Pin three third-party actions to full commit SHAs with version comments
so dependabot can update them in place without exposing the pipeline to
upstream tag tampering:
- aquasecurity/trivy-action@v0.35.0
- peter-evans/create-pull-request@v8.1.1
- googleapis/release-please-action@v4.4.0
Add a workflow-level permissions: contents: read default to ci.yml, with
update-screenshots keeping its explicit contents: write + pull-requests:
write override. Add the same default to docker-publish.yml (single job).
Expand .dockerignore to explicitly exclude .env*, *.key, *.pem, .github/,
docs/, website/, e2e/, tests/, test-results/, and playwright-report/ as
defense in depth against accidental build-context leaks. None of these
paths are read by any COPY step in Dockerfile.
Anso