diff --git a/Dockerfile b/Dockerfile
index fb76ddae..aa889283 100644
--- a/Dockerfile
+++ b/Dockerfile
@@ -144,6 +144,13 @@ RUN cp vendor.mod go.mod && cp vendor.sum go.sum && \
 # v0.29.0. The go get step below bumps otel to v1.43.0 to resolve
 # CVE-2026-39883 (BSD kenv) and CVE-2026-39882 (OTLP response OOM) so that
 # the compose binary scans completely clean.
+#
+# Compose v5.1.3 also pins github.com/containerd/containerd/v2 v2.2.3, which
+# carries CVE-2026-46680 (runAsNonRoot evasion in containerd's runtime
+# executor). The same go get step bumps containerd/v2 to v2.2.4 to clear it.
+# v2.2.3 to v2.2.4 is a patch-level fix; the release notes name CVE-2026-46680
+# as the headline item. The vulnerable code path is daemon-side and not reached
+# by compose at all, so this is defense-in-depth rather than a live exposure.
 # Base image pinned by digest (same image as cli-builder above) so both
 # source builds share an identical, immutable Go toolchain.
 FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM golang:1.26.3-alpine@sha256:91eda9776261207ea25fd06b5b7fed8d397dd2c0a283e77f2ab6e91bfa71079d AS compose-builder
@@ -166,8 +173,9 @@ WORKDIR /src/docker-compose
 RUN mkdir -p /build
 
 # Patch otel/sdk and exporters from v1.42.0 → v1.43.0 to clear CVE-2026-39883
-# and CVE-2026-39882. This is a targeted security bump; otel 1.42→1.43 is a
-# patch-level fix with no breaking API changes.
+# and CVE-2026-39882, and bump containerd/v2 from v2.2.3 → v2.2.4 to clear
+# CVE-2026-46680. Both are targeted patch-level security bumps with no
+# breaking API changes.
 RUN --mount=type=cache,id=go-mod,sharing=locked,target=/go/pkg/mod \
     go get go.opentelemetry.io/otel@v1.43.0 \
            go.opentelemetry.io/otel/sdk@v1.43.0 \
@@ -178,7 +186,8 @@ RUN --mount=type=cache,id=go-mod,sharing=locked,target=/go/pkg/mod \
            go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlptrace/otlptracegrpc@v1.43.0 \
            go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlptrace/otlptracehttp@v1.43.0 \
            go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlpmetric/otlpmetricgrpc@v1.43.0 \
-           go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlpmetric/otlpmetrichttp@v1.43.0 && \
+           go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlpmetric/otlpmetrichttp@v1.43.0 \
+           github.com/containerd/containerd/v2@v2.2.4 && \
     go mod tidy
 
 # Build target is ./cmd (the package main with plugin.Run), per docker/compose's
diff --git a/security/vex/sencho.openvex.json b/security/vex/sencho.openvex.json
index 16ef376e..4d598586 100644
--- a/security/vex/sencho.openvex.json
+++ b/security/vex/sencho.openvex.json
@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@
   "author": "Studio Saelix",
   "role": "Vendor",
   "timestamp": "2026-05-18T00:00:00Z",
-  "last_updated": "2026-05-22T00:00:00Z",
-  "version": 6,
+  "last_updated": "2026-05-24T00:00:00Z",
+  "version": 7,
   "statements": [
     {
       "vulnerability": {
@@ -51,21 +51,6 @@
       "status": "not_affected",
       "justification": "vulnerable_code_not_in_execute_path",
       "impact_statement": "The race condition is in the Docker Engine daemon-side bind-mount resolution path that backs `docker cp`, where a concurrent rename can redirect a copy operation onto a host path. docker-compose v5.1.3 statically bundles docker/docker v28.5.2+incompatible as a client-side library for API types and codecs; it never serves the daemon-side cp endpoint and never resolves bind mounts on the host. Sencho invokes compose only for up/down/ps operations against local user-authored compose files and does not invoke `docker cp` through compose. The vulnerable daemon-side code path is not reachable. The fix lives on the github.com/moby/moby/v2 module path; until upstream compose migrates to the v2 import path, v28.5.2+incompatible is the only Go-module-resolvable version of the affected library that compose can reference."
-    },
-    {
-      "vulnerability": {
-        "@id": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-46680",
-        "name": "CVE-2026-46680",
-        "description": "containerd user ID handling bypass allows runAsNonRoot evasion"
-      },
-      "products": [
-        {
-          "@id": "pkg:golang/github.com/containerd/containerd/v2@v2.2.3"
-        }
-      ],
-      "status": "not_affected",
-      "justification": "vulnerable_code_not_in_execute_path",
-      "impact_statement": "The vulnerability is in containerd's runtime executor: when starting a container whose OCI spec carries a Kubernetes `runAsNonRoot: true` security context, a crafted user ID handling sequence lets the process run as root despite the enforcement check. The vulnerable code path is reached only by containerd-shim invoking runc with a populated runtime spec, i.e., daemon-side execution by the containerd runtime itself. docker-compose v5.1.3 statically bundles `github.com/containerd/containerd/v2 v2.2.3` as a client-side library for gRPC types, API stubs, and shared utilities used to talk to a containerd daemon; it does not execute containers and does not enforce `runAsNonRoot`. Sencho invokes compose only for up/down/ps operations against user-authored compose files, which do not carry Kubernetes pod security contexts. The runtime-executor code path is not reachable. Upstream compose will pick up the fixed containerd (v2.2.4 / v2.3.1) on a future tag; until then v2.2.3 is the resolved version in compose v5.1.3's module graph."
     }
   ]
 }