Commit Graph

5 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Anso 85842cc547 feat: add service-scoped stack alert rules (#1681)
* feat: add service-scoped stack alert rules

Stack alerts can target one Compose service or all services. Breach timers
are per container and cooldowns are per service so a healthy sibling no
longer clears another container's timer or silences a different service.

* fix: gate remote scoped alert creates without losing the body

Remote hops skip JSON parsing so the proxy stream stays pipeable, which
left service_name invisible to the capability gate. Buffer POST /alerts
bodies for inspection, fail closed when the remote lacks the capability,
and rewrite the buffered bytes on forward. Restore alert-panel alt text
to match the unchanged screenshot.

* fix: bound remote alert body buffer and reject encoded JSON

Cap proxied POST /alerts buffering at the local 100KB JSON limit with
structured 413 cleanup, reject non-identity Content-Encoding with 415 so
compressed scoped bodies cannot bypass the mixed-version gate, and cover
oversized, chunked, and gzip regressions.

* fix: harden service-scoped alert delete, cooldown, and proxy gates

Reject non-digit alert ids, dual-write last_fired_at for rollback safety,
gate cooldown on persisted notification history, fail-fast oversized proxy
bodies with 413, and clarify Not in compose UI semantics.

* test: expect dispatchAlert persisted result in crash-safety cases

Update notification-routing assertions for the new { persisted } return
shape so CI matches the cooldown-gating contract.
2026-07-23 17:57:04 -04:00
Anso 3f1f15a6f4 fix: keep running containers until stack pull/build succeeds (#1657)
* fix: keep running containers until stack pull/build succeeds

Acquire images before reconcile, capture a recovery generation for
compensation, and only remove classified orphans after handoff.

* fix: address recovery audit blockers for safe stack updates

Retire abandoned and expired recovery artifacts, probe compensated
runtimes before reporting rollback success, preserve local Docker when
deleting a node, validate the exact Compose invocation before capture,
and repair updateStack return-contract fixtures.

* fix: resolve ESLint errors blocking CI on this branch

Unused-import and unused-variable errors left over from the stack
deletion refactor: MeshService in stacks.ts (its opt-out cascade moved
into DeployedStackDeletionService), a redundant pruneVolumes
destructure in deleteDeployedStack (the real one is re-derived from
the same input object inside runDeletionBody), and an unused beforeAll
import in a Docker-integration test stub. Also scopes the webhook
pull-action case body in a block to satisfy no-case-declarations;
purely syntactic, no behavior change.

* fix: harden recovery probe, cleanup retry, and failed-pull Docker test

Reject absent or unhealthy expected replicas before reporting rollback
success, keep cleanup records until artifacts are actually removed, fail
closed when a mesh override cannot be generated, and assert a real
failed pull leaves the original container running.

* fix: verify recovery probe image identity and stack-scoped override paths

Reject recovered runtimes that use the wrong image or leave scale-zero
services running, and confine tombstone override deletion to the intent
stack directory so forged cross-stack paths cannot be swept.

* test: batch notification cap fixtures in a SQLite transaction

Unbatched 1200-row inserts were timing out at the default 30s under
CI load even though the same assertions pass in under 2s when green.
2026-07-21 12:18:01 -04:00
Anso 6527bc971b feat(security): gate deploys on exploitation risk, not just severity (#1432)
Scan-policy deploy gates can now block on a known-exploited CVE (CISA KEV)
and on a fixable Critical/High finding, in addition to an optional severity
threshold. New policies default risk-first (KEV and fixable on, severity off);
existing policies keep their severity-only behavior. CVSS stays captured for
context but is never the sole basis for a block, and a finding whose
exploitability cannot be confirmed is treated as risky rather than safe
(incomplete scan detail fails closed on KEV/fixable inputs).

The decision logic is shared between the pre-deploy gate and the informational
post-scan banner via a pure helper, so the two never disagree. Block messages
and the block dialog now name the conditions an image matched. Backend and
frontend gates move together, the new inputs replicate across the fleet, and a
blocking policy with no active input is rejected on both sides.
2026-06-24 20:05:17 -04:00
Anso 865d792874 feat(pricing): collapse to two tiers (#1309)
* feat(pricing): collapse to two tiers (Community + Admiral)

Collapse Sencho's pricing from three tiers (Community / Skipper / Admiral)
to two: a generous free Community tier and a single paid Admiral tier. The
Skipper tier is removed.

Now free in Community: auto-heal, auto-update, scheduled operations,
webhooks, notification routing, Fleet Actions and bulk operations, SSO
preset providers (Google / GitHub / Okta), unlimited users with admin and
viewer roles, and deploy safety (atomic deploys, auto-rollback, and
one-click rollback).

Admiral (paid) is focused on running and governing a fleet: blueprints,
Fleet Secrets, deploy enforcement, vulnerability report export, audit log,
host console, private registries, mesh networking, node cordon, managed
cloud backup, LDAP / Active Directory SSO, and the advanced RBAC roles
(deployer, node-admin, auditor) with per-resource scoped assignments.

Internally the license variant distinction is removed so tier is binary
(community / paid). License validation still verifies the Lemon Squeezy
store and product before granting paid status.

Docs and the contributor guide are updated to the two-tier model.

* docs(pricing): correct licensing page to two-tier pricing and tidy stale tier wording

The licensing docs page kept the old Admiral pricing plus a Founder
Lifetime column and an Enterprise paragraph after the two-tier collapse.
Update it to $12/month or $99/year, drop the lifetime and Enterprise
content, and link to the pricing page for current pricing.

Also fix stale "Skipper" wording in CLA.md, SUPPORT.md, one test title,
and three test comments. Historical CHANGELOG entries and the
retired-Skipper license-guard test are intentionally left as-is.

* docs: align licensing and SSO pages with the two-tier model

Correct the SSO overview so the Google, GitHub, and Okta presets read as
available on every tier, matching the provider table; only LDAP and Active
Directory require Sencho Admiral. Remove the lifetime-plan references from the
licensing, settings, and troubleshooting pages so they reflect subscription-only
Admiral pricing.

* fix(rbac): omit scoped permissions from /me on the Community tier

Scoped role assignments only take effect on the paid tier, but GET /api/permissions/me returned them unconditionally, so a downgraded instance with leftover assignments rendered per-resource affordances the API then rejected with 403. The endpoint now mirrors the permission middleware and includes scoped permissions only on the paid tier. Adds a regression test covering the downgrade case.

* docs: use custom-pricing wording on the contact page

The two-tier model has no Enterprise tier; reword the contact page's enterprise pricing/deals to custom pricing/deals so it does not imply a tier that no longer exists.
2026-06-04 17:45:53 -04:00
Anso 5aedc52737 feat(stacks): server-side POST /api/stacks/bulk endpoint (#1185)
* feat(stacks): server-side POST /api/stacks/bulk

The frontend's bulk action UI fanned out N parallel POSTs to
/api/stacks/:name/{start,stop,restart,update}. For 30 stacks on a
remote node that was 30 round-trips through the proxy + auth + audit
chain, with no shared mutex and partial-failure UX bolted on the
client.

The new endpoint accepts {action, stackNames} (max 100 names), runs
ops under bounded parallelism (4 concurrent), reuses the per-(nodeId,
stackName) lock from the lifecycle-mutex change so collisions report
stack_op_in_progress as a per-row outcome, and returns
{action, results: [{stackName, ok, error?, code?}, ...]} with a 200
envelope. Per-stack errors are rows, not response codes.

Update action keeps the policy-enforcement check (per-stack, returns
policy_blocked rows) and the post-deploy scan trigger so the
single-stack security contract is preserved. State-invalidate and
image-update notifications fire per successful row so the activity
timeline and image-updates UI reflect bulk operations the same way
as single-stack ones.

Frontend useBulkStackActions swaps the Promise.allSettled fan-out for
a single call; the per-stack toast aggregation moves to reading the
results array. isPaid pre-flight stays in place to avoid a round trip
for Community-tier users on update.

* chore(stacks): dedupe bulk inputs; document tier asymmetry; regression test

Three follow-ups from independent review:

- Dedupe stackNames before scheduling so a payload like ['web','web']
  produces one row, not one ok-row plus one stack_op_in_progress row
  whose presence depended on worker scheduling.
- Add a route-ordering regression test verifying that a stack literally
  named 'bulk' is still reachable via /api/stacks/bulk/restart. Express
  matches the literal /bulk before /:stackName paths only at the
  no-suffix level; the :stackName/restart route still catches it.
- Comment the deliberate tier asymmetry: bulk update is requirePaid;
  single-stack /:stackName/update is open to all tiers. The fan-out
  blast radius is the reason, and it matches the prior frontend gate.

Existing 'policy_blocked per-row' test now uses the real ScanPolicy /
PolicyViolation / PolicyEnforcementResult shapes (the first cut elided
fields tsc strict-checked).
2026-05-24 15:56:53 -04:00