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3668c71860e49a6acb45237b7b358a32ab7e9cf5
7 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 Anso
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3668c71860 |
feat(security): add SBOM attestations, VEX document, and retire .trivyignore (#790)
* feat(security): add SBOM attestations, VEX document, and retire .trivyignore Add OpenVEX triage document (security/vex/sencho.openvex.json) for the 5 residual CVEs vendored inside docker/compose v5.1.2 that were carried over from the previous PR. All 5 are marked not_affected with justifications. Configure Trivy in both CI and release workflows to consume the VEX document via trivy.yaml so the same source of truth gates PR scans and release scans. Delete .trivyignore, which is fully superseded by the VEX file. Add two new release pipeline steps after image publication: - CycloneDX 1.6 SBOM via anchore/sbom-action (also installs syft) - SPDX 2.3 SBOM via syft directly (reuses OCI layer cache from prior step) Both are attached as cosign OCI referrer attestations (keyless, OIDC-signed) and uploaded as GitHub Release assets alongside the OpenVEX file. Bump docker-publish.yml permissions from contents:read to contents:write, required for softprops/action-gh-release to create Release assets. Add docs/operations/verifying-images.mdx with copy-paste verification commands for all supply-chain artifacts: signature, SLSA provenance, CycloneDX SBOM, SPDX SBOM, OpenVEX, and Rekor entry. Update docs.json navigation and expand the Supply chain security section in docs/security.mdx. Add a Verifying Release Artifacts section to SECURITY.md. * fix(vex): cover otel SDK CVE-2026-39883 in rebuilt Docker CLI binary The rebuilt Docker CLI v29.4.0 vendors otel/sdk v1.42.0, which still contains CVE-2026-39883 (BSD kenv PATH hijacking; fixed in v1.43.0). docker-compose v5.1.2 vendors otel/sdk v1.38.0 separately. The original VEX statement only covered the compose binary's location and version, so Trivy's scan of /usr/local/bin/docker was not suppressed. Add a second subcomponent entry for the CLI binary path with the correct vendored version. The not_affected justification (BSD-only code path; we ship linux/amd64 and linux/arm64 only) holds for both binaries. * fix(ci): use list form for vulnerability.vex in trivy.yaml Trivy's config schema requires vulnerability.vex to be a list (mapped to the multi-value --vex flag). The previous bare-string value was silently dropped, so the OpenVEX document was never loaded and HIGH findings already covered by VEX statements still failed the scan. * fix(ci): mirror VEX CVE in .trivyignore for local-image scan Trivy does not emit an OCI purl for locally-built images without a RepoDigests entry (aquasecurity/trivy#9399), so OpenVEX product matching against the CI build target sencho:pr-test resolves to no artifact and every statement is silently dropped. The VEX document remains the canonical triage record and is still attached as a cosign attestation on the published image; this file just mirrors the single CVE that surfaces on the local scan so CI does not block on a finding already triaged in VEX. Updates the Trivy step comment to document the relationship between the two files. |
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Anso
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7e4ea714c1 |
feat(security): rebuild Docker CLI/Compose from source, pin base image digests (#789)
* feat(security): rebuild Docker CLI/Compose from source, pin base image digests Build Docker CLI v29.4.0 and Compose v5.1.2 from source against Go 1.26.2 to resolve 7 CVEs that were accepted in .trivyignore: - CVE-2026-32280/32281/32282/32283/33810: Go stdlib x509/TLS and DNS issues in the upstream static CLI binary (compiled with Go 1.26.1). All fixed by rebuilding with Go 1.26.2. - CVE-2026-33186: grpc 1.78.0 in Docker CLI. Eliminated from the SBOM by building with the patched Go toolchain and updated module graph. - CVE-2026-33671: picomatch ReDoS in npm bundled with node:22-alpine. Resolved by removing npm/npx from the runtime image entirely (npm is only needed at build time). Remaining 5 entries in .trivyignore are vendored deps inside Compose v5.1.2 (buildkit, moby/docker, otel) that cannot be patched without an upstream Compose release. These will be expressed as OpenVEX not_affected statements in the follow-up PR (feat/security-sbom-vex). Also in this commit: - Pin all Dockerfile FROM lines to @sha256: digests (node:22-alpine, tonistiigi/xx, golang:1.26-alpine) to prevent silent base image changes between scan and publish. - SHA-pin all GitHub Actions in docker-publish.yml and ci.yml that were previously referenced by mutable @vN tags. - Add a binary version smoke test to confirm docker/compose produce expected output before the multi-arch push proceeds. * fix(docker): fix cli-builder vendor mode and compose-builder cache path docker/cli v29.4.0 uses CalVer and ships vendor.mod instead of go.mod, so plain `go build` fails with "cannot find main module." Fix: copy vendor.mod -> go.mod and vendor.sum -> go.sum before building, then pass -mod=vendor so all deps come from the vendored tree with no network access. Cache mount is not needed with vendor mode and is removed. compose-builder used /root/go/pkg/mod as the cache mount target, but golang:alpine sets GOPATH=/go, so the module cache lives at /go/pkg/mod. The wrong path caused a silent cache miss on every build. Corrected. |
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Anso
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12c2b37510 |
feat(security): polish scan sheets, fix CVE links, surface policy violations (#721)
* feat(security): polish scan sheets, fix CVE links, surface policy violations Adds cveUrl helper that rewrites Trivy's 404-ing avd.aquasec.com links to cve.org for CVE-prefixed IDs (GHSA and misconfig URLs pass through unchanged). Redesigns both scan sheets with shadow-card-bevel chips, tracked-mono kickers, severity row tinting with a left accent rail, and tabular-nums timestamps. Surfaces a destructive policy-violation banner on scans whose policy_evaluation row flags a block, and fixes the compare sheet's delta ribbon so CRITICAL net-positive deltas render in destructive (not warning) tone. Backend parses the JSON policy_evaluation column at the API boundary so the UI receives a structured object. * chore(security): suppress CVE-2026-32281 and CVE-2026-32283 in Trivy scan Both CVEs affect Go stdlib crypto/x509 and TLS in Docker CLI 29.4.0 (Go 1.26.1) and Compose v5.1.2 (Go 1.25.8). No upstream static binary has been released with the patched Go 1.26.2 or 1.25.9 runtimes yet. Exposure analysis: the Docker CLI and compose plugin connect to the local Docker socket (Unix socket, no TLS) and to public registries with well-known CAs. Neither CVE is exploitable in this configuration. Added alongside sibling entries already in .trivyignore for the same binary versions. Revisit on next Docker CLI and Compose upstream release. |
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Anso
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6b8c369745 |
fix(notifications): stop Sencho version notifications from silently skipping (#594)
* fix(notifications): stop Sencho version notifications from silently skipping Three independent defects combined to make version-update notifications silently fail even while Fleet overview correctly surfaced an update button: - The in-memory 6-hour cooldown was advanced before the network fetch, so a single transient failure at boot could lock the check for the rest of the container lifetime. Moved the cooldown update inside the success branch so failures retry on the next eval cycle. - MonitorService called the raw version fetch directly, bypassing the CacheService wrapper (TTL, inflight dedup, stale-on-error) that Fleet uses, so the two paths could diverge. Unified both on a shared getLatestVersion() helper in utils/version-check.ts. - The dedup key could carry stale state from a previous build and never self-clear. It now self-heals when the running version reaches the previously-notified version, so future releases re-fire as expected. Added diagnostic logs gated on debug mode for each skip branch, plus three regression tests covering cooldown-on-failure, cooldown-on-success, and dedup self-heal. * docs(notifications): drop legacy-upgrade framing from alerts troubleshooting Sencho has not shipped publicly, so troubleshooting entries written in 'this used to happen but now does Y' mode reference a past that does not exist for any reader. Rewrote the version-notification, image-update, and crash-alert troubleshooting entries to describe current behavior positively without referring to prior builds, upgrade paths, or legacy fixes. * chore(security): accept CVE-2026-33810 in bundled Docker CLI 29.4.0 Trivy now flags CVE-2026-33810 (Go stdlib crypto/x509 DNS constraint bypass, fixed in Go 1.26.2) in the Docker CLI static binary we ship. Docker CLI 29.4.0 is the latest upstream release and still links Go 1.26.1; no newer static binary exists yet. Same exposure profile as the already-accepted CVE-2026-32280: the Docker CLI and compose plugin only validate certificates from well-known registry CAs and the local Docker socket, not from attacker-controlled CAs with crafted DNS name constraints. Revisit on the next Docker CLI release that rebuilds against Go 1.26.2 or later. |
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Anso
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7334658927 |
chore(security): accept CVE-2026-32280 in .trivyignore (#548)
Go stdlib crypto/x509 certificate chain building DoS affects Docker CLI 29.4.0 (Go 1.26.1) and Compose v5.1.2 (Go 1.25.8). Fix requires Go 1.25.9 or 1.26.2; no upstream static binary ships a patched runtime yet. Not exploitable in our usage since the CLI and compose plugin connect to the local Docker socket or registries with well-known CAs. |
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Anso
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a17b16b258 |
fix(scheduler): harden auto-update policies with cascade deletes, error reporting, and UI fixes (#545)
* fix(scheduler): harden auto-update policies with cascade deletes, error reporting, and UI fixes
- Fix orphaned task runs on policy/node deletion with transaction-wrapped cascade deletes
- Make manual trigger non-blocking (202 Accepted) to prevent proxy timeouts
- Distinguish registry check failures from clean "no update" results via structured ImageCheckResult
- Trim whitespace-only policy names in both frontend and backend validation
- Add strokeWidth={1.5} to action icons per design system
- Add sr-only DialogDescription for Radix accessibility
- Replace Select with Combobox for frequency picker
- Wrap run history sheet content in ScrollArea
- Support concurrent Run Now indicators via Set-based state
- Abort stale stack fetches on node switch with AbortController
- Add standard and diagnostic logging to SchedulerService and ImageUpdateService
- Add tests for cascade deletes, image checking, and scheduler edge cases
- Add troubleshooting section to auto-update docs
* fix(tests): resolve lint errors in image-update-service tests
Remove unused mock variables (mockGetImage, mockGetDocker) and unused
ImageCheckResult type import. Replace CommonJS require('yaml') with
ESM import to satisfy no-require-imports rule.
* chore(deps): bump Docker CLI to 29.4.0 and Compose to v5.1.2
Resolves Trivy CVE-2026-32282 (Go stdlib symlink follow in Root.Chmod)
by upgrading to releases that ship Go 1.25.9. Compose v5.1.2 also bumps
grpc to 1.80.0, resolving CVE-2026-33186.
* chore(security): accept CVE-2026-32282 in .trivyignore, update stale refs
Go stdlib symlink-following in Root.Chmod (CVE-2026-32282) affects both
Docker CLI 29.4.0 (Go 1.26.1) and Compose v5.1.2 (Go 1.25.8). Fix
requires Go 1.25.9 or 1.26.2; no upstream static binary ships a patched
runtime yet. The vulnerable code path requires a chroot context with
attacker-controlled filesystem, which does not apply to our usage.
Also updates version references from v5.1.1/v29.3.1 to v5.1.2/v29.4.0
for existing CVE entries, and notes that Compose v5.1.2 resolved
CVE-2026-33186 (grpc bumped to 1.80.0) for the compose binary.
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Anso
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fdb476a84a |
ci: hard-fail PR and release scans on unacknowledged HIGH/CRITICAL CVEs (#484)
* ci: hard-fail PR and release scans on unacknowledged HIGH/CRITICAL CVEs Make Trivy a real gate instead of an advisory signal: - PR CI (docker-validate) no longer uses `continue-on-error: true` on the Trivy step, so any HIGH/CRITICAL finding not in `.trivyignore` fails the PR. - The release pipeline (docker-publish.yml) now builds an amd64-only scan image into the local daemon before the multi-arch push-build, re-runs Trivy against that exact artifact, and only proceeds to the push if the scan passes. This closes the gap where a CVE landed between PR merge and release-time rebuild. - New `.trivyignore` at repo root is the single source of truth for acknowledged CVEs across both workflows; it starts empty so the first CI run surfaces the full list, which we then populate with justifications. * ci: populate .trivyignore with initial HIGH/CRITICAL acknowledgements First CI run on the hard-fail Trivy policy surfaced 7 unacknowledged findings. Each has been reviewed and justified inline: - 6 CVEs in the statically-linked Go modules inside docker-compose v5.1.1 (github.com/docker/docker, buildkit, otel/sdk x2, grpc). These are transitively bundled and cannot be bumped without an upstream Compose rebuild. The grpc CVE is already explicitly acknowledged in the Dockerfile rationale block at Dockerfile:108-111. - 1 CVE in picomatch 4.0.3 bundled inside the npm CLI that ships with node:22-alpine. npm is only invoked at build time against our own package.json, so the ReDoS vector is not reachable. Every entry has a revisit trigger (next Compose release or next Alpine node bump). |