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16d381fc0e
No workflow ever set RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN, so live_vault_backends() returned an empty set in every CI run and behavior_rotation.rs never asserted the working half of rotate/versioning; the #[ignore] live-Vault tests had never executed in CI either. nightly-gnu.yml gains a kms-vault-lane job (vault server -dev with KV2 + Transit, full rustfs-kms suite with the lane on, the dev-Vault ignored tests, and the AppRole live script) plus a separate kms-vault-ha-failover job for the three-node Raft failover script, isolated so an election-timing flake cannot mask the main lane's verdict. GitHub-hosted ubuntu-latest rather than the self-hosted fleet: the HA script needs Docker, and e2e-s3tests.yml's banner records how the heterogeneous sm-standard pods burned the last docker-dependent workflow. The behavior harness now records every key TestKms::create_key mints and deletes them after each Vault-backed for_each_backend case, on a fresh manager over the same configuration with the immediate-deletion gate enabled for cleanup only. Transit needs the deletion issued twice (first call parks the key in PendingDeletion, the second destroys it); KV2 destroys on the first call. Verified against a real dev Vault: after a full suite run the server holds zero behavior-* keys. Also fixes test_vault_cancel_key_deletion_persists_state, which was broken by construction — Default::default() never picks up the insecure-dev-defaults env override, so the HTTP dev Vault the test requires was always refused. It now declares development mode on the config, and passes. Refs rustfs/backlog#1774, rustfs/backlog#1562.
558 lines
21 KiB
Rust
558 lines
21 KiB
Rust
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
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//
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// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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// You may obtain a copy of the License at
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//
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// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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//
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// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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// limitations under the License.
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//! Shared harness for the `rustfs-kms` black-box behavior suite.
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//!
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//! Everything here drives the crate through the same public entry points the
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//! server uses (`KmsServiceManager` -> `KmsManager` / `ObjectEncryptionService`),
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//! so the suite keeps holding after internal refactors. Two rules keep it
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//! black-box:
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//!
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//! * no `pub(crate)` internals, no on-disk key format parsing;
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//! * assertions target observable contract — error *variants*, returned values,
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//! and state that survives a restart — never implementation details.
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//!
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//! Every harness instance owns its own `KmsServiceManager`; the process-global
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//! singleton is deliberately avoided so tests never cross-talk under nextest.
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#![allow(dead_code)] // each test binary uses a different slice of the harness
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use std::collections::HashMap;
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use std::fmt::Debug;
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use std::future::Future;
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use std::path::PathBuf;
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use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
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use base64::Engine as _;
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use base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD as BASE64;
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use rustfs_kms::backends::BackendCapabilities;
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use rustfs_kms::{
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CreateKeyRequest, DeleteKeyRequest, KeyUsage, KmsConfig, KmsError, KmsManager, KmsServiceManager, KmsServiceStatus,
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ObjectEncryptionService, Result,
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};
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use tempfile::TempDir;
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/// Key id configured for the static backend harness.
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pub const STATIC_KEY_ID: &str = "behavior-static-key";
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/// Deterministic 32-byte secret for the static backend, base64 encoded.
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///
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/// Fixed rather than random so a failure is reproducible; it is test-only
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/// material and never leaves this crate's test binaries.
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pub fn static_secret_key() -> String {
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BASE64.encode([0x5au8; 32])
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}
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/// Which backend a harness instance is running.
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///
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/// Local and Static always run. The two Vault backends are **opt-in**: they
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/// need a reachable server, so they join the matrix only when
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/// `RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN` is set (see [`live_vault_backends`]).
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///
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/// This matters for how a green run should be read. `rotate` and `versioning`
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/// are advertised *only* by the Vault backends, so without the Vault lane every
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/// capability-gated branch for them in a `for_each_backend` spec runs the
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/// `UnsupportedCapability` side and never the working side — a rotation that
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/// silently dropped prior key versions would pass. An offline-only run says
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/// nothing about whether the Vault backends work.
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
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pub enum BackendKind {
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Local,
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Static,
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VaultKv2,
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VaultTransit,
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}
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impl BackendKind {
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pub fn name(self) -> &'static str {
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match self {
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Self::Local => "local",
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Self::Static => "static",
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Self::VaultKv2 => "vault-kv2",
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Self::VaultTransit => "vault-transit",
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}
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}
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/// Whether this backend keeps its state on an external server that outlives
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/// the harness, so key names must not collide between runs.
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pub fn is_vault(self) -> bool {
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matches!(self, Self::VaultKv2 | Self::VaultTransit)
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}
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}
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/// Address of the live Vault, defaulting to the usual local dev server.
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pub fn vault_address() -> String {
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std::env::var("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_ADDR").unwrap_or_else(|_| "http://127.0.0.1:8200".to_string())
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}
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/// Token for the live Vault, or `None` when the Vault lane is switched off.
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///
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/// Presence of this variable is the single switch that adds the Vault backends
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/// to every `for_each_backend` spec.
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pub fn vault_token() -> Option<String> {
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std::env::var("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN").ok().filter(|token| !token.is_empty())
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}
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/// The Vault backends to include in the matrix for this run.
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pub fn live_vault_backends() -> Vec<BackendKind> {
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match vault_token() {
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Some(_) => vec![BackendKind::VaultKv2, BackendKind::VaultTransit],
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None => Vec::new(),
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}
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}
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/// A key name that cannot collide with another run against the same Vault.
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///
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/// Vault state is persistent and shared, unlike the per-test temp directory the
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/// local backend gets, so a fixed name would make a rerun collide with its own
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/// leftovers and turn every assertion into a function of run order.
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pub fn unique_key_name(prefix: &str) -> String {
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format!("{prefix}-{}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4().simple())
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}
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/// A running KMS service, reachable only through the crate's public API.
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pub struct TestKms {
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manager: Arc<KmsServiceManager>,
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kind: BackendKind,
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config: KmsConfig,
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/// Ids of the keys [`TestKms::create_key`] created, so a run against a
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/// persistent Vault can remove them afterwards instead of accumulating
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/// `behavior-*` keys forever (rustfs/backlog#1774). Shared through an Arc
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/// because the harness instance is consumed by the spec while the cleanup
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/// runs after it.
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created_keys: Arc<Mutex<Vec<String>>>,
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/// Held for the harness lifetime so the local key directory outlives a
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/// simulated process restart.
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_dir: Option<TempDir>,
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}
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impl TestKms {
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/// Local backend with development defaults and no default key id.
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pub async fn local() -> Self {
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Self::local_with(|_| {}).await
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}
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/// Local backend with `tweak` applied to the configuration before start.
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pub async fn local_with(tweak: impl FnOnce(&mut KmsConfig)) -> Self {
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let dir = TempDir::new().expect("create temp key dir");
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let mut config = KmsConfig::local(dir.path().to_path_buf()).with_insecure_development_defaults();
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tweak(&mut config);
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let manager = start_manager(&config).await;
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Self {
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manager,
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kind: BackendKind::Local,
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config,
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created_keys: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())),
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_dir: Some(dir),
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}
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}
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/// Vault KV v2 backend against the live server.
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///
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/// Panics when the Vault lane is off — callers gate on
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/// [`live_vault_backends`] rather than calling this blind.
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pub async fn vault_kv2() -> Self {
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let token = vault_token().expect("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN must be set to run the Vault lane");
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let address = vault_address().parse().expect("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_ADDR must be a URL");
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// A local dev Vault speaks plain HTTP, which the config guard refuses
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// unless development mode is declared explicitly.
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let config = KmsConfig::vault(address, token).with_insecure_development_defaults();
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let manager = start_manager(&config).await;
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Self {
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manager,
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kind: BackendKind::VaultKv2,
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config,
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created_keys: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())),
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_dir: None,
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}
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}
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/// Vault Transit backend against the live server.
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pub async fn vault_transit() -> Self {
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let token = vault_token().expect("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN must be set to run the Vault lane");
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let address = vault_address().parse().expect("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_ADDR must be a URL");
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let config = KmsConfig::vault_transit(address, token).with_insecure_development_defaults();
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let manager = start_manager(&config).await;
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Self {
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manager,
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kind: BackendKind::VaultTransit,
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config,
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created_keys: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())),
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_dir: None,
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}
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}
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/// Static single-key backend with a fixed key id and secret.
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pub async fn static_backend() -> Self {
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let config = KmsConfig::static_kms(STATIC_KEY_ID.to_string(), static_secret_key());
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let manager = start_manager(&config).await;
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Self {
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manager,
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kind: BackendKind::Static,
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config,
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created_keys: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())),
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_dir: None,
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}
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}
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/// Simulate a process restart: stop the running service and bring a brand
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/// new manager up over the same configuration and key directory.
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///
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/// A fresh manager (rather than `stop` + `start` on the same one) is what
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/// makes this meaningful — it discards every in-memory cache and version
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/// counter, so anything that still holds afterwards came off disk.
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pub async fn restart(&mut self) {
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self.manager.stop().await.expect("stop should succeed");
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self.manager = start_manager(&self.config).await;
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}
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pub fn manager(&self) -> &Arc<KmsServiceManager> {
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&self.manager
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}
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pub fn kind(&self) -> BackendKind {
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self.kind
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}
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pub fn config(&self) -> &KmsConfig {
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&self.config
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}
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/// Key directory of the local backend, for restart-over-same-state setups.
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pub fn key_dir(&self) -> Option<PathBuf> {
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self.config.local_config().map(|local| local.key_dir.clone())
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}
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pub async fn kms(&self) -> Arc<KmsManager> {
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self.manager.get_manager().await.expect("KMS manager should be running")
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}
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pub async fn service(&self) -> Arc<ObjectEncryptionService> {
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self.manager
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.get_encryption_service()
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.await
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.expect("encryption service should be running")
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}
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pub async fn capabilities(&self) -> BackendCapabilities {
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self.kms().await.backend_capabilities()
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}
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/// Create a key and return its id, failing loudly on backends that cannot.
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pub async fn create_key(&self, name: &str) -> String {
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let response = self
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.kms()
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.await
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.create_key(CreateKeyRequest {
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key_name: Some(name.to_string()),
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key_usage: KeyUsage::EncryptDecrypt,
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description: Some(format!("black-box behavior key {name}")),
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..Default::default()
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})
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.await
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.unwrap_or_else(|error| panic!("create_key({name}) should succeed on {}: {error:?}", self.kind.name()));
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assert_eq!(response.key_id, name, "created key id must be the requested name");
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self.created_keys
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.lock()
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.expect("created-keys lock")
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.push(response.key_id.clone());
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response.key_id
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}
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/// Handle to the ids [`Self::create_key`] recorded, for cleanup that runs
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/// after a spec consumed the harness instance.
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pub fn created_keys_handle(&self) -> Arc<Mutex<Vec<String>>> {
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Arc::clone(&self.created_keys)
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}
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/// Remove this instance's recorded Vault keys; see [`cleanup_vault_keys`].
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pub async fn cleanup(&self) {
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cleanup_vault_keys(self.kind, &self.config, self.created_keys_handle()).await;
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}
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}
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/// Best-effort removal of the Vault keys a harness instance created, so a
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/// persistent dev Vault does not accumulate `behavior-*` keys across runs
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/// (rustfs/backlog#1774). A no-op for the Local and Static backends, whose
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/// state dies with the per-test temp directory.
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///
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/// The deletion runs on a fresh manager over the same configuration — the
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/// case's own manager is consumed by the spec and may have been stopped by a
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/// restart scenario — with the immediate-deletion gate enabled on the cleanup
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/// configuration only, so the configuration under test keeps the gate at its
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/// production default and specs asserting the gate's refusal stay honest.
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///
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/// Failures are reported but never panic: cleanup runs after the spec's own
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/// assertions, and a Vault hiccup here must not turn a green behavior run red.
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pub async fn cleanup_vault_keys(kind: BackendKind, config: &KmsConfig, created_keys: Arc<Mutex<Vec<String>>>) {
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if !kind.is_vault() {
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return;
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}
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let key_ids: Vec<String> = created_keys.lock().expect("created-keys lock").drain(..).collect();
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if key_ids.is_empty() {
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return;
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}
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let config = config.clone().with_immediate_deletion_allowed();
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let manager = start_manager(&config).await;
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let kms = manager.get_manager().await.expect("KMS manager should be running");
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for key_id in key_ids {
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// The Transit backend deletes in two steps (first call parks the key in
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// PendingDeletion, the next call destroys it); KV2 destroys on the
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// first call and reports KeyNotFound on the second.
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for _ in 0..2 {
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match kms
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.delete_key(DeleteKeyRequest {
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key_id: key_id.clone(),
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pending_window_in_days: None,
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force_immediate: Some(true),
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confirm_key_id: Some(key_id.clone()),
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})
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.await
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{
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Ok(_) => continue,
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Err(KmsError::KeyNotFound { .. }) => break,
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Err(error) => {
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eprintln!("vault key cleanup: could not delete {key_id}: {error:?}");
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break;
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}
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}
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}
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}
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if let Err(error) = manager.stop().await {
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eprintln!("vault key cleanup: could not stop the cleanup manager: {error:?}");
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}
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}
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async fn start_manager(config: &KmsConfig) -> Arc<KmsServiceManager> {
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let manager = Arc::new(KmsServiceManager::new());
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manager.configure(config.clone()).await.expect("configure should succeed");
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manager.start().await.expect("start should succeed");
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assert_eq!(
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manager.get_status().await,
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KmsServiceStatus::Running,
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"manager must report Running right after a successful start"
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);
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manager
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}
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/// One backend under the shared behavior spec, pre-seeded with a usable key.
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pub struct BackendCase {
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pub kms: TestKms,
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/// A key that exists and is Enabled on this backend.
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pub key_id: String,
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}
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impl BackendCase {
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async fn new(kind: BackendKind) -> Self {
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match kind {
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BackendKind::Local => {
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let kms = TestKms::local().await;
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let key_id = kms.create_key("behavior-local-key").await;
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Self { kms, key_id }
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}
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BackendKind::Static => {
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let kms = TestKms::static_backend().await;
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Self {
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kms,
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key_id: STATIC_KEY_ID.to_string(),
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}
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}
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BackendKind::VaultKv2 => {
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let kms = TestKms::vault_kv2().await;
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let key_id = kms.create_key(&unique_key_name("behavior-kv2")).await;
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Self { kms, key_id }
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}
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BackendKind::VaultTransit => {
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let kms = TestKms::vault_transit().await;
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let key_id = kms.create_key(&unique_key_name("behavior-transit")).await;
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Self { kms, key_id }
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}
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}
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}
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pub fn kind(&self) -> BackendKind {
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self.kms.kind()
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}
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pub async fn caps(&self) -> BackendCapabilities {
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self.kms.capabilities().await
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}
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}
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/// Run one behavior spec against every backend in this run's matrix.
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///
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/// Always Local and Static; plus the Vault backends when the Vault lane is on
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/// (see [`live_vault_backends`]).
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///
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/// The spec is expected to branch on `case.caps()`: a capability a backend
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/// advertises must behave correctly, and one it does not advertise must be
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/// rejected with `UnsupportedCapability` (or the backend's documented
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/// read-only refusal). The contract is deliberately two-directional.
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pub async fn for_each_backend<F, Fut>(spec: F)
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where
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F: Fn(BackendCase) -> Fut,
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Fut: Future<Output = ()>,
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{
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let kinds = [BackendKind::Local, BackendKind::Static]
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.into_iter()
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.chain(live_vault_backends());
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for kind in kinds {
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let case = BackendCase::new(kind).await;
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// Captured before the spec consumes the case; keys the spec creates
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// through the harness afterwards still land in the shared list.
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let config = case.kms.config().clone();
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let created_keys = case.kms.created_keys_handle();
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spec(case).await;
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cleanup_vault_keys(kind, &config, created_keys).await;
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}
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}
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/// Drop the service's own startup probe key from a listing.
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///
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/// Starting the service provisions the reserved [`rustfs_kms::probe::PROBE_KEY_ID`]
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/// to verify the backend is actually usable, so it exists on every running
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/// service and is not something a spec created. Exact-set assertions filter it
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/// out: it is startup machinery, not behavior under test, and asserting it in
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/// every expected list would couple those specs to the probe's naming.
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pub fn without_probe_key(ids: impl IntoIterator<Item = String>) -> Vec<String> {
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ids.into_iter().filter(|id| id != rustfs_kms::probe::PROBE_KEY_ID).collect()
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}
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/// Build an encryption context from literal pairs.
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pub fn ctx(pairs: &[(&str, &str)]) -> HashMap<String, String> {
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pairs.iter().map(|(k, v)| ((*k).to_string(), (*v).to_string())).collect()
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}
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/// Deterministic pseudo-random payload of `len` bytes.
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///
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/// Avoids a RNG dependency in the assertions while still producing data that a
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/// broken cipher cannot accidentally round-trip (unlike an all-zero buffer).
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pub fn payload(len: usize) -> Vec<u8> {
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(0..len).map(|i| ((i * 31 + 17) % 251) as u8).collect()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Drop a successful value so a result whose `Ok` type is not `Debug` (an
|
|
/// `AsyncRead` trait object, for instance) can still go through the error
|
|
/// assertions below.
|
|
pub fn discard<T>(result: Result<T>) -> Result<()> {
|
|
result.map(|_| ())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Flip one bit in the middle of `bytes`, returning the tampered copy.
|
|
pub fn flip_middle_bit(bytes: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
|
|
assert!(!bytes.is_empty(), "cannot tamper with empty bytes");
|
|
let mut tampered = bytes.to_vec();
|
|
let index = tampered.len() / 2;
|
|
tampered[index] ^= 0b0000_1000;
|
|
tampered
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
// Error-variant assertions
|
|
//
|
|
// Every failure path is pinned to a KmsError *variant*, never to message text:
|
|
// messages are diagnostics and may be reworded, whereas the variant is what
|
|
// callers (admin handlers, ecfs) actually match on.
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
#[track_caller]
|
|
pub fn assert_key_not_found<T: Debug>(result: Result<T>, expected_key_id: &str) {
|
|
match result {
|
|
Err(KmsError::KeyNotFound { key_id }) => assert!(
|
|
key_id.contains(expected_key_id),
|
|
"KeyNotFound should name {expected_key_id:?}, got {key_id:?}"
|
|
),
|
|
other => panic!("expected KeyNotFound({expected_key_id}), got {other:?}"),
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[track_caller]
|
|
pub fn assert_key_already_exists<T: Debug>(result: Result<T>, expected_key_id: &str) {
|
|
match result {
|
|
Err(KmsError::KeyAlreadyExists { key_id }) => {
|
|
assert_eq!(key_id, expected_key_id, "KeyAlreadyExists must name the conflicting key")
|
|
}
|
|
other => panic!("expected KeyAlreadyExists({expected_key_id}), got {other:?}"),
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[track_caller]
|
|
pub fn assert_invalid_operation<T: Debug>(result: Result<T>, message_fragment: &str) {
|
|
match result {
|
|
Err(KmsError::InvalidOperation { message }) => assert!(
|
|
message.contains(message_fragment),
|
|
"InvalidOperation should mention {message_fragment:?}, got {message:?}"
|
|
),
|
|
other => panic!("expected InvalidOperation containing {message_fragment:?}, got {other:?}"),
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[track_caller]
|
|
pub fn assert_unsupported_capability<T: Debug>(result: Result<T>, expected_operation: &str) {
|
|
match result {
|
|
Err(KmsError::UnsupportedCapability { operation, .. }) => {
|
|
assert_eq!(operation, expected_operation, "UnsupportedCapability must name the refused operation")
|
|
}
|
|
other => panic!("expected UnsupportedCapability({expected_operation}), got {other:?}"),
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[track_caller]
|
|
pub fn assert_context_mismatch<T: Debug>(result: Result<T>) {
|
|
match result {
|
|
Err(KmsError::ContextMismatch { .. }) => {}
|
|
other => panic!("expected ContextMismatch, got {other:?}"),
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[track_caller]
|
|
pub fn assert_configuration_error<T: Debug>(result: Result<T>, message_fragment: &str) {
|
|
match result {
|
|
Err(KmsError::ConfigurationError { message }) => assert!(
|
|
message.contains(message_fragment),
|
|
"ConfigurationError should mention {message_fragment:?}, got {message:?}"
|
|
),
|
|
other => panic!("expected ConfigurationError containing {message_fragment:?}, got {other:?}"),
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[track_caller]
|
|
pub fn assert_invalid_key_size<T: Debug>(result: Result<T>, expected: usize, actual: usize) {
|
|
match result {
|
|
Err(KmsError::InvalidKeySize {
|
|
expected: got_expected,
|
|
actual: got_actual,
|
|
}) => {
|
|
assert_eq!(got_expected, expected, "InvalidKeySize.expected");
|
|
assert_eq!(got_actual, actual, "InvalidKeySize.actual");
|
|
}
|
|
other => panic!("expected InvalidKeySize({expected}, {actual}), got {other:?}"),
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Assert that a rendered representation carries none of the given secrets.
|
|
///
|
|
/// Used against `Debug` and serde output of configs and responses: the crate's
|
|
/// security rule is that key material never reaches a log or an API payload.
|
|
#[track_caller]
|
|
pub fn assert_no_secret_leak(rendered: &str, secrets: &[&str]) {
|
|
for secret in secrets {
|
|
assert!(
|
|
!rendered.contains(secret),
|
|
"rendered output leaked a secret ({} chars of it): {rendered}",
|
|
secret.len()
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|