* feat: add service-scoped Compose update and restore
Allow updating or rebuilding one declared Compose service on multi-service
stacks without recreating siblings, with recovery snapshots, health-gate
observation, and prune holds for rollback images. Full-stack update paths
and single-service UX stay unchanged.
* fix: sanitize service-scoped update log messages for CodeQL
* fix: address service-scoped update audit findings B-01 through B-07
* fix: complete service-scoped update audit metadata and surfaces
* test: wrap Updates readiness tests for deploy-feedback context
* fix: keep service recovery reachable without Deploy Progress
Make failed service-gate recovery discoverable when Deploy Progress is
disabled or dismissed, suppress stale image-scan notification side
effects, normalize ComposeService line endings, and add focused
regression coverage.
* fix: resurface ContainersHealth density and expand on multi-service stacks
Service grouping hid the summary strip and Compact/Detailed/Expand controls that still applied to multi-container stacks.
* refactor(backend): sanitize user input before logging to close CRLF injection
Adds a small sanitizeForLog helper that strips CR, LF, tab, and ASCII
control characters (0x00-0x1F, 0x7F) from a value before it is embedded
in a console.log/warn/error/debug call. Wraps every call site where a
user-controlled value (req.params, req.body, req.query, or a value
derived from them) flows into a log message.
Closes the bulk of the open CodeQL alerts in this family:
- 96 js/log-injection
- 28 js/tainted-format-string
The helper is in backend/src/utils/safeLog.ts. Routes still pre-validate
input at the request boundary; this is the second line of defense and
gives static analyzers a sanitizer they can trace through. JSON
responses, Docker filter labels, and other non-log call sites are
intentionally left unwrapped.
* refactor(backend): printf-style format strings for tainted-log call sites
CodeQL's js/tainted-format-string rule flags template literals in the first
arg of console.X when any interpolated value is user-controlled, regardless
of whether each value is sanitized inline. The canonical mitigation is to
use a static format string and pass values as positional args.
Converts the 28 flagged template literals to printf-style ("%s") format
strings, with sanitizeForLog applied to each positional arg. Also fills in
the log-injection wraps on 9 sites where a user-controlled value was
missed in the first sweep (agents, fleet, gitSources, imageUpdates,
GitSourceService).
No behavior change at runtime. Node's util.format substitutes %s tokens
identically to template-literal interpolation.
* fix(backend): wrap nodeId/snapshotId in fleet restore debug log
CodeQL flagged the unwrapped numeric args even though they cannot
contain control chars in practice. Apply the sanitizer for taint-flow
recognition.
First slice of Phase 4 (route extraction). Pulls 8 well-tested, mostly
independent route groups out of index.ts into focused Router files. No
behavior change; every handler body moves verbatim.
New route files under backend/src/routes/:
- meta.ts /api/health, /api/meta (mounted before authGate)
- license.ts /api/license/* + /api/system/update,
exports scheduleLocalUpdate for the fleet route
- permissions.ts /api/permissions/me
- convert.ts POST /api/convert
- alerts.ts /api/alerts/*
- labels.ts /api/labels/* + PUT /api/stacks/:name/labels
(exported as stackLabelsRouter)
- apiTokens.ts /api/api-tokens/*
- auditLog.ts /api/audit-log/*
Shared helper lifts:
- helpers/cacheInvalidation.ts: invalidateNodeCaches()
- middleware/tierGates.ts: requireBody (was inline in index.ts)
- utils/errors.ts: isSqliteUniqueViolation (was inline in index.ts)
- middleware/apiTokenScope.ts: rejectApiTokenScope() helper (new)
- utils/csv.ts: escapeCsvField() (new)
index.ts drops from ~7520 to ~6775 lines and now mounts the routers right
after enforceApiTokenScope. The remote proxy and fleet/auth/webhooks/users
routes remain inline in index.ts pending later Phase 4 slices.
Code review fixes: rejectApiTokenScope helper replaces duplicated
`if (req.apiTokenScope) 403 SCOPE_DENIED` blocks in apiTokens.ts and
license.ts; escapeCsvField replaces the inline CSV escape in auditLog.ts.
Phase 1 of the index.ts monolith refactor. Extracts all non-auth middleware
into focused modules. Routes and authMiddleware itself stay in index.ts for
now; Phase 2 introduces createApp() and extracts authMiddleware.
New modules:
- middleware/rateLimiters.ts: globalApiLimiter, pollingLimiter,
webhookTriggerLimiter, authRateLimiter, ssoRateLimiter, trivyInstallLimiter
plus the hybrid rateLimitKeyGenerator and isNodeProxyRequest helper
- middleware/jsonParser.ts: conditionalJsonParser that preserves the raw
stream for remote-proxy forwarding (via helpers/proxyExemptPaths)
- middleware/nodeContext.ts: nodeContextMiddleware
- middleware/apiTokenScope.ts: enforceApiTokenScope + DEPLOY_ALLOWED_PATTERNS
- middleware/authGate.ts: createAuthGate(authMiddleware) factory + auditLog.
Factory takes authMiddleware as a dependency to avoid a circular import
until Phase 2 extracts the auth module.
- middleware/errorHandler.ts: central error handler that preserves
err.status / err.expose from body-parser and other HTTP errors
- helpers/routePatterns.ts: WEBHOOK_TRIGGER_RE shared by rateLimiters and
authGate
index.ts drops ~290 lines. Middleware registration order is unchanged.
All 1278 tests pass.
Code review fixes: typed ApiTokenScope in apiTokenScope.ts; replaced 2
em dashes with colons (Directive 18); added local CachedProxyFlagReq
type alias for the node_proxy memoization cast; extracted deny() helper.
Anso