Updates the backend listen port, Vite dev proxy target, Docker EXPOSE,
compose port mapping, .env.example default, GitHub Actions smoke-test
default, healthcheck URLs, and every doc/example reference. Test fixtures
that include example URLs were updated for consistency, though their
assertions are port-agnostic.
The rate-limit value of 3000 in middleware/rateLimiters.ts and the
3000 entry in WEB_UI_PORTS (which detects user containers like Grafana)
are intentionally untouched.
Policies with block_on_deploy=1 now scan every stack image before
docker compose up runs and reject the deploy with HTTP 409 on violation.
The UI opens a dialog listing offending images; admins can override per
deploy with ?ignorePolicy=true, and every bypass is recorded in the
audit log with the originating route, actor, policy, and image list.
When Trivy is not installed on the target node the gate fails open with
a warning notification, so teams are never locked out by tooling state.
Post-deploy and scheduled scans still evaluate matching policies and
dispatch warnings on violations to surface drift on long-running stacks.
Public API additions: policy and suppression CRUD under /api/security,
plus the documented 409 block-response shape on all deploy paths.
* fix(container-exec): harden with security fixes, validation, and test coverage
- Enforce admin role at WebSocket upgrade for container exec sessions
- Validate container is running before creating exec
- Fix bash-to-sh fallback (move .start() inside try/catch)
- Register container-exec as a capability for fleet visibility
- Add standard and diagnostic logging for exec lifecycle
- Fix false Admiral license claim in API docs
- Fix design system violations in BashExecModal (hardcoded colors)
- Remove duplicate legacy xterm dependencies
- Add 18-test suite covering auth, validation, fallback, and cleanup
* fix(container-exec): use correct Duplex type for exec stream
The stream variable was typed as NodeJS.ReadWriteStream, which lacks
.destroy(). Dockerode's Exec.start() returns stream.Duplex per its
type definitions. This caused tsc to fail while Vitest (which skips
full type checking) passed.
* fix(api): add tiered rate limiting to prevent polling lockouts
Replace the single global rate limiter (100 req/min/IP) with a tiered
system that separates high-frequency polling endpoints from standard
API traffic:
- Polling tier (300/min): /stats, /system/stats, /stacks/statuses,
/metrics/historical, /health, /meta, /auth/status, /auth/sso/providers,
/license. Exempt from the global limiter but governed by their own
safety net to prevent resource exhaustion.
- Standard tier (200/min): All other endpoints, raised from 100.
- Webhook tier (500/min): POST /webhooks/:id/trigger, dedicated limiter
for CI/CD platforms sharing datacenter IPs.
- Auth tier: Unchanged (5-10 attempts / 15 min).
Enterprise adaptations:
- Authenticated requests keyed by user session (JWT sub/username) instead
of IP, preventing shared NAT/VPN environments from pooling budgets.
- Internal node-to-node traffic (node_proxy tokens) bypasses all rate
limiters entirely.
Includes comprehensive stress tests (21 cases) validating tier
separation, node proxy bypass, and per-user keying.
* chore(deps): bump axios to 1.15.0 to fix SSRF vulnerability
Addresses GHSA-3p68-rc4w-qgx5 (NO_PROXY hostname normalization bypass).
Eliminate all references to "Pro" across backend, frontend, and docs.
Internal tier value renamed from 'pro' to 'paid'; user-facing text now
uses the thematic tier names (Community, Skipper, Admiral).
- Rename LicenseTier 'pro' to 'paid' in backend and frontend types
- Rename requirePro guard to requirePaid, error code PRO_REQUIRED to PAID_REQUIRED
- Rename ProGate.tsx to PaidGate.tsx with updated copy
- Fix: trial users can now see upgrade/purchase cards in Settings
- Update all docs and openapi.yaml to use correct tier names
* docs: remove security-sensitive implementation details from public documentation
Generalize or remove internal architecture details that could aid targeted
attacks — CVE tables, database schema, rate limit thresholds, proxy internals,
encryption algorithm names, and WebSocket middleware bypass info.
* test(metrics): fix flaky minute-bucket aggregation test
Floor baseTime to the start of the current minute so baseTime + 5000
never crosses a minute boundary and produces 2 buckets instead of 1.
Apply a global rate limit of 100 requests/min per IP to all /api/ routes
in production, configurable via API_RATE_LIMIT env var. Auth endpoints
retain their existing stricter limits which stack independently.
Returns 429 Too Many Requests when exceeded.
Audit found 11 routes with no stackName validation and 2 using a weaker
manual check. All 13 now use the canonical isValidStackName() guard
(^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$), returning 400 with { error: 'Invalid stack name' }.
Add a complete OpenAPI 3.1 specification covering ~55 public API endpoints
across 8 categories (Stacks, Containers, API Tokens, Webhooks, Nodes, Fleet,
Scheduled Tasks, Health). Wire it into Mintlify via native OpenAPI rendering
with an interactive "Try It" playground and a dedicated API Reference tab.
Includes an API overview page documenting authentication, token scopes,
node routing, error format, license tier requirements, and WebSocket endpoints.
Anso