Audit-hardening pass for secret and misconfiguration scanning (#977)

* fix(security): dedupe concurrent compose-stack scans

Track stack scans in scanningImages keyed stack:<nodeId>:<stackName>.
The /scan/stack route returns 409 when an in-flight scan exists, and
the service-side check is the real correctness barrier (the route
pre-check is a fast-path optimization that mirrors scanImage). The
dedup key release lives in a try/finally so failed scans free the
slot for retry.

Why: scanComposeStack had no equivalent of scanImage's scanningImages
guard, so two simultaneous calls for the same stack would both run
trivy config, both insert a vulnerability_scans row, and double-
process the result.

* feat(security): acknowledge misconfig findings

Adds a parallel acknowledgement system for Trivy misconfig findings
that mirrors cve_suppressions: a new misconfig_acknowledgements table,
read-time enrichment via the new misconfig-ack-filter utility, REST
CRUD endpoints, fleet-sync replication from control to replicas, a
Settings panel, and an Acknowledge button on the Misconfigs tab.

Schema and behavior parity with cve_suppressions:
  - UNIQUE(rule_id, COALESCE(stack_pattern, '')) so fleet-wide acks
    collide as expected
  - blockIfReplica on every write
  - Audit-log entries name the scope (rule_id, stack_pattern) but
    never the reason text
  - replicated_from_control flag controls UI delete affordance and
    drives clearReplicatedRows on demote/reanchor
  - Validators reused: validateStackPatternForRedos for glob safety,
    sanitizeForLog for log fragments

SARIF export emits an external/accepted suppression entry per
acknowledged misconfig, matching the CVE pattern.

Per-row Acknowledge dialog prefills stack_pattern with the scan's
stack_context so the default scope is "rule + this stack only" and an
operator must broaden explicitly.

Tests: misconfig-ack-filter (15) and misconfig-ack-routes (23)
including the duplicate-409 case for both pinned and fleet-wide acks.

* fix(security): reap orphaned trivy tmp dirs at startup

When the buildEnv path writes a per-scan DOCKER_CONFIG dir under
os.tmpdir() and the process crashes before the finally block runs,
the dir leaks. Mirrors GitSourceService.sweepStaleTempDirs:
exported sweepStaleTrivyTempDirs is fire-and-forget at boot,
removes prefix-matching dirs older than 1 hour, swallows
permission/race failures, logs a single line if any were reaped.

* perf(security): emit per-batch summary for scanAllNodeImages

Adds one diag() line at the end of scanAllNodeImages summarising
unique image count, scanned, skipped, failed, violation count, and
elapsed time. Per-image diag inside scanImage stays useful for
debugging individual scans; the summary gives operators a single
fleet-level checkpoint when developer_mode is on.

* perf(security): cap SARIF export at 5000 findings per type

Replace the unbounded fetchAllPages walk on /scans/:id/sarif with a
hard limit of 5000 findings per type. When any type trips the cap,
emit run-level properties.truncated=true plus row_limit and per-type
totals so downstream tooling can flag the export as partial.
Console-warns for ops visibility.

A scan with 50k vulns previously streamed every row into memory
before serialising; the cap bounds memory and serialisation time at
the cost of completeness on pathological scans.

* docs(env): document TRIVY_BIN host-binary override

The env var is honored by TrivyService.detectTrivy as a fallback when
no managed install is present, but it was undocumented in
.env.example. Adds the var with a comment explaining precedence
(managed > TRIVY_BIN > PATH).

* test(security): cover scanComposeStack failure modes

Two new cases drive the existing try/catch through real failure
paths:
  - Malformed Trivy stdout: row flips to status='failed' with the
    parser error preserved on `error`.
  - execFile rejection: row flips to status='failed' with a string
    error message.

Pairs with the existing dedup tests so the failure path now also
verifies the scan row state, not just the thrown exception.

* test(e2e): security scanner + misconfig acknowledgement flow

Seven Playwright tests covering the scanner UI and the new
acknowledgement system end-to-end:
  - Trivy availability gate (skips suite when binary absent so CI
    without Trivy can opt out via E2E_SKIP_TRIVY=1)
  - Stack config scan completes and records misconfig findings
  - Concurrent stack scan returns 409 from the dedup gate
  - Misconfig ack POST creates and lists on Settings
  - Duplicate (rule_id, stack_pattern) returns 409
  - Malformed rule_id (shell metacharacters) returns 400
  - Misconfigs tab renders against a real stack scan

Tests drive the API for behaviour assertions and the UI only for
shell-rendering checks; the visual snapshot suite owns screenshots.

* docs(features): add misconfig acknowledgement workflow and SARIF cap

Refreshes vulnerability-scanning.mdx with:
  - Misconfig acknowledgements section covering the per-row dialog,
    Settings panel, scope/matching rules, and SARIF emission
  - Tier table row for the new feature
  - SARIF section note on the 5000 row-per-type cap and the
    properties.truncated marker for partial exports
  - Troubleshooting entries: SARIF cap, hidden Acknowledge button,
    findings resurfacing after delete, Trivy DB phone-home, and
    409 on concurrent compose-stack scans

* fix(ci): clear backend lint and CodeQL alerts

- Remove the dead fetchAllPages helper in routes/security.ts. It lost
  its callers when the SARIF endpoint switched to direct paged reads
  for the truncation cap. ESLint flagged it as unused.
- Switch the trivy-tmp-cleanup test helper to fs.mkdtempSync. Building
  paths under os.tmpdir() with predictable names tripped CodeQL's
  js/insecure-temporary-file rule (high severity), which warns about
  symlink-pre-creation attacks even in test code. mkdtempSync appends
  a process-random suffix and creates the dir atomically; the
  sencho-trivy- prefix is preserved so the production sweep still
  matches the test fixtures.
This commit is contained in:
Anso
2026-05-07 19:23:11 -04:00
committed by GitHub
parent 4b1de35dda
commit 3b650523c1
20 changed files with 2376 additions and 162 deletions
+180 -121
View File
@@ -26,6 +26,43 @@ const SCAN_TIMEOUT_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000;
const SBOM_TIMEOUT_MS = 3 * 60 * 1000;
export const DIGEST_CACHE_TTL_MS = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
const TRIVY_TEMP_DIR_PREFIX = 'sencho-trivy-';
const TRIVY_TEMP_DIR_MAX_AGE_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000; // 1 hour
/**
* Sweep leftover sencho-trivy-* temp dirs in the system tmp dir whose mtime
* is older than 1 hour. Runs once at service boot to clean up DOCKER_CONFIG
* dirs orphaned by a crashed scan process. Best-effort; swallows readdir or
* unlink failures so a quirky tmp dir cannot block startup.
*/
export async function sweepStaleTrivyTempDirs(): Promise<void> {
const tmp = os.tmpdir();
let entries: string[];
try {
entries = await fs.promises.readdir(tmp);
} catch {
return;
}
const cutoff = Date.now() - TRIVY_TEMP_DIR_MAX_AGE_MS;
let removed = 0;
for (const entry of entries) {
if (!entry.startsWith(TRIVY_TEMP_DIR_PREFIX)) continue;
const full = path.join(tmp, entry);
try {
const stat = await fs.promises.stat(full);
if (stat.mtimeMs < cutoff) {
await fs.promises.rm(full, { recursive: true, force: true });
removed++;
}
} catch {
/* race: dir already gone, or permissions; skip */
}
}
if (removed > 0) {
console.log(`[Trivy] Reaped ${removed} stale tmp dir(s) under ${tmp}`);
}
}
function diag(msg: string, ...args: unknown[]): void {
if (isDebugEnabled()) console.log(`[Trivy:diag] ${sanitizeForLog(msg)}`, ...args);
}
@@ -459,10 +496,18 @@ class TrivyService {
return `${nodeId}:${imageRef}`;
}
private stackScanKey(nodeId: number, stackName: string): string {
return `stack:${nodeId}:${stackName}`;
}
isScanning(nodeId: number, imageRef: string): boolean {
return this.scanningImages.has(this.scanKey(nodeId, imageRef));
}
isScanningStack(nodeId: number, stackName: string): boolean {
return this.scanningImages.has(this.stackScanKey(nodeId, stackName));
}
async scanImage(
imageRef: string,
nodeId: number,
@@ -835,129 +880,137 @@ class TrivyService {
if (!(await fsvc.hasComposeFile(resolved))) {
throw new Error(`No compose file found for stack: ${stackName}`);
}
const db = DatabaseService.getInstance();
const scanId = db.createVulnerabilityScan({
node_id: nodeId,
image_ref: `stack:${stackName}`,
image_digest: null,
scanned_at: Date.now(),
total_vulnerabilities: 0,
critical_count: 0,
high_count: 0,
medium_count: 0,
low_count: 0,
unknown_count: 0,
fixable_count: 0,
secret_count: 0,
misconfig_count: 0,
scanners_used: 'config',
highest_severity: null,
os_info: null,
trivy_version: this.version,
scan_duration_ms: null,
triggered_by: triggeredBy,
status: 'in_progress',
error: null,
stack_context: stackName,
});
const startedAt = Date.now();
const dedupKey = this.stackScanKey(nodeId, stackName);
if (this.scanningImages.has(dedupKey)) {
throw new Error('Already scanning this stack');
}
this.scanningImages.add(dedupKey);
try {
const { env, cleanup } = await this.buildEnv();
try {
const args = ['config', '--format', 'json', '--quiet', resolved];
const { stdout } = await execFileAsync(binary, args, {
env,
timeout: SCAN_TIMEOUT_MS,
maxBuffer: 64 * 1024 * 1024,
});
const { misconfigs } = parseTrivyOutput(stdout);
let critical = 0,
high = 0,
medium = 0,
low = 0,
unknown = 0;
for (const m of misconfigs) {
switch (m.severity) {
case 'CRITICAL':
critical++;
break;
case 'HIGH':
high++;
break;
case 'MEDIUM':
medium++;
break;
case 'LOW':
low++;
break;
default:
unknown++;
}
}
const highestSeverity: VulnSeverity | null =
critical > 0 ? 'CRITICAL'
: high > 0 ? 'HIGH'
: medium > 0 ? 'MEDIUM'
: low > 0 ? 'LOW'
: unknown > 0 ? 'UNKNOWN'
: null;
db.updateVulnerabilityScan(scanId, {
scanned_at: Date.now(),
critical_count: critical,
high_count: high,
medium_count: medium,
low_count: low,
unknown_count: unknown,
misconfig_count: misconfigs.length,
highest_severity: highestSeverity,
trivy_version: this.version,
scan_duration_ms: Date.now() - startedAt,
status: 'completed',
});
db.insertMisconfigFindings(
scanId,
misconfigs.map((m) => ({
rule_id: m.ruleId,
check_id: m.checkId,
severity: m.severity,
title: m.title,
message: m.message,
resolution: m.resolution,
target: m.target,
primary_url: m.primaryUrl,
})),
);
const stored = db.getVulnerabilityScan(scanId);
if (!stored) throw new Error('Scan vanished after write');
try {
const evaluation = db.evaluateScanAgainstPolicies(
nodeId,
stored,
FleetSyncService.getSelfIdentity(),
);
if (evaluation) {
db.setScanPolicyEvaluation(scanId, evaluation);
stored.policy_evaluation = JSON.stringify(evaluation);
}
} catch (err) {
console.warn(
`[Trivy] policy evaluation failed for stack scanId=${scanId}:`,
getErrorMessage(err, 'unknown error'),
);
}
return stored;
} finally {
cleanup();
}
} catch (error) {
const msg = getErrorMessage(error, 'Stack scan failed');
db.updateVulnerabilityScan(scanId, {
status: 'failed',
error: msg,
scan_duration_ms: Date.now() - startedAt,
const db = DatabaseService.getInstance();
const scanId = db.createVulnerabilityScan({
node_id: nodeId,
image_ref: `stack:${stackName}`,
image_digest: null,
scanned_at: Date.now(),
total_vulnerabilities: 0,
critical_count: 0,
high_count: 0,
medium_count: 0,
low_count: 0,
unknown_count: 0,
fixable_count: 0,
secret_count: 0,
misconfig_count: 0,
scanners_used: 'config',
highest_severity: null,
os_info: null,
trivy_version: this.version,
scan_duration_ms: null,
triggered_by: triggeredBy,
status: 'in_progress',
error: null,
stack_context: stackName,
});
throw error;
const startedAt = Date.now();
try {
const { env, cleanup } = await this.buildEnv();
try {
const args = ['config', '--format', 'json', '--quiet', resolved];
const { stdout } = await execFileAsync(binary, args, {
env,
timeout: SCAN_TIMEOUT_MS,
maxBuffer: 64 * 1024 * 1024,
});
const { misconfigs } = parseTrivyOutput(stdout);
let critical = 0,
high = 0,
medium = 0,
low = 0,
unknown = 0;
for (const m of misconfigs) {
switch (m.severity) {
case 'CRITICAL':
critical++;
break;
case 'HIGH':
high++;
break;
case 'MEDIUM':
medium++;
break;
case 'LOW':
low++;
break;
default:
unknown++;
}
}
const highestSeverity: VulnSeverity | null =
critical > 0 ? 'CRITICAL'
: high > 0 ? 'HIGH'
: medium > 0 ? 'MEDIUM'
: low > 0 ? 'LOW'
: unknown > 0 ? 'UNKNOWN'
: null;
db.updateVulnerabilityScan(scanId, {
scanned_at: Date.now(),
critical_count: critical,
high_count: high,
medium_count: medium,
low_count: low,
unknown_count: unknown,
misconfig_count: misconfigs.length,
highest_severity: highestSeverity,
trivy_version: this.version,
scan_duration_ms: Date.now() - startedAt,
status: 'completed',
});
db.insertMisconfigFindings(
scanId,
misconfigs.map((m) => ({
rule_id: m.ruleId,
check_id: m.checkId,
severity: m.severity,
title: m.title,
message: m.message,
resolution: m.resolution,
target: m.target,
primary_url: m.primaryUrl,
})),
);
const stored = db.getVulnerabilityScan(scanId);
if (!stored) throw new Error('Scan vanished after write');
try {
const evaluation = db.evaluateScanAgainstPolicies(
nodeId,
stored,
FleetSyncService.getSelfIdentity(),
);
if (evaluation) {
db.setScanPolicyEvaluation(scanId, evaluation);
stored.policy_evaluation = JSON.stringify(evaluation);
}
} catch (err) {
console.warn(
`[Trivy] policy evaluation failed for stack scanId=${scanId}:`,
getErrorMessage(err, 'unknown error'),
);
}
return stored;
} finally {
cleanup();
}
} catch (error) {
const msg = getErrorMessage(error, 'Stack scan failed');
db.updateVulnerabilityScan(scanId, {
status: 'failed',
error: msg,
scan_duration_ms: Date.now() - startedAt,
});
throw error;
}
} finally {
this.scanningImages.delete(dedupKey);
}
}
@@ -968,6 +1021,7 @@ class TrivyService {
if (this.source === 'none') {
throw new Error('Trivy is not available on this host');
}
const batchStartedAt = Date.now();
const images = await DockerController.getInstance(nodeId).getImages();
const imageRefs = new Set<string>();
for (const img of images as Array<{ RepoTags?: string[] }>) {
@@ -1040,6 +1094,11 @@ class TrivyService {
}
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 300));
}
diag(
`scanAllNodeImages: nodeId=${nodeId} unique=${imageRefs.size} `
+ `scanned=${scanned} skipped=${skipped} failed=${failed} `
+ `violations=${violations.length} elapsedMs=${Date.now() - batchStartedAt}`,
);
return { scanned, skipped, failed, severity, violations };
}