docs: comprehensive review and refresh of all documentation (#374)

* docs: comprehensive review and refresh of all documentation pages

Reviewed every doc page against the current app state after the v0.38
dashboard redesign. Updated content, fixed inaccuracies, and refreshed
all screenshots at 1920x1080.

Pages updated:
- introduction: expanded feature list to 25 items across 6 subsections
- quickstart: fixed docker run command (Docker Hub, auto JWT, COMPOSE_DIR)
- configuration: replaced personal paths with generic /home/user/docker
- sso-quickstart: fixed Settings navigation reference
- sso: added SSO_LDAP_DISPLAY_NAME env var
- overview: added 8 missing feature sections (labels, API tokens, schedules, etc.)
- dashboard: complete rewrite for new health bar, gauges, stack health table
- stack-management: updated for UP/DN indicators, rollback button, split actions
- editor: rewritten for two-column layout, inline stats, embedded terminal
- resources: updated Quick Clean docs, added network topology and inspect
- app-store: updated categories, deploy sheet details, permission gate, settings
- openapi.yaml: fixed YAML parsing error on line 1831

Screenshots refreshed: 14 images across 6 feature areas.

* docs: review and update observability, console, multi-node, and compatibility pages

- Global Observability: fix log format fields, add download button docs,
  split display limits into memory buffer vs rendered rows, correct
  settings labels
- Host Console: remove internal implementation details per security
  docs policy, add stack directory behavior, expand header bar docs,
  remove unverified scrollback claim
- Multi-Node: add Compose Directory field, document connection test
  details panel, fix edit/delete node behavior, simplify token security
  section, remove internal details
- Node Compatibility: add missing self-update capability, remove
  internal endpoint paths and cache TTL, move from Features to
  Reference group in navigation
- Refresh all screenshots for the redesigned UI (7 images)

* docs: review and refresh fleet, remote updates, labels, alerts, routing, and webhooks pages

- Fleet View: added node updates modal, container detail, version/update/critical badges, Tags filter
- Remote Updates: removed internal details, added capability cross-link, fast polling
- Stack Labels: three creation methods, two assignment methods, 10 colors, bulk actions screenshot
- Alerts & Notifications: fixed metric labels, added notification popover detail, status banner
- Notification Routing: HTTPS requirement, rule card layout, channel terminology fix
- Webhooks: corrected license tier to Admiral, matched action labels to UI, removed internal security details, added local-only note
- Troubleshooting: centralized entries from remote-updates, stack-labels, notification-routing
- Refreshed all screenshots at 1920x1080, removed 11 orphaned images

* docs: review and refresh RBAC, user management, and atomic deployments pages

- RBAC: added missing Auditor role (5th role), updated permission matrix, fixed license tier references, documented username/password validation rules, self-deletion protection
- Atomic Deployments: added "Which operations are protected" section covering webhooks/schedules/app store, removed internal backup path, fixed license tier to Skipper/Admiral
- Screenshots: cropped to dialog element per updated strategic cropping guideline, removed 2 orphaned images

* docs: review and refresh fleet-wide backups and audit log pages

Update fleet-backups page to reflect current inline create form, add
scheduled snapshots section, document the detail view and restore dialog,
expand RBAC table to all five roles. Update audit log page to document
expanded row detail fields, pagination, refresh button, and data retention
screenshot. Replace all screenshots with fresh captures at 1920x720.

* docs: review and refresh API tokens and private registries pages

- API Tokens: clarify Full Admin scope, add Managing tokens section
  with card details, document revocation confirmation dialog, add
  usage tracking to security model, refresh screenshot
- Private Registries: add Managing registries section with card details
  and action buttons, document edit behavior, fix URL auto-fill
  description, remove encryption algorithm name per security policy,
  fix grammar, refresh both screenshots

* docs: review and refresh auto-update policies, scheduled operations, and SSO pages

- Auto-Update Policies: document all 8 table columns, expand action buttons,
  add "All Stacks" wildcard option, fix field labels, add CSV export and
  pagination details, refresh screenshots
- Scheduled Operations: fix System Prune target description, add Task List
  table columns, restructure create dialog fields with action-specific
  annotations, rewrite execution history with column table, refresh screenshots
- SSO: remove encryption algorithm name per security policy, add LDAP and
  OIDC configuration field tables, document provider card controls (Save,
  Test Connection, Remove, Active badge), refresh screenshots
- Move SSO troubleshooting entries to centralized troubleshooting page

* docs: review and refresh licensing & billing page

Update upgrade card feature lists to match actual tier gating (Skipper:
fleet view, webhooks, labels, atomic deployments, backups, auto-update
policies; Admiral: scoped RBAC, SSO, audit log, host console, API
tokens, private registries, scheduled operations). Add flex layout to
align upgrade card buttons at the bottom. Replace stale screenshot with
fresh community and active license captures. Add feature breakdown
subsection and profile menu billing shortcut to docs.

* docs: review and refresh settings reference and security advisories pages

Settings Reference: add 5 missing sections (SSO, API Tokens, Registries,
Labels, Routing), expand Users from 2 to 5 roles, fix System Limits and
Developer field labels to match UI, restructure Developer into Streaming
and Data Retention sub-tables, update App Store and Support sections,
refresh overview screenshot.

Security Advisories: restructure into versioned sections (v0.25.x
hardening and v0.19-v0.24 CVE remediation), expand from 3 bullet points
to 10 specific improvements, fix GitHub URL from SaelixCode to AnsoCode,
redact internal details per security docs policy.

Remove "Sencho Pro" product name from all three pages, replaced with
tier names (Community, Skipper, Admiral).

* docs: review and refresh troubleshooting page, remove architecture and development guides

- Rewrote forgotten password section to remove exposed SQL and table names
- Updated all Settings navigation paths to Profile > Settings > X
- Fixed network topology from "tab" to "view mode", added Pro license note
- Updated Prune Networks to current "Prune Dead Networks" label
- Corrected update check cooldown from vague to 2 minutes
- Consolidated two network creation error sections into one
- Removed hardcoded version reference (v0.34.0)
- Replaced em dashes throughout
- Deleted architecture.mdx (exposes internal implementation details)
- Deleted development.mdx (contributor guide belongs in repo, not public docs)
- Removed both pages from docs.json navigation

* docs: review and refresh operations pages (backup, upgrade, self-hosting, troubleshooting)

Backup & Restore:
- Added missing encryption.key to all backup/restore procedures
- Added Warning about restoring db without matching encryption key
- Added cross-reference to Fleet-Wide Backups for paid tiers
- Removed false claim about no built-in backup scheduler
- Updated cron example to include encryption key copy

Upgrading Sencho:
- Removed internal migration details (table names, column specs, encryption algorithm)
- Replaced with high-level migration summary per security docs policy
- Added encryption.key to pre-upgrade backup command
- Updated version pinning example from 0.25.3 to 0.38.0
- Added Remote Updates cross-reference for Skipper/Admiral users

Self-Hosting Best Practices:
- Removed JWT_SECRET from env var table (auto-generated, not an env var)
- Removed PORT from env var table (hardcoded to 3000, not configurable)
- Added API_RATE_LIMIT to env var table (actually exists in code)
- Fixed listen port description from "configurable" to "fixed"
- Updated resource recommendations based on measured footprint audit
- Removed su-exec reference (internal implementation detail)
- Upgraded data directory Note to Warning with file names

Troubleshooting:
- Fixed "Pro features" heading to "Paid features" with correct tier names
This commit is contained in:
Anso
2026-04-04 21:32:51 -04:00
committed by GitHub
parent 7b14da0b10
commit a1804c8fbe
121 changed files with 1433 additions and 1126 deletions
+29 -41
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ title: Multi-Node Management
description: Connect multiple Sencho instances and manage all your servers from a single dashboard.
---
Sencho's multi-node feature lets you manage Docker Compose stacks on multiple servers - all from the same browser tab. Each server runs its own Sencho instance, and your primary instance acts as a transparent proxy to the others.
Sencho's multi-node feature lets you manage Docker Compose stacks on multiple servers, all from the same browser tab. Each server runs its own Sencho instance, and your primary instance acts as a transparent proxy to the others.
<Frame>
<img src="/images/multi-node/node-manager.png" alt="Node Manager showing a local and a remote node, both Online" />
@@ -15,16 +15,16 @@ There is no central server. Each Sencho instance manages its own host independen
## The local node
Your primary Sencho installation is always listed as **Local**. It is the default node, marked with a star, and cannot be deleted. All operations on the local node run directly against the host's Docker socket.
Your primary Sencho installation is always listed as **Local**. It is the default node, marked with a star icon, and cannot be deleted. All operations on the local node run directly against the host's Docker socket.
## Adding a remote node
### Step 1: Generate a token on the remote machine
On the **remote** Sencho instance (the server you want to add), open **Settings → Nodes** and click **Generate Token**. Copy the generated token - you'll only see it once.
On the **remote** Sencho instance (the server you want to add), open **Settings → Nodes**. You will see a **Generate Node Token** section at the top of the page. Click **Generate Token**, then copy the token that appears. You will only see it once.
<Note>
The token is a long-lived JWT scoped to `node_proxy`. Anyone with this token can fully control that Sencho instance, so treat it like a password.
The token is a long-lived credential that grants full control over that Sencho instance. Treat it like a password.
</Note>
### Step 2: Add the node on your primary instance
@@ -32,17 +32,18 @@ On the **remote** Sencho instance (the server you want to add), open **Settings
On your **primary** Sencho instance, open **Settings → Nodes** and click **+ Add Node**. Fill in:
<Frame>
<img src="/images/multi-node/add-node-form.png" alt="Add Node form with Name, Type, API URL, and Token fields" />
<img src="/images/multi-node/add-node-form.png" alt="Add Node form with Name, Type, API URL, Token, and Compose Directory fields" />
</Frame>
| Field | Description |
|-------|-------------|
| **Name** | A display name (e.g. `prod-server`, `media-box`) |
| **Type** | Select **Remote** |
| **Sencho API URL** | The full HTTP/HTTPS URL of the remote instance (e.g. `http://192.168.1.20:3001`) |
| **Name** | A display name (e.g. `Production VPS`, `media-box`) |
| **Type** | Select **Remote** (or **Local** for an additional local Docker socket) |
| **Sencho API URL** | The full HTTP/HTTPS URL of the remote instance (e.g. `http://192.168.1.50:3000`) |
| **API Token** | The token you generated in Step 1 |
| **Compose Directory** | The root directory where compose stack folders live on the remote node (defaults to `/app/compose`) |
Click **Create**. Sencho immediately tests the connection and shows the result.
Click **Add Node**. Sencho immediately tests the connection and shows the result.
### Step 3: Verify connectivity
@@ -51,28 +52,16 @@ A successful connection shows the remote node as **Online** with a green badge.
- The API URL is correct (include the port if non-standard)
- The token was copied correctly without extra whitespace
Click the **wifi icon** (test connection) on any node row at any time to re-check status.
## The 1:1 path rule for remote nodes
The Compose directory path matters on remote nodes too. When you register a remote node, its `COMPOSE_DIR` is whatever that remote instance was configured with. Make sure the remote Sencho's `COMPOSE_DIR` follows the [1:1 path rule](/getting-started/configuration#compose-directory-the-11-path-rule) on that remote host.
Click the **wifi icon** (Test Connection) on any node row at any time to re-check status. A successful test shows a **Connection Details** panel below the table with information about the remote instance, including its OS, architecture, container count, and Sencho version.
## Switching between nodes
The **node switcher** dropdown in the top-left of the sidebar shows the currently active node. Click it to switch to any registered node. All views - dashboard stats, stack list, editor, resources, logs - immediately reflect the selected node.
The **node switcher** dropdown in the top-left of the sidebar shows the currently active node and its Sencho version. Click it to switch to any registered node. All views (dashboard stats, stack list, editor, resources, logs) immediately reflect the selected node.
<Frame>
<img src="/images/multi-node/node-switcher-dropdown.png" alt="Node switcher dropdown expanded showing available nodes" />
</Frame>
Node status indicators:
| Indicator | Meaning |
|-----------|---------|
| Green dot | Node is reachable and responding |
| Red dot | Node is unreachable |
| Gray dot | Status not yet checked |
## Per-node scheduling and update indicators
The Nodes table surfaces scheduling and update status at a glance for each node:
@@ -86,7 +75,7 @@ The Nodes table surfaces scheduling and update status at a glance for each node:
| **Schedules** | Number of active scheduled tasks targeting this node, plus a relative countdown to the next run (e.g. "next 2h") |
| **Updates** | Whether auto-update policies are enabled ("Auto" badge), and how many stacks have pending image updates (pulsing blue dot with count) |
Click the **calendar icon** on any node row to jump directly to the Schedules view filtered to that node. From there you can create, edit, or manage scheduled tasks scoped to the selected node. The filter bar shows which node you're viewing, with a **Clear filter** button to return to the full list.
Click the **calendar icon** on any node row to jump directly to the Schedules view filtered to that node. From there you can create, edit, or manage scheduled tasks scoped to the selected node. The filter bar shows which node you are viewing, with a **Clear filter** button to return to the full list.
When a node is deleted, all scheduled tasks and update status data associated with it are automatically cleaned up.
@@ -96,17 +85,17 @@ When you have a paid license (Skipper or Admiral) on your primary instance, all
### How it works
Your primary Sencho instance asserts its license tier to remote nodes on every proxied request. Remote nodes trust this assertion because it arrives alongside a valid node proxy token — the same token you configured when adding the node. No additional configuration is required.
Your primary Sencho instance asserts its license tier to remote nodes on every proxied request. Remote nodes trust this assertion because it arrives alongside the valid node token you configured when adding the node. No additional configuration is required.
This means:
- **Paid primary → remote nodes**: Pro and Admiral features work on all remote nodes, governed by the primary instance's license.
- **Community primary → remote nodes**: Pro-gated features are blocked on remote nodes, even if a remote node has its own paid license. The primary's tier is authoritative for proxied requests.
- **Paid primary → remote nodes**: Skipper and Admiral features work on all remote nodes, governed by the primary instance's license.
- **Community primary → remote nodes**: Paid features are blocked on remote nodes, even if a remote node has its own paid license. The primary's tier is authoritative for proxied requests.
- **Direct access to a node**: If you access a remote Sencho instance directly (not through the primary), it uses its own local license tier as usual.
### Why this matters
Without this trust chain, remote nodes would default to the Community tier and block Pro/Admiral features even though the primary instance has a valid paid license. Distributed license enforcement eliminates this gap so your fleet behaves consistently regardless of which node you're operating on.
Without this trust chain, remote nodes would default to the Community tier and block paid features, even though the primary instance has a valid license. Distributed license enforcement eliminates this gap so your fleet behaves consistently regardless of which node you are operating on.
<Note>
Remote nodes do not need their own license keys. A single license on the primary instance covers all nodes managed through it.
@@ -114,22 +103,21 @@ Without this trust chain, remote nodes would default to the Community tier and b
## Editing and deleting nodes
Click the **pencil icon** on any remote node row to edit its name, URL, or token. Click the **trash icon** to remove it. The local node cannot be edited or deleted.
Click the **pencil icon** on any node row to edit its name, URL, token, or compose directory. Click the **trash icon** to remove a remote node. The local (default) node cannot be deleted.
## Security
### Token security
Node tokens are JWTs with a configurable expiry that grant full control over the remote Sencho instance. Treat them like passwords:
Node tokens grant full control over the remote Sencho instance. Treat them like passwords:
- **Rotate immediately** if a token is compromised: Settings → Nodes → Generate Token on the remote instance. The old token is invalidated instantly.
- Tokens have a configurable expiry. Generate a new token on the remote instance to renew access.
- Tokens are **encrypted at rest** in Sencho's database. Even if the database file is extracted, the tokens cannot be read without the instance's encryption key.
- Tokens are scoped to `node_proxy` — they cannot access the host console or container exec terminals. Interactive shell access always requires a real browser session on that specific instance.
- **Rotate immediately** if a token is compromised: go to the remote instance's **Settings → Nodes** and click **Generate Token**. The old token is invalidated instantly.
- Tokens are **encrypted at rest** in Sencho's database.
- Tokens cannot be used to open interactive terminals (Host Console or container exec). Interactive shell access always requires a real browser session on that specific instance.
### Transport encryption
Sencho delegates transport encryption to your infrastructure rather than implementing TLS at the application layer. This is the same approach used by [Dockge](https://github.com/louislam/dockge) and other self-hosted tools it avoids certificate management burden while letting you use the encryption layer that best fits your environment.
Sencho delegates transport encryption to your infrastructure rather than implementing TLS at the application layer. This is the same approach used by other self-hosted tools; it avoids certificate management burden while letting you use the encryption layer that best fits your environment.
<Warning>
**Never send node tokens over plain HTTP across the public internet.** A token intercepted in transit grants full control of the remote instance. Always use one of the approaches below when nodes communicate over untrusted networks.
@@ -145,7 +133,7 @@ There are three recommended approaches depending on your deployment:
#### Private network (LAN or VPC)
If all your Sencho instances are on the same local network, VPC, or subnet HTTP is perfectly fine. The token never leaves the private network, so there is no interception risk.
If all your Sencho instances are on the same local network, VPC, or subnet, HTTP is perfectly fine. The token never leaves the private network, so there is no interception risk.
```
http://192.168.1.50:3000 ← safe on a private LAN
@@ -155,7 +143,7 @@ http://10.0.1.20:3000 ← safe inside a VPC
#### VPN tunnel (WireGuard, Tailscale)
<Tip>
This is the simplest approach for connecting nodes across the internet. A VPN encrypts all traffic between your servers at the network layer no certificate management required.
This is the simplest approach for connecting nodes across the internet. A VPN encrypts all traffic between your servers at the network layer, with no certificate management required.
</Tip>
With a mesh VPN like [Tailscale](https://tailscale.com) or [WireGuard](https://www.wireguard.com/), each server gets a private IP on the VPN. Use those IPs as your Sencho API URLs:
@@ -164,11 +152,11 @@ With a mesh VPN like [Tailscale](https://tailscale.com) or [WireGuard](https://w
http://100.64.0.2:3000 ← Tailscale IP, encrypted by the VPN tunnel
```
All traffic between nodes is encrypted by the VPN Sencho does not need to do anything additional.
All traffic between nodes is encrypted by the VPN. Sencho does not need to do anything additional.
#### Reverse proxy (Caddy, Nginx, Traefik)
If you prefer TLS termination at each node, place a reverse proxy in front of each Sencho instance. [Caddy](https://caddyserver.com/) is the simplest option it auto-provisions HTTPS certificates from Let's Encrypt with zero configuration:
If you prefer TLS termination at each node, place a reverse proxy in front of each Sencho instance. [Caddy](https://caddyserver.com/) is the simplest option; it auto-provisions HTTPS certificates from Let's Encrypt with zero configuration:
<CodeGroup>
```text Caddyfile
@@ -205,6 +193,6 @@ https://sencho.example.com ← TLS terminated by Caddy/Nginx
### Why Sencho doesn't implement application-layer TLS
Some tools auto-generate self-signed TLS certificates between their server and agents (e.g. Portainer's standard agent). In practice, this provides minimal security benefit the certificates are self-signed with no verification, meaning they don't protect against man-in-the-middle attacks. It is effectively security theater.
Some tools auto-generate self-signed TLS certificates between their server and agents. In practice, this provides minimal security benefit because the certificates are self-signed with no verification, meaning they do not protect against man-in-the-middle attacks.
Sencho takes a deliberate approach: infrastructure-level encryption (VPN, reverse proxy, or private networking) is more robust, easier to manage, and doesn't impose certificate rotation burden on the user. This is the same model used by Dockge, Yacht, and other self-hosted orchestrators.
Sencho takes a deliberate approach: infrastructure-level encryption (VPN, reverse proxy, or private networking) is more robust, easier to manage, and does not impose certificate rotation burden on the user. This is the same model used by other self-hosted orchestrators.