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17a8dc8a94b18b396492735de8cd89bc2cf45c97
2 Commits
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5f1baa7522 |
fix: harden deploy/update concurrency and node-targeting safety (#1390)
* fix: harden deploy/update concurrency and node-targeting safety Release stabilization for deploy/update operational safety. Per-stack operation locking is now global. Background lifecycle paths (scheduler auto stop/down/start/backup/update, webhook execute, Git source auto-deploy, image auto-update, label bulk actions, fleet snapshot redeploy, and mesh redeploy) acquire the per-node, per-stack lock through a new StackOpLockService.runExclusive helper and skip rather than race a manual deploy/update/rollback/backup on the same stack and node. Skips surface honestly (a failed scheduled run, a recorded webhook failure, a per-stack batch result, or a thrown error) instead of a silent no-op. Update readiness and policy-bypass now run against the node captured when the dialog opened, not the live active node, so switching nodes while a dialog is open cannot retarget the update or the bypass retry. Rollback readiness no longer presents a moving-tag or unpinned image as a ready image revert. Restoring files does not revert a moving tag, so those stacks read as partial, and the rollback success message states that the compose and env files were restored. * fix: lock blueprint reconcile against manual ops and correct rollback wording Follow-up to the deploy/update safety hardening, closing two more gaps from a verification pass. BlueprintService.deployLocal and withdrawLocal called ComposeService directly, so blueprint reconciliation could race a manual deploy/update/rollback/backup on an owned stack. Both now run their compose lifecycle call through StackOpLockService.runExclusive and skip (recorded as a failed reconcile, retried on the next cycle) on conflict. The withdraw holds the lock across both the compose down and the directory delete so neither races a manual operation. The runtime rollback messages overstated recovery: a rollback restores the compose and env files and recreates containers, but does not revert an image behind a moving tag. The auto-rollback deploy-progress output, the recovery panel and chip, the failure toasts, and the manual rollback route message now state that the compose and env files were restored, with the matching OpenAPI example and atomic-deployments doc updated. * fix: acquire stack lock before blueprint deploy mutates compose and marker files Local blueprint deploy wrote the compose and marker files and ran the policy assert before acquiring the per-stack lock; the lock only wrapped the deploy itself. A reconcile could therefore rewrite an owned stack's files while a manual deploy/update/rollback/backup was running. The lock now wraps the whole critical section (create, write compose, write marker, policy assert, deploy), so on conflict nothing is written and the reconcile records a failed outcome. Adds a test asserting a deploy under a held lock records failed, writes no marker file, and leaves the manual lock untouched. * fix: make remote blueprint apply atomic under the receiving node's stack lock Remote blueprint deploy wrote the compose and marker files to the target node via separate HTTP calls and only locked on the final deploy, so the file writes could race a manual operation on that node. A node's operation lock is process-local and cannot be held by the hub across HTTP calls, so the locked create/write/deploy now runs on the receiving node. The locked critical section is extracted into BlueprintService.applyLocalUnderLock and exposed via POST /api/blueprints/apply-local. The hub posts the blueprint to that endpoint in one call; the receiving node runs create + write compose+marker + deploy under its own per-stack lock. Older nodes without the route answer 404 and fall back to the legacy multi-call flow. The endpoint is gated by paid tier and the same per-stack stack:edit and stack:deploy permissions as the PUT-compose + deploy it bundles, validates the stack name, compose size, and marker structure, and returns 409 on a lock conflict without writing anything. Adds tests for the atomic single-call path, the 404 legacy fallback, the 409 lock-conflict mapping, the route validation and permission paths, and the write-compose-then-marker-then-deploy ordering of the shared locked apply. * fix(deps): bump undici to 7.28.0 to clear high-severity advisory The frontend CI npm audit gate (--audit-level=high) failed on a transitive undici 7.25.0 (a dev-only dependency via jsdom): TLS certificate validation bypass (GHSA-vmh5-mc38-953g) and cross-user cache information disclosure (GHSA-pr7r-676h-xcf6). Bumping undici within jsdom's existing ^7.25.0 range to 7.28.0 clears the high-severity advisory and unblocks the frontend job. Lockfile only; no direct dependency or source change. |
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60ecd574b3 |
fix(stacks): serialize concurrent lifecycle operations per stack (#1182)
* fix(stacks): serialize concurrent lifecycle operations per stack
Two simultaneous POSTs to /api/stacks/:name/{deploy,down,restart,stop,
start,update} could race against the same compose project, doubling
notifications, doubling post-deploy scans, and corrupting the
atomic-deploy backup snapshot. Each lifecycle route now acquires a
per-(nodeId, stackName) in-process lock; the second caller gets 409
with {code: 'stack_op_in_progress', inProgress: {action, startedAt,
user}} and the frontend surfaces a "X is already deploying" toast.
The lock is process-local on purpose: it shares a lifetime with the
docker compose child process. A Sencho restart clears all locks, which
matches the truth that an in-flight compose op is gone too.
The existing policy-block 409 is shape-distinguishable (has policy /
violations) and continues to work; the frontend checks the new code
discriminator first before falling through to policy handling.
* chore(stacks): validate action enum in 409 parser; cover start collision
The frontend parseStackOpInProgress used to cast the parsed action
directly to StackOpAction. A backend bug or spoofed payload returning
action='wibble' would slip through. Validate against the known enum
set before returning the parsed info.
Adds an integration test for the deploy-blocks-while-start-in-flight
case so all six lifecycle verbs have collision coverage (the existing
suite covered deploy/down/restart/stop/update; start was indirect).
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