3 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Anso	d369b03a38	feat: detect stalled stack updates and add in-app recovery actions (#1347) ... * feat: detect stalled stack updates and add in-app recovery actions Add a backend idle-output backstop that stops a deploy/update compose step that has gone silent (SENCHO_COMPOSE_STALL_TIMEOUT_MS, default 10m), so a hung image pull surfaces a fast failure instead of spinning indefinitely. Surface failed, timed-out, and stalled operations with recovery actions on the stack page: a desktop chip plus popover menu and an inline mobile card offering retry, restart, roll back (when a backup exists), refresh state, and copy diagnostics, all gated by deploy permission. The streaming deploy/update progress modal is now on by default and warns when output goes quiet. Container state is refreshed after a failed or stalled operation, and the UI never sits in an indefinite spinner. * fix: harden rollback against policy-blocked file mutation and refine recovery Address review findings on the stalled-update recovery work: - The rollback route restored backup files before running the policy gate, so a policy-blocked rollback could leave the on-disk config rolled back while the deployed containers were unchanged. Snapshot the current files first and revert them when the gate blocks; if that revert itself fails, escalate it on the persistent alert feed since the 409 is already sent. - Refresh container state after a successful manual rollback (rollback redeploys), without mis-recording a refetch failure as a rollback failure. - Suppress the stalled-output warning once live progress is unavailable. * test: mock snapshotStackFiles in the atomic-deploy rollback route tests The rollback route now snapshots stack files before restoring a backup, so its FileSystemService mock needs snapshotStackFiles. Without it the mocked call threw and the route returned 500, failing the success-path rollback assertions.	2026-06-10 10:12:24 -04:00
Anso	865d792874	feat(pricing): collapse to two tiers (#1309) ... * feat(pricing): collapse to two tiers (Community + Admiral) Collapse Sencho's pricing from three tiers (Community / Skipper / Admiral) to two: a generous free Community tier and a single paid Admiral tier. The Skipper tier is removed. Now free in Community: auto-heal, auto-update, scheduled operations, webhooks, notification routing, Fleet Actions and bulk operations, SSO preset providers (Google / GitHub / Okta), unlimited users with admin and viewer roles, and deploy safety (atomic deploys, auto-rollback, and one-click rollback). Admiral (paid) is focused on running and governing a fleet: blueprints, Fleet Secrets, deploy enforcement, vulnerability report export, audit log, host console, private registries, mesh networking, node cordon, managed cloud backup, LDAP / Active Directory SSO, and the advanced RBAC roles (deployer, node-admin, auditor) with per-resource scoped assignments. Internally the license variant distinction is removed so tier is binary (community / paid). License validation still verifies the Lemon Squeezy store and product before granting paid status. Docs and the contributor guide are updated to the two-tier model. * docs(pricing): correct licensing page to two-tier pricing and tidy stale tier wording The licensing docs page kept the old Admiral pricing plus a Founder Lifetime column and an Enterprise paragraph after the two-tier collapse. Update it to $12/month or $99/year, drop the lifetime and Enterprise content, and link to the pricing page for current pricing. Also fix stale "Skipper" wording in CLA.md, SUPPORT.md, one test title, and three test comments. Historical CHANGELOG entries and the retired-Skipper license-guard test are intentionally left as-is. * docs: align licensing and SSO pages with the two-tier model Correct the SSO overview so the Google, GitHub, and Okta presets read as available on every tier, matching the provider table; only LDAP and Active Directory require Sencho Admiral. Remove the lifetime-plan references from the licensing, settings, and troubleshooting pages so they reflect subscription-only Admiral pricing. * fix(rbac): omit scoped permissions from /me on the Community tier Scoped role assignments only take effect on the paid tier, but GET /api/permissions/me returned them unconditionally, so a downgraded instance with leftover assignments rendered per-resource affordances the API then rejected with 403. The endpoint now mirrors the permission middleware and includes scoped permissions only on the paid tier. Adds a regression test covering the downgrade case. * docs: use custom-pricing wording on the contact page The two-tier model has no Enterprise tier; reword the contact page's enterprise pricing/deals to custom pricing/deals so it does not imply a tier that no longer exists.	2026-06-04 17:45:53 -04:00
Anso	45844b92ca	fix(atomic-deploy): harden rollback locking, restore fidelity, and tier gating (#1247) ... * fix(atomic-deploy): harden rollback locking, restore fidelity, and tier gating Hardens the Atomic Deployments feature found during a full audit: - Rollback now holds the per-stack lifecycle lock (deploy/update already do), so a rollback can no longer race a concurrent deploy on the same compose files. Adds a 'rollback' lifecycle action and releases the lock in finally. - restoreStackFiles is now a faithful revert: it removes managed compose/.env files added after the backup before copying, so a rollback no longer leaves a hybrid of old and new configuration. Scope is the protected file set only; user data is untouched. Aborts (rather than reporting success) if a stale managed file cannot be removed. - The scheduled image-update path derives the atomic flag from the licence tier instead of hardcoding it on, keeping the paid capability explicit at the call site (the scheduler is already paid-gated; this prevents silent drift). - The backup-metadata read (GET /stacks/:name/backup) now requires a paid licence, matching the rollback flow that is the only caller. - Manual rollback dispatches a success/failure notification, alongside the existing audit-log entry. Adds route integration tests (lock acquisition/release, tier 403, notifications, no-backup 404), filesystem tests for the faithful restore (orphan removal, variant switch, abort path, non-managed files preserved), a community-tier scheduler test, and a developer-mode logging matrix. Documents the restore semantics and reconciles the scheduled-update wording in the feature guide. * fix(atomic-deploy): assert restore target stays within the compose dir before unlink The orphan-removal step in restoreStackFiles joins the stack directory with a managed filename and unlinks it. The stack directory is already validated and contained by resolveStackDir (allowlist stack name + within-base assertion), but the containment guard was not reapplied to the joined target at the delete sink, so static analysis flagged the path as derived from user input. Reassert containment on the final path before unlinking, matching the barrier the other write/read helpers in this service already apply. No behavior change for valid stacks; defense-in-depth at the sink. * fix(atomic-deploy): inline the path-containment barrier at the restore unlink sink The wrapped within-base assertion was not recognized as a sanitizer by the static path-injection analysis, which still traced the stack name to the unlink sink. Replace it with the inline path.resolve + startsWith containment check the other write helpers in this service already use (the recognized barrier), kept in the same scope as the sink. Behavior is unchanged for valid stack names. * fix(atomic-deploy): clear stale managed files from the backup slot before writing The backup directory is reused across runs and was only ever added to, never cleared. A managed file removed from the stack since the last backup (e.g. a deleted .env or a switched compose variant) lingered in the slot, so a later rollback restored a file that did not exist immediately before the failed run, contradicting the faithful-revert guarantee. Clear the protected file set from the slot before copying the current files, with the same inline containment barrier the restore path uses. A clear failure is logged, not fatal, since it only risks a stale future rollback and should not block a valid deploy.	2026-05-29 00:12:39 -04:00