fix(rbac): enforce admin seat cap on promotion and harden last-admin and audit paths (#1266)

Promoting a user to admin now respects the per-tier admin seat limit the same
way user creation does, closing a path that let an operator exceed the cap by
creating an account and then editing its role to admin.

The last-admin guard for demote and delete now runs the admin-count re-check
and the write in a single transaction, so two concurrent admin changes can no
longer race the admin count to zero and lock everyone out.

Admin two-factor resets are now recorded once with their own audit summary
instead of being mislabeled as a user creation by the audit middleware.
This commit is contained in:
Anso
2026-06-01 13:01:22 -04:00
committed by GitHub
parent 4248ac0e72
commit b61388c675
7 changed files with 187 additions and 31 deletions
+13
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@@ -126,6 +126,19 @@ describe('getAuditSummary()', () => {
expect(getAuditSummary('DELETE', '/nodes/5')).toBe('Deleted node: 5');
expect(getAuditSummary('DELETE', 'nodes/5')).toBe('Deleted node: 5');
});
it('matches user management routes', () => {
expect(getAuditSummary('POST', '/users')).toBe('Created user');
expect(getAuditSummary('PUT', '/users/42')).toBe('Updated user: 42');
expect(getAuditSummary('DELETE', '/users/42')).toBe('Deleted user: 42');
expect(getAuditSummary('POST', '/users/42/roles')).toBe('Assigned role: 42');
expect(getAuditSummary('DELETE', '/users/42/roles/7')).toBe('Removed role assignment: 42');
});
it('labels an MFA reset distinctly and never as user creation', () => {
expect(getAuditSummary('POST', '/users/42/mfa/reset')).toBe('Reset two-factor authentication: 42');
expect(getAuditSummary('POST', '/users/42/mfa/reset')).not.toBe('Created user: 42');
});
});
// ---- DatabaseService audit methods ----
+15
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@@ -555,6 +555,21 @@ describe('POST /api/users/:id/mfa/reset', () => {
expect(db.getUserMfa(userId)).toBeUndefined();
expect(db.getUser(userId)!.token_version).toBeGreaterThan(before);
});
it('writes exactly one audit row, labeled as a reset and never as user creation', async () => {
const db = DatabaseService.getInstance();
const { userId } = await seedMfaUser('victim3', 'victim3pass123');
const res = await request(app)
.post(`/api/users/${userId}/mfa/reset`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken()}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
// The route no longer writes its own audit row; the middleware writes one.
const { entries } = db.getAuditLogs({ search: `/users/${userId}/mfa/reset` });
const resetRows = entries.filter((e) => e.path === `/api/users/${userId}/mfa/reset`);
expect(resetRows).toHaveLength(1);
expect(resetRows[0].summary).toBe(`Reset two-factor authentication: ${userId}`);
});
});
// ─── SSO bypass toggle ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+79
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@@ -563,6 +563,85 @@ describe('Last-admin protection', () => {
});
});
// ---- Seat Limit Enforcement On Promotion ----
describe('Seat limit enforcement on role promotion', () => {
it('rejects promoting a viewer to admin when the admin seat limit is reached', async () => {
const db = DatabaseService.getInstance();
const hash = await bcrypt.hash('password123', 1);
const viewerId = db.addUser({ username: 'promoteme', password_hash: hash, role: 'viewer' });
const { LicenseService } = await import('../services/LicenseService');
vi.spyOn(LicenseService.getInstance(), 'getSeatLimits').mockReturnValue({ maxAdmins: 1, maxViewers: null });
const res = await request(app)
.put(`/api/users/${viewerId}`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken()}`)
.send({ role: 'admin' });
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
expect(res.body.error).toContain('maximum');
// The role must remain unchanged when the cap blocks the promotion.
expect(db.getUser(viewerId)!.role).toBe('viewer');
vi.spyOn(LicenseService.getInstance(), 'getSeatLimits').mockReturnValue({ maxAdmins: null, maxViewers: null });
db.deleteUser(viewerId);
});
it('allows promoting a viewer to admin when admin seats are unlimited', async () => {
const db = DatabaseService.getInstance();
const hash = await bcrypt.hash('password123', 1);
const viewerId = db.addUser({ username: 'promoteok', password_hash: hash, role: 'viewer' });
// Global beforeAll mock already returns unlimited seats; the gate must not over-block.
const res = await request(app)
.put(`/api/users/${viewerId}`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken()}`)
.send({ role: 'admin' });
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(db.getUser(viewerId)!.role).toBe('admin');
db.deleteUser(viewerId);
});
});
// ---- Atomic Last-Admin Guard (TOCTOU protection) ----
describe('Atomic last-admin guard', () => {
// These lock the guard contract: the admin-count re-check and the mutation run
// in one transaction, so a refusal writes nothing (no partial state) and the
// count is unchanged. That re-check inside the transaction is what closes the
// TOCTOU window a route-level pre-check left open.
it('updateUserIfNotLastAdmin refuses to demote the sole admin and applies otherwise', async () => {
const db = DatabaseService.getInstance();
expect(db.getAdminCount()).toBe(1);
const sole = db.getUserByUsername(TEST_USERNAME)!;
expect(db.updateUserIfNotLastAdmin(sole.id, { role: 'viewer' })).toBe(false);
// Refusal is side-effect free: role intact and count unchanged.
expect(db.getUser(sole.id)!.role).toBe('admin');
expect(db.getAdminCount()).toBe(1);
const hash = await bcrypt.hash('password123', 1);
const extra = db.addUser({ username: 'raceadmin', password_hash: hash, role: 'admin' });
expect(db.updateUserIfNotLastAdmin(extra, { role: 'viewer' })).toBe(true);
expect(db.getUser(extra)!.role).toBe('viewer');
expect(db.getAdminCount()).toBe(1);
db.deleteUser(extra);
});
it('deleteUserIfNotLastAdmin refuses to delete the sole admin and applies otherwise', async () => {
const db = DatabaseService.getInstance();
expect(db.getAdminCount()).toBe(1);
const sole = db.getUserByUsername(TEST_USERNAME)!;
expect(db.deleteUserIfNotLastAdmin(sole.id)).toBe(false);
// Refusal is side-effect free: row intact and count unchanged.
expect(db.getUser(sole.id)).toBeTruthy();
expect(db.getAdminCount()).toBe(1);
const hash = await bcrypt.hash('password123', 1);
const extra = db.addUser({ username: 'raceadmin2', password_hash: hash, role: 'admin' });
expect(db.deleteUserIfNotLastAdmin(extra)).toBe(true);
expect(db.getAdminCount()).toBe(1);
});
});
// ---- Orphaned Role Assignment Cleanup ----
describe('Orphaned role assignment cleanup', () => {
+44 -28
View File
@@ -30,6 +30,24 @@ function validateUsername(value: unknown): string | null {
return null;
}
// Returns a seat-limit error message if adding an account of `role` would
// exceed the current license seat caps, or null when within limits. Counts are
// read at call time so the check reflects live state. Used by both user
// creation and admin promotion so the cap cannot be bypassed via role change.
// Seat caps gate new seat acquisition only (creation, and promotion to admin);
// reducing privilege by demoting an admin is never blocked on the viewer cap.
function seatLimitError(role: UserRole, db: DatabaseService): string | null {
const seatLimits = LicenseService.getInstance().getSeatLimits();
if (role === 'admin') {
if (seatLimits.maxAdmins !== null && db.getAdminCount() >= seatLimits.maxAdmins) {
return `Your license allows a maximum of ${seatLimits.maxAdmins} admin account${seatLimits.maxAdmins === 1 ? '' : 's'}. Upgrade to Admiral for unlimited accounts.`;
}
} else if (seatLimits.maxViewers !== null && db.getNonAdminCount() >= seatLimits.maxViewers) {
return `Your license allows a maximum of ${seatLimits.maxViewers} viewer account${seatLimits.maxViewers === 1 ? '' : 's'}. Upgrade to Admiral for unlimited accounts.`;
}
return null;
}
export const usersRouter = Router();
usersRouter.get('/', authMiddleware, async (req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> => {
@@ -84,13 +102,9 @@ usersRouter.post('/', authMiddleware, async (req: Request, res: Response): Promi
}
// Enforce seat limits based on license variant.
const seatLimits = LicenseService.getInstance().getSeatLimits();
if (role === 'admin' && seatLimits.maxAdmins !== null && db.getAdminCount() >= seatLimits.maxAdmins) {
res.status(403).json({ error: `Your license allows a maximum of ${seatLimits.maxAdmins} admin account${seatLimits.maxAdmins === 1 ? '' : 's'}. Upgrade to Admiral for unlimited accounts.` });
return;
}
if (role !== 'admin' && seatLimits.maxViewers !== null && db.getNonAdminCount() >= seatLimits.maxViewers) {
res.status(403).json({ error: `Your license allows a maximum of ${seatLimits.maxViewers} viewer account${seatLimits.maxViewers === 1 ? '' : 's'}. Upgrade to Admiral for unlimited accounts.` });
const seatError = seatLimitError(role, db);
if (seatError) {
res.status(403).json({ error: seatError });
return;
}
@@ -145,9 +159,17 @@ usersRouter.put('/:id', authMiddleware, async (req: Request, res: Response): Pro
res.status(400).json({ error: 'Cannot change your own role' });
return;
}
if (user.role === 'admin' && role !== 'admin' && db.getAdminCount() <= 1) {
res.status(400).json({ error: 'Cannot demote the only admin user' });
return;
// Promoting a non-admin to admin consumes an admin seat; enforce the cap
// here the same way user creation does, so a role change cannot exceed it.
if (role === 'admin' && user.role !== 'admin') {
const seatError = seatLimitError('admin', db);
if (isDebugEnabled()) {
console.log('[Users:diag] admin-promotion id=', id, 'blocked=', seatError !== null, 'actor=', sanitizeForLog(req.user!.username));
}
if (seatError) {
res.status(403).json({ error: seatError });
return;
}
}
updates.role = role;
}
@@ -166,7 +188,13 @@ usersRouter.put('/:id', authMiddleware, async (req: Request, res: Response): Pro
updates.password_hash = await bcrypt.hash(password, BCRYPT_SALT_ROUNDS);
}
db.updateUser(id, updates);
// updateUserIfNotLastAdmin returns false only when this update would demote
// the last remaining admin; map that single case to the guard message.
const applied = db.updateUserIfNotLastAdmin(id, updates);
if (!applied) {
res.status(400).json({ error: 'Cannot demote the only admin user' });
return;
}
// Invalidate the user's active sessions when their role or password changes.
if (updates.role || updates.password_hash) {
db.bumpTokenVersion(id);
@@ -196,12 +224,11 @@ usersRouter.delete('/:id', authMiddleware, async (req: Request, res: Response):
return;
}
if (user.role === 'admin' && db.getAdminCount() <= 1) {
const deleted = db.deleteUserIfNotLastAdmin(id);
if (!deleted) {
res.status(400).json({ error: 'Cannot delete the only admin user' });
return;
}
db.deleteUser(id);
console.log('[Users] Deleted:', user.username, '(id:', id, ') by:', req.user!.username);
res.json({ success: true });
} catch (error) {
@@ -230,20 +257,9 @@ usersRouter.post('/:id/mfa/reset', authMiddleware, (req: Request, res: Response)
}
db.deleteUserMfa(id);
db.bumpTokenVersion(id);
try {
db.insertAuditLog({
timestamp: Date.now(),
username: req.user!.username,
method: 'POST',
path: req.originalUrl,
status_code: 200,
node_id: null,
ip_address: req.ip || 'unknown',
summary: `Admin reset two-factor authentication for ${target.username}`,
});
} catch (err) {
console.warn('[MFA] Admin reset audit log write failed:', getErrorMessage(err, 'unknown'));
}
// The audit-log middleware records this POST automatically (summary
// "Reset two-factor authentication: <id>", keyed on the target user id);
// no explicit write is needed here.
console.log('[MFA] Admin reset: target=', target.username, 'by=', req.user!.username);
if (isDebugEnabled()) {
console.log('[MFA:diag] admin-reset target=', target.username, 'actor=', req.user!.username);
+32
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@@ -2622,6 +2622,38 @@ export class DatabaseService {
this.db.prepare('DELETE FROM users WHERE id = ?').run(id);
}
/**
* Atomically apply `updates` unless doing so would demote the last remaining
* admin. Returns false (nothing written) when the change would leave zero
* admins, true otherwise. The current-role read, the admin count, and the
* write run in a single transaction so a concurrent demote or delete of the
* other admin cannot race the count to zero.
*/
public updateUserIfNotLastAdmin(id: number, updates: Partial<{ username: string; password_hash: string; role: string; email: string }>): boolean {
return this.transaction(() => {
if (updates.role !== undefined && updates.role !== 'admin') {
const current = this.db.prepare('SELECT role FROM users WHERE id = ?').get(id) as { role: string } | undefined;
if (current?.role === 'admin' && this.getAdminCount() <= 1) return false;
}
this.updateUser(id, updates);
return true;
});
}
/**
* Atomically delete the user unless it is the last remaining admin. Returns
* false (nothing deleted) in that case, true otherwise. Same single-
* transaction guard as {@link updateUserIfNotLastAdmin}.
*/
public deleteUserIfNotLastAdmin(id: number): boolean {
return this.transaction(() => {
const current = this.db.prepare('SELECT role FROM users WHERE id = ?').get(id) as { role: string } | undefined;
if (current?.role === 'admin' && this.getAdminCount() <= 1) return false;
this.deleteUser(id);
return true;
});
}
public getUserCount(): number {
return (this.db.prepare('SELECT COUNT(*) as count FROM users').get() as { count: number })?.count || 0;
}
+1
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@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ export const AUDIT_ROUTE_SUMMARIES: Record<string, string> = {
'POST /users': 'Created user',
'DELETE /users': 'Deleted user',
'PUT /users': 'Updated user',
'POST /users/*/mfa/reset': 'Reset two-factor authentication',
'POST /users/*/roles': 'Assigned role',
'DELETE /users/*/roles': 'Removed role assignment',