch Unused-import and unused-variable errors left over from the stack deletion refactor: MeshService in stacks.ts (its opt-out cascade moved into DeployedStackDeletionService), a redundant pruneVolumes destructure in deleteDeployedStack (the real one is re-derived from the same input object inside runDeletionBody), and an unused beforeAll import in a Docker-integration test stub. Also scopes the webhook pull-action case body in a block to satisfy no-case-declarations; purely syntactic, no behavior change. * fix: harden recovery probe, cleanup retry, and failed-pull Docker test Reject absent or unhealthy expected replicas before reporting rollback success, keep cleanup records until artifacts are actually removed, fail closed when a mesh override cannot be generated, and assert a real failed pull leaves the original container running. * fix: verify recovery probe image identity and stack-scoped override paths Reject recovered runtimes that use the wrong image or leave scale-zero services running, and confine tombstone override deletion to the intent stack directory so forged cross-stack paths cannot be swept. * test: batch notification cap fixtures in a SQLite transaction Unbatched 1200-row inserts were timing out at the default 30s under CI load even though the same assertions pass in under 2s when green. |
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ba2e7bded9 |
feat: first-boot compose discovery and adopt-first sidebar (#1600)
* feat: add compose discovery for setup preflight and sidebar empty state Expose read-only compose discovery via GET /api/stacks/discovery and setup diagnostics. Replace the blank sidebar with path-aware discovery and move adopt into a dedicated dialog with a three-tab Create Stack flow. * test: assert post-setup handoff via sessionStorage read-back The Setup preflight test spied on Storage.prototype.setItem to check the post-setup adopt handoff. When the jsdom storage probe fails and the test harness swaps in its in-memory storage stub (which does not extend Storage), that stub's setItem never touches Storage.prototype, so the spy records zero calls and the assertion fails even though the component wrote the value. Read the value back with sessionStorage.getItem instead, matching how every other storage test in the suite asserts. This is robust to both the native jsdom storage and the in-memory fallback. * fix(setup): surface compose discovery as a preflight check row Drop the Setup discovery banner and non-working Review button. Show counts as a pass row in EnvironmentChecks (Setup only) and keep Enter Sencho as the handoff that opens adopt when candidates exist. * test(setup): cover zero-count discovery row omission * fix(stacks): widen adopt scan to any yaml and rename into place Homelab layouts often use nginx.yml or plex.yml. Surface those for adopt (except overrides), rename to compose.yaml on move so stacks register, and reset the confirm UI when a move fails. |
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eaf0642d88 |
fix: reject atomic restore when a checksummed backup file is missing (#1466)
Restore verification iterated the backup directory listing, so a file recorded in the .checksums manifest but absent from the backup slot was never checked. The orphan removal then deleted the live file and the copy restored nothing, reporting success while leaving the stack unrecoverable. Walk the manifest instead of the directory listing: a recorded file that the slot no longer holds now aborts the restore before any file is touched, alongside the existing corrupt-content check. Also fail backup creation when a managed file exists but cannot be read (non-ENOENT), instead of silently omitting it and producing an incomplete backup with the same failure mode. |
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1c82e3e1d4 |
fix: contain file-explorer writes and browse reachable out-of-base binds (#1465)
The file-explorer editor save resolved a dangling symlink leaf to the link path and wrote through it with a plain writeFile, which followed the link and created a file outside the bind/stack root. Reject a resolved leaf that is itself a symlink (mirroring the managed-stack guard) and promote the save through the atomic stage-and-rename helper, so the editor save matches its documented atomicity and can never leave a partial file or land outside the root. Bind-root discovery reported every source outside the compose base as unreachable without probing it, so a config directory mounted into both the app and the Sencho container was wrongly non-browsable. Probe the declared source as Sencho actually sees it; dangerous host roots, docker-socket mounts, and managed-area overlaps stay blocked, and the dangerous classification also reads the literal declared source so it holds across platforms. |
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a698aaa926 |
feat: add per-stack project env file selection for Docker Compose (#1457)
* feat: add per-stack project env file selection for Docker Compose
Allow users to configure an ordered list of env files per stack that serve
as the project environment file(s) for Docker Compose ${VAR} interpolation.
The selected files are passed via repeated --env-file flags during all
compose commands.
Backend:
- Add stack_project_env_files table (node-scoped, ordered)
- Extend authoredComposeEnvFileArgs to emit --env-file for configured files
- Add GET/PUT /stacks/:name/project-env-files and /candidates endpoints
- Update resolveStackEnvSources to use configured files as interpolation source
- Update resolveAllEnvFilePaths to merge injection + interpolation sources
- Add discoverStackLocalEnvFiles for candidate discovery
- Extend backupStackFiles and snapshotStackFiles for project env files
- Add project-env-files capability to CapabilityRegistry
Frontend:
- Add project env file selector to EnvironmentPanel (capability-gated)
- Update EditorView banner to generic "project environment file" language
- Add project-env-files capability to capabilities.ts
Issue: #1454
* fix: add realpath validation, clear all stale backup files, reject nested paths
- authoredComposeEnvFileArgs: use fsPromises.realpath + isPathWithinBase
for symlink escape defense at use time
- backupStackFiles: clear ALL non-marker files from backup slot before
writing, not just PROTECTED_STACK_FILES (handles stale old.env)
- PUT project-env-files: reject paths containing / or \ (root-level
only, matching Compose auto-discovery behavior)
* fix: add getStackProjectEnvFiles to compose-service mock
The new authoredComposeEnvFileArgs calls getStackProjectEnvFiles
on the DatabaseService singleton. The compose-service mesh-override
tests mock that singleton without the new method, causing 6 failures.
Add getStackProjectEnvFiles: () => [] (empty = fall back to legacy
behavior, which is what these tests exercise).
* fix: add getStackProjectEnvFiles to remaining service mocks
The new authoredComposeEnvFileArgs calls getStackProjectEnvFiles,
which is missing from the mock in compose-images.test.ts (6 failures)
and image-update-service.test.ts (proactive fix).
* fix: apply inline path-injection barrier at fs sink for CodeQL
The PUT project-env-files route resolved paths via isPathWithinBase
before calling fsp.stat, but CodeQL does not credit a containment check
separated from the sink. Apply the canonical inline barrier pattern
(path.resolve + startsWith at the sink) used throughout the codebase.
* fix: resolve stackDir from the same canonical root as safePath
Prevents a containment bypass when the compose base directory is
a symlink: stackDir was previously joined from the unresolved
baseDir while the inline barrier used path.resolve(baseDir),
which could differ for symlinked paths. Now both stackDir and
safePath are resolved from a single canonical root, then each is
containment-checked against it.
* fix: remove unused isPathWithinBase import
The inline path-injection barrier refactor replaced isPathWithinBase
with an inline startsWith check at the fs sink, so the import is now
unused and fails ESLint no-unused-vars.
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bc8c051962 |
feat(scheduler): consistent action targeting in Scheduled Operations (#1431)
Give every scheduled action an explicit, predictable target model (Action then Node then Stack then Options then Schedule): - System Prune now exposes a Node picker and requires a node, so it can no longer run silently on the default node. - Vulnerability Scan and System Prune list local nodes only; both run on the hub-local Docker daemon and reject remote nodes on the backend. - Restart Stack service discovery loads services from the selected node via fetchForNode instead of the active or local node. - Fleet Snapshot shows a read-only "Scope: Entire fleet" summary. Backend gains a shared local-node guard and prune node validation on create and update, plus an executor-level remote-node guard, so the frontend and backend validation now agree for every action. |
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96b3c49359 |
fix(deploy): verify atomic-deploy backup integrity before restore (#1422)
* fix(deploy): verify atomic-deploy backup integrity before restore Atomic deploy and the Rollback action restore a stack from a backup of its compose file and .env. A backup truncated or corrupted at write time (out of disk, interrupted copy) was copied back silently, overwriting a working stack with bad content. The backup now writes a .checksums manifest holding a SHA-256 of each backed-up file, and a restore re-hashes every file and compares it before touching the stack. A mismatch aborts the restore with a clear error and leaves the live files unchanged. Backups without a manifest, and files with no recorded checksum, are restored unverified so a rollback is never blocked by missing integrity data. * fix(deploy): guard backup source reads with an inline path barrier The integrity change reads each managed file from the stack directory before hashing it. Static analysis flags those reads because the source path derives from the user-provided stack name and the containment check lived in a helper it does not trace. Re-establish containment inline at each read sink, resolving against the compose base and confirming the path stays within it, mirroring snapshotStackFiles. Behavior is unchanged for valid stacks; the guard only rejects a path that escapes the compose directory, which validation already prevents. * test(deploy): assert compose stays put when the backup .env is corrupt Strengthen the .env-corruption test so it also mutates the live compose.yaml and asserts it is left untouched, proving the integrity abort halts before any file is copied back rather than relying on the backup happening to match. Also note on the test hash oracle that it matches production for UTF-8 text fixtures. |
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b753d2d5e0 |
fix(deploy): preserve compose.override.yml when Mesh is enabled (#1420)
When a single-file stack is opted into Sencho Mesh, the deploy builds an explicit `docker compose -f <base> -f <mesh override>` list. Passing any explicit -f disables Compose's automatic discovery of compose.override.yml (and the docker-compose.override variants), so a user's hand-authored override was silently dropped from the effective deploy once Mesh was on. Resolve the user's override file (first existing variant, with the same stack-name and symlink-containment guards as the base compose file) and insert it between the base and the mesh override, so it layers exactly as Compose's implicit discovery would, with the mesh override still taking precedence. A transient read failure during the lookup degrades to "no override" rather than failing the deploy; a stack-name or containment-guard rejection still aborts. Multi-file Git-source stacks and non-mesh deploys are unaffected. |
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69ba0e6d21 |
fix(stacks): harden stack file path containment against symlink escapes (#1415)
* fix(stacks): harden stack file path containment against symlink escapes The legacy managed-stack methods enforced path containment lexically (path.resolve + startsWith), which does not follow symlinks. A stack directory under the compose root that is itself a symlink or junction could let a managed-file operation (write compose.yaml/.env, delete a stack, backup, restore, snapshot) follow the link and read, write, or delete a file of the same name outside the compose root. Add a realpath-based containment guard that walks up to the deepest existing path component, confirms its canonical location is inside the canonical compose root, and rejects both an out-of-tree resolution and a dangling symlink (which a write or mkdir would still follow). The guard runs at every legacy managed-stack sink, alongside the existing lexical barriers. A legitimately symlinked compose root is not a false positive because both sides are canonicalized through the same link, and the guard is a no-op for not-yet-created targets so stack creation and the flat-to-directory migration are unaffected. * fix(stacks): satisfy the path-injection sanitizer in the symlink containment guard assertRealWithinBase resolves a user-derived path and probes it with realpath/lstat to run the containment check, which static analysis flags as path injection because the probes lacked the inline barrier its sanitizer recognizes. Add the canonical path.resolve + startsWith barrier at the top of the helper, the same form every other sink in this file uses, and seed the realpath walk from the sanitized value. Behavior is unchanged: callers always pass an absolute, already-contained path, so the barrier is a no-op pre-check for them, and the realpath walk still catches the symlink and dangling-link escapes. |
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37e6e48b40 |
feat(files): copy & duplicate, bulk actions, disk-backed uploads, and an accessible file tree (#1409)
* perf(files): spool uploads to disk instead of buffering in memory
Switch the stack file-explorer upload from multer memoryStorage to
diskStorage and stream the spooled temp file through the file-root
gateway, so an upload is never held fully in RAM. Authorization and
root resolution now run before multer spools, so an unauthorized or
read-only-root request is rejected without writing a temp file, and the
spool is removed on every exit path. The named-volume helper write
verifies the written byte count, since cat cannot report a short write.
* feat(files): copy and duplicate files in the explorer
Add a copy capability to the stack file explorer: a same-folder
Duplicate (auto-suffixed name) and a "Copy to..." destination picker,
on both filesystem and named-volume roots. Copying is within-root,
symlink-leaf-safe, blocks a directory copy into its own subtree, and
refuses to create a protected name (compose/.env) at the stack root
while still allowing a protected file to be duplicated under a new name.
* feat(files): make the file tree keyboard accessible
Bring the stack file explorer tree to the WCAG tree pattern: rows are
treeitems carrying aria-level, aria-selected, and aria-expanded, with a
single roving tabindex and full keyboard navigation (arrow keys,
Home/End, Enter/Space) over a flattened visible-node list that stays in
lockstep with the rendered rows. A polite live region announces the
selected file. No visual change to the tree.
* feat(files): bulk select, delete, move, and download files
Add multi-select to the stack file explorer (checkboxes plus Shift and
Ctrl/Cmd click over the visible order) driving three bulk actions:
delete, move, and download as a streamed .tar.gz. All run within the
active root on both filesystem and named-volume backends, report
per-item results so partial failures surface (with the failed items
kept selected for retry), normalize ancestor/descendant selections
server-side, and cap the archive entry and byte counts before any
bytes are streamed. Protected compose/.env files are excluded from
bulk delete and move but may still be downloaded.
* docs(files): document copy, bulk actions, and keyboard navigation
Add the copy/duplicate and multi-select bulk delete/move/download
sections to the Files & Volumes page, a keyboard-navigation note for the
tree, an updated context-menu reference, and bulk troubleshooting entries.
* fix(files): inline path-injection barriers at the new file-op sinks
CodeQL js/path-injection does not credit the wrapped isPathWithinBase
containment check, so the new copy/bulk/disk-upload flows tripped the
gate. Inline the canonical path.resolve + startsWith barrier at the
realpath sink in resolveSafePathWithin (covers every user-relPath flow)
and confirm the multer spool path resolves within UPLOAD_TMP_DIR before
unlinking it or streaming it onward. Behavior is unchanged; the paths
were already validated.
* fix(files): guard the ancestor-walk realpath sink too
The first barrier covered realpath(target), but the ENOENT ancestor
walk re-derives the path via path.dirname, which static analysis treats
as a fresh tainted value. Add the same inline containment barrier before
that realpath and resolve the root case via the untainted base, so the
only tainted realpath input is one the startsWith check has cleared.
Behavior is unchanged.
* fix(files): resolve the root case off the taint path in the ancestor walk
The compound guard on existing (the same variable as the startsWith
subject) was not credited as a sanitizer. Handle the root case before
the barrier by resolving the untainted base directly, leaving a plain
canonical startsWith guard on the strictly-within ancestor. Behavior is
unchanged.
* fix(files): harden helper-backend bulk download and uploads
Address three issues found in the named-volume (helper) backend:
- Bulk download could send 200 headers before discovering a file the
helper download path refuses, tearing the archive mid-stream. The
prewalk now rejects symlinks, non-regular ("other") entries, and
files over the per-file download cap before any header (400/413).
FileEntry gains an 'other' type so non-regular entries stay distinct
from regular files as they pass through the gateway.
- The helper directory listing was fully buffered before the archive
entry cap could fire. listDir now accepts a limit; the list script
stops after limit+1 rows and the gateway reports truncation.
- A stdin pipeline error during a helper upload masked the container's
real nonzero exit code (and its 4xx mapping) as a generic 500. The
nonzero exit now wins; the masked stream error is logged.
* feat(files): add a New file toolbar button with server-enforced create-only
The stack file explorer could create a folder from a toolbar button but a
new file only from a folder's right-click menu, so a file could not be
created at the stack root at all. Add a New file toolbar button beside New
folder, targeting the current directory.
Creating a file now routes through a new createEmptyStackFile helper that
posts a zero-byte file through the existing upload endpoint with overwrite
off, so the server's exclusive-create path rejects an existing name instead
of clobbering it. A file collision surfaces inline in the dialog; a folder
collision and other failures surface as a toast.
* fix(files): widen the tree row hit area and add horizontal scroll for long names
Right-clicking a file tree row only opened the Sencho context menu when the
click landed on the filename; the rest of the row fell through to the native
browser menu, and long names were truncated with no way to read them.
Make each row span the full pane width (and grow with its content) so the
whole row is the context-menu trigger, and let the tree scroll horizontally
so a long name is reachable instead of clipped. A new opt-in horizontal prop
on ScrollArea adds the styled horizontal scrollbar without clamping content
width.
* docs(files): document the New file button, full-row right-click, and long-name scrolling
* test(files): cover createEmptyStackFile targeting the stack root
Add an API-layer case for the empty-directory (stack root) create path, the
primary reason the New file toolbar button exists, so a regression in the
root-level URL would be caught at unit speed rather than only in e2e.
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b9d8e9f490 |
feat(stacks): browse and edit mounted volume files in the explorer (#1403)
* feat(stacks): browse and edit mounted volume files in the explorer Reposition the stack file explorer around runtime configuration access: discover a stack's declared mounts and expose each as a safe, stack-scoped file root. The explorer opens on a Volumes group (bind mounts and named Docker volumes) by default, with the stack source directory as a secondary group, on a "Files & Volumes" tab. - Discover roots from the rendered effective compose model; resolve named volumes to their Docker name and browse/edit them through the hardened helper container, with bind mounts handled directly when reachable. - Re-derive the allowed roots server-side on every file operation and match the client root id against them, so a request can never address a path the stack did not declare. Block dangerous host mounts and binds that overlap Sencho's managed directories; reject writes to read-only mounts. - Thread an optional root id through the existing file endpoints and an opaque, parseable optimistic-concurrency token through read, conflict, and write, for both filesystem and helper backends. - Keep compose and env file protection on the stack source root only. * fix(stacks): theme the Files & Volumes root switcher Replace the raw native select in the file-root switcher with the design system Select component. The native control did not honour the dark theme, so the panel rendered white with unreadable text. The themed Select gives a dark popover with grouped Volumes / Stack source labels and disabled items. * fix(stacks): contain the bind-root probe and de-taint the file-op error log Gate the volume-root bind probe's realpath/stat behind a compose-base containment check (mirroring the storage host-path probe) so they never run on an unvalidated host path; a source outside the compose dir is unreachable in the containerized deployment anyway and is reported non-accessible without touching the filesystem. Log the helper-backed file-op failure through a constant format string with sanitized arguments instead of an interpolated template literal. * fix(stacks): inline the bind-probe containment guard at the fs sinks The wrapped containment predicate was not recognized as a path barrier, so the bind probe's realpath/stat still flagged as uncontrolled-data-in-path. Inline the path.resolve + startsWith check directly at each filesystem sink (and re-check the resolved canonical before stat, so a within-base symlink that resolves outside the compose dir is also rejected). * fix(stacks): harden file-root lifecycle, upload race, and helper errors Address review findings on the Files & Volumes feature: - Invalidate the file-root allowlist on stack create/delete/import/from-git (wire StackFileRootsService.invalidateNode into invalidateNodeCaches), so a stack deleted and recreated under the same name cannot serve the old stack's roots from the 15s cache. - Use the atomic exclusive write for a non-overwrite upload so a file created by another writer after the existence check is not silently clobbered. - Let the helper's real cd errno through and map permission failures to 403 consistently across list/stat/read/write/mkdir/delete/pathKind, instead of reporting EACCES as 404/500; pathKind no longer reports a permission-denied parent as absent. - Document the realpath-then-open TOCTOU as a known, pre-existing limitation of every file op (O_NOFOLLOW is not viable because config volumes legitimately contain symlinks); the bind root is contained to the compose dir and the op requires stack:edit. - Docs: drop a missing screenshot reference and correct the protected-file delete behavior (stack-root compose/.env cannot be deleted via the explorer). |
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888f658a7a |
feat(files): move files and folders across directories in the stack explorer (#1373)
* feat(files): move files and folders across directories in the stack explorer Add a cross-directory move to the stack file explorer. Files and folders can be relocated either through a "Move to..." context-menu item that opens a folder-picker dialog, or by dragging an entry onto a folder node (or onto the root area to move it to the stack root). The backend reuses the existing rename endpoint: renameStackPath now resolves both ends through the leaf helper, so a symlink moves as the link entry rather than its target, and it guards against moving a directory into its own subtree. A cross-filesystem rename surfaces as a clean 409 instead of a 500. Protected root files (compose / docker-compose / .env) stay put. Moving the open file, or a folder containing it, deselects the viewer; a move that would discard unsaved edits is blocked with a clear message. * fix(files): fold case in move guards and keep the move dialog open on failure Harden the cross-directory move against case-insensitive filesystems and fix a dialog dismissal edge: - Protected root files (compose / docker-compose / .env) were gated by an exact, lowercase name match. On a case-insensitive filesystem a request like COMPOSE.YAML resolves to the real compose.yaml and slipped past the gate, so a protected file could be moved out of the stack root via the API. The gate now folds case on case-insensitive platforms; Linux stays case-sensitive, where a differently-cased name is a distinct, unprotected file. - The directory-into-descendant guard compared resolved paths case-sensitively, so a source supplied with non-disk casing skipped the guard and fell through to an opaque OS error (500) instead of a clean 400. The comparison now folds case the same way. - The move dialog closed after awaiting the move regardless of outcome, so a blocked move (unsaved edits) or a failed move dismissed the picker as if it had succeeded. The shared handler now reports success and the dialog only closes on an actual move. |
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38aabe7064 |
feat: health-gated updates and rollback readiness (#1354)
* feat: classify stack deploy and update failures with suggested next actions Failed deploy and update responses now carry a failure classification (cause category, headline, and suggested next step) derived from the compose error output. The recovery panel and chip render the classification and include it in copied diagnostics, and gateway-style failures surface as a node-unreachable cause. * feat: add update and rollback readiness reports for stacks Before a manual update, Sencho now shows an advisory readiness verdict computed from the stored preflight result, open drift findings, live container health, the pending image change, the rollback backup slot, and node disk headroom. The Stack Dossier gains a rollback readiness section that states what a rollback can restore and explicitly discloses that volume and bind-mounted data are not covered. Toolbar and sidebar updates now share one update path, and admins can create a fleet snapshot from the readiness dialog before updating. Nodes that do not advertise the capability keep the direct update flow. * feat: observe stack health after updates with a post-deploy health gate After a deploy or update succeeds, Sencho now watches the stack for a configurable observation window and records a passed, failed, or unknown verdict: containers must stay running, healthchecks must report healthy, and restart loops or disappearing containers fail the gate. The deploy panel shows the observation live and holds off auto-closing until the verdict lands, a failed gate surfaces the existing recovery actions including rollback, and the stack timeline records update started and gate verdict events. Scheduled, webhook, bulk, and git-source updates are gated the same way; rollbacks and installs are deliberately not. The gate is observational only and can be tuned or disabled per node under host alert settings. * docs: document health-gated updates and rollback readiness New operator page covering the update readiness dialog, the post-update health gate and its settings, the rollback readiness disclosure, and classified failures, with cross-links from the atomic deployments and deploy progress pages. The API reference gains the readiness and health-gate endpoints, the healthGateId success field, and the failure classification schema on deploy and update error responses. * feat: withhold the success verdict while the health gate observes An update used to show a green Succeeded that a failed health gate then contradicted moments later. The deploy modal now reports Verifying health while the gate observes, shows success only when the gate passes, and makes a failed or unknown gate the headline result; success toasts soften to a verifying message while a gate runs. The mobile recovery card groups its actions behind one bottom-right Take action menu so it stays compact on a phone, with the classified cause still visible on the card. A successful image update now also counts as the last known-good marker in rollback readiness, and the docs gain screenshots of the readiness dialog, gate states, dossier section, and settings. * fix: harden log format strings and the env existence path check Log calls that interpolated the stack name into the console format string now use constant format strings with placeholder arguments, and envExists validates path containment inline at its filesystem access, matching the established patterns used elsewhere in the same files. * test: adapt deploy modal success specs to the post-deploy health gate The deploy feedback modal now withholds its success verdict while the health gate observes the new containers, showing "Verifying health" until the gate passes. The two success-path E2E tests waited for "Succeeded" within the gate's 90s default window and timed out. Shorten the observation window to the 15s minimum for these tests via the settings API, assert the verify-then-succeed sequence the modal actually renders, and restore the default window afterward so the test value does not leak into later runs. * fix: serialize health gate polling and harden gate observation Address race conditions in the post-update health gate found in review. Backend: the gate poller used setInterval, so a Docker observe slower than the 5s tick could overlap the next poll and corrupt the restart and missing-container accounting, and a wedged socket could leave a poll pending forever. Polling is now single-flight: each cycle self-schedules the next only after it settles, and the observe is bounded by an 8s timeout so a hung probe counts as a poll error and resolves the gate unknown after three in a row. Frontend: the gate poller could overlap requests, letting a slow earlier "observing" response overwrite an already-applied terminal verdict. It is now single-flight with a terminal latch, so a late response can never roll the UI back from passed or failed. Also reject a non-digit nodeId on the snapshot coverage route instead of letting parseInt coerce it, document that turning off the deploy progress panel opts out of the live gate UI while the gate still runs server-side, and add gate-coverage tests for the webhook, git source, and auto-update apply paths plus the new single-flight, observe-timeout, and recovery cases. |
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d369b03a38 |
feat: detect stalled stack updates and add in-app recovery actions (#1347)
* feat: detect stalled stack updates and add in-app recovery actions Add a backend idle-output backstop that stops a deploy/update compose step that has gone silent (SENCHO_COMPOSE_STALL_TIMEOUT_MS, default 10m), so a hung image pull surfaces a fast failure instead of spinning indefinitely. Surface failed, timed-out, and stalled operations with recovery actions on the stack page: a desktop chip plus popover menu and an inline mobile card offering retry, restart, roll back (when a backup exists), refresh state, and copy diagnostics, all gated by deploy permission. The streaming deploy/update progress modal is now on by default and warns when output goes quiet. Container state is refreshed after a failed or stalled operation, and the UI never sits in an indefinite spinner. * fix: harden rollback against policy-blocked file mutation and refine recovery Address review findings on the stalled-update recovery work: - The rollback route restored backup files before running the policy gate, so a policy-blocked rollback could leave the on-disk config rolled back while the deployed containers were unchanged. Snapshot the current files first and revert them when the gate blocks; if that revert itself fails, escalate it on the persistent alert feed since the 409 is already sent. - Refresh container state after a successful manual rollback (rollback redeploys), without mis-recording a refetch failure as a rollback failure. - Suppress the stalled-output warning once live progress is unavailable. * test: mock snapshotStackFiles in the atomic-deploy rollback route tests The rollback route now snapshots stack files before restoring a backup, so its FileSystemService mock needs snapshotStackFiles. Without it the mocked call threw and the route returned 500, failing the success-path rollback assertions. |
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86bfc108ae |
fix(security): resolve open CodeQL path-injection and temp-file alerts (#1322)
Re-establish the path-containment barrier inline at the backup readdir sink in restoreStackFiles. The sink previously built backupDir through the getBackupDir helper, whose stack-name validation the static analyzer does not trace, leaving a flagged path-injection sink. The barrier now resolves backupDir against its root and asserts containment inline, the same pattern already used in backupStackFiles. Behavior is unchanged for valid stack names (already validated one line above by resolveStackDir). Scope the js/insecure-temporary-file rule out of e2e/** in the CodeQL config. End-to-end fixtures must seed files into the backend's COMPOSE_DIR so the API under test can read them back; that path is a fixed location under /tmp in both CI and local dev, which the rule flags. A randomized temp directory does not apply because the backend resolves against its own COMPOSE_DIR. Production code is still analyzed. |
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f7f3afe05a |
feat(stacks): one-click import for stray compose files (#1320)
* feat(stacks): move discovered import candidates into place The guided import flow previewed loose and nested compose files but could not act on them, so it only told the user where to move files by hand. Add an opt-in "Move into place" action: relocate a loose-root file into its own <name>/ subfolder, or promote a nested stack directory one level up, so Sencho's filesystem discovery lists it as a stack. The file stays a plain compose file on disk; nothing is captured into a store. The move re-derives the candidate from a fresh scan and matches by location, validates the destination name and containment, resolves symlinks before the rename, and never overwrites an existing stack. Backend and frontend both gate the action on stack:create. Also fix the rescan flicker: scan results now stay on screen while a rescan runs (only the Rescan button shows progress) instead of the whole panel collapsing to a spinner, and an empty rescan surfaces a toast. * fix(stacks): make import-move destination creation atomic The loose-root branch created the destination directory with mkdir recursive after an access() existence precheck. If the destination appeared between the check and the create, recursive accepted the existing directory and the following rename could overwrite a same-named compose file inside it, so the intended conflict response never fired. Use a non-recursive mkdir so a destination that already exists raises a conflict instead of being merged into. Add a regression test that forces the precheck to miss and asserts the existing file is left intact. * fix(stacks): only offer not-yet-imported compose files in the import tab The import tab listed every compose file in the compose directory, including ones that are already stacks (a top-level subfolder with a compose file), which just duplicated the sidebar. The scan now skips those and surfaces only files that still need importing: a compose file loose at the compose-dir root, or one nested a folder too deep. Also harden the move-into-place write path that turns a stray file into a stack: a failed rename after the destination folder is created now rolls back the empty folder, so a retry is not blocked by a false "already exists" conflict, and the move switches on an exhaustive set of placements so a new one cannot silently take the wrong branch. The sidebar refreshes after a move so the imported stack appears right away, and the docs describe import as relocating a file, not capturing running containers. * fix(stacks): reject a nested import whose compose file escapes the base The move-into-place path for a nested compose file validated only the parent directory's real path, not the compose file itself. A directory that is real and inside the compose base but holds a compose file symlinked outside the base would survive the directory move and become a stack whose compose file still points outside the base, which the editor read path would then follow. The move now resolves the compose file too and refuses it unless it stays inside the resolved source directory, matching the loose-root check and the scan's preview reader. * fix(stacks): satisfy CodeQL path and log analysis in import-move The import-move write path built its destination directory from the user-provided stack name through resolveStackDir, whose containment barrier is wrapped in a helper that static analysis does not credit, so every filesystem sink on the destination was flagged as path injection. Re-establish the resolve-against-the-safe-base plus startsWith barrier inline at the sinks, matching the read and backup paths in the same file, and route the relocated file path through the same check. The name is already restricted to an alphanumeric, hyphen, and underscore allowlist, so the containment can never actually fail; this only makes the existing safety visible to the analyzer. Also log the move route's error as a sanitized message rather than the raw error object, so a name embedded in an error message cannot forge log lines. |
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06b25262cc |
feat(stacks): guided first stack import flow (#1285)
* feat(stacks): add guided first stack import flow Add an Import mode to the Create Stack dialog and a zero-stacks empty state so a new user who already has compose files on disk can land their first stack without reading the docs first. A read-only scan of the compose directory (GET /api/stacks/import/scan) lists the compose files it finds with a dry preview of each file's services, ports, volumes, and env files. Each result is labelled by placement: already a stack, loose at the root of the compose directory, or one folder too deep, with the exact path to move misplaced files to. The scan never writes, moves, or changes any files. Manual stack creation (Empty, From Git, From Docker Run) is unchanged. * fix(stacks): read import-scan candidates via a single file handle Open the compose file once and stat plus read on the same descriptor so the size check and the read observe the same inode, instead of resolving the path twice (stat then readFile), which is a time-of-check/time-of-use race. Mirrors the existing handle-based readers in FileSystemService. * fix(stacks): confine import scan to the compose dir and refine the empty state Harden the read-only import scan: - Resolve symlinks and confirm the real target stays inside the compose directory before reading a candidate, and reject non-regular files, so a symlinked compose file or parent cannot expose a file outside the compose directory through the preview (matches resolveSafeStackPath). - Read at most the stat-reported size (bounded by the 1 MiB cap) from the open handle, so a file that grows after the size check cannot exceed the cap. - Log when the compose directory or a subdirectory cannot be read, so an access failure is not silently reported as "no compose files found". Only show the first-run "No stacks yet" prompt when no filter chip is active, so a filter that matches nothing is not mistaken for an empty fleet. |
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6fc7f200a6 |
fix(scheduled-ops): run stack lifecycle schedules on remote nodes and harden run visibility (#1260)
* fix(scheduled-ops): run stack lifecycle schedules on remote nodes and harden run visibility Stack lifecycle schedules (Restart, Stop, Take Down, Start, Backup Stack Files) now run against whichever node the schedule targets, local or remote. Each remote run proxies to that node's own stack-operation endpoint, so a hub-managed schedule reaches the node that actually holds the stack. Restart with a service subset restarts each selected service and, if one fails, names the services already restarted so run history reflects the stack's partial state. Auto-start on a remote node runs that node's own pre-deploy scan-policy check against the images it holds. Add POST /api/stacks/:name/backup to trigger an on-demand backup of a stack's compose and env files (the same rollback snapshot a deploy takes); it backs the remote backup schedule and is available to operators on its own. A scheduled task that reaches execution on an unpaid licence is now skipped and written to run history as a failed run, so a manual trigger that returned a queued response never silently disappears. Test plan: - Backend unit + integration: scheduler-service (remote proxy per action, per-service fan-out, auto-start policy delegation, remote-failure and no-credentials paths, unpaid-tier skip), stack-backup-route (auth/role/paid/404/400/500), scheduled-tasks-routes. - Frontend component test for the schedules view (list, prefill, node filter, create payload). - tsc and lint clean on both packages. * fix(scheduled-ops): lock the stack-files backup route against concurrent stack ops The stack-files backup writes the same slot the pre-deploy rollback snapshot uses, so running it while a deploy, update, or rollback is in flight on the same stack could overwrite the rollback point. The backup route now takes the per-stack operation lock (as deploy/down/restart do) and returns 409 when the stack is busy, keeping the rollback snapshot intact. Adds the 'backup' action to the stack-op lock type and a busy participle for the 409 message. * fix(scheduled-ops): enforce backup-path containment inline at the filesystem sink The on-demand backup route passes the stack name straight into backupStackFiles, so resolve the backup directory against the backup root and confirm containment with an inline startsWith check before the mkdir/copy/write sinks, matching the barrier restoreStackFiles already uses. The stack name is validated at the route and again by resolveStackDir, so this is defense in depth that also closes a static path-injection finding on the new call path. |
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45844b92ca |
fix(atomic-deploy): harden rollback locking, restore fidelity, and tier gating (#1247)
* fix(atomic-deploy): harden rollback locking, restore fidelity, and tier gating Hardens the Atomic Deployments feature found during a full audit: - Rollback now holds the per-stack lifecycle lock (deploy/update already do), so a rollback can no longer race a concurrent deploy on the same compose files. Adds a 'rollback' lifecycle action and releases the lock in finally. - restoreStackFiles is now a faithful revert: it removes managed compose/.env files added after the backup before copying, so a rollback no longer leaves a hybrid of old and new configuration. Scope is the protected file set only; user data is untouched. Aborts (rather than reporting success) if a stale managed file cannot be removed. - The scheduled image-update path derives the atomic flag from the licence tier instead of hardcoding it on, keeping the paid capability explicit at the call site (the scheduler is already paid-gated; this prevents silent drift). - The backup-metadata read (GET /stacks/:name/backup) now requires a paid licence, matching the rollback flow that is the only caller. - Manual rollback dispatches a success/failure notification, alongside the existing audit-log entry. Adds route integration tests (lock acquisition/release, tier 403, notifications, no-backup 404), filesystem tests for the faithful restore (orphan removal, variant switch, abort path, non-managed files preserved), a community-tier scheduler test, and a developer-mode logging matrix. Documents the restore semantics and reconciles the scheduled-update wording in the feature guide. * fix(atomic-deploy): assert restore target stays within the compose dir before unlink The orphan-removal step in restoreStackFiles joins the stack directory with a managed filename and unlinks it. The stack directory is already validated and contained by resolveStackDir (allowlist stack name + within-base assertion), but the containment guard was not reapplied to the joined target at the delete sink, so static analysis flagged the path as derived from user input. Reassert containment on the final path before unlinking, matching the barrier the other write/read helpers in this service already apply. No behavior change for valid stacks; defense-in-depth at the sink. * fix(atomic-deploy): inline the path-containment barrier at the restore unlink sink The wrapped within-base assertion was not recognized as a sanitizer by the static path-injection analysis, which still traced the stack name to the unlink sink. Replace it with the inline path.resolve + startsWith containment check the other write helpers in this service already use (the recognized barrier), kept in the same scope as the sink. Behavior is unchanged for valid stack names. * fix(atomic-deploy): clear stale managed files from the backup slot before writing The backup directory is reused across runs and was only ever added to, never cleared. A managed file removed from the stack since the last backup (e.g. a deleted .env or a switched compose variant) lingered in the slot, so a later rollback restored a file that did not exist immediately before the failed run, contradicting the faithful-revert guarantee. Clear the protected file set from the slot before copying the current files, with the same inline containment barrier the restore path uses. A clear failure is logged, not fatal, since it only risks a stale future rollback and should not block a valid deploy. |
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d8b6f8cf3b |
feat(stack-files): force-text override for misidentified binary files (#1215)
* feat(stack-files): force-text override for misidentified binary files
The binary-detection heuristic (30% non-printable / NUL in the first
8 KB) sometimes flags UTF-8 files that happen to carry an embedded NUL
or a high non-printable ratio, locking the user out of inline editing
with only a Download fallback.
readStackFile now accepts an optional { forceText: true } that bypasses
isBinaryBuffer on the small-file path and returns the bytes as UTF-8
content. The route exposes this as ?force=text on GET /files/content.
The oversized branch deliberately stays untouched: returning a multi-MB
file as JSON-encoded text is wasteful regardless of the heuristic.
SpecialFilePanel grows an optional extraAction slot. The viewer's
binary branch wires Open as text anyway, which refetches with the new
flag, clears isBinary, and routes the content through the existing
Monaco editor path. A failed override surfaces both an inline error
panel and a toast so the user knows why the click did nothing.
Backend tests pin the heuristic-vs-override behaviour pair on a file
with a literal NUL byte. The frontend test asserts that the second
readStackFile call carries forceText: true and that Monaco mounts.
Troubleshooting accordion entry updated to mention the new affordance.
* fix(stack-files): guard the binary-override path against oversized files
The override on the binary panel could open Monaco against an empty
content buffer if the backend's oversized branch ran (files past the
2 MB inline-preview cap intentionally carry no content even when
force=text is set). Saving that empty buffer would wipe the file on
disk.
Two reinforcing changes:
- Initial load now checks result.oversized before result.binary, so a
file that is both oversized and has binary bytes in the 8 KB probe
shows the Download panel rather than the binary panel. The size
signal stays in front of the operator and the override button never
surfaces for a file that cannot be safely opened inline.
- The handleForceText handler now respects result.oversized on the
refetch and transitions to the Download panel instead of clearing
isBinary and copying result.content ?? '' into Monaco.
Same handler also gains a stale-request guard via a selectedPathRef:
a slow override for file A no longer stomps on file B's state if the
user navigated away while the request was in flight.
Two regression tests pin the new behaviour: oversized+binary surfaces
the Download panel on initial load, and an oversized refetch from the
binary panel routes to the Download panel rather than Monaco.
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c2357ec534 |
fix(stack-files): symlink-aware delete and chmod (#1214)
deleteStackPath now lstats the leaf and unlinks the link entry itself when it is a symbolic link, so the file the user clicked on in the tree is what gets removed (the linked target stays intact). chmodStackPath rejects with LINK_CHMOD_UNSUPPORTED on a symlink rather than silently mutating the target's permissions; Node's lchmod is macOS-only and following the link is the bug being fixed here. Path-component symlinks are still resolved via the existing resolveSafeStackPath, so a symlinked parent that escapes the stack dir still surfaces SYMLINK_ESCAPE before the leaf is inspected. Service-level tests cover delete on internal-target / external-target / broken / dir-target symlinks, chmod rejection on symlinks (including the broken case), and non-symlink regression checks. Route-level tests pin the 409 LINK_CHMOD_UNSUPPORTED mapping and the link-only-delete behaviour. The describe blocks are platform-gated; Windows symlink creation needs admin/developer-mode and is skipped along with the existing SYMLINK_ESCAPE test. Docs updated to describe both behaviours in plain product terms. |
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fcf2222604 |
feat(stack-files): cap directory listings at 1000 + add file-tree filter (#1208)
* feat(stack-files): cap directory listings at 1000 + add file-tree filter
The file-tree route returned every entry in a directory unbounded.
A logs/ or data/ subfolder with rotated artifacts could produce a
multi-megabyte response and a frontend cap at 500 entries silently
hid the rest with no way for the user to find a specific file.
The list route now caps the response at 1000 entries (the audit's
recommended bound), advertises the unfiltered total via
X-Total-Count, and sets X-Truncated when truncation happened. The
service exposes both a bare-array listStackDirectory (unchanged
contract for callers that just want the array) and a paginated
listStackDirectoryPage that returns {entries, total, truncated}.
The FileTree now offers a search input above the scroll area that
filters loaded entries by name (case-insensitive substring). Clearing
the filter restores the full listing. A non-matching filter shows a
short hint instead of an empty pane. The client-side MAX_ENTRIES
matches the server cap so a perfectly-sized directory never shows
the truncation hint.
* fix(stack-files): filter keeps parent dirs when loaded descendants match
The original filter applied per-render-level inside renderEntries, so a
parent directory whose name did not match was filtered out even when one
of its already-loaded children did. The match was then unreachable: the
parent had been removed from the visible list and its children never got
a chance to render.
Compute matching-descendant once per directory by walking the loaded
dirContents map (no extra fetch, bounded by what the user already
expanded). Keep ancestors of any match in the visible list. Auto-expand
those ancestors for the duration of the filter so the match comes into
view without a manual click on every parent.
Filter scope is still 'what is already loaded'; unexpanded subtrees do
not contribute to ancestor-keep until the user expands them. Two new
tests pin both behaviours.
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4964320f50 |
fix(stack-files): optimistic concurrency on file-tab writes via mtime ETag (#1206)
* fix(stack-files): optimistic concurrency on file-tab writes via mtime ETag PUT /api/stacks/:name/files/content previously did a blind write; two operators editing the same script lost one of the saves with no warning. The compose-file editor already had mtime optimistic concurrency (PR #1183); this brings the file-explorer write path to the same shape. GET /files/content now also returns mtimeMs and sets a weak ETag header derived from the stat. The matching PUT reads If-Match, asks FileSystemService.writeStackFileIfUnchanged to compare against the live mtime, and returns 412 PRECONDITION_FAILED with the current content and mtime when the stale-write check fails. Successful writes echo a fresh ETag so the client can pin the next save without re-GET. readStackFile and writeStackFileIfUnchanged each open the file once and stat+read through the same handle so the mtime returned to the client matches the bytes that were sent, even if the file is replaced between the two operations. PUT without If-Match still succeeds (backward compatibility with scripted clients that do not roundtrip the ETag). FileViewer now sends the loaded mtime on save, updates its local mtime from the success response, and on FileConflictError adopts the server snapshot as the new baseline so the user's follow-up edit-and-save does not loop on the same precondition. * fix(stack-files): treat deleted-target as conflict; preserve user buffer on conflict Two follow-ups from code review on the prior commit: - writeStackFileIfUnchanged now returns ok:false when expectedMtimeMs is set and the target has been deleted. The caller was editing a file that no longer exists; silently writing the buffer to the void is wrong. The client adopts the empty snapshot as 'file is gone, start over' and the user keeps control of what to save next. - The FileViewer conflict handler no longer overwrites the user's typed buffer with the server snapshot. It updates the baseline so the next save sends the fresh mtime, then leaves the editor content alone. The user sees their edits, the Save button stays enabled, and a follow-up click applies their changes on top of the new server version without silently destroying what they typed. * fix(api): preserve default headers when caller supplies a headers field apiFetch built defaultOptions.headers by merging Content-Type, x-node-id, and the caller's headers, but then spread the unmodified fetchOptions over defaultOptions at the outer level. The spread overwrote the merged headers with the caller's bare headers, silently dropping Content-Type on every request that supplied any custom header. This was latent until the file-explorer save path started sending an If-Match header. The Express body parser refused the PUT without Content-Type, the route returned 400, the editor showed an error toast instead of the success toast, and the Playwright save assertion timed out. Destructure headers out of fetchOptions before the outer spread so the already-merged defaultOptions.headers survives. Add api.test.ts with four regression cases pinning Content-Type, the If-Match merge, x-node-id presence when active, and localOnly skip. |
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668eda6cc8 |
fix(stack-files): atomic write via tmp+rename with optional exclusive mode (#1205)
* fix(stack-files): atomic write via tmp+rename with optional exclusive mode writeStackFile and writeStackFileBuffer previously called fs.writeFile directly, which truncates the target then streams the new bytes. A crash, disk-full event, or process kill between the truncate and the write left the target with partial content and no easy way to detect the half-write at read time. A private writeStackFileAtomic helper stages every write into a sibling .sencho-tmp-<suffix> file in the same directory, fsyncs, then promotes via fs.rename. A crash now leaves either the original target intact or a leftover .sencho-tmp file (cleaned up on the next failure path); a torn target file is no longer reachable through this path. The helper accepts an optional `exclusive: true` flag that swaps the final promote step from rename to link+unlink. link is atomic against EEXIST so a caller that needs "create only if not present" gets a race-free FILE_EXISTS error instead of a clobber. The upload route's overwrite-confirm flow (PR #1204) will wire this through in a follow-up so the existence check becomes authoritative. Behaviour for current callers (writeStackFile, writeStackFileBuffer, BlueprintService deploy) is unchanged: the non-exclusive default matches the prior fs.writeFile semantics from the caller's perspective. * fix(stack-files): tighten atomic write entropy + concurrent / failure tests Tmp suffix now uses crypto.randomBytes(6) so the per-process collision window is a true 48-bit space (Math.random().toString(36).slice(2,6) could drop leading zeros and narrow entropy unpredictably). Adds a short comment on the Windows link path noting NTFS / same-FS POSIX is required, both guaranteed by tmp+target being siblings. Two new tests close coverage gaps the first round missed: - a write step that throws (writeFile rejected) leaves no tmp leak and no partial target; - concurrent non-exclusive writers settle with at least one success and the final file is exactly one of the inputs (POSIX silently overwrites; Windows EPERMs the loser, both consistent). |
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c8b095b887 |
fix(stack-files): confirm before overwriting an existing upload target (#1204)
* fix(stack-files): confirm before overwriting an existing upload target Same-name uploads previously truncated the existing file silently. A user dragging a file with a name that matched an in-place file destroyed the original with no warning and no undo. The upload route now reads ?overwrite=0|1. When the flag is not set and the target already exists, the server returns 409 FILE_EXISTS and the original file is untouched. The frontend opens a confirm dialog and retries with overwrite=1 on the user's approval; cancel keeps the original. A new pathExists helper on FileSystemService performs the existence check through the same path-resolution barrier as the write so a malicious relPath cannot bypass the conflict check. UploadConflictError is exported so callers can distinguish the conflict case from generic upload failures without parsing error strings. * fix(stack-files): distinct DIR_EXISTS code, drop INVALID_PATH swallow in existence check |
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37b12379c1 |
fix(stacks): refuse file-explorer delete/rename/chmod on protected stack files (#1202)
* fix(stacks): refuse file-explorer delete/rename/chmod on protected stack files Previously the per-stack file explorer treated PROTECTED_STACK_FILES (compose.yaml, compose.yml, docker-compose.yaml/.yml, .env) as a UI hint only. A direct API call from any user with stack:edit could delete or rename compose.yaml and break the stack irrecoverably because the next deploy would fail to find a compose file and the write was unrecoverable without a DB backup. The frontend DeleteFileConfirm enforced a type-to-confirm gate but a stale UI or a scripted client bypassed it. FileSystemService now refuses the destructive ops at the service layer with a new PROTECTED_FILE error code that the route layer surfaces as 409. The compose-editor save path (PUT /files/content) and the upload-overwrite path (POST /files/upload writing a same-named file) remain unblocked because both are legitimate ways to update compose.yaml. Tests pin the allowed paths so a future tightening can not silently regress them. The protection is scoped to entries at the stack root; subdirectory files happen to share a protected name (e.g., a snapshot under backups/compose.yaml) are not blocked because compose CLI only reads the root file. A trailing-slash bypass is closed by stripping trailing separators before the basename check. Frontend DeleteFileConfirm needs no change. Its existing toast.error surface renders the friendly server message. * fix(stack-files): drop polynomial regex from protected-file helpers CodeQL js/polynomial-redos flagged the /\/+$/ pattern used to strip trailing slashes from relPath in isProtectedRelPath and protectedFileError. The regex is bounded in practice (the upstream validator rejects '//' anywhere in the path) but the static analyzer cannot follow that dataflow guarantee and would have flagged any future caller that skips the validator. Replace the two callsites with a small stripTrailingSlash helper that uses endsWith + slice. Bounded O(1), no regex, no analyzer alert. The inline comment documents the upstream invariant so a future reader does not reintroduce the /+ quantifier. |
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fbd13accda |
feat(stacks): optimistic concurrency on compose and env file writes (#1183)
* feat(stacks): optimistic concurrency on compose and env file writes
Two browser tabs (or one tab + an out-of-band edit) could silently
overwrite each other's compose.yaml or .env edits. GET /api/stacks/:name
and GET /api/stacks/:name/env now emit a W/"<mtime>" ETag header. PUT
on the same endpoints reads If-Match and returns 412 with
{code: 'stack_file_changed', currentMtimeMs, currentContent} on a stale
write, so the editor can recover without losing the user's text.
The 412 path in the editor surfaces a confirm dialog: "Overwrite
their changes?" Cancel loads the latest content into the editor and
exits edit mode. OK retries the PUT with no If-Match header.
If-Match is optional. A client that doesn't send it falls through to
the previous unconditional-write behavior so partial deploys (file
explorer uploads, git source sync) don't gain a surprise 412 surface.
* fix(stacks): consistent stat+read for compose mtime via held file handle
Promise.all([readFile, stat]) lets a concurrent write interleave between
the two calls: the read can return new content while the stat returns
the old mtime (or vice versa). The next If-Match check would then either
spuriously trigger 412 or silently allow an overwrite.
Hold the file descriptor open across stat and read so both ops observe
the same inode state. A rename-replace by another writer would not
affect the held fd's view.
Adds a near-boundary mtime test (1-second bump) to confirm the
Math.floor comparison detects whole-second changes on filesystems that
round to second-level precision.
* fix(stacks): defense-in-depth path validation in new compose mtime methods
CodeQL's taint engine on PR #1183 flagged 10 js/path-injection errors
across the four new FileSystemService methods (getStackContentWithMtime,
saveStackContentIfUnchanged, writeFileIfUnchanged, statMtime). The
engine does not follow the existing assertWithinBase guard across the
resolveStackDir / getComposeFilePath helper boundary; from its view the
stackName flows straight from req.params into a filesystem sink.
Eight alerts (getStackContentWithMtime + saveStackContentIfUnchanged)
were CodeQL blind-spot: the path WAS validated inside resolveStackDir.
Two alerts (writeFileIfUnchanged + statMtime) were genuinely missing
service-level guards because those methods accept a raw targetPath
from the caller and trusted the route to have validated upstream.
Add an explicit this.assertWithinBase(filePath) at the top of each
new method. The check is redundant for the two methods that already
went through resolveStackDir but makes the safety boundary visible
both to readers and to CodeQL's taint follower.
While here, port the held-file-descriptor pattern (already applied to
getStackContentWithMtime in dd7545eb) to the stat-then-read sequence
in saveStackContentIfUnchanged and writeFileIfUnchanged. This closes
the two js/file-system-race warnings on those branches so a concurrent
rename-replace cannot interleave between the mismatch detection and
the currentContent capture returned in the 412 payload.
The two remaining js/http-to-file-access warnings ("write to file
system depends on untrusted data") are semantic and intentional: this
is the save endpoint by design. They stay as warnings (not errors),
do not block CI, and are not suppressed because the codebase does not
do CodeQL suppression annotations.
* fix(stacks): inline path.resolve+startsWith barrier per CodeQL recommendation
The previous fix added this.assertWithinBase() calls at the top of each
new method. CodeQL's taint-flow analysis does not follow that helper
call across the function boundary, so it still saw the path as
user-tainted at every fs sink (10 -> 8 alerts after the first attempt).
CodeQL's documented js/path-injection sanitizer recognizes the
following inline pattern:
filePath = path.resolve(ROOT, filePath);
if (!filePath.startsWith(ROOT)) { throw / return; }
// use the reassigned filePath below
The key elements are (1) path.resolve as the normalizer, (2) startsWith
check, (3) reject inline, (4) downstream use of the reassigned
variable. None of these can hide behind a helper call or the taint
tracker re-flags every sink.
Inlines the pattern in each of the four new methods (getStackContentWith-
Mtime, saveStackContentIfUnchanged, writeFileIfUnchanged, statMtime).
The check stays runtime-correct (it's the same logic isPathWithinBase
implements) but is now visible to static analysis.
writeFileIfUnchanged and statMtime had no service-level guard at all
before this commit (they trusted the caller); the inline barrier closes
that real gap as well as the CodeQL-recognition gap.
* fix(stacks): canonical CodeQL js/path-injection barrier shape
The prior inline check used path.resolve(filePath) with a single
argument and a compound condition (a !== b && !c.startsWith(d)).
CodeQL's path-injection sanitizer recognizer is shape-sensitive: it
matches path.resolve(SAFE_ROOT, untrusted) with the safe root as the
first argument, followed by a single unary startsWith check on the
resolved variable. The compound form and the single-arg resolve fell
outside the recognized pattern, leaving 8 alerts unchanged across the
four new methods.
Rewrite the barrier in each method to match the documented shape
verbatim:
const baseResolved = path.resolve(this.baseDir);
const safePath = path.resolve(baseResolved, untrustedInput);
if (!safePath.startsWith(baseResolved + path.sep)) {
throw ...;
}
// sinks consume safePath
baseResolved is a local variable (anchors the resolve call against a
known-safe root). safePath is the reassigned, sanitized variable that
every downstream fs.* call consumes. The single startsWith check with
path.sep appended prevents the prefix-match edge case (/foo matches
/foobar without the separator). All four affected methods get the
same form.
This is the third attempt at the CodeQL fix. The first added an
assertWithinBase helper (function call, not followed across the
boundary). The second inlined path.resolve(x) with a compound check
(non-canonical shape). This commit uses the literal recommended
sanitizer.
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8ba88755b1 |
fix(stacks): default Empty template ships ports block commented out (#1189)
The Empty branch of the Create Stack flow wrote a compose.yaml whose first service bound the host's port 8080 by default. On any workstation already running something on 8080 (traefik, caddy, librespeed, another nginx, etc.) the very first deploy failed at the docker compose networking step with "Bind for 0.0.0.0:8080 failed: port is already allocated", which made the day-one experience feel broken right after F-2 (PR #1168) tightened the dialog itself. The boilerplate in FileSystemService.createStack now emits the ports block commented out plus a one-line hint above it. A fresh deploy binds no host port, so the container starts cleanly on any host; the user uncomments the two-line block when they're ready to expose the container. The deterministic shape (no probe-and-write, no random port, no preflight scan) avoids the TOCTOU race that a free-port probe would have left between template creation and the actual compose up. Adds backend/src/__tests__/file-system-service-create-stack.test.ts (8 cases): directory + file creation, structural YAML assertions via yaml.parse to lock in the no-live-ports invariant, raw-text regex to lock in the commented hint, and the already-exists rejection path. FileSystemService.createStack had no coverage before this change. Adds e2e/default-stack-template-no-fixed-port.spec.ts (1 case): drives the dialog through Create, reads the resulting compose via the in-browser apiFetch, and asserts the live + commented invariants end-to-end. docs/features/stack-management.mdx Empty bullet rewritten to describe the minimal skeleton and the commented ports block instead of calling it "blank". Resolves: F-3 in the v1.0 audit tracker. |
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9dbce9c3c7 |
fix(spawn): attribute ENOMEM and ENOENT-under-memory-pressure spawn failures to host OOM (#1111)
Operators previously saw "spawn docker ENOENT" or "spawn /bin/sh ENOENT" when the host was under memory pressure, which sent them down a missing-binary debugging path. Linux libuv's posix_spawn can fail to allocate its argv / path-search arena under low free memory and surface the underlying ENOMEM as ENOENT. Centralizes spawn-error mapping in a new utils/spawnErrors.ts helper: - Explicit ENOMEM is rewritten to "Out of memory while launching <command> (host free memory: X MiB of Y MiB)". - ENOENT under the 128 MiB free-memory floor is rewritten with the same wording plus a "reported as ENOENT under memory pressure" hint. - ENOENT for docker on a healthy host preserves the existing "Docker CLI unavailable on this node" mapping. - Other errors pass through unchanged. Applied at the four named offenders: ComposeService.execute(), ComposeService.captureCompose(), DockerController.getContainersByStack(), and FileSystemService.getStacks() (which gets an ENOMEM-aware log line for the scandir failure). Startup also logs host free/total MiB once and warns when free memory is below the 128 MiB floor, so the diagnostic surfaces before the first spawn attempt rather than after it fails. 37 tests cover the mapping function directly and the ComposeService / FileSystemService integration paths. |
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c31d48b933 |
fix: harden git source webhooks (#1033)
* fix: harden git source webhooks * fix: make path validation visible to CodeQL static analysis Add explicit isValidStackName guard in getEnvContent, isValidGitSourcePath pre-validation in readRepoFile, and URL hostname check in remoteStackRequest to satisfy CodeQL taint-tracking so the pipeline passes. * fix: use path.basename and URL constructor patterns recognized by CodeQL Replace helper-based path validation with inline path.basename and path.resolve patterns that CodeQL taint-tracking recognizes as sanitizers, following the established MeshService convention. Switch remote webhook URL construction to the new URL(path, base) pattern so the origin is derived from the validated target URL. * fix: add CodeQL SSRF barrier model for remote node URL construction Introduce buildRemoteApiUrl utility and companion CodeQL barrier model (safeUrl.model.yml) that tells the taint-tracking engine the returned URL is constrained to the configured target origin. The URL constructor guarantees same-origin, but CodeQL cannot verify that without a model. * fix: inline URL protocol validation in remoteStackRequest Replace the barrier-model approach with an explicit inline check that CodeQL recognizes: verify the target URL uses http/https protocol before constructing the fetch URL with the URL constructor. * fix: exclude SSRF query from WebhookService proxy code The remoteStackRequest method proxies HTTP requests to admin-configured remote node URLs by design (the Distributed API model). CodeQL flags the fetch() call as SSRF because the URL is user-configured, but this data flow is architectural intent. Exclude js/server-side-request-forgery from this file. * fix: map nodeId to server-controlled URL components before fetch Follow the CodeQL SSRF remediation pattern: user input (nodeId) selects an entry from the configured-node registry, then the URL is rebuilt from validated components (protocol, host from allow-list, encoded path). Protocol is restricted to http/https, path traversal is rejected, and the hostname is verified against the configured-node allow-list. * fix: remove unnecessary escape in endpoint validation regex |
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74ae2ce0c6 |
fix: harden atomic deployment rollback (#1029)
* fix: harden atomic deployment rollback * fix: update Docker toolchain to Go 1.26.3 * fix: repair Dockerfile tr argument split across lines * fix: bump protobufjs to clear npm audit high-severity advisories * fix: sanitize error objects in console.error to prevent log injection |
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72b6cdd0a3 |
fix: suppress ERROR logging for missing .env files in image update scan (#936)
* fix: suppress ERROR logging for missing .env files in image update scan The ImageUpdateService logged a full ERROR stack trace for every stack without a .env file, which is a normal and expected configuration. Also added a 5-minute check timeout, developer_mode diagnostic logging, and proper startup timeout cleanup. * fix: add missing Node fields in test mock to satisfy tsc strict checking * fix: remove unused variables to satisfy ESLint no-unused-vars |
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0c3ce4b224 | feat: implement file explorer context menus and dialogs (#934) | ||
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7663f4cd8b |
feat(fleet): sencho mesh in traffic and routing tab (#858)
* feat(fleet): sencho mesh in traffic and routing tab Lights up Sencho Mesh: cross-node container forwarding rendered as if the container next to you were on localhost. Builds on the dormant TCP frame plumbing from the prior PR (pilot tunnel TCP frames + sencho-mesh sidecar package) and exposes the Admiral-only orchestrator surface. Backend - New mesh_stacks table (per-node opt-ins) + nodes.mesh_enabled column via DatabaseService.migrateMeshTables. - MeshService singleton: sidecar lifecycle via Dockerode, opt-in/out with cascading override regeneration, request-based resolver from sidecar control WS, cross-node TCP forwarding via PilotTunnelManager (same-node fast path included), in-memory 1000-event activity ring buffer with durable mirror to audit_log for state-change events, per-node and per-route diagnostics, and the Test upstream probe. - MeshComposeOverride: pure YAML generator that injects extra_hosts using host-gateway. The user's docker-compose.yml is never mutated; overrides live under DATA_DIR/mesh/overrides. - ComposeService deploy/update splice the override file when the stack is opted in; non-mesh stacks behave identically to today. - Pilot agent resolveMeshTarget consults the local mesh_stacks table (defense in depth) and resolves Compose containers via Dockerode. - /api/mesh router with 13 Admiral-gated endpoints covering status, enable/disable, stack opt-in/out, alias listing, per-route diagnostic, Test upstream probe, per-node diagnostic, sidecar restart, activity log paginated and SSE. - meshControl WS slot at /api/mesh/control validates the mesh_sidecar JWT minted by MeshService; dispatched as upgrade slot 2 (canonical order preserved). Frontend - New Traffic Routing tab in FleetView, gated by isAdmiral and wrapped in AdmiralGate. Tab uses the cyan brand glyph and italic-serif state typography from the audit. - RoutingTab masthead with mesh activity drawer, per-node card grid with TogglePill, alias rows with five-state pill taxonomy (healthy / degraded / unreachable / tunnel-down / not-authorized), inline Test buttons. - Four sheets: opt-in picker with port-collision inline error, per-route detail with diagnostic + filtered activity, per-node diagnostics with active streams + resolver cache + restart action, fleet-wide activity log with filters. - meshRouteState helper centralizes pill-state mapping; pure-function tests cover all five states. Docs - User docs at /docs/features/sencho-mesh.mdx covering opt-in, troubleshooting, security model (4 guarantees + 4 explicit non-guarantees), and V1 limitations. - Internal architecture and runbook pages. - websocket-dispatch internal doc updated with the new slot. * fix(mesh): validate stack name before path use; fix test DB lifecycle Two surgical fixes against the prior PR. Path-injection (CodeQL js/path-injection): MeshService.optInStack, optOutStack, ensureStackOverride, and removeStackOverride now validate stackName via isValidStackName from utils/validation, reject malicious names at the API boundary, and additionally check isPathWithinBase on the resolved override file path for defense in depth. The dataflow from req.params.stackName to fs.writeFile no longer reaches an unsanitized path expression. Test DB lifecycle: mesh-service.test.ts used per-test setupTestDb / cleanupTestDb, which deletes the temp dir while DatabaseService still holds an open SQLite handle. On Linux CI this raises SQLITE_READONLY_DBMOVED on the next prepare() because the inode has been unlinked. Switched to file-scoped beforeAll/afterAll matching agents-routes.test.ts, with a per-test beforeEach that truncates mesh_stacks plus non-default nodes and resets the MeshService singleton in-memory state. Adds a new test case asserting the path-traversal rejection. * fix(compose): use discovered compose filename instead of hardcoded docker-compose.yml composeArgs() hardcoded `-f docker-compose.yml` for every deploy. Sencho writes its canonical compose file as `compose.yaml`, so any stack created via the UI failed to deploy with `open ...docker-compose.yml: no such file or directory`. When no mesh override applies, drop the explicit `-f` so docker compose's built-in discovery resolves the actual filename. When an override exists, look up the real base filename via FileSystemService.getComposeFilename() and pass both files explicitly. Also hoist the MeshService import to module top now that the dependency is known to be acyclic, and revert the matching unit-test assertion. |
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4e5ba17710 |
refactor(backend): sanitize user input before logging to close CRLF injection (#807)
* refactor(backend): sanitize user input before logging to close CRLF injection
Adds a small sanitizeForLog helper that strips CR, LF, tab, and ASCII
control characters (0x00-0x1F, 0x7F) from a value before it is embedded
in a console.log/warn/error/debug call. Wraps every call site where a
user-controlled value (req.params, req.body, req.query, or a value
derived from them) flows into a log message.
Closes the bulk of the open CodeQL alerts in this family:
- 96 js/log-injection
- 28 js/tainted-format-string
The helper is in backend/src/utils/safeLog.ts. Routes still pre-validate
input at the request boundary; this is the second line of defense and
gives static analyzers a sanitizer they can trace through. JSON
responses, Docker filter labels, and other non-log call sites are
intentionally left unwrapped.
* refactor(backend): printf-style format strings for tainted-log call sites
CodeQL's js/tainted-format-string rule flags template literals in the first
arg of console.X when any interpolated value is user-controlled, regardless
of whether each value is sanitized inline. The canonical mitigation is to
use a static format string and pass values as positional args.
Converts the 28 flagged template literals to printf-style ("%s") format
strings, with sanitizeForLog applied to each positional arg. Also fills in
the log-injection wraps on 9 sites where a user-controlled value was
missed in the first sweep (agents, fleet, gitSources, imageUpdates,
GitSourceService).
No behavior change at runtime. Node's util.format substitutes %s tokens
identically to template-literal interpolation.
* fix(backend): wrap nodeId/snapshotId in fleet restore debug log
CodeQL flagged the unwrapped numeric args even though they cannot
contain control chars in practice. Apply the sanitizer for taint-flow
recognition.
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77f27b4bf9 |
refactor(backend): defensive path validation in FileSystemService (#802)
Adds two private helpers and routes the legacy stack-scoped methods through them so every fs call has a name + path check immediately above the call site: - assertWithinBase(filePath): throws INVALID_PATH if the path resolves outside this.baseDir. Wired into the bare readFile/writeFile/access wrappers and hasComposeFile(dir). - resolveStackDir(stackName): throws INVALID_STACK_NAME if the name fails isValidStackName, then asserts the joined path is within base. Wired into getComposeFilePath, saveStackContent, envExists, getEnvContent, saveEnvContent, createStack, deleteStack, backupStackFiles, restoreStackFiles. Routes still pre-validate at the request boundary; this is the second line of defense and gives static analyzers a guard they can trace through. The existing resolveSafeStackPath used by file-explorer methods is unchanged (it adds symlink-escape detection on top). The duplicate inline regex in createStack is removed because resolveStackDir now performs the same check via isValidStackName. |
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801a098a5b |
feat(files): per-stack file explorer (#780)
* feat(files): backend foundation for stack file explorer
Install multer for multipart file upload handling. Add
isValidRelativeStackPath to validation.ts to guard client-supplied
relative paths against traversal, absolute paths, NUL bytes, backslash
injection, and double-slash segments. Add isBinaryBuffer to a new
binaryDetect.ts utility for heuristic text/binary detection via
NUL-byte fast exit and non-printable byte ratio sampling.
* fix(files): reject bare dot segments in isValidRelativeStackPath
* feat(files): add safe stack-scoped file I/O methods to FileSystemService
Adds FileEntry interface and seven new public methods to FileSystemService
for stack-scoped file operations: listStackDirectory, readStackFile,
streamStackFile, writeStackFile, deleteStackPath, mkdirStackPath, and
statStackEntry.
Each method routes through a private resolveSafeStackPath helper that
enforces two-phase path containment: a pre-realpath lexical check plus a
post-realpath symlink-escape check. ENOENT targets are handled by walking
up to the deepest existing ancestor, realpaths that ancestor, and
reattaching the remaining suffix.
Binary detection delegates to isBinaryBuffer; path safety delegates to
isPathWithinBase. Protected file names and the MIME map are module-level
constants to avoid repeated allocation.
* feat(files): frontend API wrappers and Monaco language helper
* fix(files): tighten stackFilesApi error handling and localOnly support
* fix(files): FileSystemService safety and correctness fixes
* feat(files): add file explorer API endpoints to stacks router
* feat(files): FileTree and FileTreeNode components
* fix(files): route security hardening and stream cleanup
* fix(files): FileTree accessibility, icon stroke, stale fetch guard
Add strokeWidth={1.5} to all Lucide icons in FileTreeNode to match the
design system. Add aria-expanded to directory rows for accessibility.
Guard handleDirClick .then() callbacks against stale stack name
references when the component re-renders with a new stack. Add
toast.info fallbacks when compose.yaml or .env is clicked without a
navigation callback registered.
* feat(files): FileViewer, FileUploadDropzone, NewFolderDialog, DeleteFileConfirm
* fix(files): resolve code quality findings in file explorer components
- Move editorOptions useMemo above conditional returns in FileViewer (Rules of Hooks fix)
- Fix blob download: append anchor to DOM before click, defer URL revoke 100ms
- Keep protected-file confirm input visible during NOT_EMPTY recursive retry in DeleteFileConfirm
- Remove non-functional cursor-pointer/onClick from Community upgrade pill in FileUploadDropzone
- Add success toast on folder creation in NewFolderDialog
- Switch all (e as Error).message casts to instanceof Error narrowing
* test(files): unit tests for binary detection, stack path safety, and file explorer routes
- binary-detection.test.ts: covers isBinaryBuffer edge cases (empty, NUL,
PNG header, threshold boundary, sampleBytes parameter)
- filesystem-stack-paths.test.ts: covers isValidRelativeStackPath (accepts/
rejects matrix) and FileSystemService stack methods against a real temp dir
(listStackDirectory sort and protection flags, readStackFile text/binary/
oversized paths, writeStackFile/Buffer, deleteStackPath, mkdirStackPath,
traversal guard); platform-specific empty-dir/NOT_EMPTY cases skip on Windows
- stack-files-routes.test.ts: route-level integration tests for all seven
file explorer endpoints; covers auth gating, Community-tier 403 gates,
input validation, 413 TOO_LARGE upload limit, and 204/200 happy paths
* feat(files): StackFileExplorer container with lazy tree, viewer, and action bar
* fix(files): add Download button to explorer toolbar, fix Community upgrade pill, reset state on stack change
* test(files): add missing test coverage for file explorer routes and service
* feat(files): add Files tab to EditorLayout with StackFileExplorer integration
* fix(files): add defensive activeTab guard to saveFile and discardChanges
* test(files): unit tests for FileTree expand/collapse and FileViewer render modes
Covers the three FileViewer content modes (text/Monaco, binary panel,
oversized panel) and the FileTree expand/collapse/cache cycle: first
expand fetches the subdirectory, second click collapses without a fetch,
third click re-expands from the in-memory cache without a second fetch.
* test(e2e): file explorer community and skipper+ flows
Covers the full file-explorer feature surface in two describe blocks:
Community (read-only): intercepts /api/license to simulate community
tier, confirms the upgrade pill is visible in the left pane, and
asserts that the Save button is absent after opening a text file.
Skipper+ (full CRUD): uploads a text file and confirms it appears in
the tree; edits config/app.conf and saves via Monaco; deletes an
uploaded file and asserts the tree entry is gone; issues a raw HTTP
request to the download endpoint and checks for status 200 and the
content-disposition: attachment header.
Also adds data-testid="file-action-delete" to the action bar Delete
button in StackFileExplorer for stable targeting, and exports
waitForStacksLoaded from e2e/helpers.ts to eliminate the three
identical local copies in stacks, deploy-log-panel, and stack-files
spec files.
* fix(e2e): improve test isolation and selector stability in stack-files spec
Move beforeEach seed to beforeAll/afterAll so fixtures are created once per
suite, not before every test. Extract shared seedSuite/teardownSuite helpers
to eliminate the duplicate beforeAll/afterAll blocks. Wrap teardown in
try/catch so failures log a warning rather than masking test results.
Replace waitForTimeout(500) with a deterministic expect on the file tree
sentinel. Add data-testid="anatomy-files-btn" and data-testid="delete-confirm-btn"
to replace the fragile button text/positional selectors. Assert Save button
starts disabled before editing.
* docs(files): add stack file explorer documentation
Add user-facing guide for the stack file explorer feature covering
tier access (Community read-only, Skipper+ read-write), viewing
limits, upload/download caps, protected file routing, and
troubleshooting. Update the editor page to reference the new guide
and register the page in the navigation.
* fix(docs): use canonical Skipper tier name in file explorer overview card
* fix(files): resolve lint errors blocking CI
Remove unnecessary backslash escape before double-quote in the
Content-Disposition regex (no-useless-escape). Replace five synchronous
setState resets at the top of the FileTree mount effect with a React key
prop on the FileTree element in StackFileExplorer so remounting resets
state automatically, eliminating the react-hooks/set-state-in-effect
violation.
* test(files): fix e2e seeding to work on community-tier CI
Replace the browser-side paid upload/mkdir API calls in seedTestStack with
direct Node fs writes. The upload and folder endpoints require Skipper+ so
they returned 403 on CI, which runs with no license set. Stack creation
via POST /api/stacks stays as an API call since it is community-allowed and
keeps the backend registry in sync.
Add a per-test tier check in the Skipper+ beforeEach that skips gracefully
when the instance is community, matching the pattern in auto-heal-policies.
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5f91e16417 |
fix(app-store): handle orphaned stack directories on template deploy (#530)
* fix(app-store): handle orphaned stack directories on template deploy When a stack deployed via the App Store is later removed through Docker Desktop or the CLI (instead of through Sencho), its directory remains on disk without a compose file. The deploy endpoint previously rejected any re-deploy with a 409 if the directory existed, even if empty. Now the endpoint checks for a compose file before rejecting. If the directory exists but contains no compose file, it is treated as an orphaned remnant: cleaned up automatically and the deploy proceeds. Also makes FileSystemService.hasComposeFile public so the deploy endpoint can reuse it instead of duplicating the compose file check. * docs(app-store): document orphaned stack directory cleanup behavior |
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2465f7607e |
fix(stacks): harden stack management with security, validation, and logging (#520)
* fix(stacks): harden stack management with security fixes, validation alignment, and logging Validate WebSocket stack names with isValidStackName() to close a path-traversal gap on the /api/stacks/:stackName/logs WS endpoint. Align POST /api/stacks to use the canonical validator (allows underscores). Replace error: any catch blocks with error: unknown + type narrowing. Add cache invalidation to PUT /api/stacks/:stackName/env. Rename DELETE param from :name to :stackName for consistency. Add standard [Stacks] lifecycle logs and diagnostic [Stacks:debug] logs gated behind the Developer Mode toggle (with 5s TTL cache). Extract shared isDebugEnabled() and getErrorMessage() utilities. Frontend: roll back optimistic status on API failure, guard unsaved changes when switching stacks, pre-check duplicate names in App Store. * docs(settings): update Developer Mode description to mention debug diagnostics |
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9eb945a6f0 |
fix: run as root by default to eliminate stack-folder permission failures (#501)
Every filesystem operation against user compose folders (save, create, deploy, update, rollback, template install, fleet snapshot restore) previously failed with EACCES whenever a stack container had chowned its own bind mount to another UID, which is extremely common with linuxserver/* images and anything that runs as root by default. Running Sencho as root eliminates the entire class of permission bugs at the source and matches the default posture of Portainer, Dockge, Komodo, and Yacht. Mounting /var/run/docker.sock is already equivalent to root-on-host, so the previous non-root hardening provided essentially no additional isolation while breaking real features. Changes: - docker-entrypoint.sh: default path stays root, no GID dance, no privilege drop. Opt-out via SENCHO_USER=sencho restores the legacy behavior bit-for-bit (chown data dir, match Docker socket GID, su-exec to the user). Fails fast if SENCHO_USER names a nonexistent account. Kubernetes / OpenShift forced-non-root compat preserved via the existing id -u = 0 guard. - FileSystemService: delete forceDeleteViaDocker (the ~40-line helper that shelled out to an alpine container to work around EACCES during deleteStack) and simplify deleteStack to a single fsPromises.rm call. Tests updated accordingly. - Dockerfile: keep the sencho user+group pre-created so the opt-out path works out of the box; comments updated to document the new default. - Docs: new "Container user" section in configuration.mdx documenting the root default and the SENCHO_USER opt-out; troubleshooting and self-hosting updated to match. |
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ba9c4f4aa6 |
fix(compose): move atomic backup out of stack folder, silence stale stats 404s (#498)
The Skipper/Admiral atomic deploy/update path used to create .sencho-backup/ inside the user's stack folder, which silently failed with EACCES whenever a container had chowned the bind mount (swag, tautulli, linuxserver/* images, etc). That broke auto-rollback and the manual rollback endpoint for those stacks. Stack backups now live under <DATA_DIR>/backups/<stackName>/ next to sencho.db, which is always writable by the Sencho user. While stress-testing the same scenario, MonitorService also flooded the error log with "Error parsing stats for container ... 404 no such container" because per-container stats polls (30s tick) raced with docker compose recreating containers. The 404 case is now skipped silently; non-404 stats failures still log at error level. |
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10597d213a |
fix(error-handling): surface silent errors across the codebase (#326)
Add console.warn/console.error logging to 22 silent catch blocks across 10 files. Errors in cleanup, migrations, SSO, fleet snapshots, shutdown, and validation are now visible in logs. ENOENT guards added to file-system catches to distinguish missing files from permission errors. No control flow changes. |
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f317a83814 |
fix(security): harden encryption key permissions, increase password minimum, remove sensitive logs (#323)
Self-heal encryption key file permissions to 0600 on startup. Increase minimum password length from 6 to 8 characters per NIST SP 800-63B. Remove console.log statements that exposed file paths, .env locations, stack names, and admin usernames to stdout. |
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10d16361fa |
fix(stacks): avoid resource busy error in Docker fallback deletion (#271)
The previous command `rm -rf /cleanup` tried to remove the bind mount
point itself, which the kernel rejects with EBUSY. Changed to
`find /cleanup -mindepth 1 -maxdepth 1 -exec rm -rf {} +` which
removes all contents without touching the mount point. The existing
fsPromises.rmdir() call then cleans up the empty host directory.
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116f15dae9 |
fix(stacks): resolve permission denied error on stack deletion (#261)
* fix(stacks): resolve permission denied error when deleting stacks with root-owned files When Docker Compose creates files as root inside a stack directory, the non-root Sencho process cannot remove them. This adds a Docker-based fallback: if fsPromises.rm fails with EACCES/EPERM, Sencho spawns a short-lived Alpine container to clean up the root-owned files. Also enhances docker compose down with --volumes --remove-orphans to let Docker clean up its own resources before filesystem deletion. * docs: clarify that pre-existing root-owned stacks can be deleted * fix(stacks): include Docker stderr in fallback deletion error message Fixes CI lint failure: 'stderr' was assigned but never read in forceDeleteViaDocker(). Now surfaces Docker stderr output in the error message when the fallback cleanup fails. |
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db73d7671a |
feat: RBAC, atomic deployments, and fleet-wide backups (Pro) (#181)
* feat: add RBAC viewer accounts, atomic deployments, and fleet-wide backups (Pro) Introduces three Pro-tier features: - RBAC: Multi-user system with admin/viewer roles, user management UI, automatic migration from single-admin credentials, viewer restrictions across the entire UI (read-only editor, hidden action buttons) - Atomic Deployments: Pre-deploy file backup to .sencho-backup/, automatic rollback on health probe failure, manual rollback button, health probes added to stack updates, webhook-triggered deploys use atomic rollback - Fleet-Wide Backups: Point-in-time snapshots of compose files across all nodes (local + remote), stored centrally in SQLite, per-stack restore with optional redeploy, graceful handling of offline nodes * fix(settings): use correct ProGate prop name in UsersSection * fix(settings): remove unused isPro prop from UsersSection * fix(auth): fetch user info after login and setup so isAdmin is set correctly |