fix(stacks): harden stack file path containment against symlink escapes (#1415)

* fix(stacks): harden stack file path containment against symlink escapes

The legacy managed-stack methods enforced path containment lexically
(path.resolve + startsWith), which does not follow symlinks. A stack
directory under the compose root that is itself a symlink or junction
could let a managed-file operation (write compose.yaml/.env, delete a
stack, backup, restore, snapshot) follow the link and read, write, or
delete a file of the same name outside the compose root.

Add a realpath-based containment guard that walks up to the deepest
existing path component, confirms its canonical location is inside the
canonical compose root, and rejects both an out-of-tree resolution and a
dangling symlink (which a write or mkdir would still follow). The guard
runs at every legacy managed-stack sink, alongside the existing lexical
barriers. A legitimately symlinked compose root is not a false positive
because both sides are canonicalized through the same link, and the
guard is a no-op for not-yet-created targets so stack creation and the
flat-to-directory migration are unaffected.

* fix(stacks): satisfy the path-injection sanitizer in the symlink containment guard

assertRealWithinBase resolves a user-derived path and probes it with
realpath/lstat to run the containment check, which static analysis flags
as path injection because the probes lacked the inline barrier its
sanitizer recognizes. Add the canonical path.resolve + startsWith barrier
at the top of the helper, the same form every other sink in this file
uses, and seed the realpath walk from the sanitized value.

Behavior is unchanged: callers always pass an absolute, already-contained
path, so the barrier is a no-op pre-check for them, and the realpath walk
still catches the symlink and dangling-link escapes.
This commit is contained in:
Anso
2026-06-22 19:53:59 -04:00
committed by GitHub
parent f91227dada
commit 69ba0e6d21
3 changed files with 439 additions and 0 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,332 @@
/**
* Symlink/junction escape hardening for FileSystemService's legacy managed-stack
* methods. A stack directory (or a managed .env / compose.yaml leaf) that is a
* symlink pointing outside the compose root must be rejected before the
* read/write/delete sink follows the link out of tree. The lexical inline
* barriers cannot see symlinks; assertRealWithinBase realpaths both sides.
*
* Real symlink creation needs admin or Developer Mode on Windows, so the escape
* cases run on Linux/macOS (CI) and skip on the Windows dev box, mirroring
* filesystem-stack-paths.test.ts. The happy-path block at the bottom runs on
* every platform and confirms the guard is a no-op on normal directories.
*/
import { describe, it, expect, beforeEach, afterEach, vi } from 'vitest';
import { promises as fs } from 'fs';
import path from 'path';
import os from 'os';
const isWindows = process.platform === 'win32';
// Mutable state the mocked NodeRegistry reads; beforeEach rewrites it before any
// FileSystemService is instantiated (the constructor reads composeDir eagerly).
const mockState = { composeDir: '' };
vi.mock('../services/NodeRegistry', () => ({
NodeRegistry: {
getInstance: () => ({
getComposeDir: () => mockState.composeDir,
getDefaultNodeId: () => 1,
}),
},
}));
vi.mock('../utils/debug', () => ({ isDebugEnabled: () => false }));
import { FileSystemService } from '../services/FileSystemService';
const STACK = 'mystack';
// ── Whole stack directory is a junction pointing out of the compose root ──────
describe.skipIf(isWindows)('FileSystemService symlink-escape: symlinked stack dir', () => {
let tmpBase: string;
let composeDir: string;
let externalTarget: string;
let dataDir: string;
let originalDataDir: string | undefined;
beforeEach(async () => {
tmpBase = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'sencho-symesc-'));
composeDir = path.join(tmpBase, 'compose');
externalTarget = path.join(tmpBase, 'external');
await fs.mkdir(composeDir, { recursive: true });
await fs.mkdir(externalTarget, { recursive: true });
// Plant sentinel managed files in the out-of-tree target.
await fs.writeFile(path.join(externalTarget, '.env'), 'SECRET=leaked\n', 'utf-8');
await fs.writeFile(path.join(externalTarget, 'compose.yaml'), 'services: {}\n', 'utf-8');
mockState.composeDir = composeDir;
// The stack directory itself is a junction out of the compose root.
await fs.symlink(externalTarget, path.join(composeDir, STACK));
// DATA_DIR backs the backup/restore/snapshot slot.
dataDir = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'sencho-symesc-data-'));
originalDataDir = process.env.DATA_DIR;
process.env.DATA_DIR = dataDir;
});
afterEach(async () => {
if (originalDataDir === undefined) delete process.env.DATA_DIR;
else process.env.DATA_DIR = originalDataDir;
await fs.rm(tmpBase, { recursive: true, force: true });
await fs.rm(dataDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
it('saveEnvContent rejects and leaves the out-of-tree .env untouched', async () => {
const svc = FileSystemService.getInstance();
await expect(svc.saveEnvContent(STACK, 'PWNED=1\n')).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'SYMLINK_ESCAPE' });
expect(await fs.readFile(path.join(externalTarget, '.env'), 'utf-8')).toBe('SECRET=leaked\n');
});
it('saveStackContent rejects and leaves the out-of-tree compose.yaml untouched', async () => {
const svc = FileSystemService.getInstance();
await expect(svc.saveStackContent(STACK, 'services: { evil: {} }\n')).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'SYMLINK_ESCAPE' });
expect(await fs.readFile(path.join(externalTarget, 'compose.yaml'), 'utf-8')).toBe('services: {}\n');
});
it('saveStackContentIfUnchanged rejects', async () => {
const svc = FileSystemService.getInstance();
await expect(svc.saveStackContentIfUnchanged(STACK, 'services: {}\n', null)).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'SYMLINK_ESCAPE' });
});
it('deleteStack rejects and the out-of-tree directory survives', async () => {
const svc = FileSystemService.getInstance();
await expect(svc.deleteStack(STACK)).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'SYMLINK_ESCAPE' });
await expect(fs.access(externalTarget)).resolves.toBeUndefined();
expect(await fs.readFile(path.join(externalTarget, '.env'), 'utf-8')).toBe('SECRET=leaked\n');
});
it('getEnvContent rejects instead of returning the planted secret', async () => {
const svc = FileSystemService.getInstance();
await expect(svc.getEnvContent(STACK)).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'SYMLINK_ESCAPE' });
});
it('envExists degrades to false without throwing', async () => {
const svc = FileSystemService.getInstance();
await expect(svc.envExists(STACK)).resolves.toBe(false);
});
it('backupStackFiles rejects and does not copy the out-of-tree file into the backup slot', async () => {
const svc = FileSystemService.getInstance();
await expect(svc.backupStackFiles(STACK)).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'SYMLINK_ESCAPE' });
await expect(fs.access(path.join(dataDir, 'backups', '1', STACK, '.env'))).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'ENOENT' });
});
it('restoreStackFiles rejects before reading the backup slot', async () => {
const svc = FileSystemService.getInstance();
await expect(svc.restoreStackFiles(STACK)).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'SYMLINK_ESCAPE' });
});
it('snapshotStackFiles rejects and never captures the out-of-tree contents', async () => {
const svc = FileSystemService.getInstance();
await expect(svc.snapshotStackFiles(STACK)).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'SYMLINK_ESCAPE' });
});
it('getStackContentWithMtime rejects via the guarded getComposeFilePath', async () => {
await fs.writeFile(path.join(externalTarget, 'compose.yaml'), 'services: { evil: {} }\n', 'utf-8');
const svc = FileSystemService.getInstance();
await expect(svc.getStackContentWithMtime(STACK)).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'SYMLINK_ESCAPE' });
});
it('generic readFile/writeFile/access through the symlinked stack dir reject', async () => {
const svc = FileSystemService.getInstance();
const envAbs = path.join(composeDir, STACK, '.env');
await expect(svc.readFile(envAbs)).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'SYMLINK_ESCAPE' });
await expect(svc.access(envAbs)).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'SYMLINK_ESCAPE' });
await expect(svc.writeFile(envAbs, 'PWNED=1\n')).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'SYMLINK_ESCAPE' });
expect(await fs.readFile(path.join(externalTarget, '.env'), 'utf-8')).toBe('SECRET=leaked\n');
});
it('writeFileIfUnchanged/statMtime through the symlinked stack dir reject (env PUT route sinks)', async () => {
const svc = FileSystemService.getInstance();
const envAbs = path.join(composeDir, STACK, '.env');
await expect(svc.writeFileIfUnchanged(envAbs, 'PWNED=1\n', null)).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'SYMLINK_ESCAPE' });
await expect(svc.statMtime(envAbs)).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'SYMLINK_ESCAPE' });
expect(await fs.readFile(path.join(externalTarget, '.env'), 'utf-8')).toBe('SECRET=leaked\n');
});
});
// ── A managed .env leaf is a symlink out of tree (stack dir is real) ──────────
describe.skipIf(isWindows)('FileSystemService symlink-escape: symlinked managed-file leaf', () => {
let tmpBase: string;
let composeDir: string;
let stackDir: string;
let externalEnv: string;
beforeEach(async () => {
tmpBase = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'sencho-symleaf-'));
composeDir = path.join(tmpBase, 'compose');
stackDir = path.join(composeDir, STACK);
await fs.mkdir(stackDir, { recursive: true });
externalEnv = path.join(tmpBase, 'outside.env');
await fs.writeFile(externalEnv, 'SECRET=leaked\n', 'utf-8');
mockState.composeDir = composeDir;
// The .env inside an otherwise-normal stack dir links out of tree.
await fs.symlink(externalEnv, path.join(stackDir, '.env'));
});
afterEach(async () => {
await fs.rm(tmpBase, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
it('saveEnvContent rejects and leaves the linked target untouched', async () => {
const svc = FileSystemService.getInstance();
await expect(svc.saveEnvContent(STACK, 'PWNED=1\n')).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'SYMLINK_ESCAPE' });
expect(await fs.readFile(externalEnv, 'utf-8')).toBe('SECRET=leaked\n');
});
it('getEnvContent rejects instead of returning the linked secret', async () => {
const svc = FileSystemService.getInstance();
await expect(svc.getEnvContent(STACK)).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'SYMLINK_ESCAPE' });
});
});
// ── Dangling (broken) symlinks: a link whose target does not exist must still ─
// be rejected, because a write/mkdir would follow it out of tree.
describe.skipIf(isWindows)('FileSystemService symlink-escape: dangling (broken) symlink', () => {
let tmpBase: string;
let composeDir: string;
let stackDir: string;
beforeEach(async () => {
tmpBase = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'sencho-symdangle-'));
composeDir = path.join(tmpBase, 'compose');
stackDir = path.join(composeDir, STACK);
await fs.mkdir(stackDir, { recursive: true });
mockState.composeDir = composeDir;
});
afterEach(async () => {
await fs.rm(tmpBase, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
it('rejects a dangling .env leaf (link to a non-existent target)', async () => {
await fs.symlink(path.join(tmpBase, 'does-not-exist.env'), path.join(stackDir, '.env'));
const svc = FileSystemService.getInstance();
await expect(svc.saveEnvContent(STACK, 'PWNED=1\n')).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'SYMLINK_ESCAPE' });
await expect(svc.getEnvContent(STACK)).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'SYMLINK_ESCAPE' });
});
it('rejects a dangling stack-dir junction (link to a non-existent target)', async () => {
await fs.symlink(path.join(tmpBase, 'no-such-dir'), path.join(composeDir, 'ghost'));
const svc = FileSystemService.getInstance();
await expect(svc.createStack('ghost')).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'SYMLINK_ESCAPE' });
await expect(svc.saveEnvContent('ghost', 'X=1\n')).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'SYMLINK_ESCAPE' });
});
});
// ── The compose root itself is a symlink: must NOT be a false positive ───────
describe.skipIf(isWindows)('FileSystemService symlink-escape: symlinked compose root is allowed', () => {
let tmpBase: string;
let realBase: string;
let linkBase: string;
beforeEach(async () => {
tmpBase = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'sencho-symbase-'));
realBase = path.join(tmpBase, 'realbase');
linkBase = path.join(tmpBase, 'linkbase');
await fs.mkdir(path.join(realBase, STACK), { recursive: true });
await fs.writeFile(path.join(realBase, STACK, '.env'), 'OK=1\n', 'utf-8');
await fs.writeFile(path.join(realBase, STACK, 'compose.yaml'), 'services: {}\n', 'utf-8');
// COMPOSE_DIR is a symlink to the real base; both canonicalize alike.
await fs.symlink(realBase, linkBase);
mockState.composeDir = linkBase;
});
afterEach(async () => {
await fs.rm(tmpBase, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
it('getEnvContent reads through the symlinked root', async () => {
const svc = FileSystemService.getInstance();
await expect(svc.getEnvContent(STACK)).resolves.toBe('OK=1\n');
});
it('saveEnvContent writes through the symlinked root', async () => {
const svc = FileSystemService.getInstance();
await expect(svc.saveEnvContent(STACK, 'OK=2\n')).resolves.toBeUndefined();
expect(await fs.readFile(path.join(realBase, STACK, '.env'), 'utf-8')).toBe('OK=2\n');
});
it('createStack succeeds under the symlinked root', async () => {
const svc = FileSystemService.getInstance();
await expect(svc.createStack('fresh')).resolves.toBeUndefined();
expect(await fs.readFile(path.join(realBase, 'fresh', 'compose.yaml'), 'utf-8')).toContain('services:');
});
});
// ── migrateFlatToDirectory skips an escaping entry rather than aborting all ──
describe.skipIf(isWindows)('FileSystemService symlink-escape: migrate skips an escaping entry', () => {
let tmpBase: string;
let composeDir: string;
let externalTarget: string;
beforeEach(async () => {
tmpBase = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'sencho-symmig-'));
composeDir = path.join(tmpBase, 'compose');
externalTarget = path.join(tmpBase, 'external');
await fs.mkdir(composeDir, { recursive: true });
await fs.mkdir(externalTarget, { recursive: true });
mockState.composeDir = composeDir;
});
afterEach(async () => {
await fs.rm(tmpBase, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
it('skips a flat entry whose target dir is a symlink out of tree, migrates the rest', async () => {
await fs.writeFile(path.join(composeDir, 'app.yaml'), 'services: {}\n', 'utf-8');
await fs.writeFile(path.join(composeDir, 'evil.yaml'), 'services: {}\n', 'utf-8');
await fs.symlink(externalTarget, path.join(composeDir, 'evil'));
const warn = vi.spyOn(console, 'warn').mockImplementation(() => undefined);
const svc = FileSystemService.getInstance();
await expect(svc.migrateFlatToDirectory()).resolves.toBeUndefined();
// The legitimate stack migrated.
expect(await fs.readFile(path.join(composeDir, 'app', 'compose.yaml'), 'utf-8')).toBe('services: {}\n');
// The escaping entry was skipped: nothing was written through the symlink.
await expect(fs.access(path.join(externalTarget, 'compose.yaml'))).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'ENOENT' });
warn.mockRestore();
});
});
// ── Happy path on every platform: the guard is a no-op on normal directories ──
describe('FileSystemService symlink-escape: happy path (no symlinks)', () => {
let composeDir: string;
beforeEach(async () => {
composeDir = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'sencho-symok-'));
mockState.composeDir = composeDir;
});
afterEach(async () => {
await fs.rm(composeDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
it('createStack then saveEnvContent / saveStackContent / deleteStack round-trip', async () => {
const svc = FileSystemService.getInstance();
await svc.createStack(STACK);
expect(await fs.readFile(path.join(composeDir, STACK, 'compose.yaml'), 'utf-8')).toContain('services:');
await svc.saveStackContent(STACK, 'services: { web: {} }\n');
expect(await fs.readFile(path.join(composeDir, STACK, 'compose.yaml'), 'utf-8')).toBe('services: { web: {} }\n');
const read = await svc.getStackContentWithMtime(STACK);
expect(read.content).toBe('services: { web: {} }\n');
await svc.saveEnvContent(STACK, 'FOO=bar\n');
expect(await fs.readFile(path.join(composeDir, STACK, '.env'), 'utf-8')).toBe('FOO=bar\n');
await svc.deleteStack(STACK);
await expect(fs.access(path.join(composeDir, STACK))).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'ENOENT' });
});
it('migrateFlatToDirectory moves a flat compose + env into a stack directory', async () => {
await fs.writeFile(path.join(composeDir, 'web.yaml'), 'services: {}\n', 'utf-8');
await fs.writeFile(path.join(composeDir, 'web.env'), 'FOO=bar\n', 'utf-8');
const svc = FileSystemService.getInstance();
await expect(svc.migrateFlatToDirectory()).resolves.toBeUndefined();
expect(await fs.readFile(path.join(composeDir, 'web', 'compose.yaml'), 'utf-8')).toBe('services: {}\n');
expect(await fs.readFile(path.join(composeDir, 'web', '.env'), 'utf-8')).toBe('FOO=bar\n');
});
});
+6
View File
@@ -27,6 +27,12 @@ vi.mock('fs', () => ({
rename: vi.fn(),
copyFile: vi.fn(),
unlink: vi.fn(),
// deleteStack now realpath-checks the stack dir against the compose root
// before rm. Resolve to the absolute path (no symlink) so the containment
// guard passes and these tests still exercise the rm error translation;
// the guard's symlink-escape behaviour is covered in
// filesystem-symlink-escape.test.ts.
realpath: vi.fn((p: string) => Promise.resolve(path.resolve(p))),
},
}));