Files
rustfs/crates/kms/tests/common/mod.rs
T
Zhengchao An 16d381fc0e ci(kms): add a nightly live-Vault lane and stop leaking behavior keys (#5999)
No workflow ever set RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN, so live_vault_backends() returned an empty set in every CI run and behavior_rotation.rs never asserted the working half of rotate/versioning; the #[ignore] live-Vault tests had never executed in CI either. nightly-gnu.yml gains a kms-vault-lane job (vault server -dev with KV2 + Transit, full rustfs-kms suite with the lane on, the dev-Vault ignored tests, and the AppRole live script) plus a separate kms-vault-ha-failover job for the three-node Raft failover script, isolated so an election-timing flake cannot mask the main lane's verdict. GitHub-hosted ubuntu-latest rather than the self-hosted fleet: the HA script needs Docker, and e2e-s3tests.yml's banner records how the heterogeneous sm-standard pods burned the last docker-dependent workflow.

The behavior harness now records every key TestKms::create_key mints and deletes them after each Vault-backed for_each_backend case, on a fresh manager over the same configuration with the immediate-deletion gate enabled for cleanup only. Transit needs the deletion issued twice (first call parks the key in PendingDeletion, the second destroys it); KV2 destroys on the first call. Verified against a real dev Vault: after a full suite run the server holds zero behavior-* keys.

Also fixes test_vault_cancel_key_deletion_persists_state, which was broken by construction — Default::default() never picks up the insecure-dev-defaults env override, so the HTTP dev Vault the test requires was always refused. It now declares development mode on the config, and passes.

Refs rustfs/backlog#1774, rustfs/backlog#1562.
2026-08-12 15:14:04 +00:00

558 lines
21 KiB
Rust

// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
//! Shared harness for the `rustfs-kms` black-box behavior suite.
//!
//! Everything here drives the crate through the same public entry points the
//! server uses (`KmsServiceManager` -> `KmsManager` / `ObjectEncryptionService`),
//! so the suite keeps holding after internal refactors. Two rules keep it
//! black-box:
//!
//! * no `pub(crate)` internals, no on-disk key format parsing;
//! * assertions target observable contract — error *variants*, returned values,
//! and state that survives a restart — never implementation details.
//!
//! Every harness instance owns its own `KmsServiceManager`; the process-global
//! singleton is deliberately avoided so tests never cross-talk under nextest.
#![allow(dead_code)] // each test binary uses a different slice of the harness
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::fmt::Debug;
use std::future::Future;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use base64::Engine as _;
use base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD as BASE64;
use rustfs_kms::backends::BackendCapabilities;
use rustfs_kms::{
CreateKeyRequest, DeleteKeyRequest, KeyUsage, KmsConfig, KmsError, KmsManager, KmsServiceManager, KmsServiceStatus,
ObjectEncryptionService, Result,
};
use tempfile::TempDir;
/// Key id configured for the static backend harness.
pub const STATIC_KEY_ID: &str = "behavior-static-key";
/// Deterministic 32-byte secret for the static backend, base64 encoded.
///
/// Fixed rather than random so a failure is reproducible; it is test-only
/// material and never leaves this crate's test binaries.
pub fn static_secret_key() -> String {
BASE64.encode([0x5au8; 32])
}
/// Which backend a harness instance is running.
///
/// Local and Static always run. The two Vault backends are **opt-in**: they
/// need a reachable server, so they join the matrix only when
/// `RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN` is set (see [`live_vault_backends`]).
///
/// This matters for how a green run should be read. `rotate` and `versioning`
/// are advertised *only* by the Vault backends, so without the Vault lane every
/// capability-gated branch for them in a `for_each_backend` spec runs the
/// `UnsupportedCapability` side and never the working side — a rotation that
/// silently dropped prior key versions would pass. An offline-only run says
/// nothing about whether the Vault backends work.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum BackendKind {
Local,
Static,
VaultKv2,
VaultTransit,
}
impl BackendKind {
pub fn name(self) -> &'static str {
match self {
Self::Local => "local",
Self::Static => "static",
Self::VaultKv2 => "vault-kv2",
Self::VaultTransit => "vault-transit",
}
}
/// Whether this backend keeps its state on an external server that outlives
/// the harness, so key names must not collide between runs.
pub fn is_vault(self) -> bool {
matches!(self, Self::VaultKv2 | Self::VaultTransit)
}
}
/// Address of the live Vault, defaulting to the usual local dev server.
pub fn vault_address() -> String {
std::env::var("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_ADDR").unwrap_or_else(|_| "http://127.0.0.1:8200".to_string())
}
/// Token for the live Vault, or `None` when the Vault lane is switched off.
///
/// Presence of this variable is the single switch that adds the Vault backends
/// to every `for_each_backend` spec.
pub fn vault_token() -> Option<String> {
std::env::var("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN").ok().filter(|token| !token.is_empty())
}
/// The Vault backends to include in the matrix for this run.
pub fn live_vault_backends() -> Vec<BackendKind> {
match vault_token() {
Some(_) => vec![BackendKind::VaultKv2, BackendKind::VaultTransit],
None => Vec::new(),
}
}
/// A key name that cannot collide with another run against the same Vault.
///
/// Vault state is persistent and shared, unlike the per-test temp directory the
/// local backend gets, so a fixed name would make a rerun collide with its own
/// leftovers and turn every assertion into a function of run order.
pub fn unique_key_name(prefix: &str) -> String {
format!("{prefix}-{}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4().simple())
}
/// A running KMS service, reachable only through the crate's public API.
pub struct TestKms {
manager: Arc<KmsServiceManager>,
kind: BackendKind,
config: KmsConfig,
/// Ids of the keys [`TestKms::create_key`] created, so a run against a
/// persistent Vault can remove them afterwards instead of accumulating
/// `behavior-*` keys forever (rustfs/backlog#1774). Shared through an Arc
/// because the harness instance is consumed by the spec while the cleanup
/// runs after it.
created_keys: Arc<Mutex<Vec<String>>>,
/// Held for the harness lifetime so the local key directory outlives a
/// simulated process restart.
_dir: Option<TempDir>,
}
impl TestKms {
/// Local backend with development defaults and no default key id.
pub async fn local() -> Self {
Self::local_with(|_| {}).await
}
/// Local backend with `tweak` applied to the configuration before start.
pub async fn local_with(tweak: impl FnOnce(&mut KmsConfig)) -> Self {
let dir = TempDir::new().expect("create temp key dir");
let mut config = KmsConfig::local(dir.path().to_path_buf()).with_insecure_development_defaults();
tweak(&mut config);
let manager = start_manager(&config).await;
Self {
manager,
kind: BackendKind::Local,
config,
created_keys: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())),
_dir: Some(dir),
}
}
/// Vault KV v2 backend against the live server.
///
/// Panics when the Vault lane is off — callers gate on
/// [`live_vault_backends`] rather than calling this blind.
pub async fn vault_kv2() -> Self {
let token = vault_token().expect("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN must be set to run the Vault lane");
let address = vault_address().parse().expect("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_ADDR must be a URL");
// A local dev Vault speaks plain HTTP, which the config guard refuses
// unless development mode is declared explicitly.
let config = KmsConfig::vault(address, token).with_insecure_development_defaults();
let manager = start_manager(&config).await;
Self {
manager,
kind: BackendKind::VaultKv2,
config,
created_keys: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())),
_dir: None,
}
}
/// Vault Transit backend against the live server.
pub async fn vault_transit() -> Self {
let token = vault_token().expect("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN must be set to run the Vault lane");
let address = vault_address().parse().expect("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_ADDR must be a URL");
let config = KmsConfig::vault_transit(address, token).with_insecure_development_defaults();
let manager = start_manager(&config).await;
Self {
manager,
kind: BackendKind::VaultTransit,
config,
created_keys: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())),
_dir: None,
}
}
/// Static single-key backend with a fixed key id and secret.
pub async fn static_backend() -> Self {
let config = KmsConfig::static_kms(STATIC_KEY_ID.to_string(), static_secret_key());
let manager = start_manager(&config).await;
Self {
manager,
kind: BackendKind::Static,
config,
created_keys: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())),
_dir: None,
}
}
/// Simulate a process restart: stop the running service and bring a brand
/// new manager up over the same configuration and key directory.
///
/// A fresh manager (rather than `stop` + `start` on the same one) is what
/// makes this meaningful — it discards every in-memory cache and version
/// counter, so anything that still holds afterwards came off disk.
pub async fn restart(&mut self) {
self.manager.stop().await.expect("stop should succeed");
self.manager = start_manager(&self.config).await;
}
pub fn manager(&self) -> &Arc<KmsServiceManager> {
&self.manager
}
pub fn kind(&self) -> BackendKind {
self.kind
}
pub fn config(&self) -> &KmsConfig {
&self.config
}
/// Key directory of the local backend, for restart-over-same-state setups.
pub fn key_dir(&self) -> Option<PathBuf> {
self.config.local_config().map(|local| local.key_dir.clone())
}
pub async fn kms(&self) -> Arc<KmsManager> {
self.manager.get_manager().await.expect("KMS manager should be running")
}
pub async fn service(&self) -> Arc<ObjectEncryptionService> {
self.manager
.get_encryption_service()
.await
.expect("encryption service should be running")
}
pub async fn capabilities(&self) -> BackendCapabilities {
self.kms().await.backend_capabilities()
}
/// Create a key and return its id, failing loudly on backends that cannot.
pub async fn create_key(&self, name: &str) -> String {
let response = self
.kms()
.await
.create_key(CreateKeyRequest {
key_name: Some(name.to_string()),
key_usage: KeyUsage::EncryptDecrypt,
description: Some(format!("black-box behavior key {name}")),
..Default::default()
})
.await
.unwrap_or_else(|error| panic!("create_key({name}) should succeed on {}: {error:?}", self.kind.name()));
assert_eq!(response.key_id, name, "created key id must be the requested name");
self.created_keys
.lock()
.expect("created-keys lock")
.push(response.key_id.clone());
response.key_id
}
/// Handle to the ids [`Self::create_key`] recorded, for cleanup that runs
/// after a spec consumed the harness instance.
pub fn created_keys_handle(&self) -> Arc<Mutex<Vec<String>>> {
Arc::clone(&self.created_keys)
}
/// Remove this instance's recorded Vault keys; see [`cleanup_vault_keys`].
pub async fn cleanup(&self) {
cleanup_vault_keys(self.kind, &self.config, self.created_keys_handle()).await;
}
}
/// Best-effort removal of the Vault keys a harness instance created, so a
/// persistent dev Vault does not accumulate `behavior-*` keys across runs
/// (rustfs/backlog#1774). A no-op for the Local and Static backends, whose
/// state dies with the per-test temp directory.
///
/// The deletion runs on a fresh manager over the same configuration — the
/// case's own manager is consumed by the spec and may have been stopped by a
/// restart scenario — with the immediate-deletion gate enabled on the cleanup
/// configuration only, so the configuration under test keeps the gate at its
/// production default and specs asserting the gate's refusal stay honest.
///
/// Failures are reported but never panic: cleanup runs after the spec's own
/// assertions, and a Vault hiccup here must not turn a green behavior run red.
pub async fn cleanup_vault_keys(kind: BackendKind, config: &KmsConfig, created_keys: Arc<Mutex<Vec<String>>>) {
if !kind.is_vault() {
return;
}
let key_ids: Vec<String> = created_keys.lock().expect("created-keys lock").drain(..).collect();
if key_ids.is_empty() {
return;
}
let config = config.clone().with_immediate_deletion_allowed();
let manager = start_manager(&config).await;
let kms = manager.get_manager().await.expect("KMS manager should be running");
for key_id in key_ids {
// The Transit backend deletes in two steps (first call parks the key in
// PendingDeletion, the next call destroys it); KV2 destroys on the
// first call and reports KeyNotFound on the second.
for _ in 0..2 {
match kms
.delete_key(DeleteKeyRequest {
key_id: key_id.clone(),
pending_window_in_days: None,
force_immediate: Some(true),
confirm_key_id: Some(key_id.clone()),
})
.await
{
Ok(_) => continue,
Err(KmsError::KeyNotFound { .. }) => break,
Err(error) => {
eprintln!("vault key cleanup: could not delete {key_id}: {error:?}");
break;
}
}
}
}
if let Err(error) = manager.stop().await {
eprintln!("vault key cleanup: could not stop the cleanup manager: {error:?}");
}
}
async fn start_manager(config: &KmsConfig) -> Arc<KmsServiceManager> {
let manager = Arc::new(KmsServiceManager::new());
manager.configure(config.clone()).await.expect("configure should succeed");
manager.start().await.expect("start should succeed");
assert_eq!(
manager.get_status().await,
KmsServiceStatus::Running,
"manager must report Running right after a successful start"
);
manager
}
/// One backend under the shared behavior spec, pre-seeded with a usable key.
pub struct BackendCase {
pub kms: TestKms,
/// A key that exists and is Enabled on this backend.
pub key_id: String,
}
impl BackendCase {
async fn new(kind: BackendKind) -> Self {
match kind {
BackendKind::Local => {
let kms = TestKms::local().await;
let key_id = kms.create_key("behavior-local-key").await;
Self { kms, key_id }
}
BackendKind::Static => {
let kms = TestKms::static_backend().await;
Self {
kms,
key_id: STATIC_KEY_ID.to_string(),
}
}
BackendKind::VaultKv2 => {
let kms = TestKms::vault_kv2().await;
let key_id = kms.create_key(&unique_key_name("behavior-kv2")).await;
Self { kms, key_id }
}
BackendKind::VaultTransit => {
let kms = TestKms::vault_transit().await;
let key_id = kms.create_key(&unique_key_name("behavior-transit")).await;
Self { kms, key_id }
}
}
}
pub fn kind(&self) -> BackendKind {
self.kms.kind()
}
pub async fn caps(&self) -> BackendCapabilities {
self.kms.capabilities().await
}
}
/// Run one behavior spec against every backend in this run's matrix.
///
/// Always Local and Static; plus the Vault backends when the Vault lane is on
/// (see [`live_vault_backends`]).
///
/// The spec is expected to branch on `case.caps()`: a capability a backend
/// advertises must behave correctly, and one it does not advertise must be
/// rejected with `UnsupportedCapability` (or the backend's documented
/// read-only refusal). The contract is deliberately two-directional.
pub async fn for_each_backend<F, Fut>(spec: F)
where
F: Fn(BackendCase) -> Fut,
Fut: Future<Output = ()>,
{
let kinds = [BackendKind::Local, BackendKind::Static]
.into_iter()
.chain(live_vault_backends());
for kind in kinds {
let case = BackendCase::new(kind).await;
// Captured before the spec consumes the case; keys the spec creates
// through the harness afterwards still land in the shared list.
let config = case.kms.config().clone();
let created_keys = case.kms.created_keys_handle();
spec(case).await;
cleanup_vault_keys(kind, &config, created_keys).await;
}
}
/// Drop the service's own startup probe key from a listing.
///
/// Starting the service provisions the reserved [`rustfs_kms::probe::PROBE_KEY_ID`]
/// to verify the backend is actually usable, so it exists on every running
/// service and is not something a spec created. Exact-set assertions filter it
/// out: it is startup machinery, not behavior under test, and asserting it in
/// every expected list would couple those specs to the probe's naming.
pub fn without_probe_key(ids: impl IntoIterator<Item = String>) -> Vec<String> {
ids.into_iter().filter(|id| id != rustfs_kms::probe::PROBE_KEY_ID).collect()
}
/// Build an encryption context from literal pairs.
pub fn ctx(pairs: &[(&str, &str)]) -> HashMap<String, String> {
pairs.iter().map(|(k, v)| ((*k).to_string(), (*v).to_string())).collect()
}
/// Deterministic pseudo-random payload of `len` bytes.
///
/// Avoids a RNG dependency in the assertions while still producing data that a
/// broken cipher cannot accidentally round-trip (unlike an all-zero buffer).
pub fn payload(len: usize) -> Vec<u8> {
(0..len).map(|i| ((i * 31 + 17) % 251) as u8).collect()
}
/// Drop a successful value so a result whose `Ok` type is not `Debug` (an
/// `AsyncRead` trait object, for instance) can still go through the error
/// assertions below.
pub fn discard<T>(result: Result<T>) -> Result<()> {
result.map(|_| ())
}
/// Flip one bit in the middle of `bytes`, returning the tampered copy.
pub fn flip_middle_bit(bytes: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
assert!(!bytes.is_empty(), "cannot tamper with empty bytes");
let mut tampered = bytes.to_vec();
let index = tampered.len() / 2;
tampered[index] ^= 0b0000_1000;
tampered
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Error-variant assertions
//
// Every failure path is pinned to a KmsError *variant*, never to message text:
// messages are diagnostics and may be reworded, whereas the variant is what
// callers (admin handlers, ecfs) actually match on.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
#[track_caller]
pub fn assert_key_not_found<T: Debug>(result: Result<T>, expected_key_id: &str) {
match result {
Err(KmsError::KeyNotFound { key_id }) => assert!(
key_id.contains(expected_key_id),
"KeyNotFound should name {expected_key_id:?}, got {key_id:?}"
),
other => panic!("expected KeyNotFound({expected_key_id}), got {other:?}"),
}
}
#[track_caller]
pub fn assert_key_already_exists<T: Debug>(result: Result<T>, expected_key_id: &str) {
match result {
Err(KmsError::KeyAlreadyExists { key_id }) => {
assert_eq!(key_id, expected_key_id, "KeyAlreadyExists must name the conflicting key")
}
other => panic!("expected KeyAlreadyExists({expected_key_id}), got {other:?}"),
}
}
#[track_caller]
pub fn assert_invalid_operation<T: Debug>(result: Result<T>, message_fragment: &str) {
match result {
Err(KmsError::InvalidOperation { message }) => assert!(
message.contains(message_fragment),
"InvalidOperation should mention {message_fragment:?}, got {message:?}"
),
other => panic!("expected InvalidOperation containing {message_fragment:?}, got {other:?}"),
}
}
#[track_caller]
pub fn assert_unsupported_capability<T: Debug>(result: Result<T>, expected_operation: &str) {
match result {
Err(KmsError::UnsupportedCapability { operation, .. }) => {
assert_eq!(operation, expected_operation, "UnsupportedCapability must name the refused operation")
}
other => panic!("expected UnsupportedCapability({expected_operation}), got {other:?}"),
}
}
#[track_caller]
pub fn assert_context_mismatch<T: Debug>(result: Result<T>) {
match result {
Err(KmsError::ContextMismatch { .. }) => {}
other => panic!("expected ContextMismatch, got {other:?}"),
}
}
#[track_caller]
pub fn assert_configuration_error<T: Debug>(result: Result<T>, message_fragment: &str) {
match result {
Err(KmsError::ConfigurationError { message }) => assert!(
message.contains(message_fragment),
"ConfigurationError should mention {message_fragment:?}, got {message:?}"
),
other => panic!("expected ConfigurationError containing {message_fragment:?}, got {other:?}"),
}
}
#[track_caller]
pub fn assert_invalid_key_size<T: Debug>(result: Result<T>, expected: usize, actual: usize) {
match result {
Err(KmsError::InvalidKeySize {
expected: got_expected,
actual: got_actual,
}) => {
assert_eq!(got_expected, expected, "InvalidKeySize.expected");
assert_eq!(got_actual, actual, "InvalidKeySize.actual");
}
other => panic!("expected InvalidKeySize({expected}, {actual}), got {other:?}"),
}
}
/// Assert that a rendered representation carries none of the given secrets.
///
/// Used against `Debug` and serde output of configs and responses: the crate's
/// security rule is that key material never reaches a log or an API payload.
#[track_caller]
pub fn assert_no_secret_leak(rendered: &str, secrets: &[&str]) {
for secret in secrets {
assert!(
!rendered.contains(secret),
"rendered output leaked a secret ({} chars of it): {rendered}",
secret.len()
);
}
}