Commit Graph

4 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Anso dd54a2e483 feat: graduate Host Console to Community admins (#1669)
* feat: graduate Host Console to Community admins

Make Host Console available to Community and Admiral admins (system:console), add host-console-community for mixed fleets, and keep opaque API tokens off the host shell.

* docs: document Host Console deep links

Cover root and stack-scoped Console URLs, correct the phone treatment note, and pin parse/build round-trips in senchoRoute tests.

* fix: bind Host Console socket to the resolved node

Treat unresolved activeNode as loading, target the WebSocket with an explicit nodeId, and wait for stack deep-link hydration so the shell cannot open on the wrong node or compose root. Add regression coverage for node/stack retargeting and fail-closed directory resolution.

* fix: harden Host Console node binding, audit acting_as, and console_session tokens

Reject unknown or malformed nodeIds before spawning a PTY. Record hub operators in audit_log.acting_as for remote console_session bridges. Path-scope and one-time-consume console_session JWTs so Host Console mints cannot open container exec or be replayed.

* test: expect acting_as in audit CSV export header

Align the CSV export assertion with the P0-2B acting_as column added to audit log exports.
2026-07-23 12:59:53 -04:00
Anso 865d792874 feat(pricing): collapse to two tiers (#1309)
* feat(pricing): collapse to two tiers (Community + Admiral)

Collapse Sencho's pricing from three tiers (Community / Skipper / Admiral)
to two: a generous free Community tier and a single paid Admiral tier. The
Skipper tier is removed.

Now free in Community: auto-heal, auto-update, scheduled operations,
webhooks, notification routing, Fleet Actions and bulk operations, SSO
preset providers (Google / GitHub / Okta), unlimited users with admin and
viewer roles, and deploy safety (atomic deploys, auto-rollback, and
one-click rollback).

Admiral (paid) is focused on running and governing a fleet: blueprints,
Fleet Secrets, deploy enforcement, vulnerability report export, audit log,
host console, private registries, mesh networking, node cordon, managed
cloud backup, LDAP / Active Directory SSO, and the advanced RBAC roles
(deployer, node-admin, auditor) with per-resource scoped assignments.

Internally the license variant distinction is removed so tier is binary
(community / paid). License validation still verifies the Lemon Squeezy
store and product before granting paid status.

Docs and the contributor guide are updated to the two-tier model.

* docs(pricing): correct licensing page to two-tier pricing and tidy stale tier wording

The licensing docs page kept the old Admiral pricing plus a Founder
Lifetime column and an Enterprise paragraph after the two-tier collapse.
Update it to $12/month or $99/year, drop the lifetime and Enterprise
content, and link to the pricing page for current pricing.

Also fix stale "Skipper" wording in CLA.md, SUPPORT.md, one test title,
and three test comments. Historical CHANGELOG entries and the
retired-Skipper license-guard test are intentionally left as-is.

* docs: align licensing and SSO pages with the two-tier model

Correct the SSO overview so the Google, GitHub, and Okta presets read as
available on every tier, matching the provider table; only LDAP and Active
Directory require Sencho Admiral. Remove the lifetime-plan references from the
licensing, settings, and troubleshooting pages so they reflect subscription-only
Admiral pricing.

* fix(rbac): omit scoped permissions from /me on the Community tier

Scoped role assignments only take effect on the paid tier, but GET /api/permissions/me returned them unconditionally, so a downgraded instance with leftover assignments rendered per-resource affordances the API then rejected with 403. The endpoint now mirrors the permission middleware and includes scoped permissions only on the paid tier. Adds a regression test covering the downgrade case.

* docs: use custom-pricing wording on the contact page

The two-tier model has no Enterprise tier; reword the contact page's enterprise pricing/deals to custom pricing/deals so it does not imply a tier that no longer exists.
2026-06-04 17:45:53 -04:00
Anso d882f223f4 feat(api-tokens): switch to sen_sk_ prefixed opaque keys (#1062)
* feat(api-tokens): switch to sen_sk_ prefixed opaque keys

Replace JWT-shaped API tokens with 56-char opaque keys of the form
`sen_sk_<43-char base62 random><6-char base62 checksum>` (256-bit
entropy, sha256-truncated checksum). Node-proxy tokens stay JWTs.

Why:
* The api_token path was already a sha256 DB lookup; the JWT signature
  was wasted work and the 400d JWT ceiling vs DB expires_at was a
  confusing dual bound.
* Opaque tokens carry a verifiable checksum so malformed/typoed values
  are rejected before any SQLite lookup.
* `sen_sk_` prefix is recognizable to GitHub, TruffleHog, GitGuardian
  and makes the on-wire shape visually distinct from node_proxy JWTs.

Changes:
* New `utils/apiTokenFormat.ts` (generate + checksum-verify, CSPRNG via
  randomInt, timingSafeEqual on the checksum compare).
* `middleware/auth.ts` and `websocket/upgradeHandler.ts` route opaque
  tokens before any jwt.verify; 401 messages unified to avoid a
  token-existence oracle.
* `middleware/rateLimiters.ts` short-circuits opaque tokens in the
  node_proxy detection and keys per-token via a non-reversible sha256
  slice so each token keeps its own bucket without a DB hit.
* All six existing tests migrated from jwt.sign({scope:'api_token'})
  to generateApiToken(); new format-only test suite covering prefix,
  length, alphabet, checksum reject paths, and a 10k-iteration
  collision/integrity loop.
* Docs (features/api-tokens.mdx, api-reference/overview.mdx) describe
  the shape and drop the obsolete JWT-ceiling note.

* fix(api-tokens): clear CI lint and CodeQL false positives

* Drop unused TEST_USERNAME import in remote-console-session.test.ts;
  the migration to generateApiToken() left it orphaned.
* Add a CodeQL barrier model so `generateApiToken`'s ReturnValue does
  not flow into the `insufficient-password-hash` query. The function
  emits 256-bit CSPRNG opaque keys; sha256 of the raw token is the
  correct construction for high-entropy API tokens (bcrypt-class
  hashes target low-entropy human passwords). CodeQL's name heuristic
  was treating "Token" as a password source and flagging the standard
  sha256 wrapping at all 9 call sites.

* ci(codeql): exclude js/insufficient-password-hash for token paths

The previous barrierModel data extension was a no-op for this rule: the
js/insufficient-password-hash query identifies its "password" sources via
SensitiveExpr's name heuristic ("token", "secret", "key" substrings),
which is upstream of the taint-tracking layer where barrierModel applies.
Verified by post-push re-analysis: 9 alerts still open, all undismissed.

Replace the dead extension with a path-scoped query-filter in
codeql-config.yml so the rule no longer fires on apiTokenFormat,
apiTokens, and the test directory. Real user-password hashing code
elsewhere in the repo (auth, users, setup routes) remains analyzed.

The 9 existing alerts on PR #1062 are dismissed via API as false
positives with a justification pointing at this config. Future runs
will not re-flag them because of the path filter.
2026-05-15 18:21:28 -04:00
Anso 43a595905b fix(backend): restore remote proxy mount order before local routers (#747)
The index.ts refactor inverted the proxy mount order. The pre-refactor
monolith mounted `app.use('/api/', remoteNodeProxy)` before any inline
route, so remote-nodeId requests short-circuited into the proxy. After
the refactor the proxy was registered after every per-group router, so
Express matched local routers first and remote-nodeId requests were
silently handled with the control instance's local state (e.g.
GET /api/stacks with x-node-id=<remote> returned local stacks rather
than the remote's).

Fix moves createRemoteProxyMiddleware() between enforceApiTokenScope
and the first per-group router, matching middleware-order.md step 13
and restoring pre-refactor behavior. PROXY_EXEMPT_PREFIXES continues to
cover gateway-level paths (auth, nodes, license, fleet, webhooks, meta)
that must stay local even when x-node-id targets a remote.

Add four regression guards that would have caught this:

- json-parser-bypass.test.ts: asserts conditionalJsonParser leaves the
  request stream intact on proxy-eligible paths so http-proxy can pipe
  the raw body to the upstream; spins up a local echo server and
  verifies the bytes arrive.
- proxy-mount-order.test.ts: asserts a remote-nodeId GET short-circuits
  into the proxy (502 from unreachable upstream) instead of matching a
  local router (200 from local state).
- upgrade-order.test.ts: pins WebSocket dispatch order by observing
  handler-specific side effects for notifications, remote forwarder,
  logs, and pilot tunnel.
- remote-console-session.test.ts: asserts the HTTP console-token route
  mints a JWT with the same claim shape as the shared mintConsoleSession
  helper, so gateway and WS forwarder tokens remain interchangeable.

Full suite: 73 files, 1,358 tests, all passing.
2026-04-24 10:20:08 -04:00