fix(fleet-sync): hygiene pass on receiver behavior and cleanup (#972)

A bundle of small file-local fixes to the receiver path and
node-deletion flow.

Changes:
- F4 receiver audit log: applyIncomingSync now writes a system audit
  entry on every applied push so mirrored security-rule changes show
  up in the replica's audit panel with a clear control-side origin.
- F7 pilot-agent skip: pushResource explicitly excludes pilot-agent
  nodes (they have no api_url for HTTP push) and warns once per node
  id so the operator sees they will not receive replicated policies.
- B4 identity-drift notification: when targetIdentity differs from
  the cached fleet_self_identity, dispatch a warning so the operator
  can audit any identity-scoped policies that may need re-targeting.
- B6 stack_pattern ReDoS guard: reject patterns with 4+ consecutive
  wildcards or more than 8 wildcards total. Both control-side
  validators (POST/PUT scan policies) and the receiver-side row
  validator share the helper.
- B9 deleteNode cascade: clear fleet_sync_status rows for the node
  inside the existing transaction so the sync-status panel does not
  render ghost entries after a node is removed.
- S6 last_error redaction: formatError strips Bearer tokens and
  JWT-shaped values from error messages and caps at 500 chars before
  storing in fleet_sync_status.last_error or logging.

Tests:
- 8 new vitest cases covering audit-log entry, identity-drift alert,
  pilot-agent warn-once, formatError redaction (Bearer + JWT), ReDoS
  validator rejection, and a backtracking-time smoke test.
- New database-fleet-sync-cascade.test.ts: deleteNode removes
  fleet_sync_status rows for the deleted node and leaves siblings
  untouched.
- Full backend suite: 1792 pass / 5 skipped.
This commit is contained in:
Anso
2026-05-07 13:41:10 -04:00
committed by GitHub
parent f8c75aa6cd
commit 4007709590
7 changed files with 303 additions and 8 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
/**
* Pins the fleet_sync_status cascade behavior of DatabaseService.deleteNode.
*
* Without this cleanup, deleting a node from Settings → Nodes leaves orphaned
* sync-status rows behind that the UI then renders as ghost entries.
*/
import { describe, it, expect, beforeAll, afterAll } from 'vitest';
import { setupTestDb, cleanupTestDb } from './helpers/setupTestDb';
let tmpDir: string;
let DatabaseService: typeof import('../services/DatabaseService').DatabaseService;
beforeAll(async () => {
tmpDir = await setupTestDb();
({ DatabaseService } = await import('../services/DatabaseService'));
});
afterAll(() => {
cleanupTestDb(tmpDir);
});
describe('deleteNode fleet_sync_status cascade', () => {
it('removes fleet_sync_status rows for the deleted node', () => {
const db = DatabaseService.getInstance();
const nodeId = db.addNode({
name: 'cascade-target',
type: 'remote',
compose_dir: '/app/compose',
is_default: false,
api_url: 'https://cascade.example',
api_token: 'tok',
mode: 'proxy',
});
// Sibling node so we can confirm its rows survive.
const siblingId = db.addNode({
name: 'cascade-sibling',
type: 'remote',
compose_dir: '/app/compose',
is_default: false,
api_url: 'https://sibling.example',
api_token: 'tok',
mode: 'proxy',
});
db.recordFleetSyncFailure(nodeId, 'scan_policies', 'timeout');
db.recordFleetSyncFailure(nodeId, 'cve_suppressions', 'timeout');
db.recordFleetSyncSuccess(siblingId, 'scan_policies');
const before = db.getFleetSyncStatuses();
expect(before.filter((s) => s.node_id === nodeId)).toHaveLength(2);
expect(before.filter((s) => s.node_id === siblingId)).toHaveLength(1);
db.deleteNode(nodeId);
const after = db.getFleetSyncStatuses();
expect(after.filter((s) => s.node_id === nodeId)).toHaveLength(0);
expect(after.filter((s) => s.node_id === siblingId)).toHaveLength(1);
});
});
@@ -274,6 +274,47 @@ describe('POST /api/fleet/role/reanchor', () => {
});
});
describe('POST /api/fleet/sync/:resource stack_pattern ReDoS guard', () => {
it('rejects 4+ consecutive wildcards in a stack_pattern', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.post('/api/fleet/sync/scan_policies')
.set('Authorization', nodeProxyAuthHeader)
.send({
rows: [{
name: 'redos', node_identity: '', stack_pattern: 'foo****bar',
max_severity: 'CRITICAL', block_on_deploy: 0, enabled: 1,
}],
});
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
expect(res.body.error).toMatch(/4\+ consecutive wildcards/);
});
it('rejects more than 8 wildcards anywhere in a stack_pattern', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.post('/api/fleet/sync/scan_policies')
.set('Authorization', nodeProxyAuthHeader)
.send({
rows: [{
name: 'too-many-stars', node_identity: '',
stack_pattern: '*a*b*c*d*e*f*g*h*i*',
max_severity: 'CRITICAL', block_on_deploy: 0, enabled: 1,
}],
});
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
expect(res.body.error).toMatch(/too many wildcards/);
});
it('regex compiled from a max-allowed pattern matches in under 50ms on a worst-case input', () => {
const pattern = 'a*b*c*d*e*f*g*h'; // 7 stars, allowed.
const escaped = pattern.replace(/[.+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\$&').replace(/\*/g, '.*');
const re = new RegExp('^' + escaped + '$');
const target = 'a' + 'a'.repeat(2000);
const start = Date.now();
re.test(target);
expect(Date.now() - start).toBeLessThan(50);
});
});
describe('POST /api/fleet/role/demote', () => {
it('returns 401 without auth', async () => {
const res = await request(app).post('/api/fleet/role/demote').send({ confirm: true });
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ const {
mockReplaceReplicatedCveSuppressions,
mockClearOrphanPolicyEvaluations,
mockClearReplicatedRows,
mockInsertAuditLog,
mockRecordFleetSyncSuccess,
mockRecordFleetSyncFailure,
mockGetSystemState,
@@ -29,6 +30,7 @@ const {
mockReplaceReplicatedCveSuppressions: vi.fn(),
mockClearOrphanPolicyEvaluations: vi.fn(),
mockClearReplicatedRows: vi.fn(),
mockInsertAuditLog: vi.fn(),
mockRecordFleetSyncSuccess: vi.fn(),
mockRecordFleetSyncFailure: vi.fn(),
mockGetSystemState: vi.fn().mockReturnValue(null),
@@ -48,6 +50,7 @@ vi.mock('../services/DatabaseService', () => ({
replaceReplicatedCveSuppressions: mockReplaceReplicatedCveSuppressions,
clearOrphanPolicyEvaluations: mockClearOrphanPolicyEvaluations,
clearReplicatedRows: mockClearReplicatedRows,
insertAuditLog: mockInsertAuditLog,
recordFleetSyncSuccess: mockRecordFleetSyncSuccess,
recordFleetSyncFailure: mockRecordFleetSyncFailure,
getSystemState: mockGetSystemState,
@@ -501,3 +504,93 @@ describe('FleetSyncService.getControlIdentity', () => {
expect(FleetSyncService.getControlIdentity()).toBe('');
});
});
describe('FleetSyncService incoming-sync side effects', () => {
it('writes a system audit log entry on every applied sync', () => {
FleetSyncService.getInstance().applyIncomingSync(
'scan_policies',
[],
'https://me.example',
1_700_000_000_000,
'fingerprint-aaa',
);
expect(mockInsertAuditLog).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.objectContaining({
username: 'system',
method: 'POST',
path: '/api/fleet/sync/scan_policies',
ip_address: 'control',
summary: expect.stringContaining('Replicated scan_policies from fingerprint-aaa'),
}));
});
it('emits an identity-drift notification when the targetIdentity changes', () => {
mockGetSystemState.mockImplementation((key: string) => {
if (key === 'fleet_self_identity') return 'https://old.example';
return null;
});
FleetSyncService.getInstance().applyIncomingSync(
'scan_policies',
[],
'https://new.example',
);
expect(mockDispatchAlert).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'warning',
'system',
expect.stringContaining('Fleet self-identity changed'),
);
});
it('does not emit identity-drift when there is no prior identity (first sync)', () => {
mockGetSystemState.mockImplementation(() => null);
FleetSyncService.getInstance().applyIncomingSync(
'scan_policies',
[],
'https://first.example',
);
const driftCalls = mockDispatchAlert.mock.calls.filter((c) =>
typeof c[2] === 'string' && c[2].includes('self-identity changed'),
);
expect(driftCalls).toHaveLength(0);
});
});
describe('FleetSyncService.pushResource pilot-agent skip', () => {
it('skips pilot-agent nodes and logs warn-once per node id', async () => {
const warnSpy = vi.spyOn(console, 'warn').mockImplementation(() => undefined);
mockGetNodes.mockReturnValue([
{ id: 50, type: 'remote', mode: 'pilot_agent', api_url: '', api_token: '', name: 'PilotNode' },
]);
await FleetSyncService.getInstance().pushResource('scan_policies');
await FleetSyncService.getInstance().pushResource('scan_policies');
const pilotWarns = warnSpy.mock.calls.filter((c) =>
typeof c[0] === 'string' && c[0].includes('pilot-agent') && c[0].includes('PilotNode'),
);
expect(pilotWarns).toHaveLength(1);
expect(mockAxiosPost).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
warnSpy.mockRestore();
});
});
describe('FleetSyncService.formatError redaction', () => {
it('redacts Bearer tokens and JWT-shaped values from error messages', async () => {
mockGetNodes.mockReturnValue([
{ id: 51, type: 'remote', api_url: 'https://leak.example', api_token: 'tok', name: 'leak' },
]);
mockGetLocalScanPolicies.mockReturnValue([]);
mockAxiosPost.mockImplementation(async () => {
const { AxiosError } = await import('axios');
const err = new AxiosError('Request failed');
(err as unknown as { response: unknown }).response = {
status: 500,
statusText: 'Server Error',
data: { error: 'Authorization: Bearer abc.def-_~+/=secrettoken denied; jwt eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiJ1c2VyIn0.signaturePart' },
};
throw err;
});
await FleetSyncService.getInstance().pushResource('scan_policies');
const failure = mockRecordFleetSyncFailure.mock.calls[0];
expect(failure[2]).not.toMatch(/Bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9]/);
expect(failure[2]).toContain('[redacted]');
expect(failure[2]).toContain('[redacted-jwt]');
});
});