feat(mesh): symmetric WS dial for proxy-mode mesh peers (#1066)

* chore(mesh): foundation for symmetric callback dial

Adds the data-plane scaffolding that the symmetric callback dial fix
builds on:
- mesh_centrals table for peer-side bootstrap material
- MeshCentralRegistry service (upsert/getActive/clear/markUsed/markRejected)
- PilotTunnelManager kind discriminator and replaceOrRegisterProxyBridge
- mesh_proxy_callback_bootstrap capability registration
- MeshProxyTunnelDialer reason-tagged proxy-bridge-down events from a
  single tearDownBridge emission point
- Reactive redial scheduler that skips idle and auth_failed reasons

* feat(mesh): add reverse-direction activity log entries (closes R1-B)

acceptReverseLocal now emits route.resolve.ok with direction=reverse on
connect ack and route.resolve.fail with direction=reverse plus
reason=container_not_found / connect_error pre-connect. Post-connect
close/error stays silent. Reuses existing event types via the new
details.direction discriminator so frontend filters are unaffected.

* feat(mesh): add peer-to-central callback dial path (closes R1-A2)

Closes the architectural gap where proxy-mode mesh peers could not
re-establish their tunnel to central after any non-idle bridge teardown
(idle close, network blip, central restart, peer reboot). Central remains
the hub for the data plane; the change is purely about WS initiation.

Symmetric WS initiation, asymmetric protocol roles. Central retains
PilotTunnelBridge ownership; peer retains TcpStreamSwitchboard +
reverseDialer ownership. Central bootstraps callback credentials over
the first authenticated central-initiated mesh tunnel via a one-shot
mesh_handshake JSON frame; peer persists the material in a new
mesh_centrals SQLite table and dials central's new
/api/mesh/proxy-tunnel-from-peer endpoint when local cross-node traffic
needs a bridge and none is live.

Mesh_tunnel JWT (HS256, signed with auth_jwt_secret) carries scope, audience,
issuer (central instance id), peer api_token fingerprint, kid. Validation
on inbound peer dial: algorithm pin, signature, scope, audience, instance,
time bounds, node existence and mode, fingerprint match. Failures return
HTTP 401 with a machine-readable reason; peer routes the response per a
clear-vs-keep cache matrix.

Triggers proactive bootstrap on mesh-enable and api_token rotation; central
startup fans out to mesh-enabled proxy-mode nodes with mesh_stacks rows
(throttled, fire-and-forget). Reactive redial on non-idle bridge loss.

Capability-gated handshake send (mesh_proxy_callback_bootstrap) makes the
upgrade path safe against older peers in mixed-version fleets.

Adds peer-side /api/system/pilot-tunnels centralCallback diag block,
bounded counter metrics for bootstrap and dial events. SENCHO_PRIMARY_URL
preflight warning when unset on a central with mesh-enabled proxy nodes.

Tested with unit suites for the validation chain, registry, manager, and
both dialers; integration tests for bootstrap E2E (asserts protocol-role
invariant), api_token rotation, instance id change, version skew, and
pilot-mode regression.

* fix(mesh): green CI on the symmetric callback branch

Two independent CI failures, both surgical:

1. Backend tests (11 fails): four mesh test files called setupTestDb in
   beforeEach. setupTestDb does not reset the DatabaseService singleton,
   so the per-test afterEach rm of the previous tmpdir left the singleton
   connection pointing at a deleted file. The next beforeEach's line-55
   write threw SQLITE_READONLY_DBMOVED on Linux. Windows file-lock
   semantics hid this locally. Hoist setupTestDb / cleanupTestDb to
   file-scope beforeAll / afterAll; per-test state resets stay in
   beforeEach. Matches the convention in the eight mesh test files that
   already pass.

2. CodeQL (4 high alerts): js/insufficient-password-hash flagged
   sha256(api_token) at four sites. The api_token is a 256-bit opaque
   bearer (sen_sk_-prefixed), not a human password; sha256 is the
   correct fingerprint primitive for binding the mesh_tunnel JWT to a
   specific token. Add the two production files plus the two test
   files that mint the fingerprint to the existing path-scoped
   query-filter for that rule.

* fix(mesh): drop unused afterEach import and revert dead codeql config

ESLint flagged afterEach as unused in mesh-central-registry.test.ts:1
after the previous commit hoisted setup/teardown to file-scope
beforeAll/afterAll. Remove from the vitest import line.

Revert the codeql-config.yml additions from the previous commit. The
paths: sub-key under query-filters > exclude is not a documented CodeQL
feature and silently no-ops. The four js/insufficient-password-hash
alerts on api_token fingerprinting are tracked as dismissed false
positives in the GitHub Security tab rather than via dead config.

docs/features/sencho-mesh.mdx

@@ -71,6 +71,20 @@ services:
 
 Sencho's static IP on the network is `<network address> + 2` (so `10.42.0.2` for the example above). Operators can configure each node independently; the override generator pushes alias hostnames that resolve to whichever IP the deploying node uses locally.
 
+## Bidirectional secure callback
+
+Proxy-mode mesh nodes can re-establish their secure mesh callback to central
+when traffic starts from that node. Central is the hub; the callback is signed
+with a `mesh_tunnel`-scoped credential bound to the node's API token.
+
+<Note>
+  **Prerequisite:** set `SENCHO_PRIMARY_URL` on central to its canonical public
+  origin. This value is used as the audience for the mesh callback credential
+  and as the callback URL on the node side. Without it, central infers an origin
+  from inbound request headers; the inference works in standard installs but is
+  not the intended deploy shape for fleets where reverse-proxy headers may differ.
+</Note>
+
 ## Test upstream
 
 Every alias row has a one-click **Test** button that runs a real probe across the same code path traffic uses. Result is shown inline: