Files
rustfs/.github/workflows/audit.yml
T
Zhengchao An 2b31bda6d1 ci: clear the checkout token in every job that does not push (#5547)
actions/checkout writes its token into .git/config as an http extraheader,
where it stays for the rest of the job. That matters more here than usual:
pull_request jobs run on self-hosted runners and execute the PR's own build.rs,
proc-macros and tests, any of which can read that file. Test and Lint holds
actions: write on top of that, so its token can cancel runs and delete the
Actions caches the whole pipeline now depends on — it was given
persist-credentials: false when that permission was added, and this extends the
same treatment to the other 45 checkouts.

Two are exempt because the token IS the credential the job needs.
helm-package's publish job pushes to rustfs/helm with it; clearing it would
break chart publishing. nix-flake-update is exempt pending verification: it
passes FLAKE_UPDATE_TOKEN to create-pull-request directly rather than reusing
.git/config, so it very likely does not need persistence, but that is unproven
and a broken weekly bot is not worth the guess. Both carry a
persist-credentials-exempt comment saying which.

scripts/security/check_persist_credentials.sh requires every checkout to either
clear its credentials or carry that comment, so the decision stays visible in
review rather than being an omission nobody notices.

Refs: rustfs/backlog#1598, rustfs/backlog#1602
2026-08-01 11:48:47 +08:00

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7.4 KiB
YAML

# Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
#
# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
# You may obtain a copy of the License at
#
# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
#
# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
# limitations under the License.
name: Security Audit
on:
push:
branches: [ main ]
paths:
- '**/Cargo.toml'
- '**/Cargo.lock'
- 'deny.toml'
- '.github/actions/**'
- '.github/workflows/**'
- 'scripts/release/create_or_update_release.sh'
- 'scripts/security/check_preview_release_workflow.sh'
- 'scripts/security/check_workflow_pins.sh'
pull_request:
types: [ opened, synchronize, reopened, closed ]
branches: [ main ]
paths:
- '**/Cargo.toml'
- '**/Cargo.lock'
- 'deny.toml'
- '.github/actions/**'
- '.github/workflows/**'
- 'scripts/release/create_or_update_release.sh'
- 'scripts/security/check_preview_release_workflow.sh'
- 'scripts/security/check_workflow_pins.sh'
schedule:
# Daily, not weekly. This schedule exists to catch RustSec advisories
# published against an unchanged dependency tree; at weekly cadence a new
# advisory could sit unnoticed for seven days. The check list is unchanged —
# splitting it into a light daily advisories-only run and a weekly full run
# would create runs where sources/bans/licenses go unverified.
- cron: '0 3 * * *' # Daily 03:00 UTC (staggered after the midnight ci/build crons)
workflow_dispatch:
permissions:
contents: read
# Event-scoped groups: merges to main must not cancel the weekly scheduled
# run (same rationale as ci.yml).
concurrency:
group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.event_name }}-${{ github.event.pull_request.number || github.ref }}
cancel-in-progress: ${{ github.event_name != 'schedule' }}
env:
CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
jobs:
cancel-closed-pr-runs:
name: Cancel Closed PR Runs
if: github.event_name == 'pull_request' && github.event.action == 'closed'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 10
steps:
- name: Explain cancellation run
run: echo "PR closed; this run only cancels older runs in the same concurrency group."
# RustSec advisory scanning is covered by the `advisories` check of
# cargo-deny below; a separate cargo-audit job would duplicate the same
# database lookup with a second ignore list to maintain.
cargo-deny:
name: Cargo Deny
if: github.event_name != 'pull_request' || github.event.action != 'closed'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 20
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
# cargo-deny compiles nothing, so the full setup composite (apt packages,
# protoc, flatc, nextest, rustfmt/clippy) was pure overhead here. It does
# still need a real cargo: `cargo deny check` runs `cargo metadata`, and
# Cargo.toml pins datafusion and s3s as git dependencies, which must be
# materialised into ~/.cargo/git — a cold clone is hundreds of MB, so the
# cache stays.
- name: Install Rust toolchain
uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@29eef336d9b2848a0b548edc03f92a220660cdb8 # stable
# Was relying on the composite's default, which used to be "true": every
# PR touching Cargo.toml/Cargo.lock saved a second, PR-scoped copy of this
# cache and pushed the main-scoped lanes out of the 10GB quota. The
# default is now "false", but state it explicitly — see
# scripts/security/check_cache_save_if.sh.
- name: Setup Rust cache
uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@e18b497796c12c097a38f9edb9d0641fb99eee32 # v2
with:
cache-all-crates: true
cache-on-failure: true
shared-key: rustfs-cargo-deny
save-if: ${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' }}
- name: Install cargo-deny
uses: taiki-e/install-action@bffeee26d4db9be238a4ea78d8826604ebcb594d # v2
with:
tool: cargo-deny
- name: Run cargo-deny
run: cargo deny check --hide-inclusion-graph advisories sources bans licenses
workflow-pin-report:
name: Workflow Pin Report
if: github.event_name != 'pull_request' || github.event.action != 'closed'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 5
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Report unpinned GitHub Actions
run: ./scripts/security/check_workflow_pins.sh --enforce
- name: Check setup cache-save-if is explicit
run: ./scripts/security/check_cache_save_if.sh
- name: Check every job declares a timeout
run: ./scripts/security/check_job_timeouts.sh
- name: Check checkouts clear their credentials
run: ./scripts/security/check_persist_credentials.sh
- name: Check preview release workflow policy
run: ./scripts/security/check_preview_release_workflow.sh
dependency-review:
name: Dependency Review
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 30
if: github.event_name == 'pull_request' && github.event.action != 'closed'
permissions:
contents: read
pull-requests: write
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Dependency Review
uses: actions/dependency-review-action@a1d282b36b6f3519aa1f3fc636f609c47dddb294 # v5
with:
fail-on-severity: moderate
allow-ghsas: GHSA-2f9f-gq7v-9h6m
# rustfs-uring is a first-party Apache-2.0 crate, now published on
# crates.io (backlog#1104) rather than pulled as a git dependency.
# Scope the allow to the exact pinned version so a version bump forces a
# conscious re-review of the license/provenance claim (backlog#1181).
allow-dependencies-licenses: pkg:cargo/rustfs-uring@0.1.0
comment-summary-in-pr: always
alert-on-failure:
name: Alert on scheduled failure
# dependency-review is deliberately excluded: it only runs on pull_request,
# so it can never contribute a failure to a scheduled run.
needs: [cargo-deny, workflow-pin-report]
# A scheduled cargo-deny failure usually means the dependency tree just
# matched a newly published advisory — the single most important signal this
# workflow produces, and until now it was only visible to whoever happened to
# open the Actions tab. Same ci-8 mechanism coverage.yml and
# e2e-replication-nightly.yml already use.
if: always() && github.event_name == 'schedule' && contains(needs.*.result, 'failure')
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 10
permissions:
contents: read
issues: write
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Open or update failure-tracking issue
uses: ./.github/actions/schedule-failure-issue
with:
github-token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}