mirror of
https://github.com/Studio-Saelix/sencho.git
synced 2026-08-13 12:17:34 +00:00
1bca75a9990b5e9344fafffd58a27b3dca6a46e5
19 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Anso
|
1bca75a999 |
fix: load the full vulnerability list in the scan detail sheet (#1483)
The scan detail sheet fetched only the first 500 vulnerabilities for its interactive table, so severity filtering, row inspection, and suppression management could not reach findings beyond the first page on a scan with more than 500. The CSV export already paged the complete list, but that is not a substitute for working with the findings in the table. The sheet now loads every vulnerability via the same paged helper the CSV uses, so the table, filter, pagination, inspection, and suppression all operate over the complete set. The "showing first N of M, export CSV for the complete list" notice is removed because the table is no longer capped. The CSV export reuses the already-complete in-memory set rather than refetching. Secrets and misconfigurations keep their existing per-request cap; they are not the suppression-managed findings this blocker concerns and rarely exceed it. |
||
|
Anso
|
1de49f8b1a |
fix: name matched risk inputs in policy scan banner and alerts (#1473)
The pre-deploy gate names the inputs that matched a scan policy (a known-exploited CVE, a fixable Critical/High, or a severity threshold), but the informational post-scan surfaces still framed every violation as a severity ceiling. The scan detail banner read "blocks severities at or above X, highest severity is Y" and the scheduled-scan alert read "<severity> exceeds <maxSeverity>", which is wrong for a KEV- or fixable-only policy that never gated on severity. Persist the matched reasons on the policy evaluation, carry them on the scheduled-scan violation, and render them on the banner so every policy surface names the input that actually matched. Evaluations persisted before this change carry no reasons: the parser defaults the field to an empty array and the banner falls back to a plain violation notice. |
||
|
Anso
|
e3b3c3b857 |
fix: export the full vulnerability list to CSV (#1472)
The scan detail sheet fetches a capped page of vulnerabilities for display, then told operators to "Export CSV for the complete list". The CSV writer only serialized the rows already in memory, so for a scan with more findings than the page cap the CSV silently dropped everything past the cap: the recovery path the notice promised did not exist. Export now pages past the API's per-request cap and serializes every row when the loaded set is short of the total, falling back to the in-memory rows when they are already complete. The CSV action shows a spinner and disables while the export runs. |
||
|
Anso
|
3a22f59057 |
feat(security): surface Compose internet-reachability exposure in posture (#1442)
* feat(security): surface Compose internet-reachability exposure in posture Builds a per-stack per-service exposure descriptor from the rendered effective Compose model, cached at deploy/update time, and joins it into the Security action posture. A service is publicly exposed when it publishes a port on a non-loopback host IP or uses host networking. The exposure cache lives in a new stack_exposure table, refreshed inside ComposeService.deployStack and updateStack (covering all funneled paths: manual, scheduler, mesh, templates, labels, App Store, Git, webhooks). Cleanup runs on stack delete, blueprint withdrawal, and node delete. The overview route intersects the exposed image set with the existing per-image suppression-aware Critical/High tally, so a clean public nginx does not escalate posture. The scan sheet shows a "Published service" or "Internal only" evidence badge per image. * fix(test): provide fresh auto-close proc for exposure spawn in stall tests Two deployStack idle-stall tests used mockSpawn.mockReturnValue(proc) which returned the same already-closed process for the new config spawn added by the exposure refresh. The renderConfig promise hung waiting for a close event that had already fired. The fix uses mockImplementation to return the controlled proc for the first spawn (up) and a fresh auto-closing proc for the second spawn (config via refreshExposureCache). * fix(security): tighten loopback detection, clarify exposure semantics, drop internal-only badge - Expand isLoopback to cover full 127.0.0.0/8 range (127.0.0.2 etc) - Clarify that exposure is configured (Compose model), not live topology - Remove "Internal only" badge: false is not proof of non-exposure when other stacks using the same image may lack a cached descriptor |
||
|
Anso
|
330f9f1acd |
fix(security): fix Security page table layouts and exploit-risk pagination (#1434)
Image scan sheet: make the finding table the single bounded scroll region (SystemSheet noScroll + flex-fill) so it no longer clips at the bottom on shorter viewports, and give the tables a phone min-width so they scroll horizontally instead of cutting off the right-hand columns. Scan history table: add the same horizontal scroll on phones. Overview "Top exploit-risk findings": render as a paginated table with column headers and top-right pagination, modeled on the dashboard stack-health table. Key the rows by rank position so recurring CVE/scan pairs no longer collide and duplicate rows when paging through. Overview severity-by-exploitability chart: label the axes (EPSS exploitability and CVSS severity) and stop the card from stretching to a taller neighbour, removing the dead space beneath the chart. |
||
|
Anso
|
f794702171 |
feat(security): action-posture Security dashboard with exploit intel and triage (#1424)
* feat(security): reframe masthead as action posture, not worst-CVE severity Derive the Security masthead from an action posture (Action needed / Monitoring / Secure / Unknown) instead of raw scanner severity, and label the raw Critical/High counts as scanner detections. "Secure" now means nothing is actionable right now, never a claim that no vulnerabilities exist; Unknown covers a missing scanner or a node with no completed scan. Phase-1 bootstrap: "actionable" is approximated from the overview facts that already exist (fixable findings, secrets, misconfigs); a later phase moves the bucketing to the backend. * feat(security): derive overview action posture from triaged facts Add deriveSecurityPosture as the single bucketing function and extend /security/overview with posture facts (fixableCriticalHigh, dangerousCompose, accepted, rawCritical/rawHigh, plus knownExploited/publiclyExposed placeholders that later phases populate) and the derived posture verb. Suppression- and acknowledgement-aware counts come from one bounded read-time pass over the latest-scan Critical/High findings, grouped per image so the existing read-time filters apply unchanged. The pass is capped and flags posturePartial, so a large node degrades gracefully instead of scanning every detail row. The masthead now prefers the backend posture and keeps the local bootstrap only as a fallback for older remote nodes reached through the proxy. * feat(security): capture Trivy finding enrichment (status, CVSS, vendor, purl, layer) parseTrivyOutput now keeps the per-finding fields Trivy already returns and we previously discarded: Status (fixed / will_not_fix / end_of_life / ...), CVSS (score + vector, preferring the NVD source then falling back), vendor severity, package URL, package path, and layer digest. Persisted on vulnerability_details via additive nullable columns (guarded ALTER), bound null when absent, and carried through the cached-scan reconstruction path. These fields separate scary from exploitable and feed the action posture and the per-finding evidence tags. Field paths verified against Trivy's documented image-scan JSON; covered by parse and insert/read round-trip tests. * feat(security): add CVE exploit-intel service (CISA KEV + FIRST EPSS) Add CveIntelService, a daily background cache of CISA KEV membership and FIRST EPSS scores stored in a new cve_intel table and joined to findings at read time by CVE id (never frozen onto scan rows, so a CVE entering KEV later lights up on scans already stored). EPSS is fetched only for CVE ids present in stored findings, batched; both feeds are best-effort and keep the last cache on failure, so the Security page degrades gracefully offline. Wired into startup/shutdown like the other background services. The overview now counts known-exploited Critical/High findings, and KEV membership escalates posture to Action needed even when no fix is available. A per-instance "Exploit intelligence" toggle on the scanner setup surface lets air-gapped or firewalled hosts disable the outbound fetch; the daily tick keeps running but skips the fetch body when it is off. * feat(security): show per-finding evidence tags (KEV, EPSS, vendor status, CVSS) The vulnerabilities endpoint joins read-time exploit intel (KEV membership and EPSS score) onto each finding by CVE id, and the scan sheet renders evidence tags beside each CVE: known-exploited, EPSS probability, vendor will-not-fix / end-of-life, and the CVSS score. Severity becomes one signal among several so an operator can tell scary from exploitable, with no invented composite score. * feat(security): evolve CVE suppressions into triage decisions Layer a triage status and optional OpenVEX justification onto CVE suppressions. Statuses: needs review / affected / not affected / accepted risk / fixed / false positive / ignored. Dismissing states (not affected, accepted, fixed, false positive, ignored) stop a finding from driving the action posture; needs review and affected stay actionable and are surfaced as counts. Existing rows default to "accepted" (the prior suppress behavior), so nothing changes for them. The overview now reports needsReview / notAffected / accepted as distinct facts derived from the triage status. The decision replicates across the fleet (snapshot + replicated-insert carry status + justification) so a replica's posture matches the control node. The inline suppress dialog gains a triage decision selector; the read-time filter surfaces the status and justification on every finding. * feat(security): export fleet triage decisions as OpenVEX (Admiral) Add an OpenVEX exporter that turns the instance's CVE triage decisions into a standard VEX document (not_affected / fixed / affected / under_investigation, with justifications), and a GET /security/vex/export endpoint to download it. Authoring fleet VEX is a governance capability, so it is gated to Admiral (paid) plus admin, mirroring the SARIF export gate; the Suppressions panel shows an Export VEX action only on Admiral. * docs(security): document action posture, evidence tags, exploit intel, and triage Update the Security page and CVE suppressions docs for the action-posture masthead (scanner detections vs product posture), per-finding evidence tags (KEV / EPSS / CVSS / vendor status), the exploit-intelligence toggle (CISA KEV + FIRST EPSS) on scanner setup, triage decisions layered on suppressions, and OpenVEX export of fleet triage decisions. * test(security): match intel hosts exactly in CveIntelService test Route the fetch stub and its call assertions by exact hostname (www.cisa.gov / api.first.org) instead of a domain substring check. Resolves the js/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization code-scanning alerts on the test's URL routing; behavior is unchanged. |
||
|
Anso
|
2a4955f56d |
feat: add dedicated Security page and policy-pack foundation (#1362)
* feat: add dedicated Security page and policy-pack foundation Bring vulnerability scanning, scan history, suppressions, Compose risks, secrets, policy packs, and scanner setup into one node-scoped Security command center instead of scattering them across Resources and Settings. - New top-level Security view with Overview, Images, Compose risks, Secrets, Policies, Suppressions, History, and Scanner setup tabs (status masthead + signal rail; controlled tabs with deep-link support). - Backend: GET /security/overview rollup and GET /security/policy-packs static catalog (auth-only, Community). DatabaseService gains an uncapped scan-status count and a node-eligible block-policy count, and getImageScanSummaries now projects secret and misconfig counts. - Reuse existing surfaces: the scan-history sheet, the control-governed suppression and acknowledgement panels, and the scan-detail sheet (now with an initial-tab prop so it opens on the matching finding type). - Extract a shared SeverityBadge (from Resources) and a TrivyManager (from Settings) so both surfaces render identical controls. - Resources "Scan history" now links into the Security page History tab. - Docs for the new Security surface and tests for the new endpoints, helpers, nav wiring, and tabs. * refactor: consolidate scanner and policy management onto the Security page Remove the Settings "Vulnerability Scanning" section now that the Security page covers the same ground, with every option preserved: - Scanner install / update / uninstall / auto-update live on the Scanner setup tab (TrivyManager). - Scan policies, the honor-suppressions toggle, and the replica managed-by-control / demote controls move into a new ScanPolicyManager on the Policies tab (paid; Community sees only the policy-pack catalog). - CVE suppressions and acknowledgements remain on the Suppressions tab. Wiring removed: the registry section and the now-empty Security settings group, the SectionId, the SettingsSectionContent case and the isPaid prop it was the sole consumer of, and SecuritySection itself. The dashboard configuration-status "Vulnerability scanning" row now navigates to the Security page Policies tab. Docs that pointed at "Settings -> Security -> Vulnerability Scanning" are swept to the relevant Security page tabs. * fix: harden Security page scanner refresh, policy-load errors, and secret-only badges Address independent-review findings on the Security page: - Scanner setup now refreshes Trivy state when the active node changes, so the displayed scanner status matches the node TrivyManager's actions target (both follow x-node-id). Previously, switching nodes on the tab left stale state. - ScanPolicyManager surfaces an explicit error state on a failed policy fetch instead of falling through to a false "No scan policies configured". - The shared SeverityBadge and the Images findings column no longer label a scan "clean" when it has secrets or misconfigurations but no CVE severity (highest_severity is derived from vulnerabilities only); they show a "Findings" state and the secret/misconfig counts instead. - The Overview enforcement note points to the Policies tab, not the removed Settings section. - The History tab auto-opens the scan-history sheet only on a deep-link (mount with the History tab active), not on every manual tab selection. Adds tests for the badge secret/misconfig state and the policy-load error state. |
||
|
Anso
|
54119be0c2 |
feat: move trivy auto-update, node labels, fleet topology, and single-scan SBOM to Community (#1336)
Rebalance several capabilities from the paid tier to the free Community tier: - Managed Trivy auto-update toggle is admin-only, no longer tier-gated. - Node labels (assign, view, manage) are available on every tier; cordon and FleetSync anchor reset stay paid. - Fleet topology layout modes (Hub, Grouped, Free) are available on Community. - Single-scan SBOM export (SPDX and CycloneDX) is admin-only on Community; SARIF export stays paid via a dedicated canExportSarif capability split out from the former shared SBOM flag. Backend route guards and frontend affordances are updated together, with tier and admin-role tests covering the Community-allowed and still-paid paths. |
||
|
Anso
|
117f590332 |
fix(security): gate admin-only scan affordances on isAdmin (#1230)
* fix(security): gate admin-only scan affordances on isAdmin Backend already required admin for SBOM, SARIF, scan policies, Trivy install/update/uninstall, the auto-update toggle, CVE suppressions, and misconfig acknowledgements. The matching frontend surfaces were gated only on isPaid (or only on isReplica), so non-admin users at the same tier saw buttons that returned 403 on click. Threads isAdmin from useAuth() into SecuritySection, SuppressionsPanel, and MisconfigAckPanel. Updates the scan-result sheet caller in ResourcesView so SBOM and SARIF render only when paid AND admin; passes canManageSuppressions to the stack-misconfig sheet so admins can ack misconfigs from that surface too. Read paths remain visible to non-admins (policy list, suppression list, ack list, scan history) since the GET routes are auth-only on both sides. * fix(security): close 3 remaining scan-sheet parity gaps from review Code review surfaced three sites missed in the first pass: 1. SecurityHistoryView opened the scan sheet with canGenerateSbom set only on isPaid, so Skipper non-admins saw SBOM and SARIF buttons even though the backend requires admin+paid. Now ANDed with isAdmin. 2. ResourcesView passed onRescan unconditionally, and the sheet renders a Re-scan primary action whenever onRescan is defined. Non-admins reaching the sheet via the severity-badge shortcut saw the button; clicking it called POST /security/scan, which the backend requires admin for. onRescan is now undefined for non-admins. 3. ShellOverlays and ResourcesView passed canManageSuppressions=isAdmin without considering the replica gate, so a replica admin saw suppress and ack columns whose backend writes blockIfReplica. The sheet now probes /fleet/role internally and ANDs !isReplica into the effective canManageSuppressions, so the column hides on a replica regardless of how the caller wired the prop. * fix(security): clear isReplica state on every scan-sheet probe The previous probe only flipped the state to true on a replica response and never wrote false on a control, non-OK, or skipped probe. With the sheet kept mounted by ResourcesView, SecurityHistoryView, and ShellOverlays, an admin who first viewed a scan on a replica would keep suppress/ack controls hidden even after switching to a control instance, because the stale true value persisted across re-opens. The effect now resets isReplica to false at the start of every probe and assigns the result of /fleet/role directly. Probe failures and skips leave the state at false, so the UI is permissive and the backend blockIfReplica guard remains the source of truth. |
||
|
Anso
|
3b650523c1 |
Audit-hardening pass for secret and misconfiguration scanning (#977)
* fix(security): dedupe concurrent compose-stack scans
Track stack scans in scanningImages keyed stack:<nodeId>:<stackName>.
The /scan/stack route returns 409 when an in-flight scan exists, and
the service-side check is the real correctness barrier (the route
pre-check is a fast-path optimization that mirrors scanImage). The
dedup key release lives in a try/finally so failed scans free the
slot for retry.
Why: scanComposeStack had no equivalent of scanImage's scanningImages
guard, so two simultaneous calls for the same stack would both run
trivy config, both insert a vulnerability_scans row, and double-
process the result.
* feat(security): acknowledge misconfig findings
Adds a parallel acknowledgement system for Trivy misconfig findings
that mirrors cve_suppressions: a new misconfig_acknowledgements table,
read-time enrichment via the new misconfig-ack-filter utility, REST
CRUD endpoints, fleet-sync replication from control to replicas, a
Settings panel, and an Acknowledge button on the Misconfigs tab.
Schema and behavior parity with cve_suppressions:
- UNIQUE(rule_id, COALESCE(stack_pattern, '')) so fleet-wide acks
collide as expected
- blockIfReplica on every write
- Audit-log entries name the scope (rule_id, stack_pattern) but
never the reason text
- replicated_from_control flag controls UI delete affordance and
drives clearReplicatedRows on demote/reanchor
- Validators reused: validateStackPatternForRedos for glob safety,
sanitizeForLog for log fragments
SARIF export emits an external/accepted suppression entry per
acknowledged misconfig, matching the CVE pattern.
Per-row Acknowledge dialog prefills stack_pattern with the scan's
stack_context so the default scope is "rule + this stack only" and an
operator must broaden explicitly.
Tests: misconfig-ack-filter (15) and misconfig-ack-routes (23)
including the duplicate-409 case for both pinned and fleet-wide acks.
* fix(security): reap orphaned trivy tmp dirs at startup
When the buildEnv path writes a per-scan DOCKER_CONFIG dir under
os.tmpdir() and the process crashes before the finally block runs,
the dir leaks. Mirrors GitSourceService.sweepStaleTempDirs:
exported sweepStaleTrivyTempDirs is fire-and-forget at boot,
removes prefix-matching dirs older than 1 hour, swallows
permission/race failures, logs a single line if any were reaped.
* perf(security): emit per-batch summary for scanAllNodeImages
Adds one diag() line at the end of scanAllNodeImages summarising
unique image count, scanned, skipped, failed, violation count, and
elapsed time. Per-image diag inside scanImage stays useful for
debugging individual scans; the summary gives operators a single
fleet-level checkpoint when developer_mode is on.
* perf(security): cap SARIF export at 5000 findings per type
Replace the unbounded fetchAllPages walk on /scans/:id/sarif with a
hard limit of 5000 findings per type. When any type trips the cap,
emit run-level properties.truncated=true plus row_limit and per-type
totals so downstream tooling can flag the export as partial.
Console-warns for ops visibility.
A scan with 50k vulns previously streamed every row into memory
before serialising; the cap bounds memory and serialisation time at
the cost of completeness on pathological scans.
* docs(env): document TRIVY_BIN host-binary override
The env var is honored by TrivyService.detectTrivy as a fallback when
no managed install is present, but it was undocumented in
.env.example. Adds the var with a comment explaining precedence
(managed > TRIVY_BIN > PATH).
* test(security): cover scanComposeStack failure modes
Two new cases drive the existing try/catch through real failure
paths:
- Malformed Trivy stdout: row flips to status='failed' with the
parser error preserved on `error`.
- execFile rejection: row flips to status='failed' with a string
error message.
Pairs with the existing dedup tests so the failure path now also
verifies the scan row state, not just the thrown exception.
* test(e2e): security scanner + misconfig acknowledgement flow
Seven Playwright tests covering the scanner UI and the new
acknowledgement system end-to-end:
- Trivy availability gate (skips suite when binary absent so CI
without Trivy can opt out via E2E_SKIP_TRIVY=1)
- Stack config scan completes and records misconfig findings
- Concurrent stack scan returns 409 from the dedup gate
- Misconfig ack POST creates and lists on Settings
- Duplicate (rule_id, stack_pattern) returns 409
- Malformed rule_id (shell metacharacters) returns 400
- Misconfigs tab renders against a real stack scan
Tests drive the API for behaviour assertions and the UI only for
shell-rendering checks; the visual snapshot suite owns screenshots.
* docs(features): add misconfig acknowledgement workflow and SARIF cap
Refreshes vulnerability-scanning.mdx with:
- Misconfig acknowledgements section covering the per-row dialog,
Settings panel, scope/matching rules, and SARIF emission
- Tier table row for the new feature
- SARIF section note on the 5000 row-per-type cap and the
properties.truncated marker for partial exports
- Troubleshooting entries: SARIF cap, hidden Acknowledge button,
findings resurfacing after delete, Trivy DB phone-home, and
409 on concurrent compose-stack scans
* fix(ci): clear backend lint and CodeQL alerts
- Remove the dead fetchAllPages helper in routes/security.ts. It lost
its callers when the SARIF endpoint switched to direct paged reads
for the truncation cap. ESLint flagged it as unused.
- Switch the trivy-tmp-cleanup test helper to fs.mkdtempSync. Building
paths under os.tmpdir() with predictable names tripped CodeQL's
js/insecure-temporary-file rule (high severity), which warns about
symlink-pre-creation attacks even in test code. mkdtempSync appends
a process-random suffix and creates the dir atomically; the
sencho-trivy- prefix is preserved so the production sweep still
matches the test fixtures.
|
||
|
Anso
|
3ec0a45ff0 |
feat(frontend): SystemSheet §9.11 — security and scheduled sheets (PR 2/3) (#961)
* feat(frontend): add SystemSheet primitive and migrate mesh sheets to §9.11 chrome
DESIGN.md §9.11 codifies one canonical right-side detail-sheet shell (cyan
rail, mono crumb, italic serif name, mono meta, ESC chip + close glyph,
fixed three-slot toolbar, cyan-underline tabs, ScrollArea body, footer
freshness band). Today the 16 sheet consumers each render their own
header chrome with stock shadcn SheetHeader/SheetTitle.
Introduce <SystemSheet> + <SheetSection> in
frontend/src/components/ui/system-sheet.tsx, composing the existing
<Sheet>/<SheetContent> primitive. Add a backward-compatible showClose
prop to SheetContent so SystemSheet can render its own ESC chip + close
glyph instead of the stock cyan square close.
Migrate the four mesh sheets as the first batch:
* MeshActivitySheet: crumb Fleet › Mesh › Activity, footer freshness from
most-recent event timestamp.
* MeshOptInSheet: crumb Fleet › Mesh › {nodeName}, meta of opted-in
count, drops the redundant bottom Close button (ESC chip dismisses).
* MeshDiagnosticsSheet: removes the icon-prefixed title (forbidden by
§9.11), lifts Refresh/Restart buttons from the body into the toolbar
band, three SheetSection blocks for sidecar status, streams, cache.
* MeshRouteDetailSheet: adds Overview/Events/Raw tabs, lifts Test probe
into the toolbar primary slot, footer surfaces last probe latency.
* feat(frontend): migrate security and scheduled sheets to §9.11 chrome
PR 2 of the System Sheet (§9.11) rollout, stacked on the SystemSheet
primitive PR. Migrates six more sheet consumers and merges the Stack
alert + auto-heal sheets into a single tabbed sheet per audit §17.
Sheets migrated:
* NodeUpdatesSheet: crumb Fleet > Updates, Recheck primary, Update-all
secondary when applicable. Stat tiles and node rows lose their
card-in-sheet wrapping (forbidden by §9.11) for flat dividers.
* StackAlertSheet (now the merged stack monitor): tabs Alerts /
Auto-heal, crumb Stack > {name} > Monitor. New initialTab prop lets
callers open directly to either tab. Auto-heal tab is hidden entirely
for Community-tier users (matches the existing tier-gating on the
context menu trigger and keyboard shortcut).
* StackAutoHealSheet.tsx: deleted. Its body became the Auto-heal tab
inside the merged sheet.
* VulnerabilityScanSheet: removed the icon-prefixed title (forbidden by
§9.11). Re-scan, Compare, CSV, SARIF lifted from body cards into the
toolbar band. Tabs Vulnerabilities | Secrets | Misconfigs (counts on
the tab labels). SBOM dropdown stays in the body summary section
pending a primitive enhancement for dropdown-attached toolbar actions.
* ScanComparisonSheet: crumb Security > Scans > Compare, name Diff,
meta with the +added/-removed delta.
* SecurityHistoryView: the inner sheet only. Crumb Security > Scan
history. Compare (paid + 2 selected) and Refresh in toolbar.
* ScheduledOperationsView run-history sheet (lines ~847-935 only):
crumb Schedules > {taskName} > Runs, Download CSV in toolbar, footer
surfaces next-run timestamp.
Hook refactor:
* useOverlayState replaces three separate state vars (alertSheetOpen,
alertSheetStack, autoHealStackName) with one stackMonitor object
carrying { stackName, tab }. New helpers openAlertSheet(stackName),
openAutoHeal(stackName), closeStackMonitor(). Tests rewritten and
pass (11/11).
* useSidebarContextMenu and ShellOverlays updated for the new API. The
three other call sites (useStackMenuItems, useStackKeyboardShortcuts)
already use openAlertSheet/openAutoHeal and need no change.
|
||
|
Anso
|
f62716f557 |
refactor(design): align typography, colors, and card surfaces to DESIGN.md (#859)
* refactor(design): align surface tokens to DESIGN.md §2 * refactor(design): canonicalize tracked-mono kickers and display rungs * refactor(design): collapse to five-slot palette and align card surfaces |
||
|
Anso
|
12c2b37510 |
feat(security): polish scan sheets, fix CVE links, surface policy violations (#721)
* feat(security): polish scan sheets, fix CVE links, surface policy violations Adds cveUrl helper that rewrites Trivy's 404-ing avd.aquasec.com links to cve.org for CVE-prefixed IDs (GHSA and misconfig URLs pass through unchanged). Redesigns both scan sheets with shadow-card-bevel chips, tracked-mono kickers, severity row tinting with a left accent rail, and tabular-nums timestamps. Surfaces a destructive policy-violation banner on scans whose policy_evaluation row flags a block, and fixes the compare sheet's delta ribbon so CRITICAL net-positive deltas render in destructive (not warning) tone. Backend parses the JSON policy_evaluation column at the API boundary so the UI receives a structured object. * chore(security): suppress CVE-2026-32281 and CVE-2026-32283 in Trivy scan Both CVEs affect Go stdlib crypto/x509 and TLS in Docker CLI 29.4.0 (Go 1.26.1) and Compose v5.1.2 (Go 1.25.8). No upstream static binary has been released with the patched Go 1.26.2 or 1.25.9 runtimes yet. Exposure analysis: the Docker CLI and compose plugin connect to the local Docker socket (Unix socket, no TLS) and to public registries with well-known CAs. Neither CVE is exploitable in this configuration. Added alongside sibling entries already in .trivyignore for the same binary versions. Revisit on next Docker CLI and Compose upstream release. |
||
|
Anso
|
12bbf86dc4 |
feat(security): export scan results as SARIF 2.1.0 (#652)
Adds a new SarifExporter service that builds a SARIF 2.1.0 document from the stored scan findings (vulnerabilities, secrets, misconfigs). Rule IDs are namespaced to avoid collisions in a flat result list. Suppressions carry through as SARIF suppressions[] entries so GitHub code scanning and Defender for Cloud see the same accepted status shown in the UI. Exposed via GET /api/security/scans/:id/sarif, admin + paid-tier gated to match the SBOM export precedent. A SARIF button appears in the scan sheet next to SBOM and CSV for paid tiers. |
||
|
Anso
|
a95bf1ff33 |
feat(security): secret and misconfiguration scanning (#651)
Extends Trivy scans with secret detection in image filesystems and misconfiguration scanning for Compose stacks. Adds tabs to the scan drawer for vulnerabilities, secrets, and misconfigs. Secret matches are redacted server-side (first 8 chars + ellipsis) before storage. - TrivyService: --scanners vuln,secret for images; trivy config for stacks - DB: scanners_used/secret_count/misconfig_count cols; secret_findings, misconfig_findings tables; cache key scoped by scanners - Routes: POST /security/scan accepts scanners array (requirePaid when secret requested); POST /security/scan/stack; GET .../secrets and .../misconfigs (paid-tier reads) - UI: tabs in VulnerabilityScanSheet; scan-options dropdown on images; Scan config button on stack header |
||
|
Anso
|
732fc95415 |
feat(security): fleet-replicated CVE suppression list (#650)
Operators can accept known-benign findings once and have Sencho filter them out of scan drawers, comparison views, and other read surfaces. Suppressions replicate from the control instance to every remote node. * New cve_suppressions table with a COALESCE-based unique index so NULL scope slots collide the way users expect * Admin + paid-tier CRUD routes; writes are rejected on replicas * Read-time filter enriches vulnerability details and compare payloads without mutating stored counts * Settings > Security panel for managing rules, per-CVE suppress action in the scan drawer, dimmed rows with a shield-off indicator * Vitest unit tests for the filter (glob, expiry, specificity) and route tests (auth, tier, replica, UNIQUE conflict) |
||
|
Anso
|
8ee0c0c476 |
feat(security): scan comparison UI (#648)
Side-by-side vulnerability scan comparison with two entry points: - Compare button plus inline baseline picker inside the scan drawer. - New Scan History page reachable from the Resources Hub, grouping completed scans by image with a checkbox selection flow. The comparison sheet shows a severity delta ribbon, Added/Removed/Unchanged filters, and a paginated CVE table. Cross-image comparisons are allowed but flagged with a warning. Compare access is gated to Skipper and Admiral tiers; the underlying /security/compare endpoint is unchanged. |
||
|
Anso
|
dc8370f5a4 |
fix(security): harden Trivy scan lifecycle, logging, and docs (#639)
* fix(security): harden Trivy scan lifecycle, logging, and docs - Call TrivyService.initialize() at startup so capability state is accurate before first request; add periodic re-detect to the scheduler so newly installed Trivy binaries light up without a restart. - Add markStaleScansAsFailed sweep (+ idx_vuln_scans_status index) to recover any scan row left in_progress after a crash or timeout; sweep runs before the paid-tier gate so every tier self-heals. - Split scanImage persistence into beginScan/finishScan so the manual scan route owns a single code path and can return a scanId synchronously while work continues asynchronously. - Validate image refs on /api/security/scan and /sbom via new utility; defense-in-depth against shell-metacharacter payloads. - Dispatch a warning-level alert when a post-deploy scan fails so the operator has a user-visible path to the failure instead of a silent log. - Share DIGEST_CACHE_TTL_MS and severity ordering across service and route layers; remove dead invalidateDetection(). - Add [Trivy:diag] logging gated behind developer_mode for support diagnostics; production logs unchanged. - Frontend: defensive toast fallback chain, sr-only SheetDescription, and a truncation badge when the 500-item detail fetch is capped. - Tests: extend trivy-service and vulnerability-db suites; add image-ref and severity unit tests. - Docs: expand vulnerability-scanning troubleshooting with recovery, re-detect, and diagnostic-log guidance; link Dockerfile comment to trivy-setup. * fix(security): drop unnecessary escape in image-ref forbidden-char regex |
||
|
Anso
|
c9cd6990d2 |
feat(images): Trivy-powered vulnerability scanning (#635)
* feat(images): Trivy-powered vulnerability scanning Scan container images for known CVEs via Trivy. On-demand scanning and severity badges are available on every tier; scheduled scans, scan policies, SBOM generation, and scan history are gated to Skipper+. - New TrivyService (binary detection, per-image scan, SBOM, digest cache) - Three new tables: vulnerability_scans, vulnerability_details, scan_policies - 12 routes under /api/security (scan, results, summaries, SBOM, policies, compare) - Post-deploy async scans wired into all five deploy paths, with a per-deploy opt-out toggle in the App Store deploy sheet - "scan" action type added to SchedulerService for fleet-wide recurring scans - Frontend: severity badges in Resources Hub with animated cursor detail, scan results drawer with vulnerability table and filters, and a new Security section in Settings for scan policy CRUD - Policy threshold violations dispatch a warning or critical alert based on the policy's block_on_deploy flag; deploys themselves are never blocked * fix(security): compute scan age in useEffect to satisfy react-hooks/purity |