Ad-hoc sessions had their own form on the Sessions page with a subset
of the options a connection entry has. "Connect to a host" now opens
the Connections entry editor in an ad-hoc mode instead, so an ad-hoc
connection has every option an entry has, now and as entries gain more.
The button sits beside the global search box on every page that has
one. It is shown to poweruser and above under the same rules as the
search box, and opens the editor in place on Connections or goes to
/connections.html#adhoc elsewhere. Ad-hoc mode has no name or folder,
Connect instead of Save, and for admins a "Save as entry" action.
POST /api/addressbook/adhoc/connect takes the entry as the editor
builds it. It resolves only the caller's own credential variables,
never lends folder defaults, and goes through apply_adhoc_policy and
the session rate limit like every other ad-hoc route.
POST /api/sessions is unchanged.
session_request_from_entry() replaces the two copies of the entry to
session request conversion, used by the Connections connect endpoint
and /api/connect, so an option added to entries works in all three.
can_connect_adhoc() is the one place that decides who may connect
ad-hoc.
The Sessions ad-hoc form is removed. loadFolders() now runs its
callback, so #open= links work again.
Refs sol1/rustguac#295
(cherry picked from commit dd40bf08ec)
The Docker instructions started the container under Docker's default
seccomp profile, where every web session fails because Chromium's
sandbox cannot create its namespaces, and nothing said why.
- web-sessions.md: a Chromium sandbox section covering the namespace
sandbox, the SUID helper fallback and the new start-up error, and a
Running under Docker subsection with the shipped profile, a Compose
snippet, the user-namespace requirement on the host, and the
alternatives (seccomp=unconfined, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) with their cost;
a troubleshooting entry for the error
- installation.md, README.md, deployment-guide.md: extract the profile
from the image and pass it with --security-opt in the docker run and
Compose examples
- security.md: the sandbox section said Chromium uses the SUID helper;
it prefers its namespace sandbox and uses the helper only as a
fallback. Point Docker users at the profile rather than unconfined
Fixes#307
(cherry picked from commit 305bb6e195)
clear_entry_only_fields() missed several fields an ad-hoc caller below
admin could still set, and GET /api/connect's ad-hoc mode applied none
of the checks. apply_adhoc_policy() now runs on both ad-hoc routes. For
callers below admin it fences every target, drops the fields only a
saved entry may set (now also the VDI account, the Kerberos cache path,
sharing and Wake-on-LAN), lets recording be turned on but never off when
it is enabled site-wide, stops the drive being turned on when [drive]
leaves it off, and caps VDI CPU, memory and idle timeout at the [vdi]
defaults. Admins and saved entries are unchanged. Unit tests cover each
rule.
#281 relaxed framing to same-origin on every page. Keep DENY and
frame-ancestors 'none' everywhere, and send SAMEORIGIN with
frame-ancestors 'self' only on the client page of a session opened from
a saved entry with fullscreen on connect turned on, the one case the
Connections page frames it. An ad-hoc session cannot opt itself in, and
an unknown or ended session is not frameable. Tested end to end through
the header middleware.
docs: a framing and clickjacking section in security.md with the
approaches weighed, the corrected CSP row, and a note in
reverse-proxies.md to give rustguac its own hostname.
The network allowlists are what fence powerusers creating ad-hoc
sessions, and several paths went around them:
- POST /api/ssh/probe-host-key dialled any host:port, a port scanner and
banner grabber for anything rustguac can reach (guacd, Vault, metadata
services). Non-admin probes are now checked against
ssh_allowed_networks and dialled at the checked address.
- Jump hosts were never checked, though rustguac dials the first one
itself. For non-admin ad-hoc sessions it is now fenced by
ssh_allowed_networks and pinned.
- Ad-hoc Proxmox sessions called any proxmox_url and let guacd dial
whatever SPICE proxy that API returned. For non-admin ad-hoc sessions
both are now fenced by vnc_allowed_networks, as direct SPICE is.
The jump host and Proxmox fences are deliberately limited to non-admin
ad-hoc requests: connection entries and admins name bastions and
clusters that sit outside the target lists, and on the canary every
entry-based Proxmox and jump host session would otherwise have broken.
The flag is serde(skip), so a request body cannot set it.
The allowlist passed a hostname if any resolved address was allowed and
then handed guacd the hostname to resolve again, so a name whose DNS the
caller controls could pass the check and connect elsewhere. SSH and VNC
now dial the checked address when there are no jump hosts. RDP, SPICE
and web keep the hostname (TLS names, Kerberos) and the residual risk is
documented. Docs also no longer claim every resolved address must match.
client_ip took the LEFTMOST X-Forwarded-For entry from a trusted proxy.
Behind any proxy that appends to an incoming header (nginx
$proxy_add_x_forwarded_for, as our own reverse-proxy doc recommended, or
Apache mod_proxy), that entry is whatever the client sent, so a client
could pick an address inside an IP allowlist and walk through it. The
header is now walked from the right, skipping trusted proxies, across
every header line, split on raw bytes so a non-UTF-8 left entry cannot
hide the address a proxy appended.
Rate limiters used tower_governor's SmartIpKeyExtractor, which believes
forwarded headers from any peer: a different forged X-Forwarded-For per
request meant a fresh bucket each time, including on the always-on OIDC
limiter. They now key on the same trusted-proxy resolution. When
rate_limit is enabled, the API and WebSocket limiters sit outside
authentication so requests with bad credentials are counted. The OIDC
burst goes from 5 to 20 to cover an office behind one NAT address.
Docs: nginx recipe overwrites X-Forwarded-For with $remote_addr, and the
rate-limit section now states what is actually limited and when.
The first WebSocket to a pending session takes its guacd stream, already
logged in to the target. Any operator could claim another user's pending
session that way, and session ids are visible in reports. Now only the
session's creator may make that connection, with no admin bypass: an admin
"shadowing" a pending session used to silently become its owner and lock
the real owner out, so shadow now refuses sessions that have not started
(409). handle_ws only takes the stream when the owner check passed at
upgrade time.
POST /api/sessions accepts an admin-only `owner` field so a backend using
an API key can create a session for a user who then connects with their
own login. That user is recorded as the creator.
Share links and shadow tokens gain an optional read-only mode; the default
stays read/write. Each shareable session gets a second token
(share_url_readonly), and shadow takes {"read_only": true}. guacd enforces
it per joining user via the read-only connect arg, which was previously
hardcoded to false. The Share dialog offers both links, the Sessions page
offers watch and shadow, and docs no longer claim a read-only mode that
did not exist.
Three pieces of v1.6.0 work that happened together and are easier to
review as one save point.
Rename: Address Book → Connections
- static/addressbook.html renamed to static/connections.html
- Nav links, page titles, empty states, onboarding, and prose updated
across all 8 static pages (connections, admin, docs, index,
recordings, reports, sessions, tokens).
- README, CLAUDE.md, and every file under docs/ updated.
- src/main.rs: connections.html added to the branded-page map and
route list; /addressbook.html returns a 308 permanent redirect so
existing bookmarks keep working.
- Backend API paths, Rust types, and Vault storage paths are
deliberately unchanged — internal only.
Folder allowed_groups picker
- New SQLite table `seen_groups` tracks OIDC groups observed in any
user login; OIDC callback upserts after extracting groups.
- `GET /api/auth/known-groups` (admin-only) returns the union of
group_role_mappings and seen_groups.
- `GET /api/addressbook/folders/{scope}/{folder}/config` adds the
missing endpoint the frontend was already calling — existing
allowed_groups now prefill the edit-folder modal.
- Folder modal swaps the free-text comma-separated input for a chip
picker with a themed combobox dropdown: autocomplete over known
groups, keyboard nav, "+ add custom" row for unlisted groups.
Active session visibility (GitHub #102)
- `GET /api/sessions` scopes to the caller's own sessions by default;
`?all=true` lets admins opt in (used by the Sessions page).
- `GET /api/sessions/{id}` and the thumbnail GET/PUT endpoints are
now owner-or-admin, returning 404 for other callers so session
existence isn't leaked.
- Connections' Active Sessions strip is now always owner-scoped —
admins still manage everyone via the Sessions page.
- Add optional `banner` field to address book entries (shown before session
starts, user must click Continue). No longer auto-populates from display_name.
- Restructure web entry form: username, password, login script, and autofill
collapsed under a collapsible "Automation" section.
- Filter login scripts dropdown to .js/.sh/.py files only (skip package.json etc.)
- Fix CDP/login scripts: change DeveloperToolsAvailability policy from 2 (disabled)
to 0. DevTools UI remains blocked by chrome://* URLBlocklist. Fixes login script
automation that was silently broken by the v0.6.0 security hardening.
- Update Dockerfile, debian/postinst, install.sh with corrected policy.
- Update docs/security.md and docs/web-sessions.md.
- Rewrite Vault mTLS client to build rustls ClientConfig directly,
bypassing reqwest::Identity::from_pem() which fails with rustls
backend for PKCS#8 keys from OpenBao/Vault PKI
- Make cert_path/key_path optional in [tls] — guacd TLS now works
independently of server HTTPS (for reverse proxy setups)
- Add webpki-roots direct dependency for custom TLS config
- Add mTLS tests: PKCS#8 key, fullchain cert, tls_skip_verify
- Update docs: configuration.md, security.md
Closes#51, closes#49
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- New docs/web-sessions.md: comprehensive guide with autofill, domain
allowlisting, login scripts (Playwright + shell examples), clipboard
control, API reference, and troubleshooting
- Fix integrations.md: web sessions DO use credentials (for autofill
and login scripts)
- Add global Chromium policy warning to security.md and web-sessions.md
- Add web-sessions.md to in-app docs (build.rs)
- Condense overview.md web section to link to new dedicated doc
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
New features:
- Native Chromium autofill: pre-populate Login Data SQLite before launch,
zero external deps (no Node.js/Playwright needed for simple login flows)
- Per-entry domain allowlisting: restrict which domains Chromium can reach
via --host-rules (separate from server-side web_allowed_networks CIDR)
- Per-entry clipboard control: disable-copy and disable-paste for all
session types (SSH, RDP, VNC, Web) via guacd native parameters
- Guacamole import: `rustguac import-guacamole` parses mysqldump SQL and
writes entries to Vault address book
Security hardening:
- Comprehensive Chromium managed policy deployed via install.sh, Dockerfile,
and debian/postinst (blocks DevTools, downloads, file dialogs, extensions,
dangerous URL schemes)
- Profile isolation: each web session gets a unique UUID-based profile dir
- Autofill credentials encrypted with Chromium's native os_crypt (AES-128-CBC)
Documentation:
- Updated README, docs/api.md, docs/security.md, docs/configuration.md,
docs/overview.md, docs/integrations.md with all new features
- Clarified two-layer domain restriction (web_allowed_networks vs allowed_domains)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Multi-hop SSH tunnel chains allow routing any session type through
multiple bastion hosts. VNC is now a first-class session type.
Web browser sessions can tunnel through jump hosts with automatic
URL rewriting.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
User API tokens allow OIDC users to authenticate via bearer token for
automation and scripting. Powerusers and admins can create their own
tokens; admins can create tokens for operators. Tokens use SHA-256
hashing, optional max_role caps, optional expiry, and full audit
logging of create/revoke operations with client IPs.
- DB schema: user_api_tokens and token_audit_log tables
- Auth middleware: validates user tokens as fallback after admin keys
- API: 7 new endpoints (self-service + admin token management)
- UI: tokens.html (self-service) + admin.html token/audit sections
- Nav: Tokens link added to all pages (visible for operator+)
- Docs: API reference, security model, roles/access control updated
- Background cleanup: expired tokens + 90-day audit log retention
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Jad Seifeddine