* feat(security): add SBOM attestations, VEX document, and retire .trivyignore
Add OpenVEX triage document (security/vex/sencho.openvex.json) for the 5
residual CVEs vendored inside docker/compose v5.1.2 that were carried over
from the previous PR. All 5 are marked not_affected with justifications.
Configure Trivy in both CI and release workflows to consume the VEX document
via trivy.yaml so the same source of truth gates PR scans and release scans.
Delete .trivyignore, which is fully superseded by the VEX file.
Add two new release pipeline steps after image publication:
- CycloneDX 1.6 SBOM via anchore/sbom-action (also installs syft)
- SPDX 2.3 SBOM via syft directly (reuses OCI layer cache from prior step)
Both are attached as cosign OCI referrer attestations (keyless, OIDC-signed)
and uploaded as GitHub Release assets alongside the OpenVEX file.
Bump docker-publish.yml permissions from contents:read to contents:write,
required for softprops/action-gh-release to create Release assets.
Add docs/operations/verifying-images.mdx with copy-paste verification
commands for all supply-chain artifacts: signature, SLSA provenance,
CycloneDX SBOM, SPDX SBOM, OpenVEX, and Rekor entry. Update docs.json
navigation and expand the Supply chain security section in docs/security.mdx.
Add a Verifying Release Artifacts section to SECURITY.md.
* fix(vex): cover otel SDK CVE-2026-39883 in rebuilt Docker CLI binary
The rebuilt Docker CLI v29.4.0 vendors otel/sdk v1.42.0, which still
contains CVE-2026-39883 (BSD kenv PATH hijacking; fixed in v1.43.0).
docker-compose v5.1.2 vendors otel/sdk v1.38.0 separately. The original
VEX statement only covered the compose binary's location and version,
so Trivy's scan of /usr/local/bin/docker was not suppressed.
Add a second subcomponent entry for the CLI binary path with the
correct vendored version. The not_affected justification (BSD-only
code path; we ship linux/amd64 and linux/arm64 only) holds for both
binaries.
* fix(ci): use list form for vulnerability.vex in trivy.yaml
Trivy's config schema requires vulnerability.vex to be a list (mapped
to the multi-value --vex flag). The previous bare-string value was
silently dropped, so the OpenVEX document was never loaded and HIGH
findings already covered by VEX statements still failed the scan.
* fix(ci): mirror VEX CVE in .trivyignore for local-image scan
Trivy does not emit an OCI purl for locally-built images without a
RepoDigests entry (aquasecurity/trivy#9399), so OpenVEX product
matching against the CI build target sencho:pr-test resolves to no
artifact and every statement is silently dropped. The VEX document
remains the canonical triage record and is still attached as a cosign
attestation on the published image; this file just mirrors the single
CVE that surfaces on the local scan so CI does not block on a finding
already triaged in VEX. Updates the Trivy step comment to document
the relationship between the two files.
Custom OIDC stays on Community so self-hosters can wire any spec-compliant
OIDC identity provider (Authelia, Keycloak, Authentik, Zitadel, and others).
Google, GitHub, and Okta one-click presets move to Skipper. LDAP / Active
Directory and scoped RBAC are Admiral-only.
Backend enforces the split via a new requireTierForSsoProvider helper in
middleware/tierGates.ts, applied after requireAdmin in all four ssoConfig
mutation handlers. GET /sso/config (list) stays ungated so downgraded
admins can still see previously-configured providers. Invalid provider ids
now 400 before the tier check to avoid leaking tier information.
Frontend adds a compact mode to PaidGate and AdmiralGate for inline
list-item locks, and SSOSection reorders the provider cards as
Custom OIDC > Google > GitHub > Okta > LDAP to reinforce the
free-to-paid progression.
Stale 'SSO is Admiral' copy in AdmiralGate, PaidGate, and the Admiral
upgrade card on the License settings page has been replaced to reflect the
new split. User-facing licensing, SSO, overview, quickstart, and security
docs have been updated with the per-tier provider matrix.
* feat(images): Trivy-powered vulnerability scanning
Scan container images for known CVEs via Trivy. On-demand scanning and
severity badges are available on every tier; scheduled scans, scan
policies, SBOM generation, and scan history are gated to Skipper+.
- New TrivyService (binary detection, per-image scan, SBOM, digest cache)
- Three new tables: vulnerability_scans, vulnerability_details, scan_policies
- 12 routes under /api/security (scan, results, summaries, SBOM, policies, compare)
- Post-deploy async scans wired into all five deploy paths, with a
per-deploy opt-out toggle in the App Store deploy sheet
- "scan" action type added to SchedulerService for fleet-wide recurring scans
- Frontend: severity badges in Resources Hub with animated cursor detail,
scan results drawer with vulnerability table and filters, and a new
Security section in Settings for scan policy CRUD
- Policy threshold violations dispatch a warning or critical alert based on
the policy's block_on_deploy flag; deploys themselves are never blocked
* fix(security): compute scan age in useEffect to satisfy react-hooks/purity
Add docs/security.mdx with the full auth stack as the lead section:
password auth, SSO (5 providers + generic OIDC), TOTP MFA, JWT sessions,
API tokens, RBAC (5 roles), audit logging, AES-256-GCM encryption,
rate limiting, and node-to-node authentication.
Includes tier availability matrix, permission matrix, production
hardening checklist, and vulnerability reporting section. Links to
dedicated feature pages for configuration details.
Add navigation entry in docs.json Reference group.
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