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https://github.com/Studio-Saelix/sencho.git
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41bf075eb06c2991eaaab670cffc91698a8c042b
15 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 Anso
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000a592388 |
fix: copy the full finding set when reusing a cached scan for the deploy gate (#1476)
The pre-deploy gate reuses a cached scan for the same image digest within 24h. The cache-hit path copied only the first 1000 detail rows while keeping the cached scan's full aggregate total, so the persisted preflight scan stored fewer detail rows than its total_vulnerabilities. The gate's integrity check in evaluateImageRisk treats that mismatch as untrustworthy and fails closed on every active KEV or fixable input, blocking a deploy with no actual matching finding and bypassing honored suppressions. The cache-hit copy now reads the complete detail set (getAllVulnerabilityDetails) so the persisted scan keeps stored details equal to total_vulnerabilities, matching a fresh scan and letting the gate evaluate the real findings. |
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Anso
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1de49f8b1a |
fix: name matched risk inputs in policy scan banner and alerts (#1473)
The pre-deploy gate names the inputs that matched a scan policy (a known-exploited CVE, a fixable Critical/High, or a severity threshold), but the informational post-scan surfaces still framed every violation as a severity ceiling. The scan detail banner read "blocks severities at or above X, highest severity is Y" and the scheduled-scan alert read "<severity> exceeds <maxSeverity>", which is wrong for a KEV- or fixable-only policy that never gated on severity. Persist the matched reasons on the policy evaluation, carry them on the scheduled-scan violation, and render them on the banner so every policy surface names the input that actually matched. Evaluations persisted before this change carry no reasons: the parser defaults the field to an empty array and the banner falls back to a plain violation notice. |
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Anso
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f794702171 |
feat(security): action-posture Security dashboard with exploit intel and triage (#1424)
* feat(security): reframe masthead as action posture, not worst-CVE severity Derive the Security masthead from an action posture (Action needed / Monitoring / Secure / Unknown) instead of raw scanner severity, and label the raw Critical/High counts as scanner detections. "Secure" now means nothing is actionable right now, never a claim that no vulnerabilities exist; Unknown covers a missing scanner or a node with no completed scan. Phase-1 bootstrap: "actionable" is approximated from the overview facts that already exist (fixable findings, secrets, misconfigs); a later phase moves the bucketing to the backend. * feat(security): derive overview action posture from triaged facts Add deriveSecurityPosture as the single bucketing function and extend /security/overview with posture facts (fixableCriticalHigh, dangerousCompose, accepted, rawCritical/rawHigh, plus knownExploited/publiclyExposed placeholders that later phases populate) and the derived posture verb. Suppression- and acknowledgement-aware counts come from one bounded read-time pass over the latest-scan Critical/High findings, grouped per image so the existing read-time filters apply unchanged. The pass is capped and flags posturePartial, so a large node degrades gracefully instead of scanning every detail row. The masthead now prefers the backend posture and keeps the local bootstrap only as a fallback for older remote nodes reached through the proxy. * feat(security): capture Trivy finding enrichment (status, CVSS, vendor, purl, layer) parseTrivyOutput now keeps the per-finding fields Trivy already returns and we previously discarded: Status (fixed / will_not_fix / end_of_life / ...), CVSS (score + vector, preferring the NVD source then falling back), vendor severity, package URL, package path, and layer digest. Persisted on vulnerability_details via additive nullable columns (guarded ALTER), bound null when absent, and carried through the cached-scan reconstruction path. These fields separate scary from exploitable and feed the action posture and the per-finding evidence tags. Field paths verified against Trivy's documented image-scan JSON; covered by parse and insert/read round-trip tests. * feat(security): add CVE exploit-intel service (CISA KEV + FIRST EPSS) Add CveIntelService, a daily background cache of CISA KEV membership and FIRST EPSS scores stored in a new cve_intel table and joined to findings at read time by CVE id (never frozen onto scan rows, so a CVE entering KEV later lights up on scans already stored). EPSS is fetched only for CVE ids present in stored findings, batched; both feeds are best-effort and keep the last cache on failure, so the Security page degrades gracefully offline. Wired into startup/shutdown like the other background services. The overview now counts known-exploited Critical/High findings, and KEV membership escalates posture to Action needed even when no fix is available. A per-instance "Exploit intelligence" toggle on the scanner setup surface lets air-gapped or firewalled hosts disable the outbound fetch; the daily tick keeps running but skips the fetch body when it is off. * feat(security): show per-finding evidence tags (KEV, EPSS, vendor status, CVSS) The vulnerabilities endpoint joins read-time exploit intel (KEV membership and EPSS score) onto each finding by CVE id, and the scan sheet renders evidence tags beside each CVE: known-exploited, EPSS probability, vendor will-not-fix / end-of-life, and the CVSS score. Severity becomes one signal among several so an operator can tell scary from exploitable, with no invented composite score. * feat(security): evolve CVE suppressions into triage decisions Layer a triage status and optional OpenVEX justification onto CVE suppressions. Statuses: needs review / affected / not affected / accepted risk / fixed / false positive / ignored. Dismissing states (not affected, accepted, fixed, false positive, ignored) stop a finding from driving the action posture; needs review and affected stay actionable and are surfaced as counts. Existing rows default to "accepted" (the prior suppress behavior), so nothing changes for them. The overview now reports needsReview / notAffected / accepted as distinct facts derived from the triage status. The decision replicates across the fleet (snapshot + replicated-insert carry status + justification) so a replica's posture matches the control node. The inline suppress dialog gains a triage decision selector; the read-time filter surfaces the status and justification on every finding. * feat(security): export fleet triage decisions as OpenVEX (Admiral) Add an OpenVEX exporter that turns the instance's CVE triage decisions into a standard VEX document (not_affected / fixed / affected / under_investigation, with justifications), and a GET /security/vex/export endpoint to download it. Authoring fleet VEX is a governance capability, so it is gated to Admiral (paid) plus admin, mirroring the SARIF export gate; the Suppressions panel shows an Export VEX action only on Admiral. * docs(security): document action posture, evidence tags, exploit intel, and triage Update the Security page and CVE suppressions docs for the action-posture masthead (scanner detections vs product posture), per-finding evidence tags (KEV / EPSS / CVSS / vendor status), the exploit-intelligence toggle (CISA KEV + FIRST EPSS) on scanner setup, triage decisions layered on suppressions, and OpenVEX export of fleet triage decisions. * test(security): match intel hosts exactly in CveIntelService test Route the fetch stub and its call assertions by exact hostname (www.cisa.gov / api.first.org) instead of a domain substring check. Resolves the js/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization code-scanning alerts on the test's URL routing; behavior is unchanged. |
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Anso
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ef5a3f00a7 |
feat: add an on-demand node-wide security scan with live progress (#1367)
Add a "Scan this node" action on the Security overview that scans, in one pass, any combination of three types: image vulnerabilities, image secrets, and compose misconfigurations. Progress streams live into the deploy-feedback modal. - TrivyService.scanNode runs the selected scanners across the node's images and, for misconfig, every stack's compose file, behind a per-node lock and tolerant of per-item failures. The existing scanAllNodeImages becomes a thin vuln-only wrapper over the shared image loop, so scheduled scans are unchanged. - POST /api/security/scan-node (admin, scanner-gated) streams sanitized progress to the deploy terminal and returns a combined summary. Secret scans stream counts only, never matched values. - Frontend adds a "scan" action verb and a ScanNodeLauncher wired into the overview; the scan stays bound to the node it started on even if the active node changes mid-run. |
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Anso
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d03d97d964 |
fix(nodes): close capability-gating gaps in node compatibility (#1261)
* fix(nodes): close capability-gating gaps in node compatibility Vulnerability scanning is now gated correctly on whether the active node advertises support for it: - A node without the Trivy binary stops advertising the scanning capability. Previously the capability was toggled only on a state change, so a node that booted without Trivy kept advertising scanning it could not perform. - The control node's own capability list now reflects features disabled at runtime, matching what it advertises to peers. - The scan history surface shows a clear "not available on this node" card, with its header actions hidden, instead of attempting a request that fails. A node's version and capability metadata now refreshes immediately after a connection test or a completed update, rather than waiting out the cache. Capability gates fail closed to the unavailable card when a node's metadata request errors, instead of staying open until the next fetch. Adds a test that fails if the frontend and backend capability lists drift, plus coverage for the metadata error path, the runtime-disabled local meta, the scanning capability sync, and the metadata cache invalidation paths. * fix(nodes): refresh node metadata client-side after a connection test A connection test dropped the server-side metadata cache, but the dashboard kept its own cached copy until the client TTL expired, so version and capability gates could stay stale in the browser. The test now forces a client-side metadata refresh for that node, so the version pill and gates reflect the node's current state immediately. Also strips any URL userinfo before logging the metadata fetch target, and makes the scanning-capability detection test deterministically exercise the no-binary disable path rather than depending on whether the runner has Trivy. |
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Anso
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328a98439d | fix: harden vulnerability scan scheduling (#1035) | ||
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Anso
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3b650523c1 |
Audit-hardening pass for secret and misconfiguration scanning (#977)
* fix(security): dedupe concurrent compose-stack scans
Track stack scans in scanningImages keyed stack:<nodeId>:<stackName>.
The /scan/stack route returns 409 when an in-flight scan exists, and
the service-side check is the real correctness barrier (the route
pre-check is a fast-path optimization that mirrors scanImage). The
dedup key release lives in a try/finally so failed scans free the
slot for retry.
Why: scanComposeStack had no equivalent of scanImage's scanningImages
guard, so two simultaneous calls for the same stack would both run
trivy config, both insert a vulnerability_scans row, and double-
process the result.
* feat(security): acknowledge misconfig findings
Adds a parallel acknowledgement system for Trivy misconfig findings
that mirrors cve_suppressions: a new misconfig_acknowledgements table,
read-time enrichment via the new misconfig-ack-filter utility, REST
CRUD endpoints, fleet-sync replication from control to replicas, a
Settings panel, and an Acknowledge button on the Misconfigs tab.
Schema and behavior parity with cve_suppressions:
- UNIQUE(rule_id, COALESCE(stack_pattern, '')) so fleet-wide acks
collide as expected
- blockIfReplica on every write
- Audit-log entries name the scope (rule_id, stack_pattern) but
never the reason text
- replicated_from_control flag controls UI delete affordance and
drives clearReplicatedRows on demote/reanchor
- Validators reused: validateStackPatternForRedos for glob safety,
sanitizeForLog for log fragments
SARIF export emits an external/accepted suppression entry per
acknowledged misconfig, matching the CVE pattern.
Per-row Acknowledge dialog prefills stack_pattern with the scan's
stack_context so the default scope is "rule + this stack only" and an
operator must broaden explicitly.
Tests: misconfig-ack-filter (15) and misconfig-ack-routes (23)
including the duplicate-409 case for both pinned and fleet-wide acks.
* fix(security): reap orphaned trivy tmp dirs at startup
When the buildEnv path writes a per-scan DOCKER_CONFIG dir under
os.tmpdir() and the process crashes before the finally block runs,
the dir leaks. Mirrors GitSourceService.sweepStaleTempDirs:
exported sweepStaleTrivyTempDirs is fire-and-forget at boot,
removes prefix-matching dirs older than 1 hour, swallows
permission/race failures, logs a single line if any were reaped.
* perf(security): emit per-batch summary for scanAllNodeImages
Adds one diag() line at the end of scanAllNodeImages summarising
unique image count, scanned, skipped, failed, violation count, and
elapsed time. Per-image diag inside scanImage stays useful for
debugging individual scans; the summary gives operators a single
fleet-level checkpoint when developer_mode is on.
* perf(security): cap SARIF export at 5000 findings per type
Replace the unbounded fetchAllPages walk on /scans/:id/sarif with a
hard limit of 5000 findings per type. When any type trips the cap,
emit run-level properties.truncated=true plus row_limit and per-type
totals so downstream tooling can flag the export as partial.
Console-warns for ops visibility.
A scan with 50k vulns previously streamed every row into memory
before serialising; the cap bounds memory and serialisation time at
the cost of completeness on pathological scans.
* docs(env): document TRIVY_BIN host-binary override
The env var is honored by TrivyService.detectTrivy as a fallback when
no managed install is present, but it was undocumented in
.env.example. Adds the var with a comment explaining precedence
(managed > TRIVY_BIN > PATH).
* test(security): cover scanComposeStack failure modes
Two new cases drive the existing try/catch through real failure
paths:
- Malformed Trivy stdout: row flips to status='failed' with the
parser error preserved on `error`.
- execFile rejection: row flips to status='failed' with a string
error message.
Pairs with the existing dedup tests so the failure path now also
verifies the scan row state, not just the thrown exception.
* test(e2e): security scanner + misconfig acknowledgement flow
Seven Playwright tests covering the scanner UI and the new
acknowledgement system end-to-end:
- Trivy availability gate (skips suite when binary absent so CI
without Trivy can opt out via E2E_SKIP_TRIVY=1)
- Stack config scan completes and records misconfig findings
- Concurrent stack scan returns 409 from the dedup gate
- Misconfig ack POST creates and lists on Settings
- Duplicate (rule_id, stack_pattern) returns 409
- Malformed rule_id (shell metacharacters) returns 400
- Misconfigs tab renders against a real stack scan
Tests drive the API for behaviour assertions and the UI only for
shell-rendering checks; the visual snapshot suite owns screenshots.
* docs(features): add misconfig acknowledgement workflow and SARIF cap
Refreshes vulnerability-scanning.mdx with:
- Misconfig acknowledgements section covering the per-row dialog,
Settings panel, scope/matching rules, and SARIF emission
- Tier table row for the new feature
- SARIF section note on the 5000 row-per-type cap and the
properties.truncated marker for partial exports
- Troubleshooting entries: SARIF cap, hidden Acknowledge button,
findings resurfacing after delete, Trivy DB phone-home, and
409 on concurrent compose-stack scans
* fix(ci): clear backend lint and CodeQL alerts
- Remove the dead fetchAllPages helper in routes/security.ts. It lost
its callers when the SARIF endpoint switched to direct paged reads
for the truncation cap. ESLint flagged it as unused.
- Switch the trivy-tmp-cleanup test helper to fs.mkdtempSync. Building
paths under os.tmpdir() with predictable names tripped CodeQL's
js/insecure-temporary-file rule (high severity), which warns about
symlink-pre-creation attacks even in test code. mkdtempSync appends
a process-random suffix and creates the dir atomically; the
sencho-trivy- prefix is preserved so the production sweep still
matches the test fixtures.
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Anso
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4e5ba17710 |
refactor(backend): sanitize user input before logging to close CRLF injection (#807)
* refactor(backend): sanitize user input before logging to close CRLF injection
Adds a small sanitizeForLog helper that strips CR, LF, tab, and ASCII
control characters (0x00-0x1F, 0x7F) from a value before it is embedded
in a console.log/warn/error/debug call. Wraps every call site where a
user-controlled value (req.params, req.body, req.query, or a value
derived from them) flows into a log message.
Closes the bulk of the open CodeQL alerts in this family:
- 96 js/log-injection
- 28 js/tainted-format-string
The helper is in backend/src/utils/safeLog.ts. Routes still pre-validate
input at the request boundary; this is the second line of defense and
gives static analyzers a sanitizer they can trace through. JSON
responses, Docker filter labels, and other non-log call sites are
intentionally left unwrapped.
* refactor(backend): printf-style format strings for tainted-log call sites
CodeQL's js/tainted-format-string rule flags template literals in the first
arg of console.X when any interpolated value is user-controlled, regardless
of whether each value is sanitized inline. The canonical mitigation is to
use a static format string and pass values as positional args.
Converts the 28 flagged template literals to printf-style ("%s") format
strings, with sanitizeForLog applied to each positional arg. Also fills in
the log-injection wraps on 9 sites where a user-controlled value was
missed in the first sweep (agents, fleet, gitSources, imageUpdates,
GitSourceService).
No behavior change at runtime. Node's util.format substitutes %s tokens
identically to template-literal interpolation.
* fix(backend): wrap nodeId/snapshotId in fleet restore debug log
CodeQL flagged the unwrapped numeric args even though they cannot
contain control chars in practice. Apply the sanitizer for taint-flow
recognition.
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Anso
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661b9c638b |
feat(security): enforce scan policies as a pre-deploy gate (#719)
Policies with block_on_deploy=1 now scan every stack image before docker compose up runs and reject the deploy with HTTP 409 on violation. The UI opens a dialog listing offending images; admins can override per deploy with ?ignorePolicy=true, and every bypass is recorded in the audit log with the originating route, actor, policy, and image list. When Trivy is not installed on the target node the gate fails open with a warning notification, so teams are never locked out by tooling state. Post-deploy and scheduled scans still evaluate matching policies and dispatch warnings on violations to surface drift on long-running stacks. Public API additions: policy and suppression CRUD under /api/security, plus the documented 409 block-response shape on all deploy paths. |
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Anso
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aa10db1d09 |
fix(trivy): remove unsupported --no-progress flag from trivy config (#718)
The `trivy config` subcommand does not accept `--no-progress`; the flag exists only on `trivy image`. Every stack configuration scan therefore failed with `FATAL Fatal error unknown flag: --no-progress`, and the "Scan configuration" action on the stack details page has been non-functional since it shipped. Removing the flag is the complete fix. `trivy config` is silent by default, so the flag was redundant even if it had been accepted. A new Vitest spec pins the exact argument vector (`['config', '--format', 'json', '--quiet', <stackPath>]`) so a future edit cannot reintroduce the bug, and exercises the success path end to end: status transitions to `completed`, misconfig severities tally correctly, and `highest_severity` rolls up to the worst finding. |
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Anso
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29ed0524c1 |
feat(security): severity-aware scheduled scan notifications (#654)
Enrich scheduled vulnerability scan completion notifications with per-severity CVE counts so recipients can triage from the message body alone. Expose the scan action in the schedule creation UI, require an explicit node_id, and harden fire-and-forget alert dispatches so a failing webhook cannot crash the scheduler. Notification body now reports scanned/skipped/failed counts plus critical/high/medium totals aggregated across fresh and cached scans, reflecting the current node posture rather than only what was newly scanned on this run. |
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Anso
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a95bf1ff33 |
feat(security): secret and misconfiguration scanning (#651)
Extends Trivy scans with secret detection in image filesystems and misconfiguration scanning for Compose stacks. Adds tabs to the scan drawer for vulnerabilities, secrets, and misconfigs. Secret matches are redacted server-side (first 8 chars + ellipsis) before storage. - TrivyService: --scanners vuln,secret for images; trivy config for stacks - DB: scanners_used/secret_count/misconfig_count cols; secret_findings, misconfig_findings tables; cache key scoped by scanners - Routes: POST /security/scan accepts scanners array (requirePaid when secret requested); POST /security/scan/stack; GET .../secrets and .../misconfigs (paid-tier reads) - UI: tabs in VulnerabilityScanSheet; scan-options dropdown on images; Scan config button on stack header |
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Anso
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61bac08027 |
feat(security): one-click managed Trivy install (#643)
* feat(security): one-click managed Trivy install Add a Vulnerability Scanner card to Settings, Security with install, update, uninstall, and auto-update controls (Admiral-only). The installer downloads a verified Trivy release into the existing data volume at /app/data/bin/trivy and defaults the cache to /app/data/trivy-cache, so no host mounts or extra env vars are required. Detection probes the managed path, a TRIVY_BIN override, and the host PATH, distinguishing managed vs host installs. A daily scheduled check surfaces available Trivy updates, installs them automatically when opted in, and dedupes notifications per version. * fix(frontend): silence react-hooks/set-state-in-effect in useTrivyStatus The initial status fetch and managed-source update check both call setState from the effect body. Match the existing pattern used in useDashboardData / SSOSection and disable the rule at the call site. |
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Anso
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dc8370f5a4 |
fix(security): harden Trivy scan lifecycle, logging, and docs (#639)
* fix(security): harden Trivy scan lifecycle, logging, and docs - Call TrivyService.initialize() at startup so capability state is accurate before first request; add periodic re-detect to the scheduler so newly installed Trivy binaries light up without a restart. - Add markStaleScansAsFailed sweep (+ idx_vuln_scans_status index) to recover any scan row left in_progress after a crash or timeout; sweep runs before the paid-tier gate so every tier self-heals. - Split scanImage persistence into beginScan/finishScan so the manual scan route owns a single code path and can return a scanId synchronously while work continues asynchronously. - Validate image refs on /api/security/scan and /sbom via new utility; defense-in-depth against shell-metacharacter payloads. - Dispatch a warning-level alert when a post-deploy scan fails so the operator has a user-visible path to the failure instead of a silent log. - Share DIGEST_CACHE_TTL_MS and severity ordering across service and route layers; remove dead invalidateDetection(). - Add [Trivy:diag] logging gated behind developer_mode for support diagnostics; production logs unchanged. - Frontend: defensive toast fallback chain, sr-only SheetDescription, and a truncation badge when the 500-item detail fetch is capped. - Tests: extend trivy-service and vulnerability-db suites; add image-ref and severity unit tests. - Docs: expand vulnerability-scanning troubleshooting with recovery, re-detect, and diagnostic-log guidance; link Dockerfile comment to trivy-setup. * fix(security): drop unnecessary escape in image-ref forbidden-char regex |
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Anso
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c9cd6990d2 |
feat(images): Trivy-powered vulnerability scanning (#635)
* feat(images): Trivy-powered vulnerability scanning Scan container images for known CVEs via Trivy. On-demand scanning and severity badges are available on every tier; scheduled scans, scan policies, SBOM generation, and scan history are gated to Skipper+. - New TrivyService (binary detection, per-image scan, SBOM, digest cache) - Three new tables: vulnerability_scans, vulnerability_details, scan_policies - 12 routes under /api/security (scan, results, summaries, SBOM, policies, compare) - Post-deploy async scans wired into all five deploy paths, with a per-deploy opt-out toggle in the App Store deploy sheet - "scan" action type added to SchedulerService for fleet-wide recurring scans - Frontend: severity badges in Resources Hub with animated cursor detail, scan results drawer with vulnerability table and filters, and a new Security section in Settings for scan policy CRUD - Policy threshold violations dispatch a warning or critical alert based on the policy's block_on_deploy flag; deploys themselves are never blocked * fix(security): compute scan age in useEffect to satisfy react-hooks/purity |