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refactor(backend): sanitize user input before logging to close CRLF injection (#807)

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* refactor(backend): sanitize user input before logging to close CRLF injection

Adds a small sanitizeForLog helper that strips CR, LF, tab, and ASCII
control characters (0x00-0x1F, 0x7F) from a value before it is embedded
in a console.log/warn/error/debug call. Wraps every call site where a
user-controlled value (req.params, req.body, req.query, or a value
derived from them) flows into a log message.

Closes the bulk of the open CodeQL alerts in this family:
- 96 js/log-injection
- 28 js/tainted-format-string

The helper is in backend/src/utils/safeLog.ts. Routes still pre-validate
input at the request boundary; this is the second line of defense and
gives static analyzers a sanitizer they can trace through. JSON
responses, Docker filter labels, and other non-log call sites are
intentionally left unwrapped.

* refactor(backend): printf-style format strings for tainted-log call sites

CodeQL's js/tainted-format-string rule flags template literals in the first
arg of console.X when any interpolated value is user-controlled, regardless
of whether each value is sanitized inline. The canonical mitigation is to
use a static format string and pass values as positional args.

Converts the 28 flagged template literals to printf-style ("%s") format
strings, with sanitizeForLog applied to each positional arg. Also fills in
the log-injection wraps on 9 sites where a user-controlled value was
missed in the first sweep (agents, fleet, gitSources, imageUpdates,
GitSourceService).

No behavior change at runtime. Node's util.format substitutes %s tokens
identically to template-literal interpolation.

* fix(backend): wrap nodeId/snapshotId in fleet restore debug log

CodeQL flagged the unwrapped numeric args even though they cannot
contain control chars in practice. Apply the sanitizer for taint-flow
recognition.
This commit is contained in:
Anso
2026-04-27 10:47:23 -04:00
committed by GitHub
parent 77f27b4bf9
commit 4e5ba17710
32 changed files with 148 additions and 102 deletions
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backend/src/middleware/apiTokenScope.ts
+3 -2
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
import type { Request, Response, NextFunction, RequestHandler } from 'express';
import { isDebugEnabled } from '../utils/debug';
import { sanitizeForLog } from '../utils/safeLog';
import type { ApiTokenScope } from '../services/DatabaseService';
/**
@@ -28,14 +29,14 @@ const DEPLOY_ALLOWED_PATTERNS: RegExp[] = [
];
const deny = (res: Response, req: Request, error: string, scope: ApiTokenScope | 'unknown'): void => {
if (isDebugEnabled()) console.log('[ApiTokenScope:diag] Denied:', req.method, req.path, 'scope:', scope);
if (isDebugEnabled()) console.log('[ApiTokenScope:diag] Denied:', sanitizeForLog(req.method), sanitizeForLog(req.path), 'scope:', scope);
res.status(403).json({ error, code: 'SCOPE_DENIED' });
};
export const enforceApiTokenScope: RequestHandler = (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction): void => {
const scope = req.apiTokenScope;
if (!scope) { next(); return; } // Not an API token request
if (isDebugEnabled()) console.log('[ApiTokenScope:diag]', req.method, req.path, 'scope:', scope);
if (isDebugEnabled()) console.log('[ApiTokenScope:diag]', sanitizeForLog(req.method), sanitizeForLog(req.path), 'scope:', scope);
if (scope === 'full-admin') { next(); return; }
if (scope === 'read-only') {