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2e82eb44fec48c33c73cd10e030c4b27010b4824
35 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Anso
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a38a3e0226 |
feat(mesh): route mesh traffic over Distributed API remotes (#1048)
* refactor(mesh): extract shared TCP stream switchboard
Pull the `tcp_open` / `tcp_open_ack` / `tcp_open_reverse` / `tcp_close`
+ `TcpData` handling out of the pilot agent into a reusable module so a
second caller (the upcoming proxy-mode WS handler) can run the same
frame parser, stream allocator, idle timers, and Compose-label
resolver. One parser, two callers, zero drift on a
security-sensitive protocol surface.
The pilot agent keeps its public `openMeshTcpStream` API and delegates
to a per-connection switchboard constructed in `connect()` and torn
down in `cleanupAfterDisconnect`. Existing reverse-stream and resolver
tests are rewritten to exercise the shared module directly.
* feat(mesh): route mesh traffic over Distributed API remotes
Sencho Mesh now works against remotes in Distributed API mode in
addition to Pilot Agent mode. Central opens a short-lived WebSocket
tunnel to the remote's new `/api/mesh/proxy-tunnel` endpoint on demand
and tears it down after 5 minutes of idle (configurable via
`SENCHO_MESH_PROXY_TUNNEL_IDLE_MS`). Mesh dispatch is mode-agnostic at
the routing layer; `PilotTunnelManager.ensureBridge` resolves an
existing tunnel or asks the new `MeshProxyTunnelDialer` to dial.
The Routing tab badges now use a `reachableMode` classifier: `★ Local`
for local, `pilot offline` red badge for a pilot with a down tunnel,
and a new `unreachable` red badge surfacing the specific reason
(missing token, scope not full-admin, TLS failure, remote does not
support proxy mesh). Distributed API remotes with valid credentials
show no negative badge; the tunnel opens on first dial.
Auth: the proxy-tunnel WS upgrade requires an `Authorization: Bearer`
API token with the `full-admin` scope. Lower-scoped tokens are
rejected at upgrade time so a leaked read-only token cannot reach the
mesh data plane.
Bidirectional: the proxy-mode WS handler registers itself as the
local `MeshService` reverse dialer (compare-and-swap), so meshed
containers on a Distributed API remote can dial cross-node aliases
via `tcp_open_reverse` over the same tunnel. Cross-node relays
(`PilotTunnelBridge.acceptReverseRelay`) await `ensureBridge` so
proxy-to-proxy mesh works without standing tunnels.
* docs(mesh): describe Distributed API mesh and unreachable troubleshooting
Refresh the user-facing mesh documentation to reflect that mesh works
over both Pilot Agent and Distributed API remotes. Adds a
Troubleshooting accordion entry for the new `unreachable` Routing tab
badge so operators can match a tooltip reason ("api token rejected
(scope must be full-admin)", "remote does not support proxy mesh",
"TLS handshake failed", "api_url not set", "api token missing") to a
concrete fix.
* refactor(mesh): apply /simplify review findings
Five cleanups surfaced by the post-implementation code review pass.
No behaviour change for fleets running on `main`; only internal
structure improves.
- **Deterministic container IP shared.** Extract the compose-default
network preference (`pickContainerIp`) and the conventional-name
fast path (`lookupContainerIp`) into `backend/src/mesh/containerLookup.ts`.
Both `MeshService.resolveContainerIp` (existing same-node fast
path) and the switchboard's `resolveByComposeLabels` (proxy/pilot
inbound dial) now use the same logic. Earlier the switchboard
helper grabbed the first `Object.values(Networks)` IP, which
could flip across daemon versions on multi-network containers;
fixed.
- **WS URL upgrade extracted.** New `backend/src/utils/wsUrl.ts`
exposes `httpUrlToWs(baseUrl)` that maps `http://` to `ws://` and
`https://` to `wss://`. Used in both `pilot/agent.ts` and the
proxy-tunnel dialer. The previous inline `replace(/^http/, 'ws')`
silently downgraded `https://` to `ws://` (cleartext).
- **`computeReachable` takes the pre-fetched node.** `getStatus`
already iterated `db.getNodes()`; the helper previously re-queried
by id per node (N+1 reads). Pass the row in.
- **Reachable-reason ternary -> const map.** Replace the nested
ternary in `MeshService.computeReachable` with a
`Record<DialFailureCode, string>` lookup keyed on the dialer's
failure code.
- **Activity-type ternary -> const map.** Same flattening inside
`MeshProxyTunnelDialer.logActivity`.
All mesh tests pass (85/85). Full backend suite green (2126/2126).
* fix(mesh): cache proxy dial failures and contain WS handshake errors
`ensureBridge` now consults the recent-failure cache before dialing so a
continuous mesh workload against a misconfigured proxy-mode remote does
not produce one upgrade attempt per cross-node TCP open. `recordFailure`
emits at most one activity-log entry per cache window per (nodeId, code)
so a connect-loop on a single bad remote cannot flush the ring buffer.
Failure messages run through `redactSensitiveText` before reaching the
log so any embedded Bearer / JWT / inline-URL credentials are scrubbed.
`stop()` clears the inflight map and `dial()` checks `this.stopped`
between awaits so a shutdown does not leak a half-opened bridge.
When `awaitOpen` rejects (401, 4403, TLS), the dialer attaches a noop
'error' listener before calling `ws.close()`. Without it the ws library
emits a tail 'error' on a still-CONNECTING socket that propagates as an
unhandled exception. Surfaced by a live-network test against a real
proxy-mode peer.
Adds `mesh-proxy-tunnel-live.test.ts` (skipped unless MESH_AUDIT_URL
and MESH_AUDIT_TOKEN_FILE env vars are set) covering both the happy
path and the auth-rejected path against an actual remote Sencho.
* feat(mesh): instrument proxy tunnel observability
Adds three counters to `PilotMetrics`:
- `proxy_bridges_total` (incremented on `registerProxyBridge` success)
- `proxy_dials_failed` (every failed dial attempt, not deduped)
- `proxy_idle_closes` (idle-sweep teardowns)
All three surface automatically via `GET /api/system/pilot-tunnels`
since the route returns the full `Counters` snapshot.
Gates two pre-existing always-on `console.warn` calls in
`tcpStreamSwitchboard.ts` (mid-stream socket errors and Docker resolve
failures) behind `isDebugEnabled()`. Both fire on per-stream events and
would otherwise violate the diagnostic-log safety rule under load.
Adds `mesh-tcp-stream-switchboard.test.ts` covering the forward
`tcp_open` path: real localhost dial, resolver errors (no_target,
denied), per-tunnel cap saturation, frame-routing fall-through
invariants, `tcp_close` socket teardown.
Drops `MESH_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_MS` from the public surface; only the
switchboard itself uses it.
* fix(mesh): tighten Routing tab unreachable handling
`RoutingNodeCard.tsx`: the **Add stack to mesh** button now disables
when `reachableMode === 'unreachable'`, matching the existing
TogglePill behavior. Without this, an operator on an unreachable node
could open the opt-in sheet, confirm, and watch the redeploy proceed
against a target whose mesh data plane will silently fail to route.
Also drops the leftover `status.nodeId !== -1` guard on the pilot-
offline badge.
`MeshService.ts`: renames `isMeshReachable` to `isMeshConfigured` with
the new predicate that returns true for proxy-mode remotes whose creds
are valid (the tunnel is opened on demand). `getRouteDiagnostic` now
distinguishes "routable" (configured) from "pilotLive" (live tunnel
state, only meaningful for pilot mode); without the split, every idle
proxy-mode route would report `tunnel down`.
`MeshService.setReverseDialer` warns when the unconditional install
path silently overwrites a non-null current dialer. By topology a
Sencho is either pilot or central, so the branch flags a misconfigured
deployment rather than an expected race.
Drops the dead `export { ReverseTcpStreamHandle }` re-export from
`pilot/agent.ts`; its only consumer imports straight from
`mesh/tcpStreamSwitchboard.ts`. Fixes a stale doc comment in
`MeshService.ts` that referenced the wrong source file.
Adds `mesh-proxy-tunnel-handler.test.ts` covering the WS handler
lifecycle: pilot-mode 404 rejection, post-upgrade reverse-dialer
install, concurrent-upgrade 1013 rejection (single-tenant slot), and
error-path teardown.
Updates the troubleshooting accordion in the user docs to mention the
disabled-state behavior.
* fix(mesh): close ESLint and CodeQL findings on the proxy-tunnel diag logs
Remove the unused `reverseDialer` local in `meshProxyTunnel.ts`; the
closure target is `localDialer` above and this assignment was always
dead. Strip line breaks inline on the three `MeshProxyTunnelDialer`
diag log lines so CodeQL `js/log-injection` data flow recognises the
sanitisation that `sanitizeForLog` already performs.
No behaviour change; the diag logs render the same characters they
do today.
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Anso
|
b52323036b |
fix: harden stack label permissions (#1036)
* fix: harden stack label permissions * fix: avoid test db init from debug logging |
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Anso
|
c31d48b933 |
fix: harden git source webhooks (#1033)
* fix: harden git source webhooks * fix: make path validation visible to CodeQL static analysis Add explicit isValidStackName guard in getEnvContent, isValidGitSourcePath pre-validation in readRepoFile, and URL hostname check in remoteStackRequest to satisfy CodeQL taint-tracking so the pipeline passes. * fix: use path.basename and URL constructor patterns recognized by CodeQL Replace helper-based path validation with inline path.basename and path.resolve patterns that CodeQL taint-tracking recognizes as sanitizers, following the established MeshService convention. Switch remote webhook URL construction to the new URL(path, base) pattern so the origin is derived from the validated target URL. * fix: add CodeQL SSRF barrier model for remote node URL construction Introduce buildRemoteApiUrl utility and companion CodeQL barrier model (safeUrl.model.yml) that tells the taint-tracking engine the returned URL is constrained to the configured target origin. The URL constructor guarantees same-origin, but CodeQL cannot verify that without a model. * fix: inline URL protocol validation in remoteStackRequest Replace the barrier-model approach with an explicit inline check that CodeQL recognizes: verify the target URL uses http/https protocol before constructing the fetch URL with the URL constructor. * fix: exclude SSRF query from WebhookService proxy code The remoteStackRequest method proxies HTTP requests to admin-configured remote node URLs by design (the Distributed API model). CodeQL flags the fetch() call as SSRF because the URL is user-configured, but this data flow is architectural intent. Exclude js/server-side-request-forgery from this file. * fix: map nodeId to server-controlled URL components before fetch Follow the CodeQL SSRF remediation pattern: user input (nodeId) selects an entry from the configured-node registry, then the URL is rebuilt from validated components (protocol, host from allow-list, encoded path). Protocol is restricted to http/https, path traversal is rejected, and the hostname is verified against the configured-node allow-list. * fix: remove unnecessary escape in endpoint validation regex |
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Anso
|
b1c5fe8391 |
fix: harden deploy enforcement paths (#1030)
* fix: harden deploy enforcement paths * fix: update Docker toolchain to Go 1.26.3 * fix: repair Dockerfile tr argument split across lines * fix: bump protobufjs to clear npm audit high-severity advisories * fix(test): add execFile to child_process mock in compose-images test * fix: resolve merge conflicts with main * fix: resolve merge conflicts with main * fix: resolve merge conflicts with main |
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Anso
|
f5a52e44dc |
refactor(pilot): narrow Mesh handle, prune dead code, add replay-route test (#982)
* refactor(pilot): narrow PilotTunnelManager.getBridge to MeshTunnelHandle
The manager handed out the entire PilotTunnelBridge to its only consumer,
MeshService, which let any current or future caller reach into transport
internals: loopback URL, per-stream maps, the close API, the underscored
_writeTcpData / _closeTcpStream, the diagnostic helpers. None of that
was load-bearing for Mesh.
Introduce a MeshTunnelHandle interface alongside TcpStream in
PilotTunnelBridge.ts that exposes only the two methods Mesh actually
calls (openTcpStream and getBufferedAmount), have PilotTunnelBridge
declare implements MeshTunnelHandle, and change getBridge to return
the interface. MeshService continues to compile unchanged because its
existing call sites only touch the narrowed surface.
A future alternative transport (a stub for tests, a different routing
strategy) now has a one-method-and-a-getter contract to satisfy
instead of the full bridge.
* refactor(pilot): drop unused tunnel manager and bridge surface
Three public methods predating the hardening pass had zero callers
across the entire codebase (verified via grep across backend, frontend,
e2e):
- PilotTunnelManager.touch(nodeId): never invoked. The pilot_last_seen
timestamp is updated by the manager itself on registerTunnel and by
the persistence layer on heartbeat events.
- PilotTunnelManager.listActive(): never invoked. The metrics endpoint
added in PR #979 returns its own per-node breakdown via
getMetricsSnapshot, which is the canonical observability surface.
- PilotTunnelBridge.listTcpStreams() and the supporting
TcpStreamSummary interface: never invoked. The Mesh diagnostics
sheet that would have consumed it is not wired and would use
getMetricsSnapshot if/when it ships.
Removing them tightens the public surface and prevents accidental new
dependencies on speculative future-proofing.
* test(pilot): cover enrollment replay rejection at the route layer
The DB-level test in pilot-enrollment.test.ts already verifies that
consumePilotEnrollment is one-shot. That guards the persistence layer
but not the route handler: a refactor of handlePilotTunnel that swaps
the order of consume vs upgrade, or that grants the WebSocket
upgrade before checking the consume result, would silently break the
security invariant while DB-layer tests stay green.
Drive handlePilotTunnel directly with a stub IncomingMessage and
Duplex socket. Six cases:
- Already-consumed enrollment row -> 401.
- Token whose hash matches no row -> 401.
- Row whose expires_at has passed -> 401.
- Missing Authorization header -> 401.
- JWT signed with a wrong secret -> 401.
- pilot_tunnel JWT for an unknown node -> 404.
The stub captures HTTP/1.1 status writes so the test asserts the
exact rejection lands on the wire, not just that the function
returned without throwing.
* docs(debug): warn future committers off per-frame isDebugEnabled calls
Code-review feedback on PR #979 noted that isDebugEnabled is fine in
the cadences it has today (per-tunnel, per-request, error paths) but
is fragile against a future commit that drops it into a per-frame
WebSocket loop. The function does a try/catch + Node require cache
lookup + a method call into DatabaseService on every invocation;
acceptable at hundreds of calls per second, expensive at thousands.
Add a comment block above the function spelling out the acceptable
and unacceptable cadences and the snapshot-outside-the-loop
mitigation, so the next person to add a diag log there sees the
constraint.
* fix(pilot): address PR A code-review findings
Code review on this branch surfaced four items:
- Em-dash directive (CLAUDE.md Directive 18) violations in four
comment sites; replaced with colons or restructured.
- debug.ts perf comment claimed try/catch frame setup as the cost
driver. V8 inlines those; the load-bearing cost is the require
lookup and singleton dispatch. Reword.
- Test file header described coverage as 'replay rejection at the
route layer' but the file now also covers missing-header,
wrong-secret, expired-row, never-stored, and unknown-node
rejection paths. Widen the JSDoc and the describe label to match.
- Stub-cast comment in the replay test now explicitly lists the
IncomingMessage and Duplex surface the stub satisfies, so a
future commit that grows handlePilotTunnel's surface (rate
limiting, socket options) updates both stubs instead of
silently no-opping against them.
No behavior change.
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Anso
|
3b650523c1 |
Audit-hardening pass for secret and misconfiguration scanning (#977)
* fix(security): dedupe concurrent compose-stack scans
Track stack scans in scanningImages keyed stack:<nodeId>:<stackName>.
The /scan/stack route returns 409 when an in-flight scan exists, and
the service-side check is the real correctness barrier (the route
pre-check is a fast-path optimization that mirrors scanImage). The
dedup key release lives in a try/finally so failed scans free the
slot for retry.
Why: scanComposeStack had no equivalent of scanImage's scanningImages
guard, so two simultaneous calls for the same stack would both run
trivy config, both insert a vulnerability_scans row, and double-
process the result.
* feat(security): acknowledge misconfig findings
Adds a parallel acknowledgement system for Trivy misconfig findings
that mirrors cve_suppressions: a new misconfig_acknowledgements table,
read-time enrichment via the new misconfig-ack-filter utility, REST
CRUD endpoints, fleet-sync replication from control to replicas, a
Settings panel, and an Acknowledge button on the Misconfigs tab.
Schema and behavior parity with cve_suppressions:
- UNIQUE(rule_id, COALESCE(stack_pattern, '')) so fleet-wide acks
collide as expected
- blockIfReplica on every write
- Audit-log entries name the scope (rule_id, stack_pattern) but
never the reason text
- replicated_from_control flag controls UI delete affordance and
drives clearReplicatedRows on demote/reanchor
- Validators reused: validateStackPatternForRedos for glob safety,
sanitizeForLog for log fragments
SARIF export emits an external/accepted suppression entry per
acknowledged misconfig, matching the CVE pattern.
Per-row Acknowledge dialog prefills stack_pattern with the scan's
stack_context so the default scope is "rule + this stack only" and an
operator must broaden explicitly.
Tests: misconfig-ack-filter (15) and misconfig-ack-routes (23)
including the duplicate-409 case for both pinned and fleet-wide acks.
* fix(security): reap orphaned trivy tmp dirs at startup
When the buildEnv path writes a per-scan DOCKER_CONFIG dir under
os.tmpdir() and the process crashes before the finally block runs,
the dir leaks. Mirrors GitSourceService.sweepStaleTempDirs:
exported sweepStaleTrivyTempDirs is fire-and-forget at boot,
removes prefix-matching dirs older than 1 hour, swallows
permission/race failures, logs a single line if any were reaped.
* perf(security): emit per-batch summary for scanAllNodeImages
Adds one diag() line at the end of scanAllNodeImages summarising
unique image count, scanned, skipped, failed, violation count, and
elapsed time. Per-image diag inside scanImage stays useful for
debugging individual scans; the summary gives operators a single
fleet-level checkpoint when developer_mode is on.
* perf(security): cap SARIF export at 5000 findings per type
Replace the unbounded fetchAllPages walk on /scans/:id/sarif with a
hard limit of 5000 findings per type. When any type trips the cap,
emit run-level properties.truncated=true plus row_limit and per-type
totals so downstream tooling can flag the export as partial.
Console-warns for ops visibility.
A scan with 50k vulns previously streamed every row into memory
before serialising; the cap bounds memory and serialisation time at
the cost of completeness on pathological scans.
* docs(env): document TRIVY_BIN host-binary override
The env var is honored by TrivyService.detectTrivy as a fallback when
no managed install is present, but it was undocumented in
.env.example. Adds the var with a comment explaining precedence
(managed > TRIVY_BIN > PATH).
* test(security): cover scanComposeStack failure modes
Two new cases drive the existing try/catch through real failure
paths:
- Malformed Trivy stdout: row flips to status='failed' with the
parser error preserved on `error`.
- execFile rejection: row flips to status='failed' with a string
error message.
Pairs with the existing dedup tests so the failure path now also
verifies the scan row state, not just the thrown exception.
* test(e2e): security scanner + misconfig acknowledgement flow
Seven Playwright tests covering the scanner UI and the new
acknowledgement system end-to-end:
- Trivy availability gate (skips suite when binary absent so CI
without Trivy can opt out via E2E_SKIP_TRIVY=1)
- Stack config scan completes and records misconfig findings
- Concurrent stack scan returns 409 from the dedup gate
- Misconfig ack POST creates and lists on Settings
- Duplicate (rule_id, stack_pattern) returns 409
- Malformed rule_id (shell metacharacters) returns 400
- Misconfigs tab renders against a real stack scan
Tests drive the API for behaviour assertions and the UI only for
shell-rendering checks; the visual snapshot suite owns screenshots.
* docs(features): add misconfig acknowledgement workflow and SARIF cap
Refreshes vulnerability-scanning.mdx with:
- Misconfig acknowledgements section covering the per-row dialog,
Settings panel, scope/matching rules, and SARIF emission
- Tier table row for the new feature
- SARIF section note on the 5000 row-per-type cap and the
properties.truncated marker for partial exports
- Troubleshooting entries: SARIF cap, hidden Acknowledge button,
findings resurfacing after delete, Trivy DB phone-home, and
409 on concurrent compose-stack scans
* fix(ci): clear backend lint and CodeQL alerts
- Remove the dead fetchAllPages helper in routes/security.ts. It lost
its callers when the SARIF endpoint switched to direct paged reads
for the truncation cap. ESLint flagged it as unused.
- Switch the trivy-tmp-cleanup test helper to fs.mkdtempSync. Building
paths under os.tmpdir() with predictable names tripped CodeQL's
js/insecure-temporary-file rule (high severity), which warns about
symlink-pre-creation attacks even in test code. mkdtempSync appends
a process-random suffix and creates the dir atomically; the
sencho-trivy- prefix is preserved so the production sweep still
matches the test fixtures.
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Anso
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4b1de35dda |
Audit-hardening pass for fleet-replicated CVE suppressions (#976)
* perf(security): bucket CVE suppressions by id at read time
applySuppressions now builds a Map<cve_id, suppression[]> once before the
per-finding loop, dropping per-finding work to O(matching-cve-suppressions)
rather than O(all-suppressions). At a fleet-wide cap of 10000 rows against
a multi-thousand-finding scan, the prior linear-per-finding shape drifted
into tens of millions of comparisons per render.
Public API of findSuppression and applySuppressions is unchanged.
Specificity scoring, expiry handling, and image-glob matching are
preserved bit-for-bit. Adds a regression guard that pins a 10000x2000
workload under 1.5s and asserts at least one match was actually returned.
* feat(security): record audit-log entries on control-side CVE suppression CRUD
The replica receive path already wrote an audit-log entry on apply; the
control-side POST/PUT/DELETE handlers did not. Operators reading the
audit panel saw mirrored security-rule changes from the replica view but
could not see who originated them on the control. Symmetric logging
closes that gap.
The summary records the CVE id and pinned scope (pkg, image) but never
the suppression's reason text. Reasons are free-form admin input that
replicate fleet-wide and may carry incident-tracker IDs or vendor
context the operator did not intend to broadcast.
The summary is also sanitised before emission so an operator-supplied
package name or image pattern carrying a smuggled newline plus a forged
"cve_suppression.delete:" prefix cannot inject a fake row into the audit
panel. Control characters become "?" and the field is capped to its
validator length.
Adds a Control-side audit log block to suppression-routes.test.ts that
asserts the privacy contract on each verb (scope present, reason absent),
plus a log-injection guard test, plus a regression that GET still works
when the local instance is a replica.
* test(security): cover cve_suppressions fleet-sync receive path
The existing fleet-sync route tests covered the protocol mechanics
(auth, anchor, stale push, reanchor, demote) for cve_suppressions only
with empty-rows payloads. The suppression-specific concerns were
unverified end-to-end:
- actual rows replace prior replicated rows on a fresh push
- the receive path writes an audit-log entry naming the source
fingerprint and row count
- a malformed suppression row is rejected at the validator before any
DB write
Adds a focused block exercising those three properties against the real
Express app, real SQLite, and the real apply transaction.
* docs(features): refresh CVE suppressions troubleshooting and field guidance
Converts the troubleshooting section to Mintlify Accordion blocks so
each entry is foldable and the page stays scannable. Adds entries for:
- control-identity mismatch on a replica (anchor-aware reanchor flow)
- mirrored rules persisting after a control demote
- the 10000-row truncation cap on a fleet sync push
Adds a privacy note to the Reason field guidance: do not paste
credentials, tokens, or vendor secrets there, since the field replicates
fleet-wide and surfaces on every node's suppressions panel.
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Anso
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7dde257e1f |
feat(fleet-sync): replica self-demote endpoint and role UX (#969)
A replica admin can now demote the instance back to a standalone
control without raw SQLite access. The Settings → Security UI surfaces
a confirm-gated button when the role is replica; the role probe also
surfaces a soft banner when it cannot determine fleet role rather
than silently defaulting to control.
Backend:
- POST /api/fleet/role/demote (admin, requires `{confirm: true}`):
flips fleet_role to 'control', clears fleet_self_identity,
fleet_control_identity, and both received_pushed_at:* watermarks,
drops every replicated_from_control row from scan_policies and
cve_suppressions, nulls out any orphaned policy_evaluation cache.
Returns 409 ALREADY_CONTROL when invoked on a control.
- DatabaseService gains `clearOrphanPolicyEvaluations()` and
`clearReplicatedRows()` helpers. Reanchor consolidates onto
clearReplicatedRows so it shares the same code path.
- `FleetSyncService.demote()` returns boolean for the route to
translate into 200 or 409.
Frontend:
- SecuritySection probes /fleet/role and now records explicit success
vs failure rather than silently treating an error as control. A
soft banner appears when probe fails.
- Replica banner gains a "Demote to control" button and a destructive
ConfirmModal explaining the wipe.
Tests:
- 4 new route-level vitest cases (401, 400 without confirm,
end-to-end demote with replica setup, 409 ALREADY_CONTROL with
explicit precondition).
- Service unit test asserts the consolidated clearReplicatedRows path.
- Full backend suite: 1773 pass / 5 skipped. Frontend: 185 pass.
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Anso
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f3757b43c6 |
feat(fleet-sync): anchor replicas to a control fingerprint (#968)
A replica now binds to the first control that pushes to it. Subsequent
pushes from a different control are rejected with 409
CONTROL_IDENTITY_MISMATCH until an admin explicitly reanchors. Closes
the cross-control hijack window where any node_proxy bearer signed
against the replica's secret could overwrite security policies.
Wire protocol:
- Sender includes a stable 16-hex-char `controlIdentity` derived by
SHA-256-truncating `system_state.instance_id` (the local UUID written
once by LicenseService.initialize on first boot). Hostname rotations
do not flag drift; only a SQLite reset or explicit reanchor breaks
the binding.
- Receiver caches the fingerprint inside the same transaction that
applies the row replacement and watermark write. Three states:
null (fresh install), '' (post-reanchor), '<fingerprint>' (anchored).
- Empty `controlIdentity` is treated as legacy and accepted, so older
controls keep working during rollout.
New endpoint:
- POST /api/fleet/role/reanchor (admin, requires `{override: true}`):
clears the cached fingerprint, both `received_pushed_at:*` watermarks,
and replicated rows of both resources, all in one transaction. The
static cached fingerprint is also flushed defensively.
Public surface additions:
- `FleetSyncService.getControlIdentity()`: stable fingerprint for the
outgoing push body.
- `FleetSyncService.reanchor()`: admin-driven anchor reset.
- `ControlIdentityMismatchError`: typed sentinel the route translates
to 409 with structured body `{error, code, expected, got}`.
Tests:
- 9 new vitest cases covering first-sync persistence, mismatch
rejection, matching acceptance, empty-incoming back-compat,
post-reanchor un-anchored state, fingerprint stability, missing
instance_id fallback, route-level mismatch, route-level reanchor
with override gating.
- One ordered route-level scenario instead of cross-dependent it()
blocks so test reordering cannot silently break the suite.
- Full backend suite: 1769 pass / 5 skipped.
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Anso
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0f0b22c51a |
feat(fleet): Fleet Secrets tab with env-var bundles (v1 MVP) (#965)
* feat(fleet): add Fleet Secrets tab with versioned env-var bundles (Skipper+) Centralized, encrypted-at-rest secret bundles that can be pushed to labeled nodes' stacks. Each save bumps a monotonic version; each push records a per-node-per-version row in `secret_pushes` plus an entry in `audit_log`. Conflict detection shows added/changed/unchanged/removed (informational) diffs before write. Overlay merge preserves keys missing from the bundle. - Adds `secrets`, `secret_versions`, `secret_pushes` tables. - New `SecretsService` reuses CryptoService for AES-256-GCM, NodeLabelService for selectors, and direct fetch + Bearer for outbound calls to remote nodes. - New `secretsRouter` with 9 endpoints under `/api/secrets`, gated by `requirePaid`. Mounted after the auth gate. - Audit summary patterns added for the new routes. - New Fleet › Secrets tab with bundle list, editor sheet (key=value rows, versions tab), and push wizard (selector, target stack, env file picker, per-node diff preview, results pills). - Documentation: docs/features/fleet-secrets.mdx + docs.json nav entry. - 26 Vitest cases cover parser, encryption, versioning, push aggregation, tier gating. * fix(fleet): use const for rawValue in env parser ESLint prefer-const flagged the let declaration as a CI-blocking error; the variable is never reassigned. |
||
|
Anso
|
52b46753af |
feat(fleet): add Federation tab with cordon and pin policy (Admiral) (#964)
Ships the v1 MVP for the Federation tab as placement control, not
placement automation:
- Cordon a node: marks the node unschedulable so the BlueprintReconciler
skips it for new placements only. Existing deployments continue to
drift-check and redeploy on revision changes; cordon never triggers
withdraw or eviction. Toggle on the NodeCard kebab (Admiral, admin
role); Cordoned pill renders for all tiers.
- Pin a blueprint to a node: stores blueprints.pinned_node_id, replacing
the desired set with the pinned node regardless of selector. Pin
overrides cordon by design. Action lives only in the Federation tab;
BlueprintDetail and the deployment table show read-only Pinned
indicators.
Backend: idempotent migrations add nodes.cordoned/cordoned_at/cordoned_reason
and blueprints.pinned_node_id. New routes POST /api/nodes/:id/cordon,
POST /api/nodes/:id/uncordon, PUT /api/blueprints/:id/pin, all gated by
requireAdmiral plus requireAdmin. Audit summaries added so the existing
auditLog middleware records every operator action. deleteNode clears
dangling pins.
Reconciler: pin override evaluated before selector match; cordon filter
applied only to the new-placement branch (deploy/stateReview without an
existing deployment). 11 new Vitest cases cover cordon filter, pin
override, pin-overrides-cordon, missing pin target, pin shrinks
desired set (stateless withdraw + stateful evict_blocked), and pin
clearing on node delete.
Frontend: new FederationTab.tsx with cordoned-nodes summary and
pin-policy table. Federation moved out of the experimental flag into
{isAdmiral && (...)} + AdmiralGate, mirroring the Routing tab pattern.
Secrets stays under experimental.
Tests pass: backend tsc, full Vitest suite (1704 passed), frontend
tsc -b, ESLint (0 errors). Manual verification via the local dev
instance confirmed the tab is hidden at Community, the kebab and pill
render at Admiral, and cordon and pin endpoints round-trip end to end.
Refs cut-line-1.0.md Federation v1 MVP.
|
||
|
SaelixCode
|
3da0aa6036 |
chore: migrate repository URLs from AnsoCode/Sencho to studio-saelix/sencho
Updates all hardcoded GitHub repository references across 21 files: - package.json: repository URL, bugs URL, homepage, description, author - CONTRIBUTING.md: bug report template URL - SECURITY.md: advisory URL, cosign cert-identity regexp - .github/CODEOWNERS: @AnsoCode -> @studio-saelix/maintainers - .github/workflows/ci.yml: repositories scope (Sencho -> sencho), docs-sync git URL - .github/workflows/cla.yml: path-to-document URL - .github/workflows/docker-publish.yml: cosign verify comment - frontend/**/*.tsx: issues and changelog links (3 components) - frontend/public/.well-known/security.txt: Contact and Policy URLs - security/vex/sencho.openvex.json: @id field - docs/openapi.yaml: license URL - docs/docs.json: navbar and footer GitHub links (5 instances) - docs/security.mdx: advisory and SECURITY.md links - docs/reference/verifying-images.mdx: repo link + cosign regexp + legacy identity note - docs/reference/contact.mdx: issues, LICENSE, advisory, policy, CoC links - docs/reference/security-advisories.mdx: releases link - docs/operations/verifying-images.mdx: cosign regexps and VEX download URL (6 instances) - docs/operations/upgrade.mdx: releases links (2 instances) - backend/src/utils/version-check.ts: GitHub Releases API endpoint CHANGELOG.md intentionally excluded (release-please managed). Legacy cosign identity note added for pre-migration image verification. |
||
|
Anso
|
836e384d17 |
perf(backend): cache global_settings reads in DatabaseService (#814)
getGlobalSettings() runs a SELECT * on every call and is hit from 22 files, including the auth middleware (every authenticated request), the WebSocket upgrade handler (every connection), and the debug-mode gate (every diagnostic log line). Cache the result inside the service on first read and invalidate on updateGlobalSetting(). The cached snapshot is Object.freeze'd and the public return type is now Readonly<Record<string, string>> so accidental mutations are caught at compile time. The settings GET handler that delete'd private keys now takes a defensive shallow copy first. The 5-second TTL cache in utils/debug.ts is now redundant and removed; the service-level cache is strictly fresher (invalidates on write rather than going stale for up to 5s). |
||
|
Anso
|
4e5ba17710 |
refactor(backend): sanitize user input before logging to close CRLF injection (#807)
* refactor(backend): sanitize user input before logging to close CRLF injection
Adds a small sanitizeForLog helper that strips CR, LF, tab, and ASCII
control characters (0x00-0x1F, 0x7F) from a value before it is embedded
in a console.log/warn/error/debug call. Wraps every call site where a
user-controlled value (req.params, req.body, req.query, or a value
derived from them) flows into a log message.
Closes the bulk of the open CodeQL alerts in this family:
- 96 js/log-injection
- 28 js/tainted-format-string
The helper is in backend/src/utils/safeLog.ts. Routes still pre-validate
input at the request boundary; this is the second line of defense and
gives static analyzers a sanitizer they can trace through. JSON
responses, Docker filter labels, and other non-log call sites are
intentionally left unwrapped.
* refactor(backend): printf-style format strings for tainted-log call sites
CodeQL's js/tainted-format-string rule flags template literals in the first
arg of console.X when any interpolated value is user-controlled, regardless
of whether each value is sanitized inline. The canonical mitigation is to
use a static format string and pass values as positional args.
Converts the 28 flagged template literals to printf-style ("%s") format
strings, with sanitizeForLog applied to each positional arg. Also fills in
the log-injection wraps on 9 sites where a user-controlled value was
missed in the first sweep (agents, fleet, gitSources, imageUpdates,
GitSourceService).
No behavior change at runtime. Node's util.format substitutes %s tokens
identically to template-literal interpolation.
* fix(backend): wrap nodeId/snapshotId in fleet restore debug log
CodeQL flagged the unwrapped numeric args even though they cannot
contain control chars in practice. Apply the sanitizer for taint-flow
recognition.
|
||
|
Anso
|
4c352c74c8 |
refactor(backend): hoist parseIntParam helper to utils (#798)
Adds backend/src/utils/parseIntParam.ts with a shared parseIntParam helper that writes a 400 'Invalid <label>' response and returns null on non-numeric route params. Consolidates the parseInt + isNaN + 400 shape that was inlined or duplicated across multiple routers. Updated: - routes/fleet.ts: replaced the local parseIdParam wrapper. - routes/autoHeal.ts: replaced the local parsePolicyId wrapper. - routes/notifications.ts: replaced parseRouteId wrapper plus an inline notification-id site. - routes/apiTokens.ts, routes/labels.ts, routes/registries.ts, routes/scheduledTasks.ts, routes/users.ts: replaced inline copies. Out of scope (route handlers without an existing isNaN check, kept intentionally untouched to avoid introducing new 400 responses): alerts, nodes, webhooks, and several user-routes handlers that rely on a downstream 404 instead. Closes #748 |
||
|
Anso
|
8460ae9ede |
refactor(backend): hoist severity Sets to utils/severity.ts (#795)
Replaces five inline new Set([...]) literals scattered across routes/security.ts and routes/fleet.ts with two shared constants (FINDING_SEVERITIES, POLICY_SEVERITIES) exported from utils/severity.ts. Pure refactor: no error response or status code changes. Closes #749 |
||
|
Anso
|
03f91cd5bb |
feat(cloud-backup): mirror fleet snapshots to S3-compatible storage (#782)
* feat(cloud-backup): mirror fleet snapshots to S3-compatible storage
Add an Admiral-tier Cloud Backup feature that replicates every fleet
snapshot to off-site storage, with two provider modes that share the
same `@aws-sdk/client-s3` code path:
- Sencho Cloud Backup: zero-config, 500 MB allowance backed by
Cloudflare R2, provisioned via the sencho.io worker against the
user's Lemon Squeezy license.
- Custom S3 (BYOB): any S3-compatible bucket (AWS, MinIO, Backblaze
B2, Wasabi, R2 with own keys), with credentials encrypted via
`CryptoService` before storage.
API-triggered snapshots upload fire-and-forget so the UI returns
immediately; scheduled snapshots block on the upload so the task's
success/failure reflects cloud durability. Object keys include the
instance_id segment to prevent collisions when the same Admiral
license is activated on multiple Sencho instances.
* fix(cloud-backup): drop ES2022-only Error cause arg breaking ES2020 build
The backend tsconfig pins lib to ES2020. The two-argument
`Error(message, { cause })` form requires ES2022, so tsc rejected it
with TS2554. Revert to single-argument throw to match the
convention used elsewhere in the backend services.
|
||
|
Anso
|
801a098a5b |
feat(files): per-stack file explorer (#780)
* feat(files): backend foundation for stack file explorer
Install multer for multipart file upload handling. Add
isValidRelativeStackPath to validation.ts to guard client-supplied
relative paths against traversal, absolute paths, NUL bytes, backslash
injection, and double-slash segments. Add isBinaryBuffer to a new
binaryDetect.ts utility for heuristic text/binary detection via
NUL-byte fast exit and non-printable byte ratio sampling.
* fix(files): reject bare dot segments in isValidRelativeStackPath
* feat(files): add safe stack-scoped file I/O methods to FileSystemService
Adds FileEntry interface and seven new public methods to FileSystemService
for stack-scoped file operations: listStackDirectory, readStackFile,
streamStackFile, writeStackFile, deleteStackPath, mkdirStackPath, and
statStackEntry.
Each method routes through a private resolveSafeStackPath helper that
enforces two-phase path containment: a pre-realpath lexical check plus a
post-realpath symlink-escape check. ENOENT targets are handled by walking
up to the deepest existing ancestor, realpaths that ancestor, and
reattaching the remaining suffix.
Binary detection delegates to isBinaryBuffer; path safety delegates to
isPathWithinBase. Protected file names and the MIME map are module-level
constants to avoid repeated allocation.
* feat(files): frontend API wrappers and Monaco language helper
* fix(files): tighten stackFilesApi error handling and localOnly support
* fix(files): FileSystemService safety and correctness fixes
* feat(files): add file explorer API endpoints to stacks router
* feat(files): FileTree and FileTreeNode components
* fix(files): route security hardening and stream cleanup
* fix(files): FileTree accessibility, icon stroke, stale fetch guard
Add strokeWidth={1.5} to all Lucide icons in FileTreeNode to match the
design system. Add aria-expanded to directory rows for accessibility.
Guard handleDirClick .then() callbacks against stale stack name
references when the component re-renders with a new stack. Add
toast.info fallbacks when compose.yaml or .env is clicked without a
navigation callback registered.
* feat(files): FileViewer, FileUploadDropzone, NewFolderDialog, DeleteFileConfirm
* fix(files): resolve code quality findings in file explorer components
- Move editorOptions useMemo above conditional returns in FileViewer (Rules of Hooks fix)
- Fix blob download: append anchor to DOM before click, defer URL revoke 100ms
- Keep protected-file confirm input visible during NOT_EMPTY recursive retry in DeleteFileConfirm
- Remove non-functional cursor-pointer/onClick from Community upgrade pill in FileUploadDropzone
- Add success toast on folder creation in NewFolderDialog
- Switch all (e as Error).message casts to instanceof Error narrowing
* test(files): unit tests for binary detection, stack path safety, and file explorer routes
- binary-detection.test.ts: covers isBinaryBuffer edge cases (empty, NUL,
PNG header, threshold boundary, sampleBytes parameter)
- filesystem-stack-paths.test.ts: covers isValidRelativeStackPath (accepts/
rejects matrix) and FileSystemService stack methods against a real temp dir
(listStackDirectory sort and protection flags, readStackFile text/binary/
oversized paths, writeStackFile/Buffer, deleteStackPath, mkdirStackPath,
traversal guard); platform-specific empty-dir/NOT_EMPTY cases skip on Windows
- stack-files-routes.test.ts: route-level integration tests for all seven
file explorer endpoints; covers auth gating, Community-tier 403 gates,
input validation, 413 TOO_LARGE upload limit, and 204/200 happy paths
* feat(files): StackFileExplorer container with lazy tree, viewer, and action bar
* fix(files): add Download button to explorer toolbar, fix Community upgrade pill, reset state on stack change
* test(files): add missing test coverage for file explorer routes and service
* feat(files): add Files tab to EditorLayout with StackFileExplorer integration
* fix(files): add defensive activeTab guard to saveFile and discardChanges
* test(files): unit tests for FileTree expand/collapse and FileViewer render modes
Covers the three FileViewer content modes (text/Monaco, binary panel,
oversized panel) and the FileTree expand/collapse/cache cycle: first
expand fetches the subdirectory, second click collapses without a fetch,
third click re-expands from the in-memory cache without a second fetch.
* test(e2e): file explorer community and skipper+ flows
Covers the full file-explorer feature surface in two describe blocks:
Community (read-only): intercepts /api/license to simulate community
tier, confirms the upgrade pill is visible in the left pane, and
asserts that the Save button is absent after opening a text file.
Skipper+ (full CRUD): uploads a text file and confirms it appears in
the tree; edits config/app.conf and saves via Monaco; deletes an
uploaded file and asserts the tree entry is gone; issues a raw HTTP
request to the download endpoint and checks for status 200 and the
content-disposition: attachment header.
Also adds data-testid="file-action-delete" to the action bar Delete
button in StackFileExplorer for stable targeting, and exports
waitForStacksLoaded from e2e/helpers.ts to eliminate the three
identical local copies in stacks, deploy-log-panel, and stack-files
spec files.
* fix(e2e): improve test isolation and selector stability in stack-files spec
Move beforeEach seed to beforeAll/afterAll so fixtures are created once per
suite, not before every test. Extract shared seedSuite/teardownSuite helpers
to eliminate the duplicate beforeAll/afterAll blocks. Wrap teardown in
try/catch so failures log a warning rather than masking test results.
Replace waitForTimeout(500) with a deterministic expect on the file tree
sentinel. Add data-testid="anatomy-files-btn" and data-testid="delete-confirm-btn"
to replace the fragile button text/positional selectors. Assert Save button
starts disabled before editing.
* docs(files): add stack file explorer documentation
Add user-facing guide for the stack file explorer feature covering
tier access (Community read-only, Skipper+ read-write), viewing
limits, upload/download caps, protected file routing, and
troubleshooting. Update the editor page to reference the new guide
and register the page in the navigation.
* fix(docs): use canonical Skipper tier name in file explorer overview card
* fix(files): resolve lint errors blocking CI
Remove unnecessary backslash escape before double-quote in the
Content-Disposition regex (no-useless-escape). Replace five synchronous
setState resets at the top of the FileTree mount effect with a React key
prop on the FileTree element in StackFileExplorer so remounting resets
state automatically, eliminating the react-hooks/set-state-in-effect
violation.
* test(files): fix e2e seeding to work on community-tier CI
Replace the browser-side paid upload/mkdir API calls in seedTestStack with
direct Node fs writes. The upload and folder endpoints require Skipper+ so
they returned 403 on CI, which runs with no license set. Stack creation
via POST /api/stacks stays as an API call since it is community-allowed and
keeps the backend registry in sync.
Add a per-test tier check in the Skipper+ beforeEach that skips gracefully
when the instance is community, matching the pattern in auto-heal-policies.
|
||
|
Anso
|
6986b927e3 |
feat(stacks): per-service start/stop/restart lifecycle actions (#778)
* feat(stacks): add per-service start/stop/restart lifecycle routes
Adds POST /:stackName/services/:serviceName/{start,stop,restart} routes
that operate on containers belonging to a single Compose service, using
the same Engine API pattern as the existing stack-level lifecycle routes.
Includes isValidServiceName validator and audit-summary entries for the
three new paths.
* test(stacks): add per-service action route tests
* test(stacks): fix test quality issues in service action tests
* feat(stacks): add per-service lifecycle menu to container cards
* fix(stacks): handle paused container state in service action menu
* docs(stacks): add per-service lifecycle actions documentation
* docs(stacks): add validation screenshots for per-service lifecycle actions
|
||
|
Anso
|
ed553f1f19 |
feat: change default listen port from 3000 to 1852 (#756)
Updates the backend listen port, Vite dev proxy target, Docker EXPOSE, compose port mapping, .env.example default, GitHub Actions smoke-test default, healthcheck URLs, and every doc/example reference. Test fixtures that include example URLs were updated for consistency, though their assertions are port-agnostic. The rate-limit value of 3000 in middleware/rateLimiters.ts and the 3000 entry in WEB_UI_PORTS (which detects user containers like Grafana) are intentionally untouched. |
||
|
Anso
|
50e64b058b |
refactor(backend): extract 8 low-blast-radius route groups into routers (phase 4a-1) (#734)
First slice of Phase 4 (route extraction). Pulls 8 well-tested, mostly
independent route groups out of index.ts into focused Router files. No
behavior change; every handler body moves verbatim.
New route files under backend/src/routes/:
- meta.ts /api/health, /api/meta (mounted before authGate)
- license.ts /api/license/* + /api/system/update,
exports scheduleLocalUpdate for the fleet route
- permissions.ts /api/permissions/me
- convert.ts POST /api/convert
- alerts.ts /api/alerts/*
- labels.ts /api/labels/* + PUT /api/stacks/:name/labels
(exported as stackLabelsRouter)
- apiTokens.ts /api/api-tokens/*
- auditLog.ts /api/audit-log/*
Shared helper lifts:
- helpers/cacheInvalidation.ts: invalidateNodeCaches()
- middleware/tierGates.ts: requireBody (was inline in index.ts)
- utils/errors.ts: isSqliteUniqueViolation (was inline in index.ts)
- middleware/apiTokenScope.ts: rejectApiTokenScope() helper (new)
- utils/csv.ts: escapeCsvField() (new)
index.ts drops from ~7520 to ~6775 lines and now mounts the routers right
after enforceApiTokenScope. The remote proxy and fleet/auth/webhooks/users
routes remain inline in index.ts pending later Phase 4 slices.
Code review fixes: rejectApiTokenScope helper replaces duplicated
`if (req.apiTokenScope) 403 SCOPE_DENIED` blocks in apiTokens.ts and
license.ts; escapeCsvField replaces the inline CSV escape in auditLog.ts.
|
||
|
Anso
|
732fc95415 |
feat(security): fleet-replicated CVE suppression list (#650)
Operators can accept known-benign findings once and have Sencho filter them out of scan drawers, comparison views, and other read surfaces. Suppressions replicate from the control instance to every remote node. * New cve_suppressions table with a COALESCE-based unique index so NULL scope slots collide the way users expect * Admin + paid-tier CRUD routes; writes are rejected on replicas * Read-time filter enriches vulnerability details and compare payloads without mutating stored counts * Settings > Security panel for managing rules, per-CVE suppress action in the scan drawer, dimmed rows with a shield-off indicator * Vitest unit tests for the filter (glob, expiry, specificity) and route tests (auth, tier, replica, UNIQUE conflict) |
||
|
Anso
|
dc8370f5a4 |
fix(security): harden Trivy scan lifecycle, logging, and docs (#639)
* fix(security): harden Trivy scan lifecycle, logging, and docs - Call TrivyService.initialize() at startup so capability state is accurate before first request; add periodic re-detect to the scheduler so newly installed Trivy binaries light up without a restart. - Add markStaleScansAsFailed sweep (+ idx_vuln_scans_status index) to recover any scan row left in_progress after a crash or timeout; sweep runs before the paid-tier gate so every tier self-heals. - Split scanImage persistence into beginScan/finishScan so the manual scan route owns a single code path and can return a scanId synchronously while work continues asynchronously. - Validate image refs on /api/security/scan and /sbom via new utility; defense-in-depth against shell-metacharacter payloads. - Dispatch a warning-level alert when a post-deploy scan fails so the operator has a user-visible path to the failure instead of a silent log. - Share DIGEST_CACHE_TTL_MS and severity ordering across service and route layers; remove dead invalidateDetection(). - Add [Trivy:diag] logging gated behind developer_mode for support diagnostics; production logs unchanged. - Frontend: defensive toast fallback chain, sr-only SheetDescription, and a truncation badge when the 500-item detail fetch is capped. - Tests: extend trivy-service and vulnerability-db suites; add image-ref and severity unit tests. - Docs: expand vulnerability-scanning troubleshooting with recovery, re-detect, and diagnostic-log guidance; link Dockerfile comment to trivy-setup. * fix(security): drop unnecessary escape in image-ref forbidden-char regex |
||
|
Anso
|
6529a24530 |
feat(git-sources): harden create-from-git with LFS + submodule warnings (#609)
* feat(git-sources): surface LFS and submodule warnings on create
Creating a stack from a Git repo now detects two common anomalies and
tells the user about them rather than silently producing broken stacks.
- LFS-pointer compose/env files fail early with a clear error instead
of writing a 130-byte pointer stub to disk as real content.
- Repositories containing .gitmodules produce a non-fatal warning so
the user knows build contexts or volumes inside submodules will be
empty at deploy time.
Also refines the create dialog: sr-only DialogDescription for a11y,
short commit SHA suffix on the success toast, env-path hint under the
"Sync .env" checkbox showing which path will be read, and a route-level
diagnostic log line gated on developer mode for support debugging.
* test(git-sources): cover LFS, submodule, and nested env_path paths
Adds unit coverage for the new LFS-pointer rejection and submodule
warning plumbing, plus a nested compose_path case that exercises the
default env_path resolution ("apps/web/compose.yaml" with sync_env on
and env_path unset writes "apps/web/.env" both to disk and to the DB).
Extends the E2E suite with a happy-path assertion that the full-length
commit SHA is returned in the create response, and a UI flow that
verifies the short-SHA suffix appears in the success toast.
* docs(git-sources): add troubleshooting for LFS, submodules, HTTPS-only
Adds troubleshooting entries for the newly surfaced LFS and submodule
anomalies, expands the clone-timeout entry with the bounded-fetch
explanation, and adds a dedicated HTTPS-only entry. Also consolidates
the known limitations into a single list covering LFS, submodules,
branch-tracking, and HTTPS-only.
* fix(settings): use Route icon for notification routing
The routing section in Settings previously used GitBranch, which now
clashes with the Git Source feature's icon across the editor. Switch
to Route (a branching-flow glyph) so routing rules have a distinct
visual identity and aren't visually conflated with Git-backed stacks.
* fix(git-sources): return 400 for upstream auth failures and disambiguate 404s
Upstream git-host auth failures were mapping to HTTP 401, which the frontend
apiFetch treats as a Sencho session expiry and fires the global logout event.
They now return 400 with code=AUTH_FAILED in the body so the UI can branch on
the discriminator without logging the user out. The status mapping moved into
utils/gitSourceHttp so it can be unit-tested without booting the app.
mapGitError also relied on the HttpError class alone, so any non-2xx response
(including 404) was classified as auth failure. It now inspects the numeric
status on err.data and considers whether a token was supplied, producing more
actionable messages for missing repos, private repos, and wrong-scope tokens.
|
||
|
Anso
|
6b8c369745 |
fix(notifications): stop Sencho version notifications from silently skipping (#594)
* fix(notifications): stop Sencho version notifications from silently skipping Three independent defects combined to make version-update notifications silently fail even while Fleet overview correctly surfaced an update button: - The in-memory 6-hour cooldown was advanced before the network fetch, so a single transient failure at boot could lock the check for the rest of the container lifetime. Moved the cooldown update inside the success branch so failures retry on the next eval cycle. - MonitorService called the raw version fetch directly, bypassing the CacheService wrapper (TTL, inflight dedup, stale-on-error) that Fleet uses, so the two paths could diverge. Unified both on a shared getLatestVersion() helper in utils/version-check.ts. - The dedup key could carry stale state from a previous build and never self-clear. It now self-heals when the running version reaches the previously-notified version, so future releases re-fire as expected. Added diagnostic logs gated on debug mode for each skip branch, plus three regression tests covering cooldown-on-failure, cooldown-on-success, and dedup self-heal. * docs(notifications): drop legacy-upgrade framing from alerts troubleshooting Sencho has not shipped publicly, so troubleshooting entries written in 'this used to happen but now does Y' mode reference a past that does not exist for any reader. Rewrote the version-notification, image-update, and crash-alert troubleshooting entries to describe current behavior positively without referring to prior builds, upgrade paths, or legacy fixes. * chore(security): accept CVE-2026-33810 in bundled Docker CLI 29.4.0 Trivy now flags CVE-2026-33810 (Go stdlib crypto/x509 DNS constraint bypass, fixed in Go 1.26.2) in the Docker CLI static binary we ship. Docker CLI 29.4.0 is the latest upstream release and still links Go 1.26.1; no newer static binary exists yet. Same exposure profile as the already-accepted CVE-2026-32280: the Docker CLI and compose plugin only validate certificates from well-known registry CAs and the local Docker socket, not from attacker-controlled CAs with crafted DNS name constraints. Revisit on the next Docker CLI release that rebuilds against Go 1.26.2 or later. |
||
|
Anso
|
0a94df318a |
fix(alerts): harden with security fixes, design compliance, and test coverage (#570)
* fix(alerts): harden with security fixes, design compliance, and test coverage Add authMiddleware to all alert endpoints, validate notification test dispatch inputs, fix restart_count metric via Docker inspect, correct network metric units, replace any types with DockerContainerStats interface, add webhook timeouts and dispatch error tracking. Frontend: migrate Select to Combobox, add ScrollArea and delete confirmation AlertDialog, fix icon strokeWidth to 1.5. Add update availability notifications for both Sencho version updates (6-hour check in MonitorService) and stack image updates (state transition detection in ImageUpdateService). Extract shared version fetch logic into utils/version-check.ts. Add diagnostic logging gated behind developer_mode for MonitorService breach state machine and NotificationService dispatch routing. Tests: 24 new alert API integration tests, restart_count and version check unit tests (688 total passing). Docs updated with HTTPS requirement, update notifications section, and troubleshooting guide. * fix(alerts): remove unused TEST_USERNAME import in alerts-api tests |
||
|
Anso
|
6daa7a135d |
fix(audit): harden audit log with summary fixes, design compliance, and test coverage (#561)
* fix(audit): harden audit log with summary fixes, design compliance, and test coverage Replace stale /compose/* route summaries with current /stacks/* patterns, add ~30 missing route summaries for container ops, labels, fleet updates, SSO, templates, and auto-update. Fix X-Forwarded-For extracting full proxy chain instead of first client IP. Pre-sort pattern table at module load for O(1) lookup instead of sorting per request. Add Calendar and DatePicker UI components (react-day-picker v9 + date-fns) replacing browser-native date inputs. Align AuditLogView with design system: Combobox instead of Select, design token colors, strokeWidth 1.5, card bevel, tabular-nums on all numeric cells. Add diagnostic logging gated behind developer mode for audit middleware, query, and export endpoints. Extract getAuditSummary to testable utility. Add 32 tests covering summary resolution, DB round-trips, API permissions, export formats, and middleware integration. * fix(audit): use correct Chevron prop types for react-day-picker compatibility |
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Anso
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809bf76c20 |
fix(fleet): harden fleet snapshots with DRY capture, audit fixes, and design compliance (#555)
Extract duplicated snapshot capture functions from index.ts and SchedulerService.ts into a shared module (snapshot-capture.ts). Fix audit log route patterns that used singular 'snapshot' instead of plural 'snapshots'. Apply design system to FleetSnapshots component (card styling, strokeWidth, font-mono, tabular-nums, ScrollArea). Add safePage pagination, loading toast for creation, and fix the restore dialog race condition with a controlled AlertDialog. Add diagnostic logging gated behind Developer Mode. Add tests for restore endpoint, admin role enforcement, and edge cases. Update docs with troubleshooting section and refresh screenshots. |
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Anso
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a74a516850 |
fix(logs): harden global logs with shared parsing, SSE fixes, and level filter (#539)
- Extract log parsing utilities (normalizeContainerName, parseLogTimestamp,
detectLogLevel, stripControlChars, demuxDockerLog) to shared module,
eliminating duplication between polling and SSE endpoints
- Fix timestamp regex to accept timezone offsets (+HH:MM/-HH:MM), not just Z
- Replace any[] with typed GlobalLogEntry interface
- Add SSE heartbeat (30s) to prevent reverse proxy timeouts
- Add X-Accel-Buffering: no header for nginx SSE compatibility
- Replace swallowed catch blocks with console.warn diagnostics
- Fix SSE not reconnecting on node switch (missing dep in effect array)
- Add settings change event so devMode/pollRate updates apply without remount
- Add log level filter (ALL/ERROR/WARN/INFO) to toolbar
- Replace overflow-auto div with ScrollArea for design system compliance
- Add strokeWidth={1.5} to all toolbar icons
- Include stack name in download format
- Surface fetch errors with inline banner
- Add 39 unit tests for all log parsing utilities
- Update docs with level filter documentation and refreshed screenshot
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Anso
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4909c35e50 |
fix(resources): harden Resource Explorer with auth, validation, design, and UX fixes (#527)
- Sanitize error messages in all delete/prune/create/inspect endpoints to prevent Docker internals from leaking to the frontend - Add CIDR, IPv4, and Docker resource ID input validation - Add requirePaid gate to network topology endpoint - Add invalidateNodeCaches after image/volume/network mutations - Fix design system violations: card borders, destructive button variant, visible DialogDescription, overflow-auto replaced with ScrollArea, hardcoded Tailwind colors replaced with tokens - Gate purge button behind isAdmin to prevent silent 403s - Fix shared inspect loading state to be per-network-row - Parse error response bodies for meaningful toast messages - Add clipboard API fallback for non-HTTPS contexts - Render Options section in network inspect sheet - Add operational and diagnostic logging for resource operations - Extend validation and DockerController test suites - Update docs with Options field in network inspect |
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Anso
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2465f7607e |
fix(stacks): harden stack management with security, validation, and logging (#520)
* fix(stacks): harden stack management with security fixes, validation alignment, and logging Validate WebSocket stack names with isValidStackName() to close a path-traversal gap on the /api/stacks/:stackName/logs WS endpoint. Align POST /api/stacks to use the canonical validator (allows underscores). Replace error: any catch blocks with error: unknown + type narrowing. Add cache invalidation to PUT /api/stacks/:stackName/env. Rename DELETE param from :name to :stackName for consistency. Add standard [Stacks] lifecycle logs and diagnostic [Stacks:debug] logs gated behind the Developer Mode toggle (with 5s TTL cache). Extract shared isDebugEnabled() and getErrorMessage() utilities. Frontend: roll back optimistic status on API failure, guard unsaved changes when switching stacks, pre-check duplicate names in App Store. * docs(settings): update Developer Mode description to mention debug diagnostics |
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Anso
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10597d213a |
fix(error-handling): surface silent errors across the codebase (#326)
Add console.warn/console.error logging to 22 silent catch blocks across 10 files. Errors in cleanup, migrations, SSO, fleet snapshots, shutdown, and validation are now visible in logs. ENOENT guards added to file-system catches to distinguish missing files from permission errors. No control flow changes. |
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Anso
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32a7d53b2b |
feat: RBAC, atomic deployments, fleet backups, and licensing (Pro) (#185)
* feat: add RBAC viewer accounts, atomic deployments, and fleet-wide backups (Pro) Introduces three Pro-tier features: - RBAC: Multi-user system with admin/viewer roles, user management UI, automatic migration from single-admin credentials, viewer restrictions across the entire UI (read-only editor, hidden action buttons) - Atomic Deployments: Pre-deploy file backup to .sencho-backup/, automatic rollback on health probe failure, manual rollback button, health probes added to stack updates, webhook-triggered deploys use atomic rollback - Fleet-Wide Backups: Point-in-time snapshots of compose files across all nodes (local + remote), stored centrally in SQLite, per-stack restore with optional redeploy, graceful handling of offline nodes * fix(settings): use correct ProGate prop name in UsersSection * fix(settings): remove unused isPro prop from UsersSection * fix(auth): fetch user info after login and setup so isAdmin is set correctly * feat(pricing): revise pricing strategy and enforce variant-based seat limits Raise Personal Pro from $49/yr to $69/yr with 3 viewer seats (up from 1). Add $15/mo billing option for Team Pro. Mark lifetime pricing as a 90-day early-adopter offer. Store Lemon Squeezy variant_name on activation/validation and enforce seat limits server-side per variant. * feat(licensing): add Lemon Squeezy checkout, webhook, and billing portal integration Server-side checkout URL generation (POST /api/checkout) with admin email pre-fill and instance_id custom data. HMAC-SHA256 verified webhook endpoint (POST /api/webhooks/lemonsqueezy) handling order, subscription, and payment lifecycle events for automatic license activation. Customer billing portal link stored from webhook events and exposed via GET /api/billing/portal. In-app checkout buttons in Settings with manual license key fallback. * fix(licensing): exempt Lemon Squeezy webhook from auth middleware The catch-all auth middleware on /api/* was blocking the public webhook endpoint. Added /webhooks/lemonsqueezy to the exemption list alongside /auth/* and /webhooks/:id/trigger. * feat(pricing): update pricing to final live rates Personal Pro: $7.99/month, $69.99/year, $249 lifetime. Team Pro: $49.99/month, $499.99/year, $1,499 lifetime. Added personal_monthly checkout variant across backend, frontend, and website. * refactor(licensing): remove server-side checkout/webhook for self-hosted model Sencho is self-hosted — each user runs their own instance, so there is no central server to receive webhooks or hold the store API key. Replaced in-app checkout buttons with a "View Pricing" redirect to sencho.io and kept manual license key activation as the primary flow. - Delete LemonSqueezyService (checkout, webhook, HMAC verification) - Remove POST /api/checkout, GET /api/billing/portal, POST /api/webhooks/lemonsqueezy - Remove raw body parser and auth exemption for webhook route - Remove all LEMONSQUEEZY_* env vars from .env.example - Replace checkout buttons in SettingsModal with single "View Pricing" button - Simplify LicenseContext checkout to open sencho.io pricing page - Update licensing docs to reflect website-based purchase flow * chore: normalize em-dashes to hyphens across codebase (linter) * chore: remove accidentally tracked directories from index |
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SaelixCode
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ce50db0fde |
security: pre-release hardening, automated testing, and production readiness
SECURITY (critical fixes):
- Add authMiddleware to /api/system/console-token (was publicly accessible)
- Validate api_url on node create/update to prevent SSRF (rejects localhost/loopback)
- Add rate limiting (5 req/15 min/IP) to /api/auth/login and /api/auth/setup
- Fix path traversal in env_file resolution — absolute/escaping paths rejected
- Add stack name validation to GET routes (was only on PUT/POST)
- Add helmet security headers middleware
- Restrict CORS to FRONTEND_URL in production
PRODUCTION READINESS:
- Add GET /api/health public endpoint + HEALTHCHECK in Dockerfile
- Add SIGTERM/SIGINT graceful shutdown handler (drains connections, closes DB)
- Run container as non-root sencho user in Dockerfile
QUALITY:
- Fix 4 silent empty catch{} blocks in EditorLayout (now show toast.error)
- Connect ErrorBoundary to root App in main.tsx
- Replace WebSocket.Server with named WebSocketServer import (ESM compat)
TESTING (new automated test suite):
- Install Vitest; 38 backend tests across 4 suites covering validation utilities,
health endpoint, auth middleware, login flows, SSRF protection, and path traversal
- Extract isValidStackName/isValidRemoteUrl/isPathWithinBase to utils/validation.ts
- Playwright E2E scaffolding: auth, stacks, nodes specs + shared login helper
- CI: run Vitest + ESLint on every PR
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SaelixCode
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953049a45d | feat: implement smart error parser and post-deploy health probe |