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fix(api): add tiered rate limiting to prevent polling lockouts (#460)
* fix(api): add tiered rate limiting to prevent polling lockouts Replace the single global rate limiter (100 req/min/IP) with a tiered system that separates high-frequency polling endpoints from standard API traffic: - Polling tier (300/min): /stats, /system/stats, /stacks/statuses, /metrics/historical, /health, /meta, /auth/status, /auth/sso/providers, /license. Exempt from the global limiter but governed by their own safety net to prevent resource exhaustion. - Standard tier (200/min): All other endpoints, raised from 100. - Webhook tier (500/min): POST /webhooks/:id/trigger, dedicated limiter for CI/CD platforms sharing datacenter IPs. - Auth tier: Unchanged (5-10 attempts / 15 min). Enterprise adaptations: - Authenticated requests keyed by user session (JWT sub/username) instead of IP, preventing shared NAT/VPN environments from pooling budgets. - Internal node-to-node traffic (node_proxy tokens) bypasses all rate limiters entirely. Includes comprehensive stress tests (21 cases) validating tier separation, node proxy bypass, and per-user keying. * chore(deps): bump axios to 1.15.0 to fix SSRF vulnerability Addresses GHSA-3p68-rc4w-qgx5 (NO_PROXY hostname normalization bypass).
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@@ -88,7 +88,20 @@ This applies to all stack endpoints: read, write, deploy, down, restart, stop, s
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## Rate limiting
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All API endpoints are rate-limited per IP address. Authentication endpoints have stricter limits to prevent brute-force attacks. When exceeded, the server responds with `429 Too Many Requests`:
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Sencho uses a tiered rate limiting system that balances security with usability:
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| Tier | Limit | Applies to | Keyed by |
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|------|-------|------------|----------|
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| **Polling** | 300/min | Dashboard status endpoints (`/stats`, `/system/stats`, `/stacks/statuses`, etc.) | User session |
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| **Standard** | 200/min | All other API endpoints | User session |
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| **Webhooks** | 500/min | `POST /webhooks/:id/trigger` | IP address |
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| **Auth** | 5-10/15min | Login, setup, SSO endpoints | IP address |
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Authenticated requests (browser sessions and API tokens) are rate-limited per user, not per IP. This prevents teams behind shared NAT or VPN from pooling rate limit budgets. Unauthenticated requests fall back to IP-based limiting.
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Internal node-to-node traffic (requests authenticated with node proxy tokens) bypasses rate limiting entirely.
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When exceeded, the server responds with `429 Too Many Requests`:
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```json
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{
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@@ -98,6 +111,8 @@ All API endpoints are rate-limited per IP address. Authentication endpoints have
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Standard rate limit headers (`RateLimit-Limit`, `RateLimit-Remaining`, `RateLimit-Reset`) are included in all API responses, so clients can self-throttle accordingly.
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The default limits can be tuned via environment variables (`API_RATE_LIMIT`, `API_POLLING_RATE_LIMIT`). See [Self-Hosting](/operations/self-hosting) for details.
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## License tier requirements
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Some endpoints are gated by license tier:
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