Commit Graph

6 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Anso a7e856f447 feat: enforce singleton local node per instance (#1567)
Only one local node is allowed. Creating a second local returns 409,
and the last local node cannot be deleted or converted to a remote type.
Existing duplicate local nodes from older versions are preserved and can
be cleaned up individually. Zero-local recovery auto-assigns the default
flag. Frontend delete surfaces and the Add Node form respect the new
invariant.

Enforced in DatabaseService (addNode/updateNode/deleteNode guards) and
routes (error translations). Legacy test fixtures use raw SQL helpers.
2026-07-05 05:30:56 -04:00
Anso 65a69d9ecc fix(nodes): never send stored node tokens to clients (#1281)
Node read endpoints now return a client-safe projection that omits the
stored api_token and exposes a has_token boolean instead, so a node's
long-lived proxy credential is never serialized to a browser or API
token client. The token stays encrypted at rest and is read server-side
only by the components that need it (the remote proxy, the connection
test, and the mesh dialer).

The edit form opens the API Token field blank, and a blank value keeps
the existing credential, so saving an edit without retyping the token no
longer clears it; a non-empty value rotates it. The backend enforces the
same rule defensively.

Node management actions (add, edit, delete, test connection, generate
node token) are gated in the UI to match their server-side permission
checks, so operators no longer see an action the API would reject. The
test-connection route also gains the missing server-side permission and
token-scope guards.

Also validate the x-node-id header and fall back to the default node for
malformed values instead of an obscure 404, and return 400 (not 500)
when deleting the default node.
2026-06-02 10:26:31 -04:00
Anso d03d97d964 fix(nodes): close capability-gating gaps in node compatibility (#1261)
* fix(nodes): close capability-gating gaps in node compatibility

Vulnerability scanning is now gated correctly on whether the active node
advertises support for it:

- A node without the Trivy binary stops advertising the scanning capability.
  Previously the capability was toggled only on a state change, so a node that
  booted without Trivy kept advertising scanning it could not perform.
- The control node's own capability list now reflects features disabled at
  runtime, matching what it advertises to peers.
- The scan history surface shows a clear "not available on this node" card,
  with its header actions hidden, instead of attempting a request that fails.

A node's version and capability metadata now refreshes immediately after a
connection test or a completed update, rather than waiting out the cache.

Capability gates fail closed to the unavailable card when a node's metadata
request errors, instead of staying open until the next fetch.

Adds a test that fails if the frontend and backend capability lists drift,
plus coverage for the metadata error path, the runtime-disabled local meta,
the scanning capability sync, and the metadata cache invalidation paths.

* fix(nodes): refresh node metadata client-side after a connection test

A connection test dropped the server-side metadata cache, but the dashboard
kept its own cached copy until the client TTL expired, so version and
capability gates could stay stale in the browser. The test now forces a
client-side metadata refresh for that node, so the version pill and gates
reflect the node's current state immediately.

Also strips any URL userinfo before logging the metadata fetch target, and
makes the scanning-capability detection test deterministically exercise the
no-binary disable path rather than depending on whether the runner has Trivy.
2026-05-31 20:28:18 -04:00
Anso ed553f1f19 feat: change default listen port from 3000 to 1852 (#756)
Updates the backend listen port, Vite dev proxy target, Docker EXPOSE,
compose port mapping, .env.example default, GitHub Actions smoke-test
default, healthcheck URLs, and every doc/example reference. Test fixtures
that include example URLs were updated for consistency, though their
assertions are port-agnostic.

The rate-limit value of 3000 in middleware/rateLimiters.ts and the
3000 entry in WEB_UI_PORTS (which detects user containers like Grafana)
are intentionally untouched.
2026-04-24 22:23:31 -04:00
Anso 32a7d53b2b feat: RBAC, atomic deployments, fleet backups, and licensing (Pro) (#185)
* feat: add RBAC viewer accounts, atomic deployments, and fleet-wide backups (Pro)

Introduces three Pro-tier features:

- RBAC: Multi-user system with admin/viewer roles, user management UI,
  automatic migration from single-admin credentials, viewer restrictions
  across the entire UI (read-only editor, hidden action buttons)

- Atomic Deployments: Pre-deploy file backup to .sencho-backup/, automatic
  rollback on health probe failure, manual rollback button, health probes
  added to stack updates, webhook-triggered deploys use atomic rollback

- Fleet-Wide Backups: Point-in-time snapshots of compose files across all
  nodes (local + remote), stored centrally in SQLite, per-stack restore
  with optional redeploy, graceful handling of offline nodes

* fix(settings): use correct ProGate prop name in UsersSection

* fix(settings): remove unused isPro prop from UsersSection

* fix(auth): fetch user info after login and setup so isAdmin is set correctly

* feat(pricing): revise pricing strategy and enforce variant-based seat limits

Raise Personal Pro from $49/yr to $69/yr with 3 viewer seats (up from 1).
Add $15/mo billing option for Team Pro. Mark lifetime pricing as a
90-day early-adopter offer. Store Lemon Squeezy variant_name on
activation/validation and enforce seat limits server-side per variant.

* feat(licensing): add Lemon Squeezy checkout, webhook, and billing portal integration

Server-side checkout URL generation (POST /api/checkout) with admin email
pre-fill and instance_id custom data. HMAC-SHA256 verified webhook endpoint
(POST /api/webhooks/lemonsqueezy) handling order, subscription, and payment
lifecycle events for automatic license activation. Customer billing portal
link stored from webhook events and exposed via GET /api/billing/portal.
In-app checkout buttons in Settings with manual license key fallback.

* fix(licensing): exempt Lemon Squeezy webhook from auth middleware

The catch-all auth middleware on /api/* was blocking the public webhook
endpoint. Added /webhooks/lemonsqueezy to the exemption list alongside
/auth/* and /webhooks/:id/trigger.

* feat(pricing): update pricing to final live rates

Personal Pro: $7.99/month, $69.99/year, $249 lifetime.
Team Pro: $49.99/month, $499.99/year, $1,499 lifetime.
Added personal_monthly checkout variant across backend, frontend, and website.

* refactor(licensing): remove server-side checkout/webhook for self-hosted model

Sencho is self-hosted — each user runs their own instance, so there is
no central server to receive webhooks or hold the store API key. Replaced
in-app checkout buttons with a "View Pricing" redirect to sencho.io and
kept manual license key activation as the primary flow.

- Delete LemonSqueezyService (checkout, webhook, HMAC verification)
- Remove POST /api/checkout, GET /api/billing/portal, POST /api/webhooks/lemonsqueezy
- Remove raw body parser and auth exemption for webhook route
- Remove all LEMONSQUEEZY_* env vars from .env.example
- Replace checkout buttons in SettingsModal with single "View Pricing" button
- Simplify LicenseContext checkout to open sencho.io pricing page
- Update licensing docs to reflect website-based purchase flow

* chore: normalize em-dashes to hyphens across codebase (linter)

* chore: remove accidentally tracked directories from index
2026-03-26 21:58:24 -04:00
SaelixCode ce50db0fde security: pre-release hardening, automated testing, and production readiness
SECURITY (critical fixes):
- Add authMiddleware to /api/system/console-token (was publicly accessible)
- Validate api_url on node create/update to prevent SSRF (rejects localhost/loopback)
- Add rate limiting (5 req/15 min/IP) to /api/auth/login and /api/auth/setup
- Fix path traversal in env_file resolution — absolute/escaping paths rejected
- Add stack name validation to GET routes (was only on PUT/POST)
- Add helmet security headers middleware
- Restrict CORS to FRONTEND_URL in production

PRODUCTION READINESS:
- Add GET /api/health public endpoint + HEALTHCHECK in Dockerfile
- Add SIGTERM/SIGINT graceful shutdown handler (drains connections, closes DB)
- Run container as non-root sencho user in Dockerfile

QUALITY:
- Fix 4 silent empty catch{} blocks in EditorLayout (now show toast.error)
- Connect ErrorBoundary to root App in main.tsx
- Replace WebSocket.Server with named WebSocketServer import (ESM compat)

TESTING (new automated test suite):
- Install Vitest; 38 backend tests across 4 suites covering validation utilities,
  health endpoint, auth middleware, login flows, SSRF protection, and path traversal
- Extract isValidStackName/isValidRemoteUrl/isPathWithinBase to utils/validation.ts
- Playwright E2E scaffolding: auth, stacks, nodes specs + shared login helper
- CI: run Vitest + ESLint on every PR
2026-03-21 21:59:44 -04:00