refactor(backend): sanitize user input before logging to close CRLF injection (#807)

* refactor(backend): sanitize user input before logging to close CRLF injection

Adds a small sanitizeForLog helper that strips CR, LF, tab, and ASCII
control characters (0x00-0x1F, 0x7F) from a value before it is embedded
in a console.log/warn/error/debug call. Wraps every call site where a
user-controlled value (req.params, req.body, req.query, or a value
derived from them) flows into a log message.

Closes the bulk of the open CodeQL alerts in this family:
- 96 js/log-injection
- 28 js/tainted-format-string

The helper is in backend/src/utils/safeLog.ts. Routes still pre-validate
input at the request boundary; this is the second line of defense and
gives static analyzers a sanitizer they can trace through. JSON
responses, Docker filter labels, and other non-log call sites are
intentionally left unwrapped.

* refactor(backend): printf-style format strings for tainted-log call sites

CodeQL's js/tainted-format-string rule flags template literals in the first
arg of console.X when any interpolated value is user-controlled, regardless
of whether each value is sanitized inline. The canonical mitigation is to
use a static format string and pass values as positional args.

Converts the 28 flagged template literals to printf-style ("%s") format
strings, with sanitizeForLog applied to each positional arg. Also fills in
the log-injection wraps on 9 sites where a user-controlled value was
missed in the first sweep (agents, fleet, gitSources, imageUpdates,
GitSourceService).

No behavior change at runtime. Node's util.format substitutes %s tokens
identically to template-literal interpolation.

* fix(backend): wrap nodeId/snapshotId in fleet restore debug log

CodeQL flagged the unwrapped numeric args even though they cannot
contain control chars in practice. Apply the sanitizer for taint-flow
recognition.
This commit is contained in:
Anso
2026-04-27 10:47:23 -04:00
committed by GitHub
parent 77f27b4bf9
commit 4e5ba17710
32 changed files with 148 additions and 102 deletions
+3 -2
View File
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import { authMiddleware } from '../middleware/auth';
import { requireAdmin, requirePaid } from '../middleware/tierGates';
import { buildPolicyGateOptions } from '../helpers/policyGate';
import { isValidStackName } from '../utils/validation';
import { sanitizeForLog } from '../utils/safeLog';
import { getErrorMessage } from '../utils/errors';
// Fleet aggregation cache: 2-minute TTL, shared across dashboard tabs.
@@ -189,7 +190,7 @@ autoUpdateRouter.post('/execute', authMiddleware, async (req: Request, res: Resp
if (!requireAdmin(req, res)) return;
try {
const { target } = req.body as { target?: string };
console.log(`[AutoUpdate] Execute requested: target="${target || ''}"`);
console.log(`[AutoUpdate] Execute requested: target="${sanitizeForLog(target || '')}"`);
if (!target || typeof target !== 'string') {
res.status(400).json({ error: 'Missing "target" (stack name or "*" for all)' });
return;
@@ -256,7 +257,7 @@ autoUpdateRouter.post('/execute', authMiddleware, async (req: Request, res: Resp
} catch (e) {
const errMsg = getErrorMessage(e, String(e));
checkErrors.push(errMsg);
console.warn(`[AutoUpdate] Failed to check image ${imageRef}:`, e);
console.warn('[AutoUpdate] Failed to check image %s:', sanitizeForLog(imageRef), sanitizeForLog((e as Error)?.message ?? String(e)));
}
}