* fix: enforce 1:1 compose path mapping for Pilot agent mounts
Pilot enrollment now generates validated 1:1 bind mounts so every
agent path maps to a unique compose directory. Persisted agent paths
reconcile during startup to catch drift. Unsafe relative-bind redeploys
are blocked before container removal to prevent path escapes.
- Add composePathMapping utility with strict path validation
- Generate COMPOSE_DIR and validated mounts during Pilot enrollment
- Reconcile persisted agent paths during startup bootstrap
- Block redeploy when a relative-bind mount would escape the compose root
- Default Pilot UI path to /opt/docker/sencho
- Update multi-node and pilot-agent documentation
- Add regression tests for enrollment, bootstrap, compose-service,
and environment-check paths
* fix: update E2E enrollment regexes for YAML-quoted token values
Pilot-agent hosts never run the first-run setup wizard, so the wizard
path that normally generates auth_jwt_secret (routes/auth.ts) never
fires. Without that secret, the agent-side loopback auth helper added
in PR #990 (pilot/agent.ts::getLoopbackAuthHeader) returned null at
mint time, no Authorization header was attached on the forwarded
loopback request, and the local Sencho's authMiddleware rejected every
proxied call with 401 "Authentication required". This was reproducible
end-to-end on v0.74.1, .2, and .3.
Add ensurePilotJwtSecret() to bootstrap/startup, called early in
startServer (before LicenseService.initialize, which only reads
system_state and does not touch global_settings, so the order is safe).
When SENCHO_MODE=pilot and global_settings.auth_jwt_secret is empty,
generate 64 random bytes (hex-encoded, matching the wizard's pattern
in routes/auth.ts) and persist. Subsequent boots see the persisted
value and no-op. Outside pilot mode the function is a no-op since the
wizard owns the lifecycle.
The helper is exported so the regression test can exercise the real
function rather than maintaining a hand-mirrored copy. Three vitest
cases cover: first-boot generation, no-op on persisted secret, no-op
in non-pilot mode.
Together with PR #989 (proxy-side bridge dispatch), PR #990 (agent-side
loopback auth injection), PR #992 (cross-node control plane via HTTP
proxy), and PR #994 (local-node mesh-reachable diagnostic), this
completes the central, bridge, agent, local-Sencho HTTP path for
pilot-agent-mode nodes.
Anso