Files
rustfs/crates/iam/src/sys.rs
T
Sinan Eldem b93e7b2355 feat(admin): self-service account management and TOTP two-factor authentication (#6596)
* feat(madmin): add account and two-factor wire contract

Defines the self-service account and MFA API shapes in one place so the
console and the `rc` CLI decode identical payloads instead of each
carrying its own copy of the contract.

`AccountMutability` is part of the contract on purpose: a client needs to
know whether the server will accept a password change for this identity
before offering the control, rather than discovering it from a rejected
request.

* feat(s3-types): add IAM identity audit events

Adds `iam:Identity:CredentialChanged` and `iam:Identity:AuthChallenge`
so account and authentication activity reaches the audit pipeline in its
own namespace, the way the KMS events already do. Neither is reachable
from a bucket notification config.

Two variants for the whole surface rather than one per operation:
`mask()` gives every variant its own bit in a `u64`, and the budget is
nearly spent (63 of 64 used after this). The per-operation detail lives
in `AuditEntry::api.name` and the `iamOperation` tag, which is what a
SIEM filters on anyway. Splitting these further needs `mask()` widened
first.

* feat(iam): add two-factor authentication primitives

Implements the state machine behind TOTP enrollment and verification in
the IAM domain, so the admin handlers stay HTTP plumbing and the console
and CLI drive identical logic.

* `totp`: RFC 6238 over the workspace's existing hmac/sha1, pinned to the
  published Appendix B vectors. SHA-1, 6 digits, 30s: the parameters every
  mainstream authenticator app implements. Verification returns the
  matched time step so the caller can burn it.
* `recovery`: ten single-use codes, 100 bits each, in a Crockford base32
  alphabet without I/L/O/U. Stored as domain-separated SHA-256 digests —
  a password KDF would have to run once per stored code on every attempt,
  turning each guess into an attacker-controlled cost, and with uniform
  100-bit input there is no dictionary for it to defend against.
* `challenge`: stateless HMAC tokens. A TTL cache would be node-local, so
  a cluster without session affinity would issue on one node and verify
  on another; nothing here needs replicating.
* `record`: two-phase enrollment, replay high-water mark, and lockout.
  Pending enrollment never gates a login, so a mis-scanned QR cannot lock
  an operator out, and re-configuring keeps the old factor working until
  the new one is confirmed.
* `store`: one object per identity under `config/mfa/`, a sibling of
  `config/iam/` so the IAM cache loader's startup walk does not sweep it
  up. Optimistic `If-Match` writes; deliberately uncached, because a cache
  would need cluster-wide invalidation to keep the replay mark and the
  lockout counter honest.
* `qr`: server-side rendering, so neither client needs a QR encoder.

Enrollment is refused without `RUSTFS_IAM_MASTER_KEY`. A TOTP secret is
credential-equivalent, and one written in plaintext could be lifted off a
disk — worse than no second factor, because the user believes they have
one. IAM identities tolerate a missing master key for backward
compatibility; a new feature has no such history to honour.

Also adds `IamSys::revoke_sts_sessions_for_parent`, so a credential
rotation can invalidate the sessions minted under the old secret.

* feat(admin): add self-service account endpoints and the two-factor login gate

Adds the account surface (`/v3/account/*`), the second-factor endpoints,
the administrative reset (`/v3/user/mfa`), and `PUT
/v3/set-user-secret-key`, plus the gate on `AssumeRole`.

What the gate covers, and what it deliberately does not:

* `AssumeRole` is the only interactive login RustFS has, so it is where a
  second factor can be enforced. With one enrolled it requires
  `TokenCode`; without an enrollment the code path is unchanged, so
  existing deployments are untouched.
* A request signed directly with a long-term access key stays ungated.
  Gating it would break every script and CLI the moment a human enabled
  2FA on their own account, and would add no protection: whoever holds
  the secret key already has full access without presenting a code. This
  is the division AWS draws; making 2FA meaningful for API access needs an
  `aws:MultiFactorAuthPresent` policy condition, tracked separately.

`SerialNumber`/`TokenCode` are STS's own parameters, so an SDK or script
authenticates the same way the console does.

`caller_identity` resolves who a request acts as. The console signs with
a short-lived STS session, so "the caller" is almost never the key that
signed. It reports two separate capabilities: root cannot rotate its
secret (a process-wide `OnceLock` that also derives the internode RPC
secret) but *can* enroll a second factor — conflating the two would leave
the default deployment's console login unprotectable.

The self-service routes carry no admin action. Giving them one would be
wrong in both directions: it would stop an ordinary user from changing
their own password, and let any holder of that action change someone
else's. They gate on possession of the credential plus, for the
mutations, knowledge of the current secret — a signature only proves a
credential was used, so without that a hijacked tab could rewrite the
account's credentials or strip its second factor.

`set-user-secret-key` exists because the only prior way to change a
password was to re-POST the whole user through `add-user`, which rewrote
`status` and dropped the policy field — a password reset that silently
re-enabled a disabled account.

Wrong, replayed and malformed codes are indistinguishable on the wire;
the distinction survives only in the audit trail, where no submitted
value, secret or code is ever recorded.

* test(e2e): cover the two-factor lifecycle and its regressions

Unit tests cover the state machine at its edges; only an end-to-end test
proves the pieces are wired together and that the existing
authentication paths still behave.

Asserts, against a real server: enrollment is refused without a master
key; the full enroll/activate flow works with a genuine RFC 6238 code;
`AssumeRole` refuses without a factor and accepts a valid one; a recovery
code works exactly once; a direct SigV4 admin request keeps working with
a factor enrolled; `AssumeRole` for an unenrolled identity is unchanged;
and a password rotation invalidates the old secret.

The test computes TOTP codes itself rather than calling the server's
implementation — a shared helper could agree with a bug on both sides.

This suite caught a real defect during development: enrollment was
refused for root because its *password* is immutable, which would have
left the default deployment — an administrator signing into the console
as root — unable to protect the one login the feature exists for.

* docs(operations): document the two-factor authentication model

Records what the second factor protects and what it deliberately does
not, because several of the boundaries look like gaps until the
alternative is spelled out: why direct SigV4 access stays ungated, why
root credentials cannot be rotated at runtime, why secret keys cannot be
hashed in an S3 server, and why at-rest protection is mandatory for a
TOTP secret but optional for an IAM identity.

Also states the limitations plainly, including that GHSA-m77q-r63m-pj89
is unaffected: a holder of the root secret can still forge a session
token, 2FA claim included.

Placed alongside the other authentication and KMS security documents
rather than under a new `docs/security/`, which `.gitignore` excludes.

* fix(admin): route the new account handlers through the admin s3 facade

Two of the guardrails in the CI "Quick Checks" job rejected the previous
commits, so the required check would have gone red as soon as a maintainer
approved the workflow run.

`check_architecture_migration_rules.sh` requires everything under
`rustfs/src/admin` to reach `ECStore` through a domain module rather than
the root of `storage_api`. The MFA handler and the two `AssumeRole`
signatures now use `storage_api::runtime::ECStore`, which is where the
other ten admin handlers already take it from.

`check_s3s_footprint.sh` ratchets two counters that new code may not grow:
files referencing `s3s` and error-macro invocation lines. This branch added
four files and thirty-two lines to them. The ratchet is lower-only and its
header forbids raising a baseline to get green, so the construction moves
behind the facade instead: `storage_api::s3` now re-exports the request and
body types these handlers need and gains an `error` constructor over
`S3Error::with_message`. That is the same constructor the macro expands to
and the one `handlers/mod.rs`, `rebalance_internal_error` and
`invalid_object_lock_configuration` already call, so this is the existing
practice rather than a new one, and it keeps the `s3s` dependency in the
boundary file the s3gate migration replaces.

Every error code and message is carried over unchanged. In `sts.rs` only
the call site this branch added is converted; the sixteen that predate it
are left alone, because rewriting them would put unrelated churn in a
feature PR and push the counter below the baseline it is meant to hold.
2026-08-26 09:35:29 +08:00

4930 lines
192 KiB
Rust

// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
use crate::error::Error as IamError;
use crate::error::is_err_no_such_account;
use crate::error::is_err_no_such_temp_account;
use crate::error::{Error, Result};
use crate::federation::OIDC_VIRTUAL_PARENT_CLAIM;
use crate::manager::extract_jwt_claims;
use crate::manager::get_default_policies;
use crate::manager::{IamCache, IamSyncMetricsSnapshot};
use crate::store::GroupInfo;
use crate::store::MappedPolicy;
use crate::store::Store;
use crate::store::UserType;
use crate::utils::{extract_claims, extract_claims_allow_missing_exp};
use crate::{
notify_iam_delete_policy, notify_iam_delete_user, notify_iam_load_group, notify_iam_load_policy,
notify_iam_load_policy_mapping, notify_iam_load_service_account, notify_iam_load_user,
};
use rustfs_credentials::{Credentials, EMBEDDED_POLICY_TYPE, INHERITED_POLICY_TYPE};
use rustfs_madmin::AddOrUpdateUserReq;
use rustfs_madmin::GroupDesc;
use rustfs_policy::arn::ARN;
use rustfs_policy::auth::{
ACCOUNT_ON, UserIdentity, contains_reserved_chars, create_new_credentials_with_metadata, generate_credentials,
is_access_key_valid, is_secret_key_valid,
};
use rustfs_policy::policy::Args;
use rustfs_policy::policy::opa;
use rustfs_policy::policy::{Policy, PolicyDoc, iam_policy_claim_name_sa, policy_needs_existing_object_tag_for_args};
use serde_json::Value;
use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::sync::OnceLock;
use time::OffsetDateTime;
use tokio::sync::RwLock;
use tracing::{error, info, warn};
#[cfg(not(test))]
const STS_INVALIDATION_RETRY_INITIAL_DELAY: std::time::Duration = std::time::Duration::from_secs(1);
#[cfg(test)]
const STS_INVALIDATION_RETRY_INITIAL_DELAY: std::time::Duration = std::time::Duration::from_millis(1);
const STS_INVALIDATION_MAX_ATTEMPTS: usize = 3;
#[cfg(not(test))]
const STS_INVALIDATION_ATTEMPT_TIMEOUT: std::time::Duration = std::time::Duration::from_secs(30);
#[cfg(test)]
const STS_INVALIDATION_ATTEMPT_TIMEOUT: std::time::Duration = std::time::Duration::from_millis(20);
/// Concurrent STS deletions inside a single revocation batch.
const STS_REVOCATION_BATCH_CONCURRENCY: usize = 16;
/// Process-wide ceiling on in-flight STS deletions across all batches, so
/// concurrent revocations cannot exhaust the runtime the peer notifications
/// each deletion waits on.
const STS_REVOCATION_GLOBAL_LIMIT: usize = 64;
static STS_REVOCATION_PERMITS: std::sync::LazyLock<tokio::sync::Semaphore> =
std::sync::LazyLock::new(|| tokio::sync::Semaphore::new(STS_REVOCATION_GLOBAL_LIMIT));
pub const MAX_SVCSESSION_POLICY_SIZE: usize = 4096;
pub const SITE_REPLICATOR_SERVICE_ACCOUNT: &str = "site-replicator-0";
pub const STATUS_ENABLED: &str = "enabled";
pub const STATUS_DISABLED: &str = "disabled";
pub const POLICYNAME: &str = "policy";
pub const SESSION_POLICY_NAME: &str = "sessionPolicy";
pub const SESSION_POLICY_NAME_EXTRACTED: &str = "sessionPolicy-extracted";
const VERIFIED_FEDERATED_POLICY_CLAIM: &str = "x-rustfs-internal-federated-policy";
const FEDERATED_POLICY_BOUNDARY_CLAIM: &str = "x-rustfs-internal-federated-boundary";
pub(crate) const SITE_REPLICATOR_CLAIM: &str = "site-replicator";
#[derive(Clone)]
enum PolicyPluginState {
Disabled,
Initializing,
Ready(opa::AuthZPlugin),
Failed,
}
impl PolicyPluginState {
fn prepared_iam_auth(&self) -> Option<PreparedIamAuth> {
match self {
Self::Ready(_) => Some(PreparedIamAuth {
needs_existing_object_tag: true,
mode: PreparedIamMode::Opa,
}),
Self::Initializing | Self::Failed => Some(PreparedIamAuth {
needs_existing_object_tag: false,
mode: PreparedIamMode::Deny,
}),
Self::Disabled => None,
}
}
}
async fn resolve_policy_plugin_state() -> PolicyPluginState {
match opa::lookup_config().await {
Ok(conf) if conf.enable() => {
info!("OPA plugin enabled");
PolicyPluginState::Ready(opa::AuthZPlugin::new(conf))
}
Ok(_) => PolicyPluginState::Failed,
Err(e) => {
error!(
component = "iam",
subsystem = "policy_plugin",
result = "configuration_load_failed",
error_kind = e.kind(),
"OPA plugin configuration load failed"
);
PolicyPluginState::Failed
}
}
}
static POLICY_PLUGIN_STATE: OnceLock<Arc<RwLock<PolicyPluginState>>> = OnceLock::new();
fn get_policy_plugin_state() -> Arc<RwLock<PolicyPluginState>> {
POLICY_PLUGIN_STATE
.get_or_init(|| {
let configured = opa::is_configured();
let state = Arc::new(RwLock::new(if configured {
PolicyPluginState::Initializing
} else {
PolicyPluginState::Disabled
}));
if configured {
let state = Arc::clone(&state);
tokio::spawn(async move {
let next_state = resolve_policy_plugin_state().await;
*state.write().await = next_state;
});
}
state
})
.clone()
}
pub struct IamSys<T> {
store: Arc<IamCache<T>>,
roles_map: HashMap<ARN, String>,
}
#[derive(Clone)]
enum PreparedSessionPolicy {
None,
DenyAll,
Policy(Policy),
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
enum PreparedServicePolicyMode {
Inherited,
SessionBound,
}
#[derive(Clone)]
enum PreparedIamMode {
Opa,
Owner,
Deny,
Regular {
combined_policy: Policy,
},
Sts {
is_owner: bool,
combined_policy: Policy,
session_policy: PreparedSessionPolicy,
},
ServiceAccount {
is_owner: bool,
bypass_parent_policy: bool,
parent_user: String,
combined_policy: Policy,
federated_boundary: Option<Policy>,
mode: PreparedServicePolicyMode,
session_policy: PreparedSessionPolicy,
},
}
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct PreparedIamAuth {
pub needs_existing_object_tag: bool,
mode: PreparedIamMode,
}
impl PreparedIamAuth {
/// Evaluate whether the already-prepared IAM context needs ExistingObjectTag
/// conditions for the provided request args.
pub async fn needs_existing_object_tag_for_args(&self, args: &Args<'_>) -> bool {
match &self.mode {
PreparedIamMode::Opa => true,
PreparedIamMode::Owner | PreparedIamMode::Deny => false,
PreparedIamMode::Regular { combined_policy } => {
policy_needs_existing_object_tag_for_args(combined_policy, args).await
}
PreparedIamMode::Sts {
combined_policy,
session_policy,
..
} => {
policy_needs_existing_object_tag_for_args(combined_policy, args).await
|| prepared_session_policy_needs_existing_object_tag_for_args(session_policy, args).await
}
PreparedIamMode::ServiceAccount {
combined_policy,
federated_boundary,
mode,
session_policy,
..
} => {
policy_needs_existing_object_tag_for_args(combined_policy, args).await
|| match federated_boundary {
Some(policy) => policy_needs_existing_object_tag_for_args(policy, args).await,
None => false,
}
|| matches!(mode, PreparedServicePolicyMode::SessionBound)
&& prepared_session_policy_needs_existing_object_tag_for_args(session_policy, args).await
}
}
}
/// Returns the resolved identity policy prepared for the current auth mode.
///
/// This is intended for read-only views (for example `/accountinfo`) so
/// callers can reuse the same policy resolution path as authorization.
pub fn combined_policy_for_view(&self) -> Option<&Policy> {
match &self.mode {
PreparedIamMode::Regular { combined_policy } => Some(combined_policy),
PreparedIamMode::Sts { combined_policy, .. } => Some(combined_policy),
PreparedIamMode::ServiceAccount { combined_policy, .. } => Some(combined_policy),
PreparedIamMode::Opa | PreparedIamMode::Owner | PreparedIamMode::Deny => None,
}
}
}
impl<T: Store> IamSys<T> {
/// Create a new IamSys instance with the given IamCache store
///
/// # Arguments
/// * `store` - An Arc to the IamCache instance
///
/// # Returns
/// A new instance of IamSys
pub fn new(store: Arc<IamCache<T>>) -> Self {
get_policy_plugin_state();
Self {
store,
roles_map: HashMap::new(),
}
}
/// Check if the IamSys has a watcher configured
///
/// # Returns
/// `true` if a watcher is configured, `false` otherwise
pub fn has_watcher(&self) -> bool {
self.store.api.has_watcher()
}
pub fn sync_metrics_snapshot(&self) -> IamSyncMetricsSnapshot {
self.store.sync_metrics_snapshot()
}
pub async fn set_policy_plugin_client(client: rustfs_policy::policy::opa::AuthZPlugin) {
let policy_plugin_state = get_policy_plugin_state();
let mut guard = policy_plugin_state.write().await;
*guard = PolicyPluginState::Ready(client);
}
pub async fn get_policy_plugin_client() -> Option<rustfs_policy::policy::opa::AuthZPlugin> {
let policy_plugin_state = get_policy_plugin_state();
let guard = policy_plugin_state.read().await;
match &*guard {
PolicyPluginState::Ready(client) => Some(client.clone()),
PolicyPluginState::Disabled | PolicyPluginState::Initializing | PolicyPluginState::Failed => None,
}
}
async fn policy_plugin_state() -> PolicyPluginState {
get_policy_plugin_state().read().await.clone()
}
pub async fn load_group(&self, name: &str) -> Result<()> {
self.store.group_notification_handler(name).await
}
pub async fn load_groups(&self, m: &mut HashMap<String, GroupInfo>) -> Result<()> {
self.store.api.load_groups(m).await
}
pub async fn load_policy(&self, name: &str) -> Result<()> {
self.store.policy_notification_handler(name).await
}
pub async fn load_policy_mapping(&self, name: &str, user_type: UserType, is_group: bool) -> Result<()> {
self.store
.policy_mapping_notification_handler(name, user_type, is_group)
.await
}
pub async fn load_user(&self, name: &str, user_type: UserType) -> Result<()> {
self.store.user_notification_handler(name, user_type).await
}
pub async fn load_users(&self, user_type: UserType, m: &mut HashMap<String, UserIdentity>) -> Result<()> {
self.store.api.load_users(user_type, m).await?;
Ok(())
}
pub async fn load_service_account(&self, name: &str) -> Result<()> {
self.store.user_notification_handler(name, UserType::Svc).await
}
pub async fn delete_policy(&self, name: &str, notify: bool) -> Result<()> {
for k in get_default_policies().keys() {
if k == name {
return Err(Error::other("system policy can not be deleted"));
}
}
self.store.delete_policy(name, notify).await?;
if !notify || self.has_watcher() {
return Ok(());
}
for r in notify_iam_delete_policy(name).await {
if let Some(err) = r.err {
warn!("notify delete_policy failed: {}", err);
}
}
Ok(())
}
pub async fn info_policy(&self, name: &str) -> Result<rustfs_madmin::PolicyInfo> {
let d = self.store.get_policy_doc(name).await?;
let pdata = serde_json::to_value(&d.policy)?;
Ok(rustfs_madmin::PolicyInfo {
policy_name: name.to_string(),
policy: pdata,
create_date: d.create_date,
update_date: d.update_date,
})
}
pub async fn load_mapped_policies(
&self,
user_type: UserType,
is_group: bool,
m: &mut HashMap<String, MappedPolicy>,
) -> Result<()> {
self.store.api.load_mapped_policies(user_type, is_group, m).await
}
pub async fn list_policies(&self, bucket_name: &str) -> Result<HashMap<String, Policy>> {
self.store.list_policies(bucket_name).await
}
/// Backward-compatible misspelling retained until the next breaking release.
#[deprecated(
since = "1.0.0",
note = "use list_policies instead; this alias will be removed in the next breaking release"
)]
pub async fn list_polices(&self, bucket_name: &str) -> Result<HashMap<String, Policy>> {
self.list_policies(bucket_name).await
}
pub async fn list_policy_docs(&self, bucket_name: &str) -> Result<HashMap<String, PolicyDoc>> {
self.store.list_policy_docs(bucket_name).await
}
pub async fn set_policy(&self, name: &str, policy: Policy) -> Result<OffsetDateTime> {
let updated_at = self.store.set_policy(name, policy).await?;
if !self.has_watcher() {
for r in notify_iam_load_policy(name).await {
if let Some(err) = r.err {
warn!("notify load_policy failed: {}", err);
}
}
}
Ok(updated_at)
}
pub async fn get_role_policy(&self, arn_str: &str) -> Result<(ARN, String)> {
let Some(arn) = ARN::parse(arn_str).ok() else {
return Err(Error::other("Invalid ARN"));
};
let Some(policy) = self.roles_map.get(&arn) else {
return Err(Error::other("No such role"));
};
Ok((arn, policy.clone()))
}
pub async fn delete_user(&self, name: &str, notify: bool) -> Result<()> {
self.store.delete_user(name, UserType::Reg).await?;
if notify && !self.has_watcher() {
for r in notify_iam_delete_user(name).await {
if let Some(err) = r.err {
warn!("notify delete_user failed: {}", err);
}
}
}
Ok(())
}
/// Delete a single temporary/STS account by its access key.
///
/// Unlike [`Self::delete_user`], which operates on regular (`UserType::Reg`)
/// identities, this removes an STS credential (`UserType::Sts`) from both the
/// in-memory cache and the backing store, immediately invalidating the
/// associated session token. This is the primitive used by the admin
/// `revoke-tokens` endpoint to revoke STS credentials for a parent user.
pub async fn delete_temp_account(&self, access_key: &str, notify: bool) -> Result<()> {
if !notify || self.has_watcher() {
return self.store.delete_user(access_key, UserType::Sts).await;
}
let runtime = tokio::runtime::Handle::try_current().map_err(Error::other)?;
#[cfg(test)]
let notification_probe = crate::LOAD_USER_NOTIFICATION_PROBE.try_with(Arc::clone).ok();
#[cfg(test)]
let notification_available = notification_probe.is_some() || crate::runtime_sources::notification_sys().is_some();
#[cfg(not(test))]
let notification_available = crate::runtime_sources::notification_sys().is_some();
if !notification_available {
return Err(Error::other("IAM peer notification system is unavailable"));
}
let store = Arc::clone(&self.store);
let access_key = access_key.to_string();
let operation = async move {
store.delete_user(&access_key, UserType::Sts).await?;
let mut delay = STS_INVALIDATION_RETRY_INITIAL_DELAY;
for attempt in 1..=STS_INVALIDATION_MAX_ATTEMPTS {
let attempt_error =
match tokio::time::timeout(STS_INVALIDATION_ATTEMPT_TIMEOUT, notify_iam_load_user(&access_key, true)).await {
Ok(results) => results.into_iter().find_map(|result| result.err).map(Error::other),
Err(_) => Some(Error::other("peer STS invalidation timed out")),
};
let Some(err) = attempt_error else {
return Ok(());
};
if attempt == STS_INVALIDATION_MAX_ATTEMPTS {
return Err(Error::other(err));
}
tokio::time::sleep(delay).await;
delay = delay.saturating_mul(2);
}
unreachable!("STS invalidation retry loop always returns")
};
#[cfg(test)]
let task = runtime.spawn(async move {
if let Some(probe) = notification_probe {
return crate::LOAD_USER_NOTIFICATION_PROBE.scope(probe, operation).await;
}
operation.await
});
#[cfg(not(test))]
let task = runtime.spawn(operation);
task.await.map_err(Error::other)?
}
/// Revoke a set of STS access keys, returning how many were deleted.
///
/// An STS credential *is* the session in RustFS, so deleting it invalidates
/// the session token immediately. Deletions run concurrently under both a
/// per-batch and a process-wide cap, so a large fan-out cannot starve the
/// peer-notification path that each individual deletion depends on.
///
/// Every key is attempted even when one fails; the first error is returned
/// afterwards so a single unreachable peer cannot silently skip the
/// remaining revocations.
///
/// The MinIO-compatible `revoke-tokens` endpoint keeps its own
/// provider-filtered variant (`admin/handlers/idp_compat.rs`) because it
/// injects the revoke closure for testing; both funnel into
/// [`Self::delete_temp_account`].
pub async fn revoke_sts_accounts(&self, access_keys: Vec<String>) -> Result<usize> {
use futures::StreamExt as _;
let results = futures::stream::iter(access_keys)
.map(|access_key| async move {
let _permit = STS_REVOCATION_PERMITS.acquire().await.map_err(Error::other)?;
self.delete_temp_account(&access_key, true).await
})
.buffer_unordered(STS_REVOCATION_BATCH_CONCURRENCY)
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.await;
let mut revoked = 0usize;
let mut first_error = None;
for result in results {
match result {
Ok(()) => revoked += 1,
Err(err) => {
if first_error.is_none() {
first_error = Some(err);
}
}
}
}
match first_error {
Some(err) => Err(err),
None => Ok(revoked),
}
}
/// Revoke every STS session minted from `parent_access_key`.
///
/// Called after that identity's secret key changes: a session issued under
/// the old secret must not outlive it. Returns the number of sessions
/// revoked; zero is a normal result for an identity with no live sessions.
pub async fn revoke_sts_sessions_for_parent(&self, parent_access_key: &str) -> Result<usize> {
let sessions = self.list_sts_accounts(parent_access_key).await?;
if sessions.is_empty() {
return Ok(0);
}
let access_keys = sessions.into_iter().map(|cred| cred.access_key).collect();
self.revoke_sts_accounts(access_keys).await
}
#[cfg(test)]
fn load_user_notification_probe(
failures_before_success: usize,
block: bool,
panic: bool,
) -> Arc<crate::LoadUserNotificationProbe> {
Arc::new(crate::LoadUserNotificationProbe {
observed: std::sync::Mutex::new(None),
remaining_failures: std::sync::atomic::AtomicUsize::new(failures_before_success),
attempts: std::sync::atomic::AtomicUsize::new(0),
panic,
started: tokio::sync::Notify::new(),
release: block.then(tokio::sync::Notify::new),
completed: tokio::sync::Notify::new(),
})
}
async fn notify_for_user(&self, name: &str, is_temp: bool) {
if self.has_watcher() {
return;
}
// Fire-and-forget notification to peers - don't block auth operations
// This is critical for cluster recovery: login should not wait for dead peers
let name = name.to_string();
tokio::spawn(async move {
for r in notify_iam_load_user(&name, is_temp).await {
if let Some(err) = r.err {
warn!("notify load_user failed (non-blocking): {}", err);
}
}
});
}
async fn notify_for_service_account(&self, name: &str) {
if self.has_watcher() {
return;
}
// Fire-and-forget notification to peers - don't block service account operations
let name = name.to_string();
tokio::spawn(async move {
for r in notify_iam_load_service_account(&name).await {
if let Some(err) = r.err {
warn!("notify load_service_account failed (non-blocking): {}", err);
}
}
});
}
pub async fn current_policies(&self, name: &str) -> String {
self.store.merge_policies(name).await.0
}
pub async fn list_bucket_users(&self, bucket_name: &str) -> Result<HashMap<String, rustfs_madmin::UserInfo>> {
self.store.get_bucket_users(bucket_name).await
}
pub async fn list_users(&self) -> Result<HashMap<String, rustfs_madmin::UserInfo>> {
self.store.get_users().await
}
pub async fn set_temp_user(&self, name: &str, cred: &Credentials, policy_name: Option<&str>) -> Result<OffsetDateTime> {
let updated_at = self.store.set_temp_user(name, cred, policy_name).await?;
self.notify_for_user(&cred.access_key, true).await;
Ok(updated_at)
}
pub async fn is_temp_user(&self, name: &str) -> Result<(bool, String)> {
let Some(u) = self.store.get_user(name).await else {
return Err(IamError::NoSuchUser(name.to_string()));
};
if u.credentials.is_temp() {
Ok((true, u.credentials.parent_user))
} else {
Ok((false, "".to_string()))
}
}
pub async fn is_service_account(&self, name: &str) -> Result<(bool, String)> {
let Some(u) = self.store.get_user(name).await else {
return Err(IamError::NoSuchUser(name.to_string()));
};
if u.credentials.is_service_account() {
Ok((true, u.credentials.parent_user))
} else {
Ok((false, "".to_string()))
}
}
pub async fn get_user_info(&self, name: &str) -> Result<rustfs_madmin::UserInfo> {
self.store.get_user_info(name).await
}
pub async fn set_user_status(&self, name: &str, status: rustfs_madmin::AccountStatus) -> Result<OffsetDateTime> {
let updated_at = self.store.set_user_status(name, status).await?;
self.notify_for_user(name, false).await;
Ok(updated_at)
}
pub async fn new_service_account(
&self,
parent_user: &str,
groups: Option<Vec<String>>,
opts: NewServiceAccountOpts,
) -> Result<(Credentials, OffsetDateTime)> {
if parent_user.is_empty() {
return Err(IamError::InvalidArgument);
}
if !opts.access_key.is_empty() && opts.secret_key.is_empty() {
return Err(IamError::NoSecretKeyWithAccessKey);
}
if !opts.secret_key.is_empty() && opts.access_key.is_empty() {
return Err(IamError::NoAccessKeyWithSecretKey);
}
if parent_user == opts.access_key {
return Err(IamError::AccessKeyAlreadyExists);
}
if opts.access_key == SITE_REPLICATOR_SERVICE_ACCOUNT && !opts.allow_site_replicator_account {
return Err(IamError::IAMActionNotAllowed);
}
let policy_buf = if let Some(policy) = opts.session_policy {
policy.validate()?;
let buf = serde_json::to_vec(&policy)?;
if buf.len() > MAX_SVCSESSION_POLICY_SIZE {
return Err(IamError::PolicyTooLarge);
}
buf
} else {
Vec::new()
};
let mut m: HashMap<String, Value> = HashMap::new();
m.insert("parent".to_owned(), Value::String(parent_user.to_owned()));
if opts.access_key == SITE_REPLICATOR_SERVICE_ACCOUNT && opts.allow_site_replicator_account {
m.insert(SITE_REPLICATOR_CLAIM.to_owned(), Value::Bool(true));
}
if !policy_buf.is_empty() {
m.insert(
SESSION_POLICY_NAME.to_owned(),
Value::String(base64_simd::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode_to_string(&policy_buf)),
);
m.insert(iam_policy_claim_name_sa(), Value::String(EMBEDDED_POLICY_TYPE.to_owned()));
} else {
m.insert(iam_policy_claim_name_sa(), Value::String(INHERITED_POLICY_TYPE.to_owned()));
}
if let Some(claims) = opts.claims {
for (k, v) in claims.iter() {
if !m.contains_key(k) {
m.insert(k.to_owned(), v.to_owned());
}
}
}
if let Some(expiration) = opts.expiration {
m.insert("exp".to_string(), Value::Number(serde_json::Number::from(expiration.unix_timestamp())));
}
let (access_key, secret_key) = if !opts.access_key.is_empty() || !opts.secret_key.is_empty() {
(opts.access_key, opts.secret_key)
} else {
generate_credentials()?
};
let mut cred = create_new_credentials_with_metadata(&access_key, &secret_key, &m, &secret_key)?;
cred.parent_user = parent_user.to_owned();
cred.groups = groups;
cred.status = ACCOUNT_ON.to_owned();
cred.name = opts.name;
cred.description = opts.description;
let create_at = self.store.add_service_account(cred.clone()).await?;
self.notify_for_service_account(&cred.access_key).await;
Ok((cred, create_at))
}
pub async fn update_service_account(&self, name: &str, opts: UpdateServiceAccountOpts) -> Result<OffsetDateTime> {
if name == SITE_REPLICATOR_SERVICE_ACCOUNT && !opts.allow_site_replicator_account {
return Err(IamError::IAMActionNotAllowed);
}
let updated_at = self.store.update_service_account(name, opts).await?;
self.notify_for_service_account(name).await;
Ok(updated_at)
}
pub async fn list_service_accounts(&self, access_key: &str) -> Result<Vec<Credentials>> {
self.store.list_service_accounts(access_key).await
}
pub async fn list_temp_accounts(&self, access_key: &str) -> Result<Vec<UserIdentity>> {
self.store.list_temp_accounts(access_key).await
}
pub async fn list_sts_accounts(&self, access_key: &str) -> Result<Vec<Credentials>> {
self.store.list_sts_accounts(access_key).await
}
pub async fn get_service_account(&self, access_key: &str) -> Result<(Credentials, Option<Policy>)> {
let (mut da, policy) = self.get_service_account_internal(access_key).await?;
da.credentials.secret_key.clear();
da.credentials.session_token.clear();
Ok((da.credentials, policy))
}
pub async fn get_site_replicator_service_account_secret(&self, access_key: &str) -> Result<String> {
if access_key != SITE_REPLICATOR_SERVICE_ACCOUNT {
return Err(IamError::NoSuchServiceAccount(access_key.to_string()));
}
let (user, claims) = self.get_account_with_claims_allow_missing_exp(access_key).await?;
if !user.credentials.is_service_account() || !claims.get(SITE_REPLICATOR_CLAIM).and_then(Value::as_bool).unwrap_or(false)
{
return Err(IamError::NoSuchServiceAccount(access_key.to_string()));
}
Ok(user.credentials.secret_key)
}
async fn get_service_account_internal(&self, access_key: &str) -> Result<(UserIdentity, Option<Policy>)> {
let (sa, claims) = match self.get_account_with_claims_allow_missing_exp(access_key).await {
Ok(res) => res,
Err(err) => {
if is_err_no_such_account(&err) {
return Err(IamError::NoSuchServiceAccount(access_key.to_string()));
}
return Err(err);
}
};
if !sa.credentials.is_service_account() {
return Err(IamError::NoSuchServiceAccount(access_key.to_string()));
}
let op_pt = claims.get(&iam_policy_claim_name_sa());
let op_sp = claims.get(SESSION_POLICY_NAME);
if let (Some(pt), Some(sp)) = (op_pt, op_sp)
&& pt == EMBEDDED_POLICY_TYPE
{
let policy =
serde_json::from_slice(&base64_simd::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.decode_to_vec(sp.as_str().unwrap_or_default().as_bytes())?)?;
return Ok((sa, Some(policy)));
}
Ok((sa, None))
}
async fn get_account_with_claims(&self, access_key: &str) -> Result<(UserIdentity, HashMap<String, Value>)> {
let Some(acc) = self.store.get_user(access_key).await else {
return Err(IamError::NoSuchAccount(access_key.to_string()));
};
let m = extract_jwt_claims(&acc)?;
Ok((acc, m))
}
async fn get_account_with_claims_allow_missing_exp(
&self,
access_key: &str,
) -> Result<(UserIdentity, HashMap<String, Value>)> {
let Some(acc) = self.store.get_user(access_key).await else {
return Err(IamError::NoSuchAccount(access_key.to_string()));
};
let m = crate::manager::extract_jwt_claims_allow_missing_exp(&acc)?;
Ok((acc, m))
}
pub async fn get_temporary_account(&self, access_key: &str) -> Result<(Credentials, Option<Policy>)> {
let (mut sa, policy) = match self.get_temp_account(access_key).await {
Ok(res) => res,
Err(err) => {
if is_err_no_such_temp_account(&err) {
// TODO: load_user
match self.get_temp_account(access_key).await {
Ok(res) => res,
Err(err) => return Err(err),
};
}
return Err(err);
}
};
sa.credentials.secret_key.clear();
sa.credentials.session_token.clear();
Ok((sa.credentials, policy))
}
async fn get_temp_account(&self, access_key: &str) -> Result<(UserIdentity, Option<Policy>)> {
let (sa, claims) = match self.get_account_with_claims(access_key).await {
Ok(res) => res,
Err(err) => {
if is_err_no_such_account(&err) {
return Err(IamError::NoSuchTempAccount(access_key.to_string()));
}
return Err(err);
}
};
if !sa.credentials.is_temp() {
return Err(IamError::NoSuchTempAccount(access_key.to_string()));
}
let op_pt = claims.get(&iam_policy_claim_name_sa());
let op_sp = claims.get(SESSION_POLICY_NAME);
if let (Some(pt), Some(sp)) = (op_pt, op_sp)
&& pt == EMBEDDED_POLICY_TYPE
{
let policy =
serde_json::from_slice(&base64_simd::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.decode_to_vec(sp.as_str().unwrap_or_default().as_bytes())?)?;
return Ok((sa, Some(policy)));
}
Ok((sa, None))
}
pub async fn get_claims_for_svc_acc(&self, access_key: &str) -> Result<HashMap<String, Value>> {
let Some(u) = self.store.get_user(access_key).await else {
return Err(IamError::NoSuchServiceAccount(access_key.to_string()));
};
if !u.credentials.is_service_account() {
return Err(IamError::NoSuchServiceAccount(access_key.to_string()));
}
crate::manager::extract_jwt_claims_allow_missing_exp(&u)
}
pub async fn delete_service_account(&self, access_key: &str, notify: bool) -> Result<()> {
self.delete_service_account_with_revision(access_key, notify).await?;
Ok(())
}
pub async fn delete_service_account_with_revision(&self, access_key: &str, notify: bool) -> Result<Option<OffsetDateTime>> {
let Some(u) = self.store.get_user(access_key).await else {
return Ok(None);
};
if !u.credentials.is_service_account() {
return Ok(None);
}
let deleted_at = self.store.delete_service_account_with_revision(access_key).await?;
if notify && !self.has_watcher() {
for result in notify_iam_load_service_account(access_key).await {
if let Some(err) = result.err {
warn!("notify deleted service account failed: {}", err);
}
}
}
Ok(Some(deleted_at))
}
async fn notify_for_group(&self, group: &str) {
if self.has_watcher() {
return;
}
// Fire-and-forget notification to peers - don't block group operations
let group = group.to_string();
tokio::spawn(async move {
for r in notify_iam_load_group(&group).await {
if let Some(err) = r.err {
warn!("notify load_group failed (non-blocking): {}", err);
}
}
});
}
pub async fn create_user(&self, access_key: &str, args: &AddOrUpdateUserReq) -> Result<OffsetDateTime> {
if !is_access_key_valid(access_key) {
return Err(IamError::InvalidAccessKeyLength);
}
if contains_reserved_chars(access_key) {
return Err(IamError::ContainsReservedChars);
}
if !is_secret_key_valid(&args.secret_key) {
return Err(IamError::InvalidSecretKeyLength);
}
let updated_at = self.store.add_user(access_key, args).await?;
self.load_user(access_key, UserType::Reg).await?;
self.notify_for_user(access_key, false).await;
Ok(updated_at)
}
pub async fn set_user_secret_key(&self, access_key: &str, secret_key: &str) -> Result<()> {
if !is_access_key_valid(access_key) {
return Err(IamError::InvalidAccessKeyLength);
}
if !is_secret_key_valid(secret_key) {
return Err(IamError::InvalidSecretKeyLength);
}
self.store.update_user_secret_key(access_key, secret_key).await
}
/// Add SSH public key for a user (for SFTP authentication)
pub async fn add_user_ssh_public_key(&self, access_key: &str, public_key: &str) -> Result<()> {
if !is_access_key_valid(access_key) {
return Err(IamError::InvalidAccessKeyLength);
}
if public_key.is_empty() {
return Err(IamError::InvalidArgument);
}
self.store.add_user_ssh_public_key(access_key, public_key).await
}
pub async fn check_key(&self, access_key: &str) -> Result<(Option<UserIdentity>, bool)> {
if let Some(sys_cred) = crate::root_credentials::credentials()
&& sys_cred.access_key == access_key
{
return Ok((Some(UserIdentity::new(sys_cred)), true));
}
match self.store.get_user(access_key).await {
Some(res) => {
let ok = res.credentials.is_valid();
Ok((Some(res), ok))
}
None => {
self.store.load_user(access_key).await?;
if let Some(res) = self.store.get_user(access_key).await {
let ok = res.credentials.is_valid();
Ok((Some(res), ok))
} else {
Ok((None, false))
}
}
}
}
pub async fn get_user(&self, access_key: &str) -> Option<UserIdentity> {
match self.check_key(access_key).await {
Ok((u, _)) => u,
_ => None,
}
}
pub async fn add_users_to_group(&self, group: &str, users: Vec<String>) -> Result<OffsetDateTime> {
if contains_reserved_chars(group) {
return Err(IamError::GroupNameContainsReservedChars);
}
let updated_at = self.store.add_users_to_group(group, users).await?;
self.notify_for_group(group).await;
Ok(updated_at)
}
pub async fn remove_users_from_group(&self, group: &str, users: Vec<String>) -> Result<OffsetDateTime> {
let updated_at = self.store.remove_users_from_group(group, users).await?;
self.notify_for_group(group).await;
Ok(updated_at)
}
pub async fn set_group_status(&self, group: &str, enable: bool) -> Result<OffsetDateTime> {
let updated_at = self.store.set_group_status(group, enable).await?;
self.notify_for_group(group).await;
Ok(updated_at)
}
pub async fn get_group_description(&self, group: &str) -> Result<GroupDesc> {
self.store.get_group_description(group).await
}
pub async fn list_groups_load(&self) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
self.store.update_groups().await
}
pub async fn list_groups(&self) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
self.store.list_groups().await
}
pub async fn policy_db_set(&self, name: &str, user_type: UserType, is_group: bool, policy: &str) -> Result<OffsetDateTime> {
let updated_at = self.store.policy_db_set(name, user_type, is_group, policy).await?;
if !self.has_watcher() {
for r in notify_iam_load_policy_mapping(name, user_type.to_u64(), is_group).await {
if let Some(err) = r.err {
warn!("notify load_policy failed: {}", err);
}
}
}
Ok(updated_at)
}
pub async fn policy_db_get(&self, name: &str, groups: &Option<Vec<String>>) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
self.store.policy_db_get(name, groups).await
}
pub async fn sts_policy_db_get(&self, name: &str, groups: &Option<Vec<String>>) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
self.store.sts_policy_db_get(name, groups).await
}
/// Check whether a policy name from a JWT claim is safe to resolve against the IAM store.
///
/// Allowed characters: `[a-zA-Z0-9_:.-]`
/// - Colons: K8s service account `sub` claims (`system:serviceaccount:ns:sa`)
/// - Dots: OIDC group names from providers like Okta/Entra (`org.team.role`)
///
/// Requirements:
/// - At least one ASCII alphanumeric character (prevents meaningless names
/// like `.`, `..`, `-`, `___`, or `:.:`).
/// - No characters outside the allowed set (helps mitigate path traversal
/// and injection when names are used in storage keys or log output).
fn is_safe_claim_policy_name(policy: &str) -> bool {
is_safe_claim_policy_name(policy)
}
// JWT policy claims carry canned policy names only; policy documents are resolved by IAM store.
fn safe_claim_policy_names(claims: &HashMap<String, Value>, parent_user: &str) -> Vec<String> {
let Some(claim_policies) = claims.get(POLICYNAME).and_then(|v| v.as_str()) else {
return Vec::new();
};
claim_policies
.split(',')
.map(str::trim)
.filter(|policy_name| {
if policy_name.is_empty() {
return false;
}
if !Self::is_safe_claim_policy_name(policy_name) {
tracing::debug!(
parent_user = %parent_user,
"prepare_sts_auth: ignoring unsafe policy name in STS policy claim"
);
return false;
}
true
})
.map(ToOwned::to_owned)
.collect()
}
async fn verified_federated_service_account_claims(
&self,
claims: &HashMap<String, Value>,
parent_user: &str,
groups: &Option<Vec<String>>,
) -> Result<Option<HashMap<String, Value>>> {
let Some(policy_names) = self.verified_federated_policy_names(claims, parent_user, groups).await? else {
return Ok(None);
};
let (resolved, _) = self.store.merge_policies(&policy_names.join(",")).await;
let resolved_names = MappedPolicy::new(&resolved).to_slice();
if policy_names.iter().any(|policy_name| !resolved_names.contains(policy_name)) {
return Err(IamError::InvalidArgument);
}
let boundary = match claims.get(SESSION_POLICY_NAME) {
Some(Value::String(encoded)) => {
decode_session_policy(encoded)?;
Some(encoded.clone())
}
Some(_) => return Err(IamError::InvalidArgument),
None => None,
};
let mut verified_claims = HashMap::from([
(VERIFIED_FEDERATED_POLICY_CLAIM.to_string(), Value::Bool(true)),
(POLICYNAME.to_string(), Value::String(resolved)),
]);
if claims.get(OIDC_VIRTUAL_PARENT_CLAIM).and_then(Value::as_str) == Some(parent_user) {
verified_claims.insert(OIDC_VIRTUAL_PARENT_CLAIM.to_string(), Value::String(parent_user.to_string()));
}
if let Some(boundary) = boundary {
verified_claims.insert(FEDERATED_POLICY_BOUNDARY_CLAIM.to_string(), Value::String(boundary));
}
Ok(Some(verified_claims))
}
pub async fn new_service_account_from_caller(
&self,
parent_user: &str,
groups: Option<Vec<String>>,
mut opts: NewServiceAccountOpts,
caller: &Credentials,
) -> Result<(Credentials, OffsetDateTime, HashMap<String, Value>)> {
if parent_user != caller.access_key && parent_user != caller.parent_user {
return Err(IamError::IAMActionNotAllowed);
}
let verified_federated_policy = if caller.is_service_account() {
None
} else {
self.verified_federated_service_account_claims(caller.claims_or_empty(), &caller.parent_user, &caller.groups)
.await
.map_err(|_| IamError::IAMActionNotAllowed)?
};
if let Some(source_claims) = caller.claims.as_ref() {
merge_derived_service_account_claims(opts.claims.get_or_insert_default(), source_claims, verified_federated_policy)?;
}
let replication_claims = opts.claims.clone().unwrap_or_default();
let (credentials, updated_at) = self.new_service_account(parent_user, groups, opts).await?;
Ok((credentials, updated_at, replication_claims))
}
async fn oidc_policy_names(
&self,
claims: &HashMap<String, Value>,
parent_user: &str,
groups: &Option<Vec<String>>,
) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
let mapped_policy_names = self.policy_db_get(parent_user, groups).await?;
let policy_names = if mapped_policy_names.is_empty() {
Self::safe_claim_policy_names(claims, parent_user)
} else {
mapped_policy_names
};
if policy_names.is_empty() {
return Err(IamError::InvalidArgument);
}
Ok(policy_names)
}
fn signed_oidc_policy_names(claims: &HashMap<String, Value>, parent_user: &str) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
let policy_names = Self::safe_claim_policy_names(claims, parent_user);
if policy_names.is_empty() {
return Err(IamError::InvalidArgument);
}
Ok(policy_names)
}
async fn verified_federated_policy_names(
&self,
claims: &HashMap<String, Value>,
parent_user: &str,
groups: &Option<Vec<String>>,
) -> Result<Option<Vec<String>>> {
if !is_rustfs_oidc_claims(claims) {
return Ok(None);
}
if !is_verified_or_legacy_federated_session(claims, parent_user) {
return Err(IamError::InvalidArgument);
}
let policy_names = if is_verified_federated_session(claims, parent_user) {
Self::signed_oidc_policy_names(claims, parent_user)?
} else {
self.oidc_policy_names(claims, parent_user, groups).await?
};
Ok(Some(policy_names))
}
/// Compatibility wrapper for service-account authorization entry points.
/// The canonical evaluation path is `prepare_service_account_auth + eval_prepared`.
pub async fn is_allowed_service_account(&self, args: &Args<'_>, parent_user: &str) -> bool {
let prepared = self.prepare_service_account_auth(args, parent_user).await;
self.eval_prepared(&prepared, args).await
}
pub async fn get_combined_policy(&self, policies: &[String]) -> Policy {
self.store.merge_policies(&policies.join(",")).await.1
}
/// Prepare IAM authorization context once so callers can:
/// 1) know whether policy evaluation may need `s3:ExistingObjectTag`, and
/// 2) evaluate with final conditions without re-merging identity policies.
pub async fn prepare_auth(&self, args: &Args<'_>) -> PreparedIamAuth {
if args.is_owner {
return PreparedIamAuth {
needs_existing_object_tag: false,
mode: PreparedIamMode::Owner,
};
}
if let Some(prepared) = Self::policy_plugin_state().await.prepared_iam_auth() {
return prepared;
}
let Ok((is_svc, parent_user)) = self.is_service_account(args.account).await else {
return PreparedIamAuth {
needs_existing_object_tag: false,
mode: PreparedIamMode::Deny,
};
};
if is_svc {
return self.prepare_service_account_auth(args, &parent_user).await;
}
let Ok((is_temp, parent_user)) = self.is_temp_user(args.account).await else {
return PreparedIamAuth {
needs_existing_object_tag: false,
mode: PreparedIamMode::Deny,
};
};
if is_temp {
return self.prepare_sts_auth(args, &parent_user).await;
}
self.prepare_regular_auth(args).await
}
pub async fn eval_prepared(&self, prepared: &PreparedIamAuth, args: &Args<'_>) -> bool {
match &prepared.mode {
PreparedIamMode::Opa => {
let Some(opa_enable) = Self::get_policy_plugin_client().await else {
tracing::warn!("eval_prepared: OPA mode requested but plugin is unavailable");
return false;
};
opa_enable.is_allowed(args).await
}
PreparedIamMode::Owner => true,
PreparedIamMode::Deny => false,
PreparedIamMode::Regular { combined_policy } => combined_policy.is_allowed(args).await,
PreparedIamMode::Sts {
is_owner,
combined_policy,
session_policy,
} => {
let session_ok = evaluate_prepared_session_policy(session_policy, args).await;
if let Some(ok) = session_ok {
return ok && (*is_owner || combined_policy.is_allowed(args).await);
}
*is_owner || combined_policy.is_allowed(args).await
}
PreparedIamMode::ServiceAccount {
is_owner,
bypass_parent_policy,
parent_user,
combined_policy,
federated_boundary,
mode,
session_policy,
} => {
let mut parent_args = args.clone();
parent_args.account = parent_user;
let boundary_allowed = if let Some(policy) = federated_boundary {
let mut boundary_args = args.clone();
boundary_args.is_owner = false;
policy.is_allowed(&boundary_args).await
} else {
true
};
let parent_allowed =
(*bypass_parent_policy || *is_owner || combined_policy.is_allowed(&parent_args).await) && boundary_allowed;
match mode {
PreparedServicePolicyMode::Inherited => parent_allowed,
PreparedServicePolicyMode::SessionBound => {
let session_ok = evaluate_prepared_session_policy(session_policy, args).await;
if let Some(ok) = session_ok {
return ok && parent_allowed;
}
parent_allowed
}
}
}
}
}
async fn prepare_regular_auth(&self, args: &Args<'_>) -> PreparedIamAuth {
let Ok(policies) = self.policy_db_get(args.account, args.groups).await else {
return PreparedIamAuth {
needs_existing_object_tag: false,
mode: PreparedIamMode::Deny,
};
};
if policies.is_empty() {
return PreparedIamAuth {
needs_existing_object_tag: false,
mode: PreparedIamMode::Deny,
};
}
let (resolved_policies, combined_policy) = self.store.merge_policies(&policies.join(",")).await;
if args.deny_only {
let resolved_policy_names: HashSet<&str> = resolved_policies
.split(',')
.filter(|policy_name| !policy_name.trim().is_empty())
.collect();
if policies
.iter()
.any(|policy_name| !resolved_policy_names.contains(policy_name.as_str()))
{
return PreparedIamAuth {
needs_existing_object_tag: false,
mode: PreparedIamMode::Deny,
};
}
}
PreparedIamAuth {
needs_existing_object_tag: policy_needs_existing_object_tag_for_args(&combined_policy, args).await,
mode: PreparedIamMode::Regular { combined_policy },
}
}
pub(crate) async fn prepare_sts_auth(&self, args: &Args<'_>, parent_user: &str) -> PreparedIamAuth {
let federated_policy_names = match self
.verified_federated_policy_names(args.claims, parent_user, args.groups)
.await
{
Ok(policy_names) => policy_names,
Err(_) => {
return PreparedIamAuth {
needs_existing_object_tag: false,
mode: PreparedIamMode::Deny,
};
}
};
let federated_session = federated_policy_names.is_some();
let verified_federated_session = is_verified_federated_session(args.claims, parent_user);
let is_owner = !is_rustfs_oidc_claims(args.claims) && crate::is_root_access_key(parent_user);
let role_arn = args.get_role_arn();
let (effective_groups, groups_source, policies) = if federated_session {
(args.groups.clone(), "oidc_claims", Vec::new())
} else if is_owner {
(None, "owner", Vec::new())
} else if let Some(arn_str) = role_arn {
let Ok(arn) = ARN::parse(arn_str) else {
tracing::warn!(
parent_user = %parent_user,
role_arn = %arn_str,
"prepare_sts_auth: invalid role ARN in STS claims"
);
return PreparedIamAuth {
needs_existing_object_tag: false,
mode: PreparedIamMode::Deny,
};
};
let p = MappedPolicy::new(self.roles_map.get(&arn).map_or_else(String::default, |v| v.clone()).as_str()).to_slice();
(None, "role", p)
} else {
let (effective_groups, groups_source) = match args.groups.as_ref() {
Some(g) if !g.is_empty() => (args.groups.clone(), "args"),
_ => match self.store.get_user(parent_user).await {
Some(u) => (u.credentials.groups, "parent_user_credentials"),
None => {
tracing::warn!(
parent_user = %parent_user,
"prepare_sts_auth: groups fallback failed, parent user not found"
);
(None, "parent_user_credentials")
}
},
};
let p = self.policy_db_get(parent_user, &effective_groups).await.unwrap_or_default();
(effective_groups, groups_source, p)
};
let mut policy_names = if let Some(policy_names) = federated_policy_names {
policy_names
} else {
policies
};
if !is_owner && policy_names.is_empty() && !is_rustfs_oidc_claims(args.claims) {
policy_names = Self::safe_claim_policy_names(args.claims, parent_user);
}
let mut combined_policy = Policy::default();
if !is_owner {
if policy_names.is_empty() {
if args.deny_only {
combined_policy = Policy::default();
} else {
return PreparedIamAuth {
needs_existing_object_tag: false,
mode: PreparedIamMode::Deny,
};
}
} else {
let requested_policies = policy_names.join(",");
let (resolved_policies, c) = self.store.merge_policies(&requested_policies).await;
if resolved_policies.is_empty() {
tracing::warn!(
parent_user = %parent_user,
requested_policies = %requested_policies,
"prepare_sts_auth: no STS policy names resolved"
);
if args.deny_only && !verified_federated_session {
combined_policy = Policy::default();
} else {
return PreparedIamAuth {
needs_existing_object_tag: false,
mode: PreparedIamMode::Deny,
};
}
} else {
let resolved_policy_names = MappedPolicy::new(&resolved_policies).to_slice();
let has_unresolved_policy_names = policy_names
.iter()
.any(|policy_name| !resolved_policy_names.iter().any(|resolved| resolved == policy_name));
if has_unresolved_policy_names {
if verified_federated_session {
return PreparedIamAuth {
needs_existing_object_tag: false,
mode: PreparedIamMode::Deny,
};
}
tracing::debug!(
parent_user = %parent_user,
requested_policies = %requested_policies,
resolved_policies = %resolved_policies,
"prepare_sts_auth: some STS policy names were not resolved"
);
}
combined_policy = c;
}
}
}
let session_policy = prepare_session_policy(args, false);
tracing::debug!(
"prepare_sts_auth: action={:?}, is_owner={}, parent_user={}, groups_source={}, effective_groups={:?}",
args.action,
is_owner,
parent_user,
groups_source,
effective_groups
);
PreparedIamAuth {
needs_existing_object_tag: policy_needs_existing_object_tag_for_args(&combined_policy, args).await
|| prepared_session_policy_needs_existing_object_tag_for_args(&session_policy, args).await,
mode: PreparedIamMode::Sts {
is_owner,
combined_policy,
session_policy,
},
}
}
async fn prepare_service_account_auth(&self, args: &Args<'_>, parent_user: &str) -> PreparedIamAuth {
let Some(p) = args.claims.get("parent") else {
return PreparedIamAuth {
needs_existing_object_tag: false,
mode: PreparedIamMode::Deny,
};
};
if p.as_str() != Some(parent_user) {
return PreparedIamAuth {
needs_existing_object_tag: false,
mode: PreparedIamMode::Deny,
};
}
let Some(sa) = args.claims.get(&iam_policy_claim_name_sa()) else {
return PreparedIamAuth {
needs_existing_object_tag: false,
mode: PreparedIamMode::Deny,
};
};
let Some(sa_str) = sa.as_str() else {
return PreparedIamAuth {
needs_existing_object_tag: false,
mode: PreparedIamMode::Deny,
};
};
let mode = if sa_str == INHERITED_POLICY_TYPE {
PreparedServicePolicyMode::Inherited
} else {
PreparedServicePolicyMode::SessionBound
};
let session_policy = prepare_session_policy(args, true);
let has_verified_federated_policy = args.claims.contains_key(VERIFIED_FEDERATED_POLICY_CLAIM);
if is_rustfs_oidc_claims(args.claims) && !has_verified_federated_policy {
return PreparedIamAuth {
needs_existing_object_tag: false,
mode: PreparedIamMode::Deny,
};
}
let federated_boundary = if has_verified_federated_policy {
if !is_valid_verified_federated_policy(args.claims, parent_user) {
return PreparedIamAuth {
needs_existing_object_tag: false,
mode: PreparedIamMode::Deny,
};
}
match federated_policy_boundary(args.claims) {
Ok(boundary) => boundary,
Err(_) => {
return PreparedIamAuth {
needs_existing_object_tag: false,
mode: PreparedIamMode::Deny,
};
}
}
} else {
None
};
let bypass_parent_policy = args.account == SITE_REPLICATOR_SERVICE_ACCOUNT
&& args
.claims
.get(SITE_REPLICATOR_CLAIM)
.and_then(Value::as_bool)
.unwrap_or(false)
&& matches!(mode, PreparedServicePolicyMode::SessionBound)
&& matches!(session_policy, PreparedSessionPolicy::Policy(_));
let is_owner = !is_rustfs_oidc_claims(args.claims) && crate::is_root_access_key(parent_user);
let role_arn = args.get_role_arn();
let svc_policies = if is_owner || bypass_parent_policy {
Vec::new()
} else if has_verified_federated_policy {
Self::safe_claim_policy_names(args.claims, parent_user)
} else if role_arn.is_some() {
let Ok(arn) = ARN::parse(role_arn.unwrap_or_default()) else {
tracing::warn!(
parent_user = %parent_user,
role_arn = ?role_arn,
"prepare_service_account_auth: invalid role ARN in service account claims"
);
return PreparedIamAuth {
needs_existing_object_tag: false,
mode: PreparedIamMode::Deny,
};
};
MappedPolicy::new(self.roles_map.get(&arn).map_or_else(String::default, |v| v.clone()).as_str()).to_slice()
} else {
let Ok(policies) = self.policy_db_get(parent_user, args.groups).await else {
return PreparedIamAuth {
needs_existing_object_tag: false,
mode: PreparedIamMode::Deny,
};
};
policies
};
if !is_owner && !bypass_parent_policy && svc_policies.is_empty() {
return PreparedIamAuth {
needs_existing_object_tag: false,
mode: PreparedIamMode::Deny,
};
}
let combined_policy = if is_owner || bypass_parent_policy {
Policy::default()
} else {
let (a, c) = self.store.merge_policies(&svc_policies.join(",")).await;
let resolved = MappedPolicy::new(&a).to_slice();
if a.is_empty()
|| has_verified_federated_policy && svc_policies.iter().any(|policy_name| !resolved.contains(policy_name))
{
return PreparedIamAuth {
needs_existing_object_tag: false,
mode: PreparedIamMode::Deny,
};
}
c
};
let needs_existing_object_tag = policy_needs_existing_object_tag_for_args(&combined_policy, args).await
|| match &federated_boundary {
Some(policy) => policy_needs_existing_object_tag_for_args(policy, args).await,
None => false,
}
|| matches!(mode, PreparedServicePolicyMode::SessionBound)
&& prepared_session_policy_needs_existing_object_tag_for_args(&session_policy, args).await;
PreparedIamAuth {
needs_existing_object_tag,
mode: PreparedIamMode::ServiceAccount {
is_owner,
bypass_parent_policy,
parent_user: parent_user.to_string(),
combined_policy,
federated_boundary,
mode,
session_policy,
},
}
}
pub async fn is_allowed(&self, args: &Args<'_>) -> bool {
let prepared = self.prepare_auth(args).await;
self.eval_prepared(&prepared, args).await
}
/// Check if the underlying store is ready
pub fn is_ready(&self) -> bool {
self.store.is_ready()
}
}
async fn prepared_session_policy_needs_existing_object_tag_for_args(policy: &PreparedSessionPolicy, args: &Args<'_>) -> bool {
match policy {
PreparedSessionPolicy::Policy(p) => policy_needs_existing_object_tag_for_args(p, args).await,
PreparedSessionPolicy::None | PreparedSessionPolicy::DenyAll => false,
}
}
fn prepare_session_policy(args: &Args<'_>, empty_is_none: bool) -> PreparedSessionPolicy {
let Some(policy_str) = extract_session_policy_text(args.claims) else {
return PreparedSessionPolicy::None;
};
let Ok(sub_policy) = Policy::parse_config(policy_str.as_bytes()) else {
return PreparedSessionPolicy::DenyAll;
};
if empty_is_none {
if sub_policy.version.is_empty() && sub_policy.statements.is_empty() && sub_policy.id.is_empty() {
return PreparedSessionPolicy::None;
}
return PreparedSessionPolicy::Policy(sub_policy);
}
if sub_policy.version.is_empty() {
return PreparedSessionPolicy::DenyAll;
}
PreparedSessionPolicy::Policy(sub_policy)
}
fn decode_session_policy(encoded: &str) -> Result<Policy> {
let bytes = base64_simd::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.decode_to_vec(encoded.as_bytes())?;
if bytes.len() > MAX_SVCSESSION_POLICY_SIZE {
return Err(IamError::PolicyTooLarge);
}
let policy = Policy::parse_config(&bytes)?;
policy.validate()?;
if policy.version.is_empty() {
return Err(IamError::InvalidArgument);
}
Ok(policy)
}
pub fn is_safe_claim_policy_name(policy: &str) -> bool {
let mut has_alnum = false;
for c in policy.bytes() {
if c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() {
has_alnum = true;
} else if !matches!(c, b'_' | b'-' | b':' | b'.') {
return false;
}
}
has_alnum
}
pub fn is_rustfs_oidc_claims(claims: &HashMap<String, Value>) -> bool {
claims.get("iss").and_then(Value::as_str) == Some("rustfs-oidc")
&& claims
.get("oidc_provider")
.and_then(Value::as_str)
.is_some_and(|provider| !provider.is_empty())
&& claims
.get("sub")
.and_then(Value::as_str)
.is_some_and(|subject| !subject.is_empty())
}
fn has_verified_federated_policy(claims: &HashMap<String, Value>) -> bool {
claims
.get(VERIFIED_FEDERATED_POLICY_CLAIM)
.and_then(Value::as_bool)
.unwrap_or(false)
}
pub fn remove_verified_federated_policy(claims: &mut HashMap<String, Value>) -> bool {
let removed = claims.remove(VERIFIED_FEDERATED_POLICY_CLAIM).is_some();
claims.remove(FEDERATED_POLICY_BOUNDARY_CLAIM);
claims.remove(OIDC_VIRTUAL_PARENT_CLAIM);
removed
}
fn merge_derived_service_account_claims(
target_claims: &mut HashMap<String, Value>,
source_claims: &HashMap<String, Value>,
verified_federated_policy: Option<HashMap<String, Value>>,
) -> Result<()> {
for (key, value) in source_claims {
if key != "exp" {
target_claims.insert(key.clone(), value.clone());
}
}
let inherited_verified_policy = remove_verified_federated_policy(target_claims);
let Some(verified_policy) = verified_federated_policy else {
return if inherited_verified_policy {
Err(IamError::IAMActionNotAllowed)
} else {
Ok(())
};
};
target_claims.remove(SESSION_POLICY_NAME);
target_claims.remove(SESSION_POLICY_NAME_EXTRACTED);
target_claims.extend(verified_policy);
Ok(())
}
fn is_verified_federated_session(claims: &HashMap<String, Value>, parent_user: &str) -> bool {
!parent_user.is_empty()
&& is_rustfs_oidc_claims(claims)
&& claims.get("parent").and_then(Value::as_str) == Some(parent_user)
&& claims.get(OIDC_VIRTUAL_PARENT_CLAIM).and_then(Value::as_str) == Some(parent_user)
}
fn is_verified_or_legacy_federated_session(claims: &HashMap<String, Value>, parent_user: &str) -> bool {
is_verified_federated_session(claims, parent_user)
|| (!claims.contains_key(OIDC_VIRTUAL_PARENT_CLAIM)
&& !parent_user.is_empty()
&& is_rustfs_oidc_claims(claims)
&& claims.get("parent").and_then(Value::as_str) == Some(parent_user))
}
fn is_valid_verified_federated_policy(claims: &HashMap<String, Value>, parent_user: &str) -> bool {
has_verified_federated_policy(claims)
&& is_verified_or_legacy_federated_session(claims, parent_user)
&& claims.get(POLICYNAME).and_then(Value::as_str).is_some_and(|policies| {
policies
.split(',')
.map(str::trim)
.all(|policy| !policy.is_empty() && is_safe_claim_policy_name(policy))
})
}
fn federated_policy_boundary(claims: &HashMap<String, Value>) -> Result<Option<Policy>> {
let Some(boundary) = claims.get(FEDERATED_POLICY_BOUNDARY_CLAIM) else {
return Ok(None);
};
boundary
.as_str()
.ok_or(IamError::InvalidArgument)
.and_then(decode_session_policy)
.map(Some)
}
fn extract_session_policy_text(claims: &HashMap<String, Value>) -> Option<String> {
if let Some(policy_str) = claims.get(SESSION_POLICY_NAME_EXTRACTED).and_then(|v| v.as_str()) {
return Some(policy_str.to_string());
}
let encoded = claims.get(SESSION_POLICY_NAME).and_then(|v| v.as_str())?;
let bytes = base64_simd::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.decode_to_vec(encoded.as_bytes()).ok()?;
String::from_utf8(bytes).ok()
}
async fn evaluate_prepared_session_policy(policy: &PreparedSessionPolicy, args: &Args<'_>) -> Option<bool> {
match policy {
PreparedSessionPolicy::None => None,
PreparedSessionPolicy::DenyAll => Some(false),
PreparedSessionPolicy::Policy(p) => {
let mut session_policy_args = args.clone();
session_policy_args.is_owner = false;
Some(p.is_allowed(&session_policy_args).await)
}
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
pub struct NewServiceAccountOpts {
pub session_policy: Option<Policy>,
pub access_key: String,
pub secret_key: String,
pub name: Option<String>,
pub description: Option<String>,
pub expiration: Option<OffsetDateTime>,
pub allow_site_replicator_account: bool,
pub claims: Option<HashMap<String, Value>>,
}
pub struct UpdateServiceAccountOpts {
pub session_policy: Option<Policy>,
pub secret_key: Option<String>,
pub name: Option<String>,
pub description: Option<String>,
pub expiration: Option<OffsetDateTime>,
pub status: Option<String>,
/// Rebind the account to a different parent.
///
/// Only site replication sets this, and only to repair an account left pointing at a
/// parent that a root-credential change invalidated. Rebinding an arbitrary service
/// account would let it inherit another user's policies, so it is gated behind
/// `allow_site_replicator_account` in the same way the account itself is.
pub parent_user: Option<String>,
pub allow_site_replicator_account: bool,
}
pub fn get_claims_from_token_with_secret(token: &str, secret: &str) -> Result<HashMap<String, Value>> {
let mut ms =
extract_claims::<HashMap<String, Value>>(token, secret).map_err(|e| Error::other(format!("extract claims err {e}")))?;
if let Some(session_policy) = ms.claims.get(SESSION_POLICY_NAME) {
let policy_str = session_policy.as_str().unwrap_or_default();
let policy = base64_simd::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
.decode_to_vec(policy_str.as_bytes())
.map_err(|e| Error::other(format!("base64 decode err {e}")))?;
ms.claims.insert(
SESSION_POLICY_NAME_EXTRACTED.to_string(),
Value::String(String::from_utf8(policy).map_err(|e| Error::other(format!("utf8 decode err {e}")))?),
);
}
Ok(ms.claims)
}
pub fn get_claims_from_token_with_secret_allow_missing_exp(token: &str, secret: &str) -> Result<HashMap<String, Value>> {
let mut ms = extract_claims_allow_missing_exp::<HashMap<String, Value>>(token, secret)
.map_err(|e| Error::other(format!("extract claims err {e}")))?;
if let Some(session_policy) = ms.claims.get(SESSION_POLICY_NAME) {
let policy_str = session_policy.as_str().unwrap_or_default();
let policy = base64_simd::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
.decode_to_vec(policy_str.as_bytes())
.map_err(|e| Error::other(format!("base64 decode err {e}")))?;
ms.claims.insert(
SESSION_POLICY_NAME_EXTRACTED.to_string(),
Value::String(String::from_utf8(policy).map_err(|e| Error::other(format!("utf8 decode err {e}")))?),
);
}
Ok(ms.claims)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::cache::{Cache, CacheEntity};
use crate::error::Error;
use crate::manager::get_default_policies;
use crate::store::{GroupInfo, MappedPolicy, Store, UserType};
use rustfs_credentials::{Credentials, init_global_action_credentials};
use rustfs_policy::auth::{UserIdentity, get_new_credentials_with_metadata};
use rustfs_policy::policy::Args;
#[test]
#[allow(deprecated)]
fn deprecated_list_polices_api_is_available() {
let _ = IamSys::<StsTestMockStore>::list_polices;
}
use rustfs_policy::policy::action::{Action, AdminAction, S3Action, StsAction};
use rustfs_policy::policy::policy_uses_existing_object_tag_conditions;
use serde_json::Value;
use serial_test::serial;
use std::{
collections::{HashMap, HashSet},
sync::{Arc, Mutex},
};
use time::OffsetDateTime;
use tokio::io::{AsyncReadExt, AsyncWriteExt};
use tokio::net::TcpListener;
#[test]
fn test_combined_policy_for_view_returns_regular_policy() {
let policy = Policy {
version: "2012-10-17".to_string(),
..Default::default()
};
let prepared = PreparedIamAuth {
needs_existing_object_tag: false,
mode: PreparedIamMode::Regular { combined_policy: policy },
};
let resolved = prepared.combined_policy_for_view();
assert_eq!(resolved.map(|p| p.version.as_str()), Some("2012-10-17"));
}
#[test]
fn test_combined_policy_for_view_returns_none_for_deny() {
let prepared = PreparedIamAuth {
needs_existing_object_tag: false,
mode: PreparedIamMode::Deny,
};
assert!(prepared.combined_policy_for_view().is_none());
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_prepare_auth_requests_existing_object_tags_in_opa_mode() {
let store = StsTestMockStore::new(false);
let iam_sys = IamSys::new(IamCache::new(store).await.expect("initialize IAM cache"));
let previous_state = IamSys::<StsTestMockStore>::policy_plugin_state().await;
IamSys::<StsTestMockStore>::set_policy_plugin_client(opa::AuthZPlugin::new(opa::Args {
url: "http://127.0.0.1:8181/v1/data/rustfs/authz/allow".to_string(),
auth_token: String::new(),
}))
.await;
let claims = HashMap::new();
let groups = None;
let conditions = HashMap::new();
let args = Args {
account: "opa-tag-test-user",
groups: &groups,
action: Action::S3Action(S3Action::GetObjectAction),
bucket: "bucket",
conditions: &conditions,
is_owner: false,
object: "tagged-object",
claims: &claims,
deny_only: false,
};
let prepared = iam_sys.prepare_auth(&args).await;
let needs_initial_tags = prepared.needs_existing_object_tag;
let needs_secondary_tags = prepared.needs_existing_object_tag_for_args(&args).await;
*get_policy_plugin_state().write().await = previous_state;
assert!(needs_initial_tags, "OPA mode must request existing object tags before evaluation");
assert!(needs_secondary_tags, "OPA mode must request existing object tags for secondary actions");
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_prepare_auth_denies_while_policy_plugin_is_unavailable() {
let store = StsTestMockStore::new(false);
let iam_sys = IamSys::new(IamCache::new(store).await.expect("initialize IAM cache"));
let claims = HashMap::new();
let groups = None;
let conditions = HashMap::new();
let args = Args {
account: "opa-unavailable-test-user",
groups: &groups,
action: Action::S3Action(S3Action::ListAllMyBucketsAction),
bucket: "",
conditions: &conditions,
is_owner: false,
object: "",
claims: &claims,
deny_only: false,
};
let mut outcomes = Vec::new();
for state in [PolicyPluginState::Initializing, PolicyPluginState::Failed] {
let prepared = state
.prepared_iam_auth()
.expect("unavailable policy plugin must prepare fail-closed IAM auth");
outcomes.push((
matches!(&prepared.mode, PreparedIamMode::Deny),
iam_sys.eval_prepared(&prepared, &args).await,
));
}
assert_eq!(outcomes, [(true, false), (true, false)]);
assert!(PolicyPluginState::Disabled.prepared_iam_auth().is_none());
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_policy_plugin_state_fails_after_opa_validation_returns_503() {
let listener = TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0")
.await
.expect("bind OPA validation test listener");
let url = format!(
"http://{}/v1/data/rustfs/authz/allow",
listener.local_addr().expect("read listener address")
);
let server = tokio::spawn(async move {
let (mut stream, _) = listener.accept().await.expect("accept OPA validation connection");
let mut request = [0_u8; 1024];
let bytes = stream.read(&mut request).await.expect("read OPA validation request");
assert!(bytes > 0, "OPA validation should send an HTTP request");
stream
.write_all(b"HTTP/1.1 503 Service Unavailable\r\nContent-Length: 0\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n")
.await
.expect("write OPA unavailable response");
});
let state = temp_env::async_with_vars(
[
("RUSTFS_POLICY_PLUGIN_URL", Some(url.as_str())),
("RUSTFS_POLICY_PLUGIN_AUTH_TOKEN", None),
],
resolve_policy_plugin_state(),
)
.await;
server.await.expect("join OPA validation test server");
assert!(matches!(state, PolicyPluginState::Failed));
}
const CUSTOM_STS_CLAIM_POLICY: &str = "custom-sts-claim-getobject";
const CUSTOM_STS_CLAIM_BUCKET: &str = "claim-bucket";
const CUSTOM_STS_CLAIM_POLICY_JSON: &str = r#"{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["s3:GetObject"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::claim-bucket/allowed/*"]
}
]
}"#;
/// Mock Store for STS tests: either group-attached policies via parent user, or no IAM policies.
#[derive(Clone)]
struct StsTestMockStore {
/// When true, parent user has no groups and no mapped policies (empty `policy_db_get`).
empty_policies: bool,
saved_sts_users: Arc<Mutex<HashMap<String, UserIdentity>>>,
saved_service_account_count: Arc<Mutex<usize>>,
fail_delete: Arc<std::sync::atomic::AtomicBool>,
deleted_mapped_policies: Arc<Mutex<Vec<(String, UserType)>>>,
block_delete: Arc<std::sync::atomic::AtomicBool>,
delete_started: Arc<tokio::sync::Notify>,
release_delete: Arc<tokio::sync::Notify>,
}
impl StsTestMockStore {
fn new(empty_policies: bool) -> Self {
Self {
empty_policies,
saved_sts_users: Arc::new(Mutex::new(HashMap::new())),
saved_service_account_count: Arc::new(Mutex::new(0)),
fail_delete: Arc::new(std::sync::atomic::AtomicBool::new(false)),
deleted_mapped_policies: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())),
block_delete: Arc::new(std::sync::atomic::AtomicBool::new(false)),
delete_started: Arc::new(tokio::sync::Notify::new()),
release_delete: Arc::new(tokio::sync::Notify::new()),
}
}
fn saved_service_account_count(&self) -> usize {
*self
.saved_service_account_count
.lock()
.expect("saved_service_account_count mutex poisoned")
}
}
#[async_trait::async_trait]
impl Store for StsTestMockStore {
fn has_watcher(&self) -> bool {
false
}
async fn save_iam_config<Item: serde::Serialize + Send>(&self, _item: Item, _path: impl AsRef<str> + Send) -> Result<()> {
Ok(())
}
async fn load_iam_config<Item: serde::de::DeserializeOwned>(&self, _path: impl AsRef<str> + Send) -> Result<Item> {
Err(Error::ConfigNotFound)
}
async fn delete_iam_config(&self, _path: impl AsRef<str> + Send) -> Result<()> {
Err(Error::InvalidArgument)
}
async fn save_user_identity(
&self,
name: &str,
user_type: UserType,
item: UserIdentity,
_ttl: Option<usize>,
) -> Result<()> {
if user_type == UserType::Svc {
*self
.saved_service_account_count
.lock()
.expect("saved_service_account_count mutex poisoned") += 1;
}
self.saved_sts_users
.lock()
.expect("saved_sts_users mutex poisoned")
.insert(name.to_string(), item);
Ok(())
}
async fn delete_user_identity(&self, name: &str, _user_type: UserType) -> Result<()> {
if self.block_delete.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst) {
self.delete_started.notify_one();
self.release_delete.notified().await;
}
if self.fail_delete.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst) {
return Err(Error::Io(std::io::Error::other("delete temporary account failed")));
}
self.saved_sts_users
.lock()
.expect("saved_sts_users mutex poisoned")
.remove(name);
Ok(())
}
async fn load_user_identity(&self, name: &str, _user_type: UserType) -> Result<UserIdentity> {
self.saved_sts_users
.lock()
.expect("saved_sts_users mutex poisoned")
.get(name)
.cloned()
.ok_or_else(|| Error::NoSuchUser(name.to_string()))
}
async fn load_user(&self, name: &str, user_type: UserType, m: &mut HashMap<String, UserIdentity>) -> Result<()> {
if matches!(name, "deleted-notify-user" | "deleted-notify-sts") {
return Err(Error::NoSuchUser(name.to_string()));
}
if user_type == UserType::Reg && name == "load-failure-user" {
return Err(Error::Io(std::io::Error::other("load user failed")));
}
if user_type == UserType::Reg && name == "notify-user" {
let user = UserIdentity::from(Credentials {
access_key: name.to_string(),
secret_key: "notify-user-secret".to_string(),
status: ACCOUNT_ON.to_string(),
..Default::default()
});
m.insert(name.to_string(), user);
}
Ok(())
}
async fn load_users(&self, _user_type: UserType, _m: &mut HashMap<String, UserIdentity>) -> Result<()> {
Ok(())
}
async fn load_secret_key(&self, _name: &str, _user_type: UserType) -> Result<String> {
Err(Error::InvalidArgument)
}
async fn save_group_info(&self, _name: &str, _item: GroupInfo) -> Result<()> {
Err(Error::InvalidArgument)
}
async fn delete_group_info(&self, _name: &str) -> Result<()> {
Err(Error::InvalidArgument)
}
async fn load_group(&self, name: &str, m: &mut HashMap<String, GroupInfo>) -> Result<()> {
if name == "notify-group" {
m.insert(name.to_string(), GroupInfo::new(vec!["notify-user".to_string()]));
}
Ok(())
}
async fn load_groups(&self, _m: &mut HashMap<String, GroupInfo>) -> Result<()> {
Err(Error::InvalidArgument)
}
async fn save_policy_doc(&self, _name: &str, _item: rustfs_policy::policy::PolicyDoc) -> Result<()> {
Err(Error::InvalidArgument)
}
async fn delete_policy_doc(&self, _name: &str) -> Result<()> {
Err(Error::InvalidArgument)
}
async fn load_policy(&self, _name: &str) -> Result<rustfs_policy::policy::PolicyDoc> {
Err(Error::InvalidArgument)
}
async fn load_policy_doc(&self, _name: &str, _m: &mut HashMap<String, rustfs_policy::policy::PolicyDoc>) -> Result<()> {
Err(Error::InvalidArgument)
}
async fn load_policy_docs(&self, _m: &mut HashMap<String, rustfs_policy::policy::PolicyDoc>) -> Result<()> {
Err(Error::InvalidArgument)
}
async fn save_mapped_policy(
&self,
_name: &str,
_user_type: UserType,
_is_group: bool,
_item: MappedPolicy,
_ttl: Option<usize>,
) -> Result<()> {
Err(Error::InvalidArgument)
}
async fn delete_mapped_policy(&self, name: &str, user_type: UserType, _is_group: bool) -> Result<()> {
self.deleted_mapped_policies
.lock()
.expect("deleted_mapped_policies mutex poisoned")
.push((name.to_string(), user_type));
Err(Error::InvalidArgument)
}
async fn load_mapped_policy(
&self,
name: &str,
user_type: UserType,
is_group: bool,
m: &mut HashMap<String, MappedPolicy>,
) -> Result<()> {
if user_type == UserType::Reg && !is_group && name == "notify-user" {
m.insert(name.to_string(), MappedPolicy::new("readwrite"));
}
if user_type == UserType::Sts && !is_group && name == "notify-sts-parent" {
m.insert(name.to_string(), MappedPolicy::new("readwrite"));
}
Ok(())
}
async fn load_mapped_policies(
&self,
_user_type: UserType,
_is_group: bool,
_m: &mut HashMap<String, MappedPolicy>,
) -> Result<()> {
Ok(())
}
async fn load_all(&self, cache: &Cache) -> Result<()> {
let mut policy_docs = get_default_policies();
let custom_claim_policy =
Policy::parse_config(CUSTOM_STS_CLAIM_POLICY_JSON.as_bytes()).expect("custom STS claim policy should parse");
policy_docs.insert(CUSTOM_STS_CLAIM_POLICY.to_string(), PolicyDoc::new(custom_claim_policy));
if self.empty_policies {
const PARENT_USER: &str = "sts-empty-parent-policy-test";
let creds = Credentials {
access_key: PARENT_USER.to_string(),
secret_key: "longenoughsecret".to_string(),
session_token: String::new(),
expiration: None,
status: "on".to_string(),
parent_user: String::new(),
groups: None,
claims: None,
name: None,
description: None,
};
let parent_identity = UserIdentity {
version: 1,
credentials: creds,
update_at: Some(OffsetDateTime::now_utc()),
};
let mut users = HashMap::new();
users.insert(PARENT_USER.to_string(), parent_identity);
cache.with_write_lock(|cache| {
cache.replace_policy_docs(CacheEntity::new(policy_docs));
cache.replace_users(CacheEntity::new(users));
cache.replace_groups(CacheEntity::default());
cache.replace_group_policies(CacheEntity::default());
cache.replace_user_policies(CacheEntity::default());
cache.replace_sts_accounts(CacheEntity::default());
cache.replace_sts_policies(CacheEntity::default());
cache.build_user_group_memberships();
});
return Ok(());
}
const PARENT_USER: &str = "sts-fallback-test-parent";
const GROUP_NAME: &str = "testgroup";
let creds = Credentials {
access_key: PARENT_USER.to_string(),
secret_key: "longenoughsecret".to_string(),
session_token: String::new(),
expiration: None,
status: "on".to_string(),
parent_user: String::new(),
groups: Some(vec![GROUP_NAME.to_string()]),
claims: None,
name: None,
description: None,
};
let parent_identity = UserIdentity {
version: 1,
credentials: creds,
update_at: Some(OffsetDateTime::now_utc()),
};
let mut users = HashMap::new();
users.insert(PARENT_USER.to_string(), parent_identity);
let group = GroupInfo::new(vec![PARENT_USER.to_string()]);
let mut groups = HashMap::new();
groups.insert(GROUP_NAME.to_string(), group);
let group_policy = MappedPolicy::new("readwrite");
let mut group_policies = HashMap::new();
group_policies.insert(GROUP_NAME.to_string(), group_policy);
cache.with_write_lock(|cache| {
cache.replace_policy_docs(CacheEntity::new(policy_docs));
cache.replace_users(CacheEntity::new(users));
cache.replace_groups(CacheEntity::new(groups));
cache.replace_group_policies(CacheEntity::new(group_policies));
cache.replace_user_policies(CacheEntity::default());
cache.replace_sts_accounts(CacheEntity::default());
cache.replace_sts_policies(CacheEntity::default());
cache.build_user_group_memberships();
});
Ok(())
}
}
fn ensure_test_global_credentials() {
if crate::root_credentials::credentials().is_none() {
let _ = init_global_action_credentials(Some("TESTROOTACCESSKEY".to_string()), Some("TESTROOTSECRET123".to_string()));
}
}
async fn test_iam_sys() -> IamSys<StsTestMockStore> {
let store = StsTestMockStore::new(false);
let cache = IamCache::new(store).await.expect("IAM cache should initialize");
IamSys::new(cache)
}
fn service_account_opts(access_key: &str, secret_key: &str) -> NewServiceAccountOpts {
NewServiceAccountOpts {
access_key: access_key.to_string(),
secret_key: secret_key.to_string(),
..Default::default()
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn new_service_account_rejects_parent_access_key() {
ensure_test_global_credentials();
let iam_sys = test_iam_sys().await;
let access_key = "PARENTACCESSKEY123";
let err = iam_sys
.new_service_account(access_key, None, service_account_opts(access_key, "parentAccessKeySecret123"))
.await
.expect_err("a service account must not reuse its parent access key");
assert_eq!(err, Error::AccessKeyAlreadyExists);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn service_account_mutations_return_the_persisted_replication_state() {
ensure_test_global_credentials();
let iam_sys = test_iam_sys().await;
let access_key = "REPLICATEDSTATE123";
iam_sys
.new_service_account("parent-user", None, service_account_opts(access_key, "replicatedStateSecret123"))
.await
.expect("create service account");
let session_policy = Policy::parse_config(CUSTOM_STS_CLAIM_POLICY_JSON.as_bytes()).expect("parse service-account policy");
iam_sys
.update_service_account(
access_key,
UpdateServiceAccountOpts {
session_policy: Some(session_policy),
secret_key: None,
name: None,
description: None,
expiration: None,
status: None,
parent_user: None,
allow_site_replicator_account: false,
},
)
.await
.expect("update service account");
let (updated, session_policy) = iam_sys
.get_service_account(access_key)
.await
.expect("updated service account");
assert!(session_policy.is_some_and(|policy| !policy.statements.is_empty()));
assert_eq!(
updated
.claims_or_empty()
.get(&iam_policy_claim_name_sa())
.and_then(Value::as_str),
Some(EMBEDDED_POLICY_TYPE)
);
iam_sys
.update_service_account(
access_key,
UpdateServiceAccountOpts {
session_policy: Some(Policy::default()),
secret_key: None,
name: None,
description: None,
expiration: None,
status: None,
parent_user: None,
allow_site_replicator_account: false,
},
)
.await
.expect("clear service account session policy");
let (cleared, session_policy) = iam_sys
.get_service_account(access_key)
.await
.expect("cleared service account");
assert!(session_policy.is_none());
assert_eq!(
cleared
.claims_or_empty()
.get(&iam_policy_claim_name_sa())
.and_then(Value::as_str),
Some(INHERITED_POLICY_TYPE)
);
let deleted_at = iam_sys
.delete_service_account_with_revision(access_key, false)
.await
.expect("delete service account")
.expect("deleted revision");
let (_, recreated_at) = iam_sys
.new_service_account("parent-user", None, service_account_opts(access_key, "recreatedStateSecret123"))
.await
.expect("recreate service account");
assert!(deleted_at <= recreated_at);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn duplicate_service_account_returns_access_key_already_exists() {
ensure_test_global_credentials();
let iam_sys = test_iam_sys().await;
let access_key = "DUPLICATESERVICEKEY1";
iam_sys
.new_service_account("svc-parent-user", None, service_account_opts(access_key, "firstServiceSecret123"))
.await
.expect("initial service account should be created");
let err = iam_sys
.new_service_account("svc-parent-user", None, service_account_opts(access_key, "secondServiceSecret123"))
.await
.expect_err("duplicate service account should fail");
assert_eq!(err, Error::AccessKeyAlreadyExists);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn service_account_creation_rejects_regular_user_access_key() {
ensure_test_global_credentials();
let iam_sys = test_iam_sys().await;
let access_key = "REGULARUSERACCESSKEY1";
let user = AddOrUpdateUserReq {
secret_key: "regularUserSecret123".to_string(),
policy: None,
status: rustfs_madmin::AccountStatus::Enabled,
};
iam_sys
.store
.add_user(access_key, &user)
.await
.expect("regular user should be created");
let err = iam_sys
.new_service_account("svc-parent-user", None, service_account_opts(access_key, "serviceAccountSecret123"))
.await
.expect_err("service-account creation must reject a regular-user access key");
assert_eq!(err, Error::AccessKeyAlreadyExists);
assert_eq!(iam_sys.store.api.saved_service_account_count(), 0);
let existing = iam_sys.get_user(access_key).await.expect("regular user should remain cached");
assert!(!existing.credentials.is_service_account());
assert_eq!(existing.credentials.secret_key, user.secret_key);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn service_account_creation_rejects_sts_access_key() {
ensure_test_global_credentials();
let iam_sys = test_iam_sys().await;
let access_key = "TEMPORARYSERVICEKEY12";
let temp_cred = Credentials {
access_key: access_key.to_string(),
secret_key: "temporarySecretKey123".to_string(),
session_token: "temporary-session-token".to_string(),
expiration: Some(OffsetDateTime::now_utc() + time::Duration::hours(1)),
status: ACCOUNT_ON.to_string(),
parent_user: "sts-parent-user".to_string(),
..Default::default()
};
iam_sys
.set_temp_user(access_key, &temp_cred, None)
.await
.expect("temporary credentials should be created");
let err = iam_sys
.new_service_account("svc-parent-user", None, service_account_opts(access_key, "serviceAccountSecret123"))
.await
.expect_err("service-account creation must reject a temporary access key");
assert_eq!(err, Error::AccessKeyAlreadyExists);
assert_eq!(iam_sys.store.api.saved_service_account_count(), 0);
let existing = iam_sys
.get_user(access_key)
.await
.expect("temporary account should remain cached");
assert!(existing.credentials.is_temp());
assert_eq!(existing.credentials.secret_key, temp_cred.secret_key);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn user_creation_rejects_service_account_access_key() {
ensure_test_global_credentials();
let iam_sys = test_iam_sys().await;
let access_key = "SERVICEACCOUNTKEY123";
iam_sys
.new_service_account("svc-parent-user", None, service_account_opts(access_key, "serviceAccountSecret123"))
.await
.expect("service account should be created");
let user = AddOrUpdateUserReq {
secret_key: "regularUserSecret123".to_string(),
policy: None,
status: rustfs_madmin::AccountStatus::Enabled,
};
let err = iam_sys
.create_user(access_key, &user)
.await
.expect_err("user creation must reject a service-account access key");
assert_eq!(err, Error::AccessKeyAlreadyExists);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_new_service_account_without_expiration_omits_exp_claim() {
ensure_test_global_credentials();
let store = StsTestMockStore::new(false);
let cache_manager = IamCache::new(store).await.unwrap();
let iam_sys = IamSys::new(cache_manager);
let (cred, _) = iam_sys
.new_service_account("svc-parent-user", None, NewServiceAccountOpts::default())
.await
.expect("service account should be created without expiration");
assert!(cred.expiration.is_none());
let claims = get_claims_from_token_with_secret_allow_missing_exp(&cred.session_token, &cred.secret_key)
.expect("service account JWT without expiration should decode");
assert!(
!claims.contains_key("exp"),
"service account without explicit expiration should not get a default JWT exp"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_update_service_account_updates_exp_claim() {
ensure_test_global_credentials();
let store = StsTestMockStore::new(false);
let cache_manager = IamCache::new(store).await.unwrap();
let iam_sys = IamSys::new(cache_manager);
let initial_expiration = OffsetDateTime::now_utc() + time::Duration::hours(2);
let (cred, _) = iam_sys
.new_service_account(
"svc-parent-user",
None,
NewServiceAccountOpts {
expiration: Some(initial_expiration),
..Default::default()
},
)
.await
.expect("service account with explicit expiration should be created");
let updated_expiration = OffsetDateTime::now_utc() + time::Duration::hours(4);
iam_sys
.update_service_account(
&cred.access_key,
UpdateServiceAccountOpts {
session_policy: None,
secret_key: None,
name: None,
description: None,
expiration: Some(updated_expiration),
status: None,
parent_user: None,
allow_site_replicator_account: false,
},
)
.await
.expect("service account expiration should update");
let updated_user = iam_sys
.get_user(&cred.access_key)
.await
.expect("updated service account should exist");
assert_eq!(updated_user.credentials.expiration, Some(updated_expiration));
let claims =
get_claims_from_token_with_secret(&updated_user.credentials.session_token, &updated_user.credentials.secret_key)
.expect("updated service account JWT should decode");
assert_eq!(
claims.get("exp").and_then(|v| v.as_i64()),
Some(updated_expiration.unix_timestamp()),
"updating service account expiration must rewrite the JWT exp claim"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_update_service_account_adds_exp_claim_to_non_expiring_account() {
ensure_test_global_credentials();
let store = StsTestMockStore::new(false);
let cache_manager = IamCache::new(store).await.unwrap();
let iam_sys = IamSys::new(cache_manager);
let (cred, _) = iam_sys
.new_service_account("svc-parent-user", None, NewServiceAccountOpts::default())
.await
.expect("service account without explicit expiration should be created");
let updated_expiration = OffsetDateTime::now_utc() + time::Duration::hours(3);
iam_sys
.update_service_account(
&cred.access_key,
UpdateServiceAccountOpts {
session_policy: None,
secret_key: None,
name: None,
description: None,
expiration: Some(updated_expiration),
status: None,
parent_user: None,
allow_site_replicator_account: false,
},
)
.await
.expect("service account without expiration should accept a new expiration");
let updated_user = iam_sys
.get_user(&cred.access_key)
.await
.expect("updated service account should exist");
assert_eq!(updated_user.credentials.expiration, Some(updated_expiration));
let claims =
get_claims_from_token_with_secret(&updated_user.credentials.session_token, &updated_user.credentials.secret_key)
.expect("updated service account JWT should decode after adding expiration");
assert_eq!(claims.get("exp").and_then(|v| v.as_i64()), Some(updated_expiration.unix_timestamp()));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_site_replicator_update_requires_explicit_internal_allowance() {
ensure_test_global_credentials();
let store = StsTestMockStore::new(false);
let cache_manager = IamCache::new(store).await.unwrap();
let iam_sys = IamSys::new(cache_manager);
let (cred, _) = iam_sys
.new_service_account(
"svc-parent-user",
None,
NewServiceAccountOpts {
access_key: SITE_REPLICATOR_SERVICE_ACCOUNT.to_string(),
secret_key: "siteReplicatorSecretKeyForTest1234567890".to_string(),
allow_site_replicator_account: true,
..Default::default()
},
)
.await
.expect("internal site replicator account should be created with explicit allowance");
assert!(
iam_sys
.update_service_account(
&cred.access_key,
UpdateServiceAccountOpts {
session_policy: None,
secret_key: None,
name: None,
description: None,
expiration: None,
status: Some(STATUS_ENABLED.to_string()),
parent_user: None,
allow_site_replicator_account: false,
},
)
.await
.is_err(),
"ordinary update must not mutate the internal site replicator account"
);
iam_sys
.update_service_account(
&cred.access_key,
UpdateServiceAccountOpts {
session_policy: None,
secret_key: None,
name: None,
description: None,
expiration: None,
status: Some(STATUS_ENABLED.to_string()),
parent_user: None,
allow_site_replicator_account: true,
},
)
.await
.expect("internal update should be allowed explicitly");
assert_eq!(
iam_sys
.get_site_replicator_service_account_secret(&cred.access_key)
.await
.expect("internal secret should be readable for canonical account"),
cred.secret_key
);
}
/// A root-credential change can leave `site-replicator-0` bound to a parent that no
/// longer exists, and the repair must rebind in place: deleting first would leave the
/// site with no replication account at all if the recreate failed. The parent also lives
/// in the session token, so both copies have to move together or authorization denies
/// the account.
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_site_replicator_parent_rebind_updates_credential_and_claim() {
ensure_test_global_credentials();
let store = StsTestMockStore::new(false);
let cache_manager = IamCache::new(store).await.unwrap();
let iam_sys = IamSys::new(cache_manager);
let (cred, _) = iam_sys
.new_service_account(
"stale-parent-user",
None,
NewServiceAccountOpts {
access_key: SITE_REPLICATOR_SERVICE_ACCOUNT.to_string(),
secret_key: "siteReplicatorSecretKeyForTest1234567890".to_string(),
allow_site_replicator_account: true,
..Default::default()
},
)
.await
.expect("site replicator account should be created");
iam_sys
.update_service_account(
&cred.access_key,
UpdateServiceAccountOpts {
session_policy: None,
secret_key: None,
name: None,
description: None,
expiration: None,
status: None,
parent_user: Some("current-parent-user".to_string()),
allow_site_replicator_account: true,
},
)
.await
.expect("site replication repair may rebind the parent");
let (identity, claims) = iam_sys
.get_account_with_claims_allow_missing_exp(&cred.access_key)
.await
.expect("rebound account should still be readable");
assert_eq!(identity.credentials.parent_user, "current-parent-user");
assert_eq!(
claims.get("parent").and_then(Value::as_str),
Some("current-parent-user"),
"the token claim must follow the credential or authorization denies the account"
);
assert_eq!(
iam_sys
.get_site_replicator_service_account_secret(&cred.access_key)
.await
.expect("secret survives a rebind"),
cred.secret_key,
"peers keep using the same secret, so a rebind must not rotate it"
);
}
/// The rebind is a site-replication repair primitive, not a general capability: letting
/// any caller re-parent a service account would let it inherit another user's policies.
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_parent_rebind_is_rejected_for_ordinary_service_accounts() {
ensure_test_global_credentials();
let store = StsTestMockStore::new(false);
let cache_manager = IamCache::new(store).await.unwrap();
let iam_sys = IamSys::new(cache_manager);
let (cred, _) = iam_sys
.new_service_account(
"ordinary-parent",
None,
NewServiceAccountOpts {
access_key: "ordinary-service-account".to_string(),
secret_key: "ordinaryServiceAccountSecret1234567890".to_string(),
..Default::default()
},
)
.await
.expect("ordinary service account should be created");
for allow in [false, true] {
assert!(
iam_sys
.update_service_account(
&cred.access_key,
UpdateServiceAccountOpts {
session_policy: None,
secret_key: None,
name: None,
description: None,
expiration: None,
status: None,
parent_user: Some("victim-user".to_string()),
allow_site_replicator_account: allow,
},
)
.await
.is_err(),
"re-parenting an ordinary service account must be rejected (allow={allow})"
);
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_created_access_token_authorizes_with_parent_policy() {
ensure_test_global_credentials();
let store = StsTestMockStore::new(false);
let cache_manager = IamCache::new(store).await.unwrap();
let iam_sys = IamSys::new(cache_manager);
let parent_user = "sts-fallback-test-parent";
let groups = Some(vec!["testgroup".to_string()]);
let (cred, _) = iam_sys
.new_service_account(
parent_user,
groups.clone(),
NewServiceAccountOpts {
access_key: "ACCESSTOKENTESTUSER".to_string(),
secret_key: "accessTokenTestSecret".to_string(),
..Default::default()
},
)
.await
.expect("access token should be created");
let stored = iam_sys
.get_user(&cred.access_key)
.await
.expect("created access token should be cached");
assert!(stored.credentials.is_service_account());
assert_eq!(stored.credentials.parent_user, parent_user);
let claims = stored
.credentials
.claims
.as_ref()
.expect("created access token should have decoded JWT claims");
assert_eq!(claims.get("parent").and_then(Value::as_str), Some(parent_user));
assert_eq!(
claims.get(&iam_policy_claim_name_sa()).and_then(Value::as_str),
Some(INHERITED_POLICY_TYPE)
);
let (is_service_account, resolved_parent) = iam_sys
.is_service_account(&cred.access_key)
.await
.expect("created access token should be recognized as a service account");
assert!(is_service_account);
assert_eq!(resolved_parent, parent_user);
let (redacted, policy) = iam_sys
.get_service_account(&cred.access_key)
.await
.expect("created access token should be readable");
assert_eq!(redacted.access_key, cred.access_key);
assert_eq!(redacted.parent_user, parent_user);
assert!(redacted.secret_key.is_empty());
assert!(redacted.session_token.is_empty());
assert!(policy.is_none());
let args = Args {
account: &cred.access_key,
groups: &groups,
action: Action::S3Action(S3Action::ListBucketAction),
bucket: "mybucket",
conditions: &HashMap::new(),
is_owner: false,
object: "",
claims,
deny_only: false,
};
let prepared = iam_sys.prepare_auth(&args).await;
assert!(
matches!(prepared.mode, PreparedIamMode::ServiceAccount { .. }),
"created access token must use service-account authorization path"
);
assert!(
iam_sys.eval_prepared(&prepared, &args).await,
"created access token should be allowed through the parent's group policy"
);
}
/// GHSA-m77q-r63m-pj89 (STS JWTs signed with the shared root secret —
/// intentionally UNFIXED). This test characterizes the STS credential
/// lifecycle: a session token signed with the active token-signing key
/// decodes and authorizes through the STS path. It pins that the SAME key
/// both signs and verifies STS tokens.
///
/// MUST UPDATE WHEN GHSA-m77q IS FIXED: the fix introduces a dedicated STS
/// signing key distinct from the root secret. The narrower pin that captures
/// the advisory's exact signature (signing key == root secret) is
/// `test_ghsa_m77q_sts_session_token_signed_with_root_secret`; keep both in
/// lockstep and flip them red -> green together.
/// Advisory: <https://github.com/rustfs/rustfs/security/advisories/GHSA-m77q-r63m-pj89>
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_created_sts_credentials_authorize_with_session_token_claims() {
ensure_test_global_credentials();
let store = StsTestMockStore::new(false);
let cache_manager = IamCache::new(store).await.unwrap();
let iam_sys = IamSys::new(cache_manager);
let parent_user = "sts-fallback-test-parent";
let token_secret = crate::root_credentials::token_signing_key()
.unwrap_or_else(|| unreachable!("global action credentials should be initialized"));
let mut claims = HashMap::new();
claims.insert("parent".to_string(), Value::String(parent_user.to_string()));
claims.insert(
"exp".to_string(),
Value::Number(serde_json::Number::from(
(OffsetDateTime::now_utc() + time::Duration::hours(1)).unix_timestamp(),
)),
);
let mut cred = get_new_credentials_with_metadata(&claims, &token_secret).expect("STS credentials should be created");
cred.parent_user = parent_user.to_string();
iam_sys
.set_temp_user(&cred.access_key, &cred, None)
.await
.expect("STS credentials should be persisted in the temp-user cache");
let stored = iam_sys
.get_user(&cred.access_key)
.await
.expect("created STS credentials should be cached");
assert!(stored.credentials.is_temp());
assert!(!stored.credentials.is_service_account());
assert_eq!(stored.credentials.parent_user, parent_user);
let (is_temp, resolved_parent) = iam_sys
.is_temp_user(&cred.access_key)
.await
.expect("created STS credentials should be recognized as temp");
assert!(is_temp);
assert_eq!(resolved_parent, parent_user);
let listed = iam_sys
.list_sts_accounts(parent_user)
.await
.expect("created STS credentials should be listable by parent");
assert_eq!(listed.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(listed[0].access_key, cred.access_key);
assert_eq!(listed[0].parent_user, parent_user);
assert!(listed[0].secret_key.is_empty());
assert!(listed[0].session_token.is_empty());
let temp_accounts = iam_sys
.list_temp_accounts(parent_user)
.await
.expect("created STS credentials should be listable as temp accounts");
assert_eq!(temp_accounts.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(temp_accounts[0].credentials.access_key, cred.access_key);
assert_eq!(temp_accounts[0].credentials.parent_user, parent_user);
assert!(temp_accounts[0].credentials.secret_key.is_empty());
assert!(temp_accounts[0].credentials.session_token.is_empty());
let (redacted, policy) = iam_sys
.get_temporary_account(&cred.access_key)
.await
.expect("created STS credentials should be readable");
assert_eq!(redacted.access_key, cred.access_key);
assert_eq!(redacted.parent_user, parent_user);
assert!(redacted.secret_key.is_empty());
assert!(redacted.session_token.is_empty());
assert!(policy.is_none());
let decoded_claims = get_claims_from_token_with_secret(&cred.session_token, &token_secret)
.expect("created STS session token should decode with the active signing key");
assert_eq!(decoded_claims.get("parent").and_then(Value::as_str), Some(parent_user));
let groups: Option<Vec<String>> = None;
let args = Args {
account: &cred.access_key,
groups: &groups,
action: Action::S3Action(S3Action::ListBucketAction),
bucket: "mybucket",
conditions: &HashMap::new(),
is_owner: false,
object: "",
claims: &decoded_claims,
deny_only: false,
};
let prepared = iam_sys.prepare_auth(&args).await;
assert!(
matches!(prepared.mode, PreparedIamMode::Sts { .. }),
"created STS credentials must use STS authorization path"
);
assert!(
iam_sys.eval_prepared(&prepared, &args).await,
"created STS credentials should inherit the parent user's group policy"
);
}
/// GHSA-m77q-r63m-pj89 flow-level pin (STS session tokens are signed with the
/// shared root secret — intentionally UNFIXED). Anyone holding the root secret
/// can forge STS session tokens because RustFS reuses the root secret as the
/// STS token-signing key. This test PINS that vulnerable-by-design behavior end
/// to end: (1) the token-signing key IS the root secret, (2) an AssumeRole-style
/// session token issued with that key decodes with the ROOT secret and NOT with
/// any other secret, and (3) it authorizes through the STS path.
///
/// MUST UPDATE WHEN GHSA-m77q IS FIXED: the fix introduces a dedicated STS
/// signing key distinct from the root secret. That makes assertion (1) and the
/// "root secret decodes the token" assertion fail (red). Whoever fixes m77q must
/// replace this pin with a regression asserting the NEW behavior — the root
/// secret can no longer decode STS session tokens — i.e. red -> green.
/// Advisory: <https://github.com/rustfs/rustfs/security/advisories/GHSA-m77q-r63m-pj89>
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_ghsa_m77q_sts_session_token_signed_with_root_secret() {
ensure_test_global_credentials();
let root = crate::root_credentials::credentials().expect("global action (root) credentials should be initialized");
assert!(!root.secret_key.is_empty(), "root secret must be present for the STS signing-key pin");
// (1) m77q signature: the STS token-signing key IS the root secret. A fix
// that introduces a dedicated STS key makes this fail -> update red->green.
assert_eq!(
crate::root_credentials::token_signing_key().as_deref(),
Some(root.secret_key.as_str()),
"GHSA-m77q pin: STS tokens are signed with the root secret. If this fails, \
m77q may have been fixed (dedicated STS key) — update this test red->green."
);
// AssumeRole-style issuance: mint a session token with the active signing key.
// Use the mock store's registered STS parent (group `testgroup` -> readwrite)
// so authorization resolves through the STS path; the m77q pin is about the
// signing key, not the parent identity.
let parent_user = "sts-fallback-test-parent";
let signing_key = crate::root_credentials::token_signing_key().expect("STS token-signing key should be present");
let mut claims = HashMap::new();
claims.insert("parent".to_string(), Value::String(parent_user.to_string()));
claims.insert(
"exp".to_string(),
Value::Number(serde_json::Number::from(
(OffsetDateTime::now_utc() + time::Duration::hours(1)).unix_timestamp(),
)),
);
let mut cred = get_new_credentials_with_metadata(&claims, &signing_key).expect("STS credentials should be created");
cred.parent_user = parent_user.to_string();
// (2) The session token decodes with the ROOT secret specifically — the crux
// of m77q — and rejects any non-root secret (HMAC verification fails).
let decoded = get_claims_from_token_with_secret(&cred.session_token, &root.secret_key)
.expect("GHSA-m77q pin: STS session token must decode with the ROOT secret");
assert_eq!(decoded.get("parent").and_then(Value::as_str), Some(parent_user));
assert!(
get_claims_from_token_with_secret(&cred.session_token, "not-the-root-secret").is_err(),
"GHSA-m77q pin: STS session token must NOT decode with a non-root secret"
);
// (3) The root-secret-signed STS credentials authorize end to end.
let store = StsTestMockStore::new(false);
let cache_manager = IamCache::new(store).await.unwrap();
let iam_sys = IamSys::new(cache_manager);
iam_sys
.set_temp_user(&cred.access_key, &cred, None)
.await
.expect("STS credentials should be persisted in the temp-user cache");
let groups: Option<Vec<String>> = None;
let args = Args {
account: &cred.access_key,
groups: &groups,
action: Action::S3Action(S3Action::ListBucketAction),
bucket: "mybucket",
conditions: &HashMap::new(),
is_owner: false,
object: "",
claims: &decoded,
deny_only: false,
};
let prepared = iam_sys.prepare_auth(&args).await;
assert!(
matches!(prepared.mode, PreparedIamMode::Sts { .. }),
"root-secret-signed STS credentials must use the STS authorization path"
);
assert!(
iam_sys.eval_prepared(&prepared, &args).await,
"root-secret-signed STS credentials should authorize through the parent group policy (m77q)"
);
}
/// Regression test: temp credentials without groups in args still receive group-attached
/// policies via the parent user (groups fallback). Without the fallback, policy_db_get
/// would get None for groups and the user would have no group policies, so the action
/// would be denied.
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_sts_groups_fallback_temp_creds_receive_parent_group_policies() {
let store = StsTestMockStore::new(false);
let cache_manager = IamCache::new(store).await.unwrap();
let iam_sys = IamSys::new(cache_manager);
let parent_user = "sts-fallback-test-parent";
let claims = HashMap::new();
let groups: Option<Vec<String>> = None;
let args = Args {
account: parent_user,
groups: &groups,
action: Action::S3Action(S3Action::ListBucketAction),
bucket: "mybucket",
conditions: &HashMap::new(),
is_owner: false,
object: "",
claims: &claims,
deny_only: false,
};
let prepared = iam_sys.prepare_sts_auth(&args, parent_user).await;
let allowed = iam_sys.eval_prepared(&prepared, &args).await;
assert!(
allowed,
"STS temp credentials with no groups in args should still be allowed via parent user's group policy (readwrite)"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_sts_claim_policy_resolves_custom_canned_policy() {
let store = StsTestMockStore::new(true);
let cache_manager = IamCache::new(store).await.unwrap();
let iam_sys = IamSys::new(cache_manager);
let parent_user = "sts-empty-parent-policy-test";
let sts_access_key = "sts-custom-claim-policy-test-user";
let sts_user = UserIdentity::from(Credentials {
access_key: sts_access_key.to_string(),
secret_key: "longenoughsecret".to_string(),
session_token: "sts-token".to_string(),
status: ACCOUNT_ON.to_string(),
parent_user: parent_user.to_string(),
..Default::default()
});
iam_sys
.store
.cache
.add_or_update_sts_account(sts_access_key, &sts_user, OffsetDateTime::now_utc());
let mut claims = HashMap::new();
claims.insert(POLICYNAME.to_string(), Value::String(CUSTOM_STS_CLAIM_POLICY.to_string()));
let groups: Option<Vec<String>> = None;
let args = Args {
account: sts_access_key,
groups: &groups,
action: Action::S3Action(S3Action::GetObjectAction),
bucket: CUSTOM_STS_CLAIM_BUCKET,
conditions: &HashMap::new(),
is_owner: false,
object: "allowed/object.txt",
claims: &claims,
deny_only: false,
};
let prepared = iam_sys.prepare_sts_auth(&args, parent_user).await;
assert!(matches!(prepared.mode, PreparedIamMode::Sts { .. }));
assert!(
iam_sys.eval_prepared(&prepared, &args).await,
"STS temp credentials should resolve custom canned policy names carried in JWT policy claims"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn oidc_service_account_uses_verified_policy_and_persisted_boundary() {
ensure_test_global_credentials();
let iam_sys = IamSys::new(IamCache::new(StsTestMockStore::new(true)).await.unwrap());
let parent_user = "TwyekekG2eMes0qk9Tgh7KXEitwGi1z2W1f2KccrXGA";
let mut oidc_claims = HashMap::from([
("iss".to_string(), Value::String("rustfs-oidc".to_string())),
("oidc_provider".to_string(), Value::String("default".to_string())),
("sub".to_string(), Value::String("subject-123".to_string())),
("parent".to_string(), Value::String(parent_user.to_string())),
(OIDC_VIRTUAL_PARENT_CLAIM.to_string(), Value::String(parent_user.to_string())),
(POLICYNAME.to_string(), Value::String("readwrite".to_string())),
]);
oidc_claims.insert(
SESSION_POLICY_NAME.to_string(),
Value::String(base64_simd::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode_to_string(CUSTOM_STS_CLAIM_POLICY_JSON.as_bytes())),
);
oidc_claims.insert("exp".to_string(), Value::Number(123456.into()));
let caller = Credentials {
access_key: "OIDCTEMPORARYCALLER1".to_string(),
secret_key: "oidcTemporaryCallerSecret123".to_string(),
session_token: "signed-session-token".to_string(),
parent_user: parent_user.to_string(),
claims: Some(oidc_claims),
..Default::default()
};
let (credential, _, replication_claims) = iam_sys
.new_service_account_from_caller(
parent_user,
None,
NewServiceAccountOpts {
access_key: "OIDCSERVICEACCOUNT01".to_string(),
secret_key: "oidcServiceAccountSecret123".to_string(),
..Default::default()
},
&caller,
)
.await
.expect("OIDC service account should be created");
assert_eq!(replication_claims.get(VERIFIED_FEDERATED_POLICY_CLAIM), Some(&Value::Bool(true)));
assert_eq!(
replication_claims.get(OIDC_VIRTUAL_PARENT_CLAIM),
Some(&Value::String(parent_user.to_string()))
);
assert!(replication_claims.contains_key(FEDERATED_POLICY_BOUNDARY_CLAIM));
assert!(!replication_claims.contains_key("exp"));
let claims = iam_sys
.get_claims_for_svc_acc(&credential.access_key)
.await
.expect("stored service-account claims should decode");
let groups = None;
let conditions = HashMap::new();
for (action, allowed) in [(S3Action::GetObjectAction, true), (S3Action::PutObjectAction, false)] {
let args = Args {
account: &credential.access_key,
groups: &groups,
action: Action::S3Action(action),
bucket: CUSTOM_STS_CLAIM_BUCKET,
conditions: &conditions,
is_owner: false,
object: "allowed/object.txt",
claims: &claims,
deny_only: false,
};
assert_eq!(
iam_sys.is_allowed(&args).await,
allowed,
"service-account permissions must be the OIDC policy intersected with its session boundary"
);
}
iam_sys.store.cache.delete_policy_doc("readwrite", OffsetDateTime::now_utc());
let args = Args {
account: &credential.access_key,
groups: &groups,
action: Action::S3Action(S3Action::GetObjectAction),
bucket: CUSTOM_STS_CLAIM_BUCKET,
conditions: &conditions,
is_owner: false,
object: "allowed/object.txt",
claims: &claims,
deny_only: false,
};
assert!(
!iam_sys.is_allowed(&args).await,
"OIDC service accounts must resolve current policy documents instead of retaining a policy snapshot"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn oidc_group_policy_applies_to_sts_and_service_account() {
ensure_test_global_credentials();
let iam_sys = IamSys::new(IamCache::new(StsTestMockStore::new(false)).await.unwrap());
let parent_user = "openid=group-policy-parent";
let groups = Some(vec!["testgroup".to_string()]);
let claims = HashMap::from([
("iss".to_string(), Value::String("rustfs-oidc".to_string())),
("oidc_provider".to_string(), Value::String("default".to_string())),
("sub".to_string(), Value::String("subject-123".to_string())),
("parent".to_string(), Value::String(parent_user.to_string())),
(OIDC_VIRTUAL_PARENT_CLAIM.to_string(), Value::String(parent_user.to_string())),
(POLICYNAME.to_string(), Value::String("readwrite".to_string())),
]);
let conditions = HashMap::new();
let sts_args = Args {
account: "OIDCGROUPCALLER01",
groups: &groups,
action: Action::S3Action(S3Action::GetObjectAction),
bucket: "bucket",
conditions: &conditions,
is_owner: false,
object: "object.txt",
claims: &claims,
deny_only: false,
};
let prepared = iam_sys.prepare_sts_auth(&sts_args, parent_user).await;
assert!(
iam_sys.eval_prepared(&prepared, &sts_args).await,
"OIDC STS must include policies mapped from verified groups"
);
let caller = Credentials {
access_key: "OIDCGROUPCALLER01".to_string(),
parent_user: parent_user.to_string(),
groups: groups.clone(),
claims: Some(claims.clone()),
..Default::default()
};
let (service_account, _, replication_claims) = iam_sys
.new_service_account_from_caller(
parent_user,
groups.clone(),
NewServiceAccountOpts {
access_key: "OIDCGROUPSERVICE01".to_string(),
secret_key: "oidcGroupServiceSecret123".to_string(),
..Default::default()
},
&caller,
)
.await
.expect("group-authorized OIDC caller should create a service account");
assert_eq!(replication_claims.get(VERIFIED_FEDERATED_POLICY_CLAIM), Some(&Value::Bool(true)));
assert_eq!(replication_claims.get(POLICYNAME), Some(&Value::String("readwrite".to_string())));
let service_claims = iam_sys
.get_claims_for_svc_acc(&service_account.access_key)
.await
.expect("service-account claims");
let service_args = Args {
account: &service_account.access_key,
groups: &groups,
claims: &service_claims,
..sts_args
};
assert!(
iam_sys.is_allowed(&service_args).await,
"OIDC service account must resolve the policy names selected at STS issuance"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn verified_oidc_policy_names_do_not_drift_after_group_mapping_changes() {
let iam_sys = IamSys::new(IamCache::new(StsTestMockStore::new(false)).await.unwrap());
let deny_delete = Policy::parse_config(
br#"{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Deny","Action":["s3:DeleteObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::bucket/*"]}]}"#,
)
.expect("parse deny policy");
let now = OffsetDateTime::now_utc();
iam_sys
.store
.cache
.add_or_update_policy_doc("deny-delete", &PolicyDoc::new(deny_delete), now);
iam_sys
.store
.cache
.add_or_update_group_policy("testgroup", &MappedPolicy::new("writeonly"), now);
let parent_user = "openid=group-deny-parent";
let claims = HashMap::from([
("iss".to_string(), Value::String("rustfs-oidc".to_string())),
("oidc_provider".to_string(), Value::String("default".to_string())),
("sub".to_string(), Value::String("subject-123".to_string())),
("parent".to_string(), Value::String(parent_user.to_string())),
(OIDC_VIRTUAL_PARENT_CLAIM.to_string(), Value::String(parent_user.to_string())),
(POLICYNAME.to_string(), Value::String("readonly,deny-delete".to_string())),
]);
let groups = Some(vec!["testgroup".to_string()]);
let conditions = HashMap::new();
for (action, allowed) in [
(S3Action::GetObjectAction, true),
(S3Action::PutObjectAction, false),
(S3Action::DeleteObjectAction, false),
] {
let args = Args {
account: "OIDCGROUPCALLER02",
groups: &groups,
action: Action::S3Action(action),
bucket: "bucket",
conditions: &conditions,
is_owner: false,
object: "object.txt",
claims: &claims,
deny_only: false,
};
let prepared = iam_sys.prepare_sts_auth(&args, parent_user).await;
assert_eq!(
iam_sys.eval_prepared(&prepared, &args).await,
allowed,
"verified OIDC sessions must retain the policy names selected at issuance"
);
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn active_legacy_oidc_session_can_create_service_account_after_upgrade() {
ensure_test_global_credentials();
let iam_sys = IamSys::new(IamCache::new(StsTestMockStore::new(true)).await.unwrap());
let parent_user = "legacy-oidc-user";
let legacy_claims = HashMap::from([
("iss".to_string(), Value::String("rustfs-oidc".to_string())),
("oidc_provider".to_string(), Value::String("default".to_string())),
("sub".to_string(), Value::String("subject-123".to_string())),
("parent".to_string(), Value::String(parent_user.to_string())),
(POLICYNAME.to_string(), Value::String("readwrite".to_string())),
]);
let caller = Credentials {
access_key: "LEGACYOIDCCALLER01".to_string(),
parent_user: parent_user.to_string(),
claims: Some(legacy_claims),
..Default::default()
};
let (service_account, _, replication_claims) = iam_sys
.new_service_account_from_caller(
parent_user,
None,
NewServiceAccountOpts {
access_key: "LEGACYOIDCSERVICE01".to_string(),
secret_key: "legacyOidcServiceSecret123".to_string(),
..Default::default()
},
&caller,
)
.await
.expect("active pre-upgrade OIDC session should remain usable");
assert!(!replication_claims.contains_key(OIDC_VIRTUAL_PARENT_CLAIM));
assert_eq!(replication_claims.get(POLICYNAME), Some(&Value::String("readwrite".to_string())));
let claims = iam_sys
.get_claims_for_svc_acc(&service_account.access_key)
.await
.expect("legacy-derived service-account claims");
let groups = None;
let args = Args {
account: &service_account.access_key,
groups: &groups,
action: Action::S3Action(S3Action::GetObjectAction),
bucket: "bucket",
conditions: &HashMap::new(),
is_owner: false,
object: "object.txt",
claims: &claims,
deny_only: false,
};
assert!(iam_sys.is_allowed(&args).await);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn non_owner_import_cannot_preserve_verified_federated_policy() {
ensure_test_global_credentials();
let iam_sys = test_iam_sys().await;
let parent_user = "sts-fallback-test-parent";
iam_sys
.store
.cache
.add_or_update_user_policy(parent_user, &MappedPolicy::new("readwrite"), OffsetDateTime::now_utc());
let mut claims = HashMap::from([
("iss".to_string(), Value::String("rustfs-oidc".to_string())),
("oidc_provider".to_string(), Value::String("default".to_string())),
("sub".to_string(), Value::String("subject-123".to_string())),
("parent".to_string(), Value::String(parent_user.to_string())),
(OIDC_VIRTUAL_PARENT_CLAIM.to_string(), Value::String(parent_user.to_string())),
(POLICYNAME.to_string(), Value::String("readwrite".to_string())),
(VERIFIED_FEDERATED_POLICY_CLAIM.to_string(), Value::Bool(true)),
(
FEDERATED_POLICY_BOUNDARY_CLAIM.to_string(),
Value::String(base64_simd::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode_to_string(CUSTOM_STS_CLAIM_POLICY_JSON.as_bytes())),
),
]);
remove_verified_federated_policy(&mut claims);
let (credential, _) = iam_sys
.new_service_account(
parent_user,
None,
NewServiceAccountOpts {
access_key: "IMPORTEDOIDCSERVICE1".to_string(),
secret_key: "importedOidcServiceSecret123".to_string(),
claims: Some(claims),
..Default::default()
},
)
.await
.expect("sanitized service account should be persisted");
let stored_claims = iam_sys
.get_claims_for_svc_acc(&credential.access_key)
.await
.expect("stored service-account claims should decode");
assert!(!stored_claims.contains_key(VERIFIED_FEDERATED_POLICY_CLAIM));
assert!(!stored_claims.contains_key(FEDERATED_POLICY_BOUNDARY_CLAIM));
assert!(!stored_claims.contains_key(OIDC_VIRTUAL_PARENT_CLAIM));
let args = Args {
account: &credential.access_key,
groups: &None,
action: Action::S3Action(S3Action::GetObjectAction),
bucket: CUSTOM_STS_CLAIM_BUCKET,
conditions: &HashMap::new(),
is_owner: false,
object: "allowed/object.txt",
claims: &stored_claims,
deny_only: false,
};
assert!(!iam_sys.is_allowed(&args).await);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn oidc_service_account_rejects_mismatched_virtual_parent() {
ensure_test_global_credentials();
let iam_sys = IamSys::new(IamCache::new(StsTestMockStore::new(true)).await.unwrap());
let caller = Credentials {
access_key: "OIDCTEMPORARYCALLER2".to_string(),
parent_user: "openid=parent-b".to_string(),
claims: Some(HashMap::from([
("iss".to_string(), Value::String("rustfs-oidc".to_string())),
("oidc_provider".to_string(), Value::String("default".to_string())),
("sub".to_string(), Value::String("subject-123".to_string())),
("parent".to_string(), Value::String("openid=parent-b".to_string())),
(OIDC_VIRTUAL_PARENT_CLAIM.to_string(), Value::String("openid=parent-a".to_string())),
(POLICYNAME.to_string(), Value::String("readwrite".to_string())),
])),
..Default::default()
};
let result = iam_sys
.new_service_account_from_caller(
"openid=parent-b",
None,
NewServiceAccountOpts {
access_key: "OIDCSERVICEACCOUNT02".to_string(),
secret_key: "oidcServiceAccountSecret234".to_string(),
..Default::default()
},
&caller,
)
.await;
assert!(matches!(result, Err(IamError::IAMActionNotAllowed)));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn verified_oidc_sts_missing_policy_fails_closed_for_deny_only_checks() {
let iam_sys = IamSys::new(IamCache::new(StsTestMockStore::new(true)).await.unwrap());
let parent_user = "openid=verified-parent";
let claims = HashMap::from([
("iss".to_string(), Value::String("rustfs-oidc".to_string())),
("oidc_provider".to_string(), Value::String("default".to_string())),
("sub".to_string(), Value::String("subject-123".to_string())),
("parent".to_string(), Value::String(parent_user.to_string())),
(OIDC_VIRTUAL_PARENT_CLAIM.to_string(), Value::String(parent_user.to_string())),
(POLICYNAME.to_string(), Value::String("readwrite,missing-policy".to_string())),
]);
let groups = None;
let args = Args {
account: "OIDCTEMPORARYCALLER3",
groups: &groups,
action: Action::AdminAction(AdminAction::ListServiceAccountsAdminAction),
bucket: "",
conditions: &HashMap::new(),
is_owner: false,
object: "",
claims: &claims,
deny_only: true,
};
let prepared = iam_sys.prepare_sts_auth(&args, parent_user).await;
assert!(matches!(prepared.mode, PreparedIamMode::Deny));
assert!(!iam_sys.eval_prepared(&prepared, &args).await);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn regular_deny_only_rejects_unresolved_mapped_policy() {
let iam_sys = test_iam_sys().await;
let user = "regular-unresolved-policy";
let identity = UserIdentity::from(Credentials {
access_key: user.to_string(),
secret_key: "longenoughsecret".to_string(),
status: ACCOUNT_ON.to_string(),
..Default::default()
});
iam_sys.store.cache.with_write_lock(|cache| {
let now = OffsetDateTime::now_utc();
cache.add_or_update_user(user, &identity, now);
cache.add_or_update_user_policy(user, &MappedPolicy::new("readwrite,missing-policy"), now);
});
let groups = None;
let claims = HashMap::new();
let conditions = HashMap::new();
let args = Args {
account: user,
groups: &groups,
action: Action::StsAction(StsAction::AssumeRoleAction),
bucket: "",
conditions: &conditions,
is_owner: false,
object: "",
claims: &claims,
deny_only: true,
};
let prepared = iam_sys.prepare_regular_auth(&args).await;
assert!(matches!(prepared.mode, PreparedIamMode::Deny));
assert!(
!iam_sys.eval_prepared(&prepared, &args).await,
"deny-only evaluation must fail closed when a mapped policy document is unresolved"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn regular_full_evaluation_keeps_resolved_part_of_partial_mapping() {
let iam_sys = test_iam_sys().await;
let user = "regular-partial-policy";
let identity = UserIdentity::from(Credentials {
access_key: user.to_string(),
secret_key: "longenoughsecret".to_string(),
status: ACCOUNT_ON.to_string(),
..Default::default()
});
iam_sys.store.cache.with_write_lock(|cache| {
let now = OffsetDateTime::now_utc();
cache.add_or_update_user(user, &identity, now);
cache.add_or_update_user_policy(user, &MappedPolicy::new("readwrite,missing-policy"), now);
});
let groups = None;
let claims = HashMap::new();
let conditions = HashMap::new();
let args = Args {
account: user,
groups: &groups,
action: Action::S3Action(S3Action::GetObjectAction),
bucket: "bucket",
conditions: &conditions,
is_owner: false,
object: "object",
claims: &claims,
deny_only: false,
};
let prepared = iam_sys.prepare_regular_auth(&args).await;
assert!(matches!(prepared.mode, PreparedIamMode::Regular { .. }));
assert!(
iam_sys.eval_prepared(&prepared, &args).await,
"full evaluation must preserve the historical partial-resolution behavior"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn regular_deny_only_honors_group_derived_explicit_deny() {
let iam_sys = test_iam_sys().await;
let deny_policy =
Policy::parse_config(br#"{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Deny","Action":["sts:AssumeRole"]}]}"#)
.expect("group deny policy should parse");
let now = OffsetDateTime::now_utc();
iam_sys
.store
.cache
.add_or_update_policy_doc("deny-assume-role", &PolicyDoc::new(deny_policy), now);
iam_sys
.store
.cache
.add_or_update_group_policy("testgroup", &MappedPolicy::new("deny-assume-role"), now);
let groups = Some(vec!["testgroup".to_string()]);
let claims = HashMap::new();
let conditions = HashMap::new();
let args = Args {
account: "sts-fallback-test-parent",
groups: &groups,
action: Action::StsAction(StsAction::AssumeRoleAction),
bucket: "",
conditions: &conditions,
is_owner: false,
object: "",
claims: &claims,
deny_only: true,
};
let prepared = iam_sys.prepare_regular_auth(&args).await;
assert!(matches!(prepared.mode, PreparedIamMode::Regular { .. }));
assert!(
!iam_sys.eval_prepared(&prepared, &args).await,
"group-derived explicit Deny must remain authoritative"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn regular_deny_only_rejects_unresolved_group_mapping() {
let iam_sys = test_iam_sys().await;
iam_sys.store.cache.add_or_update_group_policy(
"testgroup",
&MappedPolicy::new("readwrite,missing-policy"),
OffsetDateTime::now_utc(),
);
let groups = Some(vec!["testgroup".to_string()]);
let claims = HashMap::new();
let conditions = HashMap::new();
let args = Args {
account: "sts-fallback-test-parent",
groups: &groups,
action: Action::StsAction(StsAction::AssumeRoleAction),
bucket: "",
conditions: &conditions,
is_owner: false,
object: "",
claims: &claims,
deny_only: true,
};
let prepared = iam_sys.prepare_regular_auth(&args).await;
assert!(matches!(prepared.mode, PreparedIamMode::Deny));
assert!(
!iam_sys.eval_prepared(&prepared, &args).await,
"deny-only evaluation must fail closed for an unresolved group-derived mapping"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_sts_claim_policy_ignores_unsafe_and_missing_policy_names() {
let store = StsTestMockStore::new(true);
let cache_manager = IamCache::new(store).await.unwrap();
let iam_sys = IamSys::new(cache_manager);
let parent_user = "sts-empty-parent-policy-test";
let sts_access_key = "sts-mixed-claim-policy-test-user";
let sts_user = UserIdentity::from(Credentials {
access_key: sts_access_key.to_string(),
secret_key: "longenoughsecret".to_string(),
session_token: "sts-token".to_string(),
status: ACCOUNT_ON.to_string(),
parent_user: parent_user.to_string(),
..Default::default()
});
iam_sys
.store
.cache
.add_or_update_sts_account(sts_access_key, &sts_user, OffsetDateTime::now_utc());
let mut claims = HashMap::new();
claims.insert(
POLICYNAME.to_string(),
Value::String(format!("unsafe/policy, missing-sts-claim-policy, {CUSTOM_STS_CLAIM_POLICY}")),
);
let groups: Option<Vec<String>> = None;
let args = Args {
account: sts_access_key,
groups: &groups,
action: Action::S3Action(S3Action::GetObjectAction),
bucket: CUSTOM_STS_CLAIM_BUCKET,
conditions: &HashMap::new(),
is_owner: false,
object: "allowed/object.txt",
claims: &claims,
deny_only: false,
};
let prepared = iam_sys.prepare_sts_auth(&args, parent_user).await;
assert!(matches!(prepared.mode, PreparedIamMode::Sts { .. }));
assert!(
iam_sys.eval_prepared(&prepared, &args).await,
"STS policy claims should ignore unsafe or unresolved names without dropping a resolvable canned policy"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_sts_claim_policy_custom_canned_policy_does_not_grant_other_actions() {
let store = StsTestMockStore::new(true);
let cache_manager = IamCache::new(store).await.unwrap();
let iam_sys = IamSys::new(cache_manager);
let parent_user = "sts-empty-parent-policy-test";
let sts_access_key = "sts-custom-claim-policy-deny-test-user";
let sts_user = UserIdentity::from(Credentials {
access_key: sts_access_key.to_string(),
secret_key: "longenoughsecret".to_string(),
session_token: "sts-token".to_string(),
status: ACCOUNT_ON.to_string(),
parent_user: parent_user.to_string(),
..Default::default()
});
iam_sys
.store
.cache
.add_or_update_sts_account(sts_access_key, &sts_user, OffsetDateTime::now_utc());
let mut claims = HashMap::new();
claims.insert(POLICYNAME.to_string(), Value::String(CUSTOM_STS_CLAIM_POLICY.to_string()));
let groups: Option<Vec<String>> = None;
let args = Args {
account: sts_access_key,
groups: &groups,
action: Action::S3Action(S3Action::PutObjectAction),
bucket: CUSTOM_STS_CLAIM_BUCKET,
conditions: &HashMap::new(),
is_owner: false,
object: "allowed/object.txt",
claims: &claims,
deny_only: false,
};
let prepared = iam_sys.prepare_sts_auth(&args, parent_user).await;
assert!(matches!(prepared.mode, PreparedIamMode::Sts { .. }));
assert!(
!iam_sys.eval_prepared(&prepared, &args).await,
"custom claim policy must not grant S3 actions outside the resolved canned policy"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_sts_claim_policy_builtin_policy_remains_compatible() {
let store = StsTestMockStore::new(true);
let cache_manager = IamCache::new(store).await.unwrap();
let iam_sys = IamSys::new(cache_manager);
let parent_user = "sts-empty-parent-policy-test";
let mut claims = HashMap::new();
claims.insert(POLICYNAME.to_string(), Value::String("readwrite".to_string()));
let groups: Option<Vec<String>> = None;
let args = Args {
account: "sts-builtin-claim-policy-test-user",
groups: &groups,
action: Action::S3Action(S3Action::ListBucketAction),
bucket: "mybucket",
conditions: &HashMap::new(),
is_owner: false,
object: "",
claims: &claims,
deny_only: false,
};
let prepared = iam_sys.prepare_sts_auth(&args, parent_user).await;
assert!(matches!(prepared.mode, PreparedIamMode::Sts { .. }));
assert!(
iam_sys.eval_prepared(&prepared, &args).await,
"built-in policy names in STS JWT claims must keep working through the unified policy store path"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_sts_claim_policy_missing_policy_denies() {
let store = StsTestMockStore::new(true);
let cache_manager = IamCache::new(store).await.unwrap();
let iam_sys = IamSys::new(cache_manager);
let parent_user = "sts-empty-parent-policy-test";
let mut claims = HashMap::new();
claims.insert(POLICYNAME.to_string(), Value::String("missing-sts-claim-policy".to_string()));
let groups: Option<Vec<String>> = None;
let args = Args {
account: "sts-missing-claim-policy-test-user",
groups: &groups,
action: Action::S3Action(S3Action::GetObjectAction),
bucket: CUSTOM_STS_CLAIM_BUCKET,
conditions: &HashMap::new(),
is_owner: false,
object: "allowed/object.txt",
claims: &claims,
deny_only: false,
};
let prepared = iam_sys.prepare_sts_auth(&args, parent_user).await;
assert!(matches!(prepared.mode, PreparedIamMode::Deny));
assert!(
!iam_sys.eval_prepared(&prepared, &args).await,
"missing STS claim policy names must deny instead of silently allowing"
);
}
/// Regression: `deny_only` with empty IAM policies must still evaluate `sessionPolicy-extracted`
/// so session policy Deny cannot be bypassed (see PR #2250 review).
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_sts_deny_only_session_policy_deny_blocks_when_iam_policies_empty() {
let store = StsTestMockStore::new(true);
let cache_manager = IamCache::new(store).await.unwrap();
let iam_sys = IamSys::new(cache_manager);
let parent_user = "sts-empty-parent-policy-test";
let session_policy_json = r#"{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Effect": "Deny",
"Action": ["admin:CreateUser"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::*"]
}
]
}"#;
let mut claims = HashMap::new();
claims.insert(SESSION_POLICY_NAME_EXTRACTED.to_string(), Value::String(session_policy_json.to_string()));
let groups: Option<Vec<String>> = None;
let args = Args {
account: parent_user,
groups: &groups,
action: Action::AdminAction(AdminAction::CreateUserAdminAction),
bucket: "",
conditions: &HashMap::new(),
is_owner: false,
object: "",
claims: &claims,
deny_only: true,
};
let prepared = iam_sys.prepare_sts_auth(&args, parent_user).await;
let allowed = iam_sys.eval_prepared(&prepared, &args).await;
assert!(
!allowed,
"session policy Deny must be evaluated even when IAM policies are empty and deny_only is set"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_sts_deny_only_session_policy_allow_when_no_deny_on_action() {
let store = StsTestMockStore::new(true);
let cache_manager = IamCache::new(store).await.unwrap();
let iam_sys = IamSys::new(cache_manager);
let parent_user = "sts-empty-parent-policy-test";
let session_policy_json = r#"{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["s3:GetObject"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::bucket/*"]
}
]
}"#;
let mut claims = HashMap::new();
claims.insert(SESSION_POLICY_NAME_EXTRACTED.to_string(), Value::String(session_policy_json.to_string()));
let groups: Option<Vec<String>> = None;
let args = Args {
account: parent_user,
groups: &groups,
action: Action::AdminAction(AdminAction::CreateUserAdminAction),
bucket: "",
conditions: &HashMap::new(),
is_owner: false,
object: "",
claims: &claims,
deny_only: true,
};
let prepared = iam_sys.prepare_sts_auth(&args, parent_user).await;
let allowed = iam_sys.eval_prepared(&prepared, &args).await;
assert!(
allowed,
"deny_only with no matching Deny in session policy should still allow self-service-style checks"
);
}
/// Regression test for cross-node IAM notifications:
/// `load_user` must populate user cache, and regular-user mapped policy must be written to
/// `user_policies` (not `sts_policies`), otherwise list-users and bucket-scoped user listing
/// may miss users on follower nodes.
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_load_user_notification_populates_user_and_policy_caches() {
let store = StsTestMockStore::new(false);
let cache_manager = IamCache::new(store).await.unwrap();
let iam_sys = IamSys::new(cache_manager);
iam_sys.load_user("notify-user", UserType::Reg).await.unwrap();
let users = iam_sys.list_users().await.unwrap();
assert!(
users.contains_key("notify-user"),
"regular user loaded via notification must appear in list_users cache view"
);
let bucket_users = iam_sys.list_bucket_users("notification-regression-bucket").await.unwrap();
assert!(
bucket_users.contains_key("notify-user"),
"regular user mapped policy must be written to user_policies for bucket user listing"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_group_notification_populates_new_membership_entry() {
let store = StsTestMockStore::new(false);
let cache_manager = IamCache::new(store).await.unwrap();
let iam_sys = IamSys::new(cache_manager);
iam_sys.store.cache.with_write_lock(|cache| {
cache.replace_user_group_memberships(CacheEntity::default());
});
iam_sys.load_group("notify-group").await.unwrap();
let cache = iam_sys.store.cache.snapshot();
let memberships = &cache.user_group_memberships;
assert!(
memberships
.get("notify-user")
.is_some_and(|groups| groups.contains("notify-group")),
"group notification must create a reverse membership entry for first-time members"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_sts_policy_mapping_notification_updates_sts_policy_cache() {
let store = StsTestMockStore::new(false);
let cache_manager = IamCache::new(store).await.unwrap();
let iam_sys = IamSys::new(cache_manager);
iam_sys
.load_policy_mapping("notify-sts-parent", UserType::Sts, false)
.await
.unwrap();
let cache = iam_sys.store.cache.snapshot();
let sts_policies = &cache.sts_policies;
assert!(
sts_policies.contains_key("notify-sts-parent"),
"STS policy mapping notifications must update sts_policies instead of deleting them"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_sts_policy_lookup_loads_missing_mapping_without_regular_user() {
let store = StsTestMockStore::new(false);
let cache_manager = IamCache::new(store).await.unwrap();
let iam_sys = IamSys::new(cache_manager);
let policies = iam_sys.sts_policy_db_get("notify-sts-parent", &None).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(policies, vec!["readwrite"]);
assert!(iam_sys.store.cache.snapshot().sts_policies.contains_key("notify-sts-parent"));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn delete_temp_account_notifies_peers_as_sts_user() {
let store = StsTestMockStore::new(false);
let cache_manager = IamCache::new(store).await.expect("initialize IAM cache");
let iam_sys = IamSys::new(cache_manager);
let probe = IamSys::<StsTestMockStore>::load_user_notification_probe(0, false, false);
crate::LOAD_USER_NOTIFICATION_PROBE
.scope(Arc::clone(&probe), async {
iam_sys
.delete_temp_account("deleted-notify-sts", true)
.await
.expect("delete temporary account");
})
.await;
assert_eq!(
probe
.observed
.lock()
.expect("notification probe mutex poisoned")
.as_ref()
.map(|(access_key, temp)| (access_key.as_str(), *temp)),
Some(("deleted-notify-sts", true)),
"peer notification must retain the STS access key and user type"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn delete_temp_account_reports_peer_invalidation_failure() {
let store = StsTestMockStore::new(false);
let cache_manager = IamCache::new(store).await.expect("initialize IAM cache");
let iam_sys = IamSys::new(cache_manager);
let probe = IamSys::<StsTestMockStore>::load_user_notification_probe(STS_INVALIDATION_MAX_ATTEMPTS, false, false);
crate::LOAD_USER_NOTIFICATION_PROBE
.scope(Arc::clone(&probe), async {
let result = iam_sys.delete_temp_account("deleted-notify-sts", true).await;
let err = result.expect_err("failed peer invalidation must fail STS revocation");
assert!(err.to_string().contains("peer notification failed"));
})
.await;
assert_eq!(
probe
.observed
.lock()
.expect("notification probe mutex poisoned")
.as_ref()
.map(|(access_key, temp)| (access_key.as_str(), *temp)),
Some(("deleted-notify-sts", true)),
"failed notification must retain the STS access key and user type"
);
assert_eq!(probe.attempts.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst), STS_INVALIDATION_MAX_ATTEMPTS);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn transient_peer_invalidation_retries_after_local_delete() {
const ACCESS_KEY: &str = "retryable-revoked-sts";
let store = StsTestMockStore::new(false);
let cache_manager = IamCache::new(store).await.expect("initialize IAM cache");
let iam_sys = IamSys::new(cache_manager);
let probe = IamSys::<StsTestMockStore>::load_user_notification_probe(2, false, false);
crate::LOAD_USER_NOTIFICATION_PROBE
.scope(Arc::clone(&probe), iam_sys.delete_temp_account(ACCESS_KEY, true))
.await
.expect("transient peer invalidation should converge within the retry budget");
assert_eq!(
probe.attempts.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst),
STS_INVALIDATION_MAX_ATTEMPTS,
"peer invalidation must retry until it succeeds"
);
assert_eq!(
probe
.observed
.lock()
.expect("notification probe mutex poisoned")
.as_ref()
.map(|(access_key, temp)| (access_key.as_str(), *temp)),
Some((ACCESS_KEY, true))
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn stalled_peer_invalidation_is_bounded_by_attempt_timeouts() {
let store = StsTestMockStore::new(false);
let cache_manager = IamCache::new(store).await.expect("initialize IAM cache");
let iam_sys = IamSys::new(cache_manager);
let probe = IamSys::<StsTestMockStore>::load_user_notification_probe(0, true, false);
let err = crate::LOAD_USER_NOTIFICATION_PROBE
.scope(Arc::clone(&probe), async {
iam_sys
.delete_temp_account("stalled-peer-sts", true)
.await
.expect_err("stalled peer invalidation must fail after bounded attempts")
})
.await;
assert!(err.to_string().contains("peer STS invalidation timed out"));
assert_eq!(probe.attempts.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst), STS_INVALIDATION_MAX_ATTEMPTS);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn delete_temp_account_reports_local_deletion_failure_without_notifying() {
let store = StsTestMockStore::new(false);
store.fail_delete.store(true, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst);
let cache_manager = IamCache::new(store).await.expect("initialize IAM cache");
let iam_sys = IamSys::new(cache_manager);
let probe = IamSys::<StsTestMockStore>::load_user_notification_probe(0, false, false);
let err = crate::LOAD_USER_NOTIFICATION_PROBE
.scope(Arc::clone(&probe), async {
iam_sys
.delete_temp_account("deleted-notify-sts", true)
.await
.expect_err("local deletion failure must fail STS revocation")
})
.await;
assert!(err.to_string().contains("delete temporary account failed"));
assert!(
probe.observed.lock().expect("notification probe mutex poisoned").is_none(),
"peer invalidation must not run after local deletion fails"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn delete_temp_account_reports_notification_task_panic() {
let store = StsTestMockStore::new(false);
let cache_manager = IamCache::new(store).await.expect("initialize IAM cache");
let iam_sys = IamSys::new(cache_manager);
let probe = IamSys::<StsTestMockStore>::load_user_notification_probe(0, false, true);
let err = crate::LOAD_USER_NOTIFICATION_PROBE
.scope(Arc::clone(&probe), async {
iam_sys
.delete_temp_account("deleted-notify-sts", true)
.await
.expect_err("notification task panic must fail STS revocation")
})
.await;
assert!(err.to_string().contains("panicked"));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn delete_temp_account_notification_survives_caller_cancellation() {
let store = StsTestMockStore::new(false);
let cache_manager = IamCache::new(store).await.expect("initialize IAM cache");
let iam_sys = Arc::new(IamSys::new(cache_manager));
let probe = IamSys::<StsTestMockStore>::load_user_notification_probe(0, true, false);
let call = {
let iam_sys = Arc::clone(&iam_sys);
crate::LOAD_USER_NOTIFICATION_PROBE.scope(Arc::clone(&probe), async move {
iam_sys.delete_temp_account("deleted-notify-sts", true).await
})
};
let call = tokio::spawn(call);
probe.started.notified().await;
call.abort();
assert!(call.await.expect_err("caller task should be cancelled").is_cancelled());
probe
.release
.as_ref()
.expect("blocking probe must have a release signal")
.notify_one();
probe.completed.notified().await;
assert_eq!(
probe
.observed
.lock()
.expect("notification probe mutex poisoned")
.as_ref()
.map(|(access_key, temp)| (access_key.as_str(), *temp)),
Some(("deleted-notify-sts", true)),
"background peer invalidation must complete with the STS access key and user type"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn delete_temp_account_local_delete_survives_caller_cancellation() {
const ACCESS_KEY: &str = "cancelled-during-local-delete";
let store = StsTestMockStore::new(false);
store.saved_sts_users.lock().expect("saved_sts_users mutex poisoned").insert(
ACCESS_KEY.to_string(),
UserIdentity::from(Credentials {
access_key: ACCESS_KEY.to_string(),
secret_key: "temporary-user-secret".to_string(),
session_token: "session-token".to_string(),
status: ACCOUNT_ON.to_string(),
..Default::default()
}),
);
store.block_delete.store(true, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst);
let store_probe = store.clone();
let cache_manager = IamCache::new(store).await.expect("initialize IAM cache");
let iam_sys = Arc::new(IamSys::new(cache_manager));
let probe = IamSys::<StsTestMockStore>::load_user_notification_probe(0, false, false);
let call = {
let iam_sys = Arc::clone(&iam_sys);
crate::LOAD_USER_NOTIFICATION_PROBE
.scope(Arc::clone(&probe), async move { iam_sys.delete_temp_account(ACCESS_KEY, true).await })
};
let call = tokio::spawn(call);
store_probe.delete_started.notified().await;
call.abort();
assert!(call.await.expect_err("caller task should be cancelled").is_cancelled());
store_probe.release_delete.notify_one();
probe.completed.notified().await;
assert!(
!store_probe
.saved_sts_users
.lock()
.expect("saved_sts_users mutex poisoned")
.contains_key(ACCESS_KEY)
);
}
#[test]
fn notified_delete_without_tokio_runtime_returns_error() {
let runtime = tokio::runtime::Runtime::new().expect("create test runtime");
let iam_sys = runtime.block_on(async {
let store = StsTestMockStore::new(false);
let cache_manager = IamCache::new(store).await.expect("initialize IAM cache");
IamSys::new(cache_manager)
});
drop(runtime);
let result = futures::executor::block_on(iam_sys.delete_temp_account("deleted-notify-sts", true));
let err = result.expect_err("notified deletion without a Tokio runtime must return an error");
assert!(err.to_string().contains("Tokio"));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn notified_delete_without_notification_system_returns_error() {
let store = StsTestMockStore::new(false);
let cache_manager = IamCache::new(store).await.expect("initialize IAM cache");
let iam_sys = IamSys::new(cache_manager);
let err = iam_sys
.delete_temp_account("deleted-notify-sts", true)
.await
.expect_err("missing peer notification system must fail STS revocation");
assert!(err.to_string().contains("peer notification system is unavailable"));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn missing_sts_notification_evicts_only_sts_cache_entry() {
const ACCESS_KEY: &str = "deleted-notify-sts";
const GROUP: &str = "deleted-notify-sts-group";
let store = StsTestMockStore::new(false);
let cache_manager = IamCache::new(store).await.expect("initialize IAM cache");
let iam_sys = IamSys::new(cache_manager);
let regular_user = UserIdentity::from(Credentials {
access_key: ACCESS_KEY.to_string(),
secret_key: "regular-user-secret".to_string(),
status: ACCOUNT_ON.to_string(),
..Default::default()
});
let sts_user = UserIdentity::from(Credentials {
access_key: ACCESS_KEY.to_string(),
secret_key: "temporary-user-secret".to_string(),
session_token: "session-token".to_string(),
status: ACCOUNT_ON.to_string(),
..Default::default()
});
let mapped_policy = MappedPolicy::new("readwrite");
let membership = HashSet::from([GROUP.to_string()]);
let group = GroupInfo::new(vec![ACCESS_KEY.to_string()]);
iam_sys.store.cache.with_write_lock(|cache| {
let now = OffsetDateTime::now_utc();
cache.add_or_update_user(ACCESS_KEY, &regular_user, now);
cache.add_or_update_user_policy(ACCESS_KEY, &mapped_policy, now);
cache.add_or_update_group(GROUP, &group, now);
cache.add_or_update_user_group_membership(ACCESS_KEY, &membership, now);
cache.add_or_update_sts_account(ACCESS_KEY, &sts_user, now);
});
iam_sys
.load_user(ACCESS_KEY, UserType::Sts)
.await
.expect("process missing STS user notification");
let cache = iam_sys.store.cache.snapshot();
assert!(!cache.sts_accounts.contains_key(ACCESS_KEY));
assert!(
cache.users.contains_key(ACCESS_KEY),
"STS invalidation must not evict a same-name regular user"
);
assert!(cache.user_policies.contains_key(ACCESS_KEY));
assert!(cache.user_group_memberships.contains_key(ACCESS_KEY));
assert!(
cache
.groups
.get(GROUP)
.is_some_and(|group| group.members.contains(&ACCESS_KEY.to_string())),
"STS invalidation must preserve same-name regular-user group membership"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn delete_temp_account_preserves_same_name_regular_cache_state() {
const ACCESS_KEY: &str = "deleted-notify-sts";
let store = StsTestMockStore::new(false);
let cache_manager = IamCache::new(store).await.expect("initialize IAM cache");
let iam_sys = IamSys::new(cache_manager);
let regular_user = UserIdentity::from(Credentials {
access_key: ACCESS_KEY.to_string(),
secret_key: "regular-user-secret".to_string(),
status: ACCOUNT_ON.to_string(),
..Default::default()
});
let sts_user = UserIdentity::from(Credentials {
access_key: ACCESS_KEY.to_string(),
secret_key: "temporary-user-secret".to_string(),
session_token: "session-token".to_string(),
status: ACCOUNT_ON.to_string(),
..Default::default()
});
let mapped_policy = MappedPolicy::new("readwrite");
iam_sys.store.cache.with_write_lock(|cache| {
let now = OffsetDateTime::now_utc();
cache.add_or_update_user(ACCESS_KEY, &regular_user, now);
cache.add_or_update_user_policy(ACCESS_KEY, &mapped_policy, now);
cache.add_or_update_sts_account(ACCESS_KEY, &sts_user, now);
});
iam_sys
.delete_temp_account(ACCESS_KEY, false)
.await
.expect("delete temporary account without peer notification");
let cache = iam_sys.store.cache.snapshot();
assert!(!cache.sts_accounts.contains_key(ACCESS_KEY));
assert!(cache.users.contains_key(ACCESS_KEY));
assert!(cache.user_policies.contains_key(ACCESS_KEY));
assert!(
iam_sys
.store
.api
.deleted_mapped_policies
.lock()
.expect("deleted_mapped_policies mutex poisoned")
.is_empty(),
"deleting one STS identity must not delete a parent-scoped STS policy mapping"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_missing_user_notification_cleans_related_cache_state() {
let store = StsTestMockStore::new(false);
let cache_manager = IamCache::new(store).await.unwrap();
let iam_sys = IamSys::new(cache_manager);
const USER: &str = "deleted-notify-user";
const GROUP: &str = "deleted-notify-group";
const SVC_CHILD: &str = "deleted-notify-service-child";
const STS_CHILD: &str = "deleted-notify-sts-child";
const OTHER_USER: &str = "deleted-notify-other-user";
let user = UserIdentity::from(Credentials {
access_key: USER.to_string(),
secret_key: "longenoughsecret".to_string(),
status: ACCOUNT_ON.to_string(),
..Default::default()
});
let mut service_claims = HashMap::new();
service_claims.insert(iam_policy_claim_name_sa(), Value::String(INHERITED_POLICY_TYPE.to_string()));
let service_child = UserIdentity::from(Credentials {
access_key: SVC_CHILD.to_string(),
secret_key: "longenoughsecret".to_string(),
status: ACCOUNT_ON.to_string(),
parent_user: USER.to_string(),
claims: Some(service_claims),
..Default::default()
});
let sts_child = UserIdentity::from(Credentials {
access_key: STS_CHILD.to_string(),
secret_key: "longenoughsecret".to_string(),
session_token: "session-token".to_string(),
status: ACCOUNT_ON.to_string(),
parent_user: USER.to_string(),
..Default::default()
});
let membership = HashSet::from([GROUP.to_string()]);
let group = GroupInfo::new(vec![USER.to_string(), OTHER_USER.to_string()]);
let mapped_policy = MappedPolicy::new("readwrite");
iam_sys.store.cache.with_write_lock(|cache| {
let now = OffsetDateTime::now_utc();
cache.add_or_update_user(USER, &user, now);
cache.add_or_update_user_policy(USER, &mapped_policy, now);
cache.add_or_update_group(GROUP, &group, now);
cache.add_or_update_user_group_membership(USER, &membership, now);
cache.add_or_update_user(SVC_CHILD, &service_child, now);
cache.add_or_update_sts_account(STS_CHILD, &sts_child, now);
});
iam_sys.load_user(USER, UserType::Reg).await.unwrap();
let cache = iam_sys.store.cache.snapshot();
assert!(!cache.users.contains_key(USER));
assert!(!cache.user_policies.contains_key(USER));
assert!(!cache.user_group_memberships.contains_key(USER));
assert!(!cache.users.contains_key(SVC_CHILD));
assert!(!cache.sts_accounts.contains_key(STS_CHILD));
let group = cache.groups.get(GROUP).expect("group should remain after member removal");
assert!(!group.members.contains(&USER.to_string()));
assert!(group.members.contains(&OTHER_USER.to_string()));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_check_key_propagates_cache_miss_load_failure() {
let store = StsTestMockStore::new(false);
let cache_manager = IamCache::new(store).await.unwrap();
let iam_sys = IamSys::new(cache_manager);
let result = iam_sys.check_key("load-failure-user").await;
assert!(matches!(result, Err(Error::Io(_))));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_prepare_auth_eval_matches_prepare_sts_auth_for_parent_policy_fallback() {
let store = StsTestMockStore::new(false);
let cache_manager = IamCache::new(store).await.unwrap();
let iam_sys = IamSys::new(cache_manager);
let parent_user = "sts-fallback-test-parent";
let claims = HashMap::new();
let groups: Option<Vec<String>> = None;
let args = Args {
account: parent_user,
groups: &groups,
action: Action::S3Action(S3Action::ListBucketAction),
bucket: "mybucket",
conditions: &HashMap::new(),
is_owner: false,
object: "",
claims: &claims,
deny_only: false,
};
let sts_prepared = iam_sys.prepare_sts_auth(&args, parent_user).await;
let sts_eval = iam_sys.eval_prepared(&sts_prepared, &args).await;
let prepared = iam_sys.prepare_auth(&args).await;
let eval = iam_sys.eval_prepared(&prepared, &args).await;
assert_eq!(sts_eval, eval, "prepare_auth must match explicit STS preparation for this identity");
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_prepare_auth_detects_existing_object_tag_in_session_policy() {
let store = StsTestMockStore::new(true);
let cache_manager = IamCache::new(store).await.unwrap();
let iam_sys = IamSys::new(cache_manager);
let sts_access_key = "sts-session-tag-test-user";
let sts_user = UserIdentity::from(Credentials {
access_key: sts_access_key.to_string(),
secret_key: "longenoughsecret".to_string(),
session_token: "sts-token".to_string(),
status: ACCOUNT_ON.to_string(),
parent_user: "sts-empty-parent-policy-test".to_string(),
..Default::default()
});
iam_sys
.store
.cache
.add_or_update_sts_account(sts_access_key, &sts_user, OffsetDateTime::now_utc());
let mut claims = HashMap::new();
claims.insert(
SESSION_POLICY_NAME_EXTRACTED.to_string(),
Value::String(
r#"{
"Version":"2012-10-17",
"Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:GetObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::bucket/*"],"Condition":{"StringEquals":{"s3:ExistingObjectTag/security":"public"}}}]
}"#
.to_string(),
),
);
let groups: Option<Vec<String>> = None;
let args = Args {
account: sts_access_key,
groups: &groups,
action: Action::S3Action(S3Action::GetObjectAction),
bucket: "bucket",
conditions: &HashMap::new(),
is_owner: false,
object: "obj",
claims: &claims,
deny_only: true,
};
let prepared = iam_sys.prepare_auth(&args).await;
assert!(
prepared.needs_existing_object_tag,
"session policy with ExistingObjectTag must request object tag loading"
);
}
#[test]
fn test_policy_uses_existing_object_tag_matches_condition_keys_only() {
let with_value_only = Policy::parse_config(
br#"{
"Version":"2012-10-17",
"Statement":[{
"Effect":"Allow",
"Action":["s3:GetObject"],
"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::bucket/*"],
"Condition":{"StringEquals":{"s3:prefix":"ExistingObjectTag/security"}}
}]
}"#,
)
.expect("policy with value-only ExistingObjectTag text should parse");
assert!(
!policy_uses_existing_object_tag_conditions(&with_value_only),
"ExistingObjectTag text in values should not trigger tag dependency"
);
let with_condition_key = Policy::parse_config(
br#"{
"Version":"2012-10-17",
"Statement":[{
"Effect":"Allow",
"Action":["s3:GetObject"],
"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::bucket/*"],
"Condition":{"StringEquals":{"s3:ExistingObjectTag/security":"public"}}
}]
}"#,
)
.expect("policy with ExistingObjectTag condition key should parse");
assert!(
policy_uses_existing_object_tag_conditions(&with_condition_key),
"ExistingObjectTag condition key must trigger tag dependency"
);
}
#[test]
fn test_policy_uses_existing_object_tag_when_only_secondary_action_has_tag_condition() {
let split_action_policy = Policy::parse_config(
br#"{
"Version":"2012-10-17",
"Statement":[
{
"Effect":"Allow",
"Action":["s3:DeleteObject"],
"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::bucket/*"]
},
{
"Effect":"Allow",
"Action":["s3:DeleteObjectVersion"],
"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::bucket/*"],
"Condition":{"StringEquals":{"s3:ExistingObjectTag/security":"public"}}
}
]
}"#,
)
.expect("split-action policy should parse");
assert!(
policy_uses_existing_object_tag_conditions(&split_action_policy),
"full merged policy must still be detectable as containing ExistingObjectTag keys"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_prepare_auth_detects_existing_object_tag_in_encoded_session_policy() {
let store = StsTestMockStore::new(true);
let cache_manager = IamCache::new(store).await.unwrap();
let iam_sys = IamSys::new(cache_manager);
let sts_access_key = "sts-session-tag-encoded-test-user";
let sts_user = UserIdentity::from(Credentials {
access_key: sts_access_key.to_string(),
secret_key: "longenoughsecret".to_string(),
session_token: "sts-token".to_string(),
status: ACCOUNT_ON.to_string(),
parent_user: "sts-empty-parent-policy-test".to_string(),
..Default::default()
});
iam_sys
.store
.cache
.add_or_update_sts_account(sts_access_key, &sts_user, OffsetDateTime::now_utc());
let session_policy_json = r#"{
"Version":"2012-10-17",
"Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:GetObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::bucket/*"],"Condition":{"StringEquals":{"s3:ExistingObjectTag/security":"public"}}}]
}"#;
let mut claims = HashMap::new();
claims.insert(
SESSION_POLICY_NAME.to_string(),
Value::String(base64_simd::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode_to_string(session_policy_json.as_bytes())),
);
let groups: Option<Vec<String>> = None;
let args = Args {
account: sts_access_key,
groups: &groups,
action: Action::S3Action(S3Action::GetObjectAction),
bucket: "bucket",
conditions: &HashMap::new(),
is_owner: false,
object: "obj",
claims: &claims,
deny_only: true,
};
let prepared = iam_sys.prepare_auth(&args).await;
assert!(
prepared.needs_existing_object_tag,
"base64 sessionPolicy with ExistingObjectTag must request object tag loading"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_prepare_auth_service_account_inherited_ignores_session_policy_tag_hint() {
let store = StsTestMockStore::new(false);
let cache_manager = IamCache::new(store).await.unwrap();
let iam_sys = IamSys::new(cache_manager);
let service_account_access_key = "svc-inherited-tag-hint-test-user";
let parent_user = "sts-fallback-test-parent";
let mut service_account_claims = HashMap::new();
service_account_claims.insert(iam_policy_claim_name_sa(), Value::String(INHERITED_POLICY_TYPE.to_string()));
let service_identity = UserIdentity::from(Credentials {
access_key: service_account_access_key.to_string(),
secret_key: "longenoughsecret".to_string(),
status: ACCOUNT_ON.to_string(),
parent_user: parent_user.to_string(),
claims: Some(service_account_claims),
..Default::default()
});
iam_sys
.store
.cache
.add_or_update_user(service_account_access_key, &service_identity, OffsetDateTime::now_utc());
let mut request_claims = HashMap::new();
request_claims.insert("parent".to_string(), Value::String(parent_user.to_string()));
request_claims.insert(iam_policy_claim_name_sa(), Value::String(INHERITED_POLICY_TYPE.to_string()));
request_claims.insert(
SESSION_POLICY_NAME_EXTRACTED.to_string(),
Value::String(
r#"{
"Version":"2012-10-17",
"Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:GetObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::bucket/*"],"Condition":{"StringEquals":{"s3:ExistingObjectTag/security":"public"}}}]
}"#
.to_string(),
),
);
let groups: Option<Vec<String>> = Some(vec!["testgroup".to_string()]);
let args = Args {
account: service_account_access_key,
groups: &groups,
action: Action::S3Action(S3Action::GetObjectAction),
bucket: "bucket",
conditions: &HashMap::new(),
is_owner: false,
object: "obj",
claims: &request_claims,
deny_only: false,
};
let prepared = iam_sys.prepare_auth(&args).await;
assert!(
!prepared.needs_existing_object_tag,
"inherited service account should not require object tag fetch based on session policy hint"
);
}
/// Regression test for rustfs#2392: `policy_db_get` must skip non-existent groups
/// instead of aborting the entire policy resolution. When a JWT contains groups
/// that exist in the IdP but not in IAM, policies from the remaining valid groups
/// must still be returned.
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_policy_db_get_skips_nonexistent_groups() {
let store = StsTestMockStore::new(false);
let cache_manager = IamCache::new(store).await.unwrap();
let iam_sys = IamSys::new(cache_manager);
// "testgroup" exists with "readwrite" policy; "nonexistent-group" does not exist in IAM.
let groups = Some(vec!["testgroup".to_string(), "nonexistent-group".to_string()]);
let policies = iam_sys
.policy_db_get("sts-fallback-test-parent", &groups)
.await
.expect("policy_db_get should not fail when some groups are missing");
assert!(
policies.iter().any(|p| p == "readwrite"),
"policies from existing group 'testgroup' should be returned even when other groups are missing; got: {:?}",
policies
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_info_policy_returns_policy_as_json_object() {
let store = StsTestMockStore::new(false);
let cache_manager = IamCache::new(store).await.unwrap();
let iam_sys = IamSys::new(cache_manager);
let policy_info = iam_sys
.info_policy("readonly")
.await
.expect("info_policy should return existing default policy");
assert!(
policy_info.policy.is_object(),
"policy field should be a JSON object for MinIO-compatible policy readback; got: {}",
policy_info.policy
);
assert!(
policy_info.policy.get("Version").is_some(),
"policy object should contain Version field; got: {}",
policy_info.policy
);
assert!(
policy_info.policy.get("Statement").is_some(),
"policy object should contain Statement field; got: {}",
policy_info.policy
);
}
#[test]
fn test_is_safe_claim_policy_name_allows_k8s_sa_sub() {
assert!(IamSys::<StsTestMockStore>::is_safe_claim_policy_name(
"system:serviceaccount:my-namespace:my-sa"
));
}
#[test]
fn test_is_safe_claim_policy_name_allows_dotted_names() {
assert!(IamSys::<StsTestMockStore>::is_safe_claim_policy_name("org.team.policy-name"));
}
#[test]
fn test_is_safe_claim_policy_name_allows_simple_names() {
assert!(IamSys::<StsTestMockStore>::is_safe_claim_policy_name("readwrite"));
assert!(IamSys::<StsTestMockStore>::is_safe_claim_policy_name("my-custom_policy"));
assert!(IamSys::<StsTestMockStore>::is_safe_claim_policy_name("Policy123"));
}
#[test]
fn test_is_safe_claim_policy_name_rejects_empty() {
assert!(!IamSys::<StsTestMockStore>::is_safe_claim_policy_name(""));
}
#[test]
fn test_is_safe_claim_policy_name_rejects_path_traversal() {
assert!(!IamSys::<StsTestMockStore>::is_safe_claim_policy_name("../etc/passwd"));
assert!(!IamSys::<StsTestMockStore>::is_safe_claim_policy_name("policy/name"));
assert!(!IamSys::<StsTestMockStore>::is_safe_claim_policy_name("policy\\name"));
assert!(!IamSys::<StsTestMockStore>::is_safe_claim_policy_name("..\\etc\\passwd"));
}
#[test]
fn test_is_safe_claim_policy_name_rejects_whitespace() {
assert!(!IamSys::<StsTestMockStore>::is_safe_claim_policy_name("my policy"));
assert!(!IamSys::<StsTestMockStore>::is_safe_claim_policy_name("policy\tname"));
}
#[test]
fn test_is_safe_claim_policy_name_rejects_special_chars() {
assert!(!IamSys::<StsTestMockStore>::is_safe_claim_policy_name("policy;drop"));
assert!(!IamSys::<StsTestMockStore>::is_safe_claim_policy_name("pol$icy"));
assert!(!IamSys::<StsTestMockStore>::is_safe_claim_policy_name("name{bad}"));
}
#[test]
fn test_is_safe_claim_policy_name_rejects_no_alphanumeric() {
assert!(!IamSys::<StsTestMockStore>::is_safe_claim_policy_name("."));
assert!(!IamSys::<StsTestMockStore>::is_safe_claim_policy_name(".."));
assert!(!IamSys::<StsTestMockStore>::is_safe_claim_policy_name(":"));
assert!(!IamSys::<StsTestMockStore>::is_safe_claim_policy_name("..."));
assert!(!IamSys::<StsTestMockStore>::is_safe_claim_policy_name(".:.:"));
assert!(!IamSys::<StsTestMockStore>::is_safe_claim_policy_name("-"));
assert!(!IamSys::<StsTestMockStore>::is_safe_claim_policy_name("_"));
assert!(!IamSys::<StsTestMockStore>::is_safe_claim_policy_name("__"));
assert!(!IamSys::<StsTestMockStore>::is_safe_claim_policy_name("---"));
assert!(!IamSys::<StsTestMockStore>::is_safe_claim_policy_name("-_-"));
assert!(!IamSys::<StsTestMockStore>::is_safe_claim_policy_name("-.:_"));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn verified_federated_policy_rejects_malformed_session_boundary() {
let iam_sys = IamSys::new(
IamCache::new(StsTestMockStore::new(true))
.await
.expect("IAM cache should initialize"),
);
let parent_user = "virtual-parent";
let claims = HashMap::from([
("iss".to_string(), Value::String("rustfs-oidc".to_string())),
("oidc_provider".to_string(), Value::String("default".to_string())),
("sub".to_string(), Value::String("subject-123".to_string())),
("parent".to_string(), Value::String(parent_user.to_string())),
(OIDC_VIRTUAL_PARENT_CLAIM.to_string(), Value::String(parent_user.to_string())),
(POLICYNAME.to_string(), Value::String("readwrite".to_string())),
(SESSION_POLICY_NAME.to_string(), Value::Bool(true)),
]);
let result = iam_sys
.verified_federated_service_account_claims(&claims, parent_user, &None)
.await;
assert!(matches!(result, Err(IamError::InvalidArgument)));
}
}